Policy Papers

Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi spoke with his Chinese counterpart Wei Fenghe on December 28, agreeing to set up a military hotline next year, Japan’s government spokesperson said last week. According to Reuters, the Japanese defense chief voiced the importance of stability in the Taiwan strait, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno said. Japan published its

It took Mansour Abbas, the head of the southern branch of the Islamic Movement's United Arab List party(Ra'am), to show that Mahmoud Abbas has no ideological resolve or intentions to recognize the Jewish state and make genuine peace with it.

The Israeli government has not publicly expressed a position regarding the gathering of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border. Still, a renewed war between Russia and Ukraine could make it challenging to choose between its commitment to its Western allies and its important relationship with Russia.

The American pressure against the Atarot housing project north of Jerusalem was likely meant to maintain the possibility of a two-state solution.

The withdrawal of American forces from the Middle East may have strategic merits. The rationale for a contracted global military seems to match what American strategists have termed “offshore balancing,” which means that the U.S. holds fewer overseas bases but maintains its military capability to intervene in distant regions when necessary.

Iran uses uranium enrichment as leverage on the EU and US to get concessions.

If Israel fails to halt Iran's nuclear progress, the pro-Israel trend in the region will disappear.

It is not in America’s interest for Israel to be perceived as an obedient lap dog. On the contrary, keeping Israel’s options open, or even enhancing them, will ultimately prove to be of value to the US.

In conjunction with radical Arab MKs, Leftist Israeli politicians focus on settler violence when the real issue is Palestinian violence organized from the apex of the PA down to paid local instigators. Palestinian violence is twenty times greater than what settlers commit and is far more dangerous and lethal.

From Tehran’s perspective, the goals are lifting the sanctions and securing immunity from military attacks.

The new German government and the upcoming elections in France create challenges and opportunities for Israel’s foreign policy, which must adapt to Europe’s evolving political map.

The Blue Flag 2021 air force exercise was the largest and most significant since the exercise series began in 2013.

The American hope for the resumption of the talks, and the talks themselves, give the Iranians more freedom of action. They restrict US activity in response to mounting provocations.

When Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett this week meets Russian President Putin for the first time, Bennett must use a realpolitik language.

The way Tehran uses military intimidation, as well as terror by proxy and other means of threatening regional players, must become a factor in the formulation of Western policy towards Iran in this decisive period.

With the help of American Jewry, a sturdy foundation of support for Israel-US ties needs to be rebuilt based upon traditional bipartisan commitment. This will enable Israel to engage effectively with the Biden Administration and Congress on the Iranian challenge.

Even if Israel’s ability to influence US decision-making is limited, it is a serious mistake to downplay Israel's opposition to the dangerous nuclear accord.

Egyptian and Israeli interests converge in Gaza, Sinai, Syria, and Libya, and regarding Turkey and other regional matters.

In the southwest, the outside powers of relevance are Iran and Russia. The arrangement in place from July 2018 until now was the product of an uneasy standoff between them.

The dour forecasts regarding Lebanon’s future are based on fundamental facts that cannot be amended: A corrupt and rotten government and the dominance of Hezbollah. Under these circumstances, a possible alternative to current Israeli policy may be to reinforce the role of Syrian patronage, which has been undermined since 2005.

Bennett’s mission is to emphasize the American interest in the region and present Israel’s capacity to help in attaining it.

America’s decision to leave Afghanistan makes sense only if the plan is to cut losses in an unwinnable war and redirect resources and energies toward a winnable strategy against Iran.

Fighting with Poland over Holocaust restitution is not in Israel’s national interest.

In May 2021, an Israeli company became the first documented case of China imposing free expression limitations on a foreign business under the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law. Democracies must ensure that their citizens are not prosecuted for exercising their basic rights.

The Middle East is doomed to remain difficult, brutal, violent, repressive, and culturally Islamist. Regional powers, including Israel, must come together, to guarantee stability.

The region, and Israel, need the ASEAN model of cooperation.

One of the issues that must be dealt with before the Iranian nuclear program is removing the threat of Hezbollah missiles.

The lack of a coherent Western strategy for the containment and rollback of Iran in the Middle East in worrying.

Eleven policy prescriptions for Israel’s new government, reflecting the insights of JISS fellows who jointly surveyed the challenges Israel's leaders are facing and crafted these diplomatic and defense policy emphases.

It should be made clear to Israel's partners in the eastern Mediterranean that any (unlikely) improvement in Israel’s relations with Turkey will not come at their expense. Despite some recent positive signals, Erdogan's basic orientation as an Islamist is bound to remain hostile.

The current situation stands as a stark warning to all countries faced with infiltration by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its various militia franchises.

Arab diplomatic efforts unlikely to shift Tehran’s extensive infrastructure.

Only time will tell whether Israel has been successful in buying for itself some time before it needs to “mow the grass” in Gaza again. In the meantime, Israel must learn from what transpired in “Operation Guardian of the Walls.”

Beijing's anti-Israel statements and actions during the recent Gaza operation undermined Israeli trust in China.

There are plenty of nice plans for Gaza, but none that will change the core truth: Hamas will continue to seek Israel’s destruction, and Israel will continue to defend itself.

The IDF has chosen to enjoy the advantages of both a volunteer military and a conscript “people’s army,” by piecemeal combination of elements of both

US determination to draw down in the Middle East, which characterized the Obama, Trump and now Biden administrations, appears likely to prevent the development of any coherent strategy.

Don’t be blackmailed, don’t expect Hamas to keep its promises, and take initiative.

Iraq is already part of the northern crescent of threats facing Israel. The US presence, broader policy regarding Iran makes Israeli action in Iraq more complicated than in Syria.

If three core principles are maintained.

Since war is about inflicting pain and sustaining pain, Israel clearly can be declared the winner of the recent confrontation.

The violent clashes of this month attest to the depth of national conflict between Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel. Alongside a police response to the challenge, a complementary civil response is required, including dialogue with pragmatic Arab leadership towards coexistence

As ever, Iran prefers to avoid direct involvement. But without its backing, support and expertise, the latest Hamas offensive against Israel would have been inconceivable.

If the International Criminal Court of Justice conducted a fair investigation into the ongoing conflict, it would see that Hamas terrorists are committing double war crimes daily.

A guide to the Biden Administration’s first moves and initial set of senior officials. It is no wonder that popular disenchantment with US elites sometimes bubbles to the surface in unexpected ways.

The key to bringing calm to Jerusalem lies in wise management of the city during in times of calm, as well as handling moments of crisis with a firm hand.

IDF strikes on Gaza's terrorists should be intense and aimed at causing severe damage to the intermediate level of command, infrastructure and weapons.

There always are tensions bubbling below the surface in Jerusalem. Unfortunately, there are political actors who purposefully stir the pot and instigate violence for religious and political reasons.

Neither Ankara nor Tehran want a strong Iraq, or a strong Syria. On the contrary, the fragmentation of these countries suits both.

Amidst global turmoil, with Ankara seeking to lure away key regional players, the Greece-Israel partnership is a pillar of effective regional strategy.

Israel should work with China so that its initiative doesn’t interfere with the Abraham Accords, and should seek to capitalize on common denominators between Beijing and Washington.

Sanctions relief, nothing else. Iran has no intention of forsaking its nuclear and missile programs nor its proxy wars across the region.

The world is watching India's coronavirus catastrophe, and it could use any lifeline at this point. Israel could now help this Asiatic power overcome one of the most serious crises in its history.

By ignoring Israel’s views on an issue critical to its security, Washington will cast a dark shadow over Israel’s status as a key American ally in the Middle East.

The US should be appreciative of any significant delay in Iran's breakout timetable towards a nuclear weapon. The time gained can and should be used to negotiate a "longer, stronger" agreement.

A storm over a petition by retired naval officers once again has revealed longstanding tensions between the civilian Turkish government and the Turkish military, and Erdogan’s plans for advancing pro-regime Islamists in the military.

The power of the IDF, the potency of Israeli deterrence, the health of Israeli society, and the stability of Israel’s newest peace agreements with Arab counties – all are impacted negatively by continuing electoral indecision.

The West is focusing on the tragic humanitarian costs of the war in Yemen while turning a blind eye to the significant strategic implications of a Houthi/Iranian victory. This approach imperils Middle Eastern and Western security.

A flurry of Middle East-related Russian diplomatic activity is noteworthy because it reflects Moscow’s multi-faceted approach to the region.

The US decision to withdraw support from the battle against the Houtis in Yemen signals a change of direction away from staunch backing of Western allies in the contest with Iran, and towards an attempt at “balancing” between rival regional powers, along the lines attempted by the Obama Administration.

Washington will bury any chance for peace if it reverts to the “Everybody Knows Paradigm” which demands Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 armistice lines

Israel-US dialogue is necessary about Iran’s nuclear program, since a good agreement with Iran is a clear Israeli interest. But Israel must be prepared with a military option against Iran, as a last resort.

The Houthis provide deniability for an Iranian campaign of aggression.

Jerusalem views with trepidation the possibility that the Biden administration will embark on a human rights crusade in the Middle East.

As Israel and Syria concluded a deal on the return of an Israeli woman from Syria, questions arise regarding the cost and what the future of such transactions with Russian mediation should be.

Israel should exploit the expanding rift between Ankara and Tehran to normalize its relations with Turkey. This also could bring Turkey into the circle of countries supporting the Abraham Accords.

The desire for an end to war in Yemen is understandable. Unfortunately, however, the US has leverage over only one of the sides.

The launch of Iran's first solid propellant space rocket is highly significant.

The next Israeli government would be well-advised to come-up with its own proposals for improving the life of Palestinians, both to further improve its own regional standing and to meet (some of the) administration’s expectations, in dialogue and partnership.

Israel should (silently) support a more flexible US policy towards the Syrian regime and the Russian presence in Syria, including the easing of sanctions on Syria, in order to decrease Assad’s dependence on Iranian support and to heighten the conflicts of interest between Moscow and Tehran.

Turkey and Pakistan’s growing closeness has deep foundations. These are two countries following a similar trajectory.

Many have raised understandable moral qualms (and practical questions) about conduct of war in Yemen. Indeed, the coalition fighting the Houthi uprising should be more attentive to the loss of innocent lives. But allowing Iran’s proxies to win the war in Yemen would have dangerous political and far-reaching strategic consequences for Israel, the region, and US interests.

Establishing coherent US policy regarding brewing conflict in the eastern Mediterranean should be a Biden administration priority. By restraining Erdogan's ambitions, the US can add to stability and rebuild bridges with key European players and traditional US allies. The governments of Israel and Greece, in consultation with Egypt, should work together to advance this perspective in Washington.

As a major Islamic nation, Pakistan has a duty towards the Muslim ummah which it must respect.

Erdoğan has created a private military and paramilitary system. He deploys this apparatus for domestic and foreign operations without official oversight.

Only the very optimistic could believe in real strategic cooperation between Erdogan’s regime and Jerusalem.

Giving Iran unearned incentives in advance of negotiations only will bring about more Iranian provocation.

It is possible to restore American bipartisan backing for Israel. Therefore, it is important to avoid being too identified with President Trump, despite Israeli gratitude due to him for many of his policies. Bonds between Israel and American Jewry should be bolstered; bridges should be built to both sides of the aisle in Congress; and US defense establishment support should be solicited. All this, in view of Israel's need to influence decisions in Washington on matters vital to its future.

Domestic constraints, support for Palestine and growing ties with Iran will likely continue to keep Pakistan and Israel apart.

The growing friction between China and Australia is a function of Beijing’s swagger and self-confidence. Israel must take note of Beijing’s aggressive behavior, and cautiously navigate its own relations with China.

Israel seeks to disrupt Iran's efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and to reverse the Iranian project to entrench its forces in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

Morocco has maintained open channels with Israel for many years, and it values the unique Jewish contribution to its heritage. A new pattern of normalization with Israel now extends from the Atlantic to the Gulf. Morocco’s coordination with the US also is a vital part of the emerging alignment of forces of stability in the region. Israel now should give this breakthrough a firm grounding in policies beneficial to both peoples.

The Palestinian quest for an internationally imposed “solution,” which would not require them to negotiate a compromise deal with Israel, has failed. Palestinian leaders may attempt this again after Joe Biden becomes US president, but this will fail yet again, since the collapse of their past strategy is due to much more than the policies of the Trump Administration. Indeed, evolving regional and global realities allow for a new Israeli peace initiative, which can preserve the underlying principles of the Trump outline for peace.

The taking out of the senior Iranian nuclear scientist is a blow to the Iranian leadership as much as the killing of Qassem Suleimani was. But it is also a signal to the next administration in Washington. The president-elect will not be able to deal with the Iranian nuclear project like just another diplomatic issue.

Israel should seek to persuade the Biden transition team not to offer Iran any premature concessions; it should outline what would constitute an acceptable, "stronger and longer" deal; find other international actors to support the policy suggested by Israel (possibly France and even Russia); and prepare a viable military option, both to strengthen America’s negotiating hand and as an option in the case of failure to reverse Iran's present course.

To acquire greater freedom of action in dealing with Iran's quest for nuclear weapons, Israel needs to minimize tensions with the US on the Palestinian front.

As the largest arms supplier to the Middle East, America plays a critical role in ensuring that its sales uphold and do not adversely affect Israel’s security.

Trump's Middle East peace plan and the recent Israel-Arab peace accords limit Chinese influence in the region. Countering this, China is advancing a collective security concept for the region based on the JCPOA. The US and Israel must stymie this Chinese gambit and reinforce the Abraham Accords.

From his rejection of Obama-era political correctness to his family make-up, Trump has charmed Israelis.

Egypt's public welcome of the normalization between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain and Sudan is one of the payoffs emerging from the important Egypt-Israel partnership in the eastern Mediterranean.

Prime Minister Rabin insisted on defensible borders. He never entertained a return to the 1967 borders nor any territorial swaps.

The efforts of Moscow to assert itself as a power in the eastern Mediterranean should sound a cautionary note.

China aims to play a more proactive role in the Middle East, maintaining cordial relations with all rival countries. Beijing attaches great importance to its ties with Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Egypt, and therefore has welcomed the Abraham Accords (albeit in lukewarm fashion, because of tensions with the Trump administration).

The talks suggest that when common interests exist, Israel can engage beneficially and pragmatically even with enemies, resulting in de-escalation and mutual benefit.

The current political situation in Lebanon is very problematic. Hizbullah enjoys full freedom of action in a country which long ago became dysfunctional. Hence the importance of lending support to the French effort to bring about systemic change in the Lebanese confessional order. Further descent into chaos and/or growing intervention by Turkey would be even more dangerous for Israel.

Israel should reject any overtures from the Assad government, and help keep “maximum pressure” on the regime.

Turkey wants to have it both ways: To act against the Salafists, while using them as dispensable mercenaries against the Kurds.

Turkey’s ambitious and expansionist leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has capitalized on the end of the Cold War and on US isolationist tendencies in enhancing Turkey’s international standing.

Doha, alongside Ankara, is undermining American interests in the Middle East.

Is President Macron capable of reshaping Franco-Israeli relations?

Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan seek to develop a regional bloc in the geographical center of the Arab world. But all three countries are poor and dependent in for economic largesse on more wealthy partners, so their regional aspirations and strategies will necessarily be limited.

The peace deals between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain mark the completion of an existing process by which the region's stabilizing forces are banding together against the Iranian threat.

The diplomatic moves toward Israel taken by the UAE and Bahrain make it clear that Arab states can act in their own national interest when it comes to international politics, rather than abide by a stale lowest common denominator of "Arab consensus."

The long-term agreement between the two countries has not been finalized, and its scope and security implications seem to be limited. It is unlikely to force Israel into a complete reconsideration of its economic ties to China.

Antisemitism accusations against Dr Douglas MacGregor are deeply upsetting.

Israel is a key player in the crisis currently unfolding in the eastern Mediterranean basin, on the same side as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Greece.

The deal is a clear win for Israel, the UAE and the US. Netanyahu gets a face-saving, significant reward for not doing something (annexation) he was not going to be able to do anyway in the current political/diplomatic context.

Israel should act to ensure that the Greek-Egyptian EEZ delimitation map is globally endorsed, as opposed to the Turkish-GNA alternative, and work in the American arena to curb Erdogan’s ambitions.

A limited Israeli military operation in Lebanon would strengthen Israeli deterrence against Hezbollah. It also would deepen Iran's sense of defeat and demonstrate Israel's determination to check Iran's malign activity.

Lebanon is a failed state, and its misfortunes are characteristic of a broader regional malaise.

The Trump administration has realized that in order to wound Hezbollah on a profound level the organization must be disjoined from the Lebanese economy, with an emphasis on the country's banking system.

Israel is unable to get directly involved in eastern Mediterranean hostilities, should they erupt. But it can and should cooperate closely with Greece in intelligence matters and arms acquisition and coordinate political action with Greece in Washington. The US stance largely will determine the practical scope of Erdogan’s ambitions.

Israel and the US may have an opportunity to incentivize Assad and Putin to cooperate in constraining Iran's presence in Syria.

Israel’s state-of-the-art weapon systems and technological expertise are a mainstay of India’s drive for a self-reliant defense industry.

Ankara's military interventions in Iraq, Syria and Libya as well as its growing presence in the eastern Mediterranean constitutes a radical change in Turkish foreign policy. Its recent success in Libya demonstrates Ankara’s regional heft. Turkey’s next intervention is probably in Yemen.

Killing of prominent adviser shows the determination of Iranian-backed Shia militias to resist any attempt to curtail their powers and freedom of action.

Soldiers in uniform for less time means the army has less time to train them and can make use of their skills for a shorter period. In addition, there is no benefit in releasing potential young workers early at a time of rife unemployment.

The American peace plan provides a historic opportunity to break the futile paradigm based on the 1967 lines and ensure Israeli national security for the long term. In terms of security – protecting Israel, stabilizing Jordan, and preventing a terrorist takeover of a future Palestinian entity – and given the supreme importance of national cohesion, it is imperative to focus on the Jordan Valley and the Jerusalem envelope.

From northwest Iraq to Tripoli on Libya’s African coast, Turkey is flexing its muscles – without the slightest nod to the supposedly ‘pro-Western’ and ‘pro-NATO’ orientation that Turkey’s Western apologists like to recall.

The Valley is Israel's only defensible eastern border and Israel's sovereignty there is vital for the demilitarization of a future Palestinian state

The lesson learned from the current crisis is that restrictions imposed to protect the public are futile unless the public is convinced that it is at risk. To this end, government must communicate to the public with clear-cut data and logical arguments.

“Qods Day” reflects Tehran's determination to annihilate Israel, a pillar of Iranian foreign policy. It also is an important part of “exporting” the Islamic Revolution.

A strong Turkish foothold in Libya threatens the free flow of energy resources from the Eastern Mediterranean basin to Europe as planned by Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Italy and Israel.

Under the pretext of separation between regime and people, Iran seeks $5 billion in IMF emergency funding to fight COVID-19. This would significantly undermine the pressure on Iran being applied by US sanctions, and therefore the loan should be denied.

A four-way contest under way between the Assad regime, Russian interests, Iranian interests, and unreconciled former rebels.

Bashar Assad is not about to fall, But economic deterioration, regime infighting, sanctions and unrest are combining to place his regime under renewed, severe pressure.

Israel should study the strategic consequences of the continuous economic deterioration in Lebanon, with an emphasis on the Shiite community's situation. It might favor Hizballah.

The recent reciprocal cyber-attacks attributed to Israel and Iran were meant to set red lines on the non-kinetic dimension of war.

The Trump Plan is the most realistic route for progress towards the goal of “two states for two peoples.” Therefore, the Israeli national unity government should embrace the Trump plan in its entirety, including negotiations towards establishment of a Palestinian state, and at the same time act (in the first stage) to apply Israeli law to the Jordan Valley and strategically significant areas in the Jerusalem envelope, such as Maaleh Adumim and Gush Etzion. An Israeli consensus exists regarding these areas.

Germany's decision is an important step in the international effort against Hezbollah. It will hamper the criminal network and terrorist activities of Hezbollah in Europe and even in Lebanon. Hezbollah should be outlawed across Europe.

Dramatic gains on the battlefield by the forces loyal to the Turkish-backed "Government of National Accord" in western Libya have given Erdogan a victory, which may endanger the future of the eastern Mediterranean. Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel must coordinate their policies in response. A tripartite Greek-Cypriot-Israeli summit should be held urgently to annul the GNA-Libyan EEZ agreement, to present an alternative map of the Mediterranean, and to encourage a robust reaction of the EU. The US must be persuaded to pressure Turkey revoke the EEZ MoU (while still letting Erdogan take pride in saving the GNA from

A moribund terrorist group, the PFLP, is experiencing a revival and launching terror attacks, with help from Iran.

US recognition of the eternal city as Israel’s capital and the Trump peace plan pave the way forward.

Conflicts persist, and the revisionist powers continue their disruptive behavior. This includes Iranian subversion and acceleration of its nuclear project, as well as Turkey’s expansionism in Syria.

There is a discrepancy between the stated goal – the expulsion of Iran from Syria – and the means being employed by Israel to achieve it.

The virus has no political preferences, and its generalized assault has led to cooperation in some arenas between bitter rivals.

Rejection of the Trump plan outright, denunciation of any steps towards its implementation, and adherence to the failed Oslo-era paradigm for peace – is certain to condemn all sides to continued conflict.

Annexation of the Jordan Valley is a long-standing Israeli objective, going back to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

Now that IRGC leadership in Iran's space effort is out in the open, it can be expected that its homemade, long-range rockets with a global reach will be revealed soon, as well.

The virus crisis will lead to protectionism, skepticism of international institutions, narrow immigration policies, and other signposts of nationalism; thereby rolling-back policies that characterized the liberal and globalist democratic order.

The ‘ghost caliphate’ – Sunni Arab insurgency – is likely to persist in the remote, poor and sparsely governed areas of Syria and Iraq.

In the meantime, it doesn’t seem as though Iran – the driving force behind most of the friction in the Middle East – is changing its plans or abandoning its dreams, whether in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or even Yemen.

There are four factors to consider when weighing action against the coronavirus: public health, preservation of the economy, civil rights, and the international and regional context. National decision-making must take all four of these elements into account, with emphases shifting over the course of time as circumstances change.

Overall, Israeli society has remained resilient in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, and there are reasons to rate highly key aspects of the government’s response.

The assumption that the virus will curb Middle East conflicts does not stand the test of reality. Israel must remain on high security alert.

The use of special measures to stop the virus is necessary, even though this impinges on individual privacy rights, if the data is deleted after a short time.

There may be a change in Iranian policy towards the US due to Iran’s economic and coronavirus difficulties.

Even amidst the ongoing crisis, it is critical to adjust government decision-making structures and operational management procedures to “emergency” mode, in order to ensure optimal outcome.

Only an integrated political, military and economic strategy targeting the Iranian system in all its aspects, with a long-term commitment to local allies and the mission, can succeed.

Israeli national security is unquestionably weakened by the corona pandemic. Many IDF units are suffering from a shortage of manpower. And the assertion that preoccupation with corona will temper the behavior of Israel's enemies is wishful and mistaken thinking.

The spread of so lethal a virus on so wide a scale in so globalized an economy is unprecedented. Its impact is expected to be more ruinous than that of the 2008-2009 financial crisis.

The resilence of Israeli society at a time of national emergency (the corona pandemic) has direct strategic and security implications. Despite the huge budgetary challenge, it is vital to maintain investment in advanced IDF military capabilities, because a nuclear confrontation with Iran is still possible.

The Iranian regime’s response to the coronavirus crisis has been erratic and flailing.

We have five years of experience to compare to the competing assessments of 2015. Now we know that Netanyahu’s gloomy forecast has proven to be the more prescient.

Russia’s desire to woo Turkey from the West likely to prevent all-out war.

What Happens When Hezbollah Seeks a Similar Arrangement of Quiet for Cash?

Trump’s peace plan calls attention to the fact that the Arab bloc that championed the Palestinian cause has collapsed.

PIJ is an important part of the Iranian strategy for fighting Israel. The regime in Tehran makes use of charities and other civilian organizations, such as money changers, to transfer funds to its allies in Gaza.

Iran is reverting to attacks on the US through non-Iranian organizations under its control.

Behind Enemy Lines: Iran, Hezbollah and ongoing, armed resistance to Syria’s regime merge to create constant chaos.

Despite Syrian-Turkish clashes this week, Moscow is set to remain the key arbiter in Syria.

Europe ought to press the Palestinians to negotiate with Israel for a demilitarized state on a territory similar in size to the pre-1967 West Bank and Gaza Strip and whose economy will be rebuilt and boosted by a $50 billion investment.

Israel should act to implement the Trump Plan and reap its early rewards, because it transforms the Mideast peace paradigm. Most importantly, the plan reflects, and can serve as a platform for, Israeli consensus on the Palestinian issue.

Even if the Palestinians reject Trump's peace plan, it still serves their long-term interests. False, undeliverable expectations – based on the assumption that "everybody knows" what Israel will be forced to concede – eventually need to give way to a more realistic paradigm, which in turn may lead to a better life for both sides.

Everything short of a military confrontation needs to be done, though, to deter Erdogan from establishing a barrier diagonally across the Mediterranean, barring Cyprus, Egypt and Israel from connecting their gas infrastructure to Greece and hence to Europe.

It is convenient for Amman to have Israel retain security control over the Jordan Valley. And this is a rare opportunity to advance and potentially realize Israel's security needs for a cemented border in the east with the support of the world's top superpower.

The new government is the product of escalating popular protests under way since October 15. The protests are in response to Lebanon’s dire economic state.

Trilateral cooperation among Israel, Greece and Cyprus to build a natural gas subsea pipeline is setting the stage for more tensions with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Jerusalem is not the place to hold elections for a foreign entity.

Meeting with Assad sent clear messages to the countries of the region.

The congressional bill will exacerbate the economic situation in Syria and ultimately increase Syria’s dependency on Iran.

A firm stand at this critical juncture may prove to be of use as part of the effort to bring Iran back to the nuclear negotiating table on terms more acceptable to the US and to Trump's regional allies, including Israel.

Iran’s attacks against the US in Iraq accomplished what was intended

Trump has made it clear that attacks on American personnel are going to elicit a military reaction.

New Year, Same Chaos in Syria.

What appears to have caused this escalation was the departure by the Iranians from a tacit ground rule hitherto maintained.

Israel’s Struggle against Hamas’s Indirect Approach

Ktaib Hizballah, with its political, military, economic and mafia-like aspects, is the most potent enemy of the US and its allies in Iraq today.

Israel must be ready to tackle Iran militarily on its own and fight a pre-emptive war with Hizballah.

It would undoubtedly serve Israel's interest for Russia to draw closer to the US on a wide range of issues, and above all, on Iran.

Israel needs to make clear to Washington the harm done in the region, and the potential for more harm, by the perception of American policy disarray, weakness and withdrawal.

The Jewish state’s relationship with the U.S. is stronger for resting on an informal basis; replacing it with a formal alliance would do no good and only anger the world’s other major power.

It is in Israel’s interest that Assad regain control of northwestern Syria. Aside from improving the economic situation in Syria, this may increase Israeli leverage in the campaign against Iran's military entrenchment.

Israel needs enhanced naval capability for the protection of its own EEZ and for the creation of a proper balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean.

A critical point has been reached where sanctions and military conflict connect. Tehran needs and seeks a limited military confrontation with the West in order to shore-up its legitimacy at home.

The Kurds vow to defend themselves—alone if necessary—against Syria, Turkey and Russia.

At a recent conference on the Mideast economy in Doha, which included the participation of Israeli scholars, discussions highlighted changes in the regional balance of power. Acceptance of Assad's rule in Syria is growing, but so are questions about how Syria’s rehabilitation will be financed. And some Iranians are signaling that Tehran is willing to make political compromises to alleviate economic pressures.

America must provide Iranian demonstrators with access to the Internet to bolster the protests.

Syria remains the main point of contention between the two countries.

Given Iran’s presence in Syria, Israel must employ focused, operative rhetoric and policy versus the strategic threats it faces.

By changing the discourse about settlements, the Trump administration is laying the groundwork for realistic negotiation. Even if you think that Israeli settlement should be rolled-back in the context of a sensible peace arrangement, applying the demonizing epithet “illegal” makes for a destructive narrative that distances, not advances, peace.

Israel is expected by its European interlocutors to condemn Putin over his misdeeds, yet Israel wants to avoid frictions with Russia in order to maintain a free hand to operate against Iranian targets in Syria.

Israel must adapt as quickly as possible to the evolving situation in northern Syria, while continuing to adhere to self-reliance and invest in its military.

Will the people succeed in undermining the Iranian plan to spread power across the region?

If it weren't for the Iranian regime's distress, it might decide to tread water until US President Trump was out of office. But its resources are limited, and the possibility that the ayatollahs might attack Israel out of desperation is very real.

The IDF must return to the fundamentals: ground maneuver to achieve “hachra’a” – decisive outcomes.

Islamic State, that most malignant expression of the Sunni Islamist trend, was the natural enemy of this emergent Kurdish autonomy.

Once again, Kurds are complaining of “betrayal.”

Trump’s Syria decision accords with previous presidential decisions and is not necessarily a disaster for Israel.

The U.S. withdrawal makes Russia the new arbiter of everyone’s interests, including Israel’s.

On "Kurdophobia," Refugees and Reviving the National Pact Borders.

What Can and Should Be Done to Limit the Scope of the Turkish Assault on Rojava?

While a determined Western-led effort to halt the Turkish invasion could still prevent Russian, Iranian and IS gains, time is growing short.

The move confirms that the current US administration is not interested in heading an alliance of regional forces against Iranian expansionism or Sunni political Islam, but is, like its predecessor, managing imperial decline.

Escalating tensions with Iran should be a warning that Tehran’s strategy of training and arming proxy terror groups throughout the Middle East is not being countered aggressively enough.

Chinese investment in Iran would help Tehran withstand US economic pressures, and exacerbate the Western crisis with Iran

Israel’s strategic situation doesn’t brook inertia.

Both Pakistani and Israeli concerns currently militate against any imminent warming of ties.

Israel successfully thwarted Hezbollah’s and Iran’s attempts to launch suicide drones from the Syrian village of Aqraba, located some 15 kilometers (9.3 miles) from Israel’s border, at vital targets inside the country on Aug. 24. And yet, the transnational Shiite composition of the terrorist squad behind the attempt could portend what we might expect in

The Turkey-Qatar-Muslim Brotherhood alliance first came to prominence in the early, optimistic months of the “Arab Spring.”

Deadlock between Washington and Tehran won’t easily turn into détente even if Trump and Rohani do find a way to meet in New York. However, even a tentative rapprochement between the US and Iran would severely strain Israel’s close ties with the White House.

A selective settlement policy focusing on areas within the Israeli consensus, including Ma’aleh Adumim and the Jordan Valley, can be pursued with little foreign interference.

The recurrent debate about Israel in Pakistan reflects the former’s improved international standing. The Muslim giant could become the next success in Israel’s growing acceptance around the world

More than a decade of civil strife has opened up the region for the escalating state-to-state conflict.

Overlooked in the controversy regarding Trump, Omar and Tlaib, and Israel: The imperative of maintaining Israel’s sovereign decision-making.

American withdrawal from the Middle East must be accompanied by steps that reduce the general impression of a weak US going home in defeat. President Trump should bomb Iran’s nuclear installations.

The recent State Comptroller’s report on Jerusalem shows continuing Jewish emigration from the city. Israel must act swiftly to reverse this trend.

Israel, Egypt, Greece and Cyprus must encourage the US to assert a higher military and diplomatic profile as a counterweight to Turkish pressures, Russian and Iranian ambitions, and Chinese inroads.

Neglecting IDF ground maneuver capabilities is a dangerous gamble.

Jordan and other conservative Arab states are struggling with a difficult superpower ally and facing threats of regional escalation.

Turkish forces are also present in northern Iraq, where they are engaged in action against the PKK presence in the Kurdish-controlled north.

Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign must not be curtailed before Iran’s leaders truly have no choice but to capitulate to Western demands.

It is a crucial accord, but needs attention and maintenance.

It is complicit in Hizballah’s terrorism and subversion, in Europe and the US.

Outwardly, Russia is loyal to the idea that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the reason for Middle East unrest. This approach raises the bar on Palestinian demands and makes normal life in the region less likely.

With the regional focus elsewhere, violence in Syria grinds on. International backers of the various enclaves have a greater say in the direction of events than do their Syrian clients.

The US, Europe and Israel can force a modification in Erdoğan's conduct on a wide range of issues, including his duplicity on Iran, support for Hamas in Gaza, subversion in Jerusalem, intervention in Libya, aggression towards Cypriot gas explorations, threats to Kurds of Rojava, and repression at home.

The need to assign American soldiers to fight with Israel might undermine Israel's popularity in the US and constrain its freedom of action.

Even an interim Israeli government can build in Jerusalem, counter the intrusions of foreign agents, and invest in all sectors of Israel’s national capital.

Israel’s government must nurture a spirit of unity and national purpose by building a policy consensus as broad as possible. This is necessary both in preparation for likely combat operations against Iran and its proxies, and in order to respond wisely to the American peace plan and to intelligently manage conflict with the Palestinians.

Beyond Elounda, Beersheba, Cairo and Jerusalem.
The emerging informal alliance in the eastern Mediterranean is becoming increasingly significant. Egypt’s role, Erdogan's ambitions, energy resources, joint military exercises and coordinated emergency responses contribute to the alliance.

Israel needs to be prepared for potentially dramatic consequences, including rapid deterioration towards confrontation on all Israel’s borders. Resilience and readiness to act can serve to deter provocations by Iran’s proxies. Ultimately, only a credible military threat from Israel will indicate to friend and foe alike that in a showdown, Iran will be forced to back down.

Iran is continually expanding its military, economic and political presence in Syria. Bashar al-Assad’s February 25 visit to Iran was an important marker in these efforts. Assad met with Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani, who labeled him the “hero of the Arab world.” The presence of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani and

The new JISS national security plan says avoid risky diplomatic escapades and prepare for war.

In the remote deserts of western Iraq, Iran’s servants are busily at work preparing a new front against Israel.

The notion that Hamas could be incentivised by the injection of funds from Qatar has proven erroneous or deeply problematic.

Egypt may be beginning to emerge from its self-imposed strategic seclusion.

He has cornered himself into a situation where he has zero credibility and zero leverage on Israel, the US, the international community, and even the Sunni Arab world.

As dysfunctional as the Palestinian national movement has become, it has excelled in perpetuating the pork barrel born in Oslo.

Venezuela has become flash point between Russia and the US. The way in which America responds to Russian conduct in its backyard will influence Russia's international conduct in the future.

Events in Sudan and Libya suggest that the core dynamic in the Arab world has not changed: authoritarian military regimes and political Islam remain the key players, popular sovereignty remains a distant aspiration

Iran is not likely to target American troops, since Teheran’s strategy is to wait-out the Trump administration.

Regional rivals clash via proxies in Tripoli fight.

The government should act with magnanimity towards the civilian population in Gaza while preparing the IDF for intensive warfare against Hamas.

It is in Israel's interest to solidify the Egyptian role in Gaza, in the context of "conflict management" as a governing policy concept. Egyptian participation in the efforts to stabilize the situation in Gaza serves as an important component in the vital Egypt-Israel relationship. It also helps erode Hamas' pretensions of Jihad.

As ugly as the 2019 campaign may have been, it is simply wrong to portray Israel as a deeply divided nation on these matters.

The Iranian “corridor” is a central project for the mullahs in Iraq and Syria, involving a highway which would connect Tehran with Damascus.

Much ink has been and is being spilt regarding whether or not current developments in Algeria and Sudan – the second and third most populous Arab states after Egypt – constitute the Second Wave of the “Arab Spring”. But what is clear is that the second and succeeding waves of Arab Uprisings will not look the same as that of 2011.

The guaranteed failure of the “deal of the century” is an opportunity for Israel to open the Americans’ eyes to the harsh and complicated reality in our region and lead them to support the strategy of managing the conflict and wait for better times.

Trump’s landmark Golan decision asserts the law of diminishing returns: Arabs who refuse to make peace with Israel lose rights and assets as time goes forward. Mahmoud Abbas: Take notice.

The IDF's response will be harsher than usual, not because Israelis in the center are more valued than those in the periphery but because of the emerging need to show Hamas that it has grossly misjudged.

Israel should leverage its economic power and take advantage of the EU’s inner divisions, but it would not benefit from a divided Europe ruled by economic nationalists and anti-globalists aligned with Russia. To defend its national interests, Israel must develop ties with “rebellious” European governments, but only as a divide-and-rule tactic meant to break the Brussels consensus, not as a bond with forces that threaten to undermine free trade and the Atlantic alliance.

The EU’s insistence on preserving the nuclear agreement with Iran and its persistent efforts to establish a mechanism for evading American trade sanctions are encouraging Iran to escalate its subversion throughout Europe.

The fight to depose Assad is over. The battle over his regime’s boundaries has no end in sight.

No new beginnings in sight for ravaged Syria.

Israel must administer Area C effectively and with much more authority, whether it wishes to either hold the territory as an effective card for future bargaining or it intends to annex the lands to Israel.

The Houthi rebellion in Yemen, with its horrendous consequences for the country's civilian population, is being instigated primarily by Iranian assistance and direction for the rebels, together with Russian growing involvement in the conflict. An end to the fighting therefore depends to a large extent on the willingness of external countries to continue their fomenting of the conflict.

It is inconceivable that the Trump plan will parrot the stale Clinton/Obama parameters of yesteryear or force any “peace paradigm” on Israel.

Any government elected in Israel will undoubtedly agree to discuss the plan with the Americans.

The attempted resignation of Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif didn't come as a complete surprise. It reflects the utter supremacy of the Revolutionary Guard in the Iranian political sphere.

Minister Yisrael Katz should restore and reinvigorate the Israeli foreign service. Israel’s many recent diplomatic breakthroughs require systemic and sustained follow-up by a strong and committed cadre of professionals.

Assaults on Israeli sovereignty must be met by an Israeli counter-assault.

Arab countries are re-normalizing their relations with the Assad regime, seeking to balance the strong Iranian and Turkish influences in Syria and to achieve some degree of influence in a new Syrian political-strategic structure. This further cements a Russian-oriented strategic architecture in the region. In the long term, this could lead to tensions between conservative Arab states and Israel, if Israel targets the Syrian military and government in the campaign against Iran, or if Israel continues to promote diplomatic recognition of its Golan annexation.

The Iranian media claimed that millions filled the streets on the 40th anniversary of the Iranian revolution. The opposition, however says that fewer people participated. Iran's nuclear program will not protect the regime against the people's antipathy.

One way Iran’s efforts are taking place are below the official Syrian state structures – in the arming and sponsoring of Iran-controlled paramilitary formations on Syria soil.

Lebanon has neither the desire nor the ability to address Hezbollah’s threat to its sovereignty. The likelihood of Lebanon suffering severe damage in a war against Israel does not change this situation.

Russia seeks to be more involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by presenting it as critical to the stability of the whole Middle East. But the legitimacy that it accords to Hamas rules out deeper Russian involvement from Israel’s point of view.

Clear understandings between the political and military echelons are essential in employment of military force and readiness for the next war.

Iran is taking advantage of the crises created by ISIS and the Arab Spring to advance its land route project from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. The American withdrawal from Syria will remove one of the obstacles that stand in Iran’s path, yet Israel has demonstrated its determination to prevent the establishment of this route.

The Shi'ite militia threat isn't a mere thought exercise about a worst-case scenario. Iranian-controlled Popular Mobilization Forces leaders have already threatened Israel only miles from Israeli homes.

Israel will need to increase the intensity of its operations against the Iranians. US withdrawal from the arena is a good opportunity for Israel to update its strategy in Syria.

The possibility that Iran and Turkey will be emboldened by the American decision, is worrisome. The main counter to that will be robust deterrence from Israel, whose maintenance may increase the likeliness of escalation in Syria and Lebanon, and even more resort to the restraining hand of Russia.

The fitting Israeli response is to demonstrate resilience, and to declare that despite the terror and the pain we will remain in the land of our forefathers.

Military, diplomatic and economic pressures can be brought to bear to preserve SDF and Kurdish autonomy in northeastern Syria, and to deter Turkey and Iran from conquering these areas.

Trump’s hurried exit from Syria, under pressure from a Turkish threat, will be interpreted by all sides as a strategic defeat, an abandonment and a debacle.

Some hard-left Jews are out to sabotage the Birthright program. They are cutting away the limb – love for, and identification with, Israel – upon which all pro-Israel Jewish community activity must be based.

For analytical as well as practical and even political reasons, the time has come to re-define Israel’s place in the world in terms of belonging to the “eastern Mediterranean” region, not the “Middle East.”

Iran, Turkey, Russia and other bad actors threaten Western and Israeli security in this strategic zone.

Should a large operation inside Lebanon be considered after Hezbollah's tunnels are successfully neutralized?

It is necessary for Israel’s political and military leaders to readjust their conceptual framework concerning deterrence, and to engage the public in an open and effective dialogue on the deterrence equations. Also needed is a more specific and accurate capacity to strike fear into Hamas leadership by signaling both willingness and ability to destroy the assets that they value most.

Despite the fascist roots of Matteo Salvini's "Liga" party, upgrading relations with the current Italian government serves the national interest because it shall help Israel export it's natural gas to Europe as well as break the European consensus on Iran and on Jerusalem's status.

Israel’s security requirements on other fronts, require containment of the conflict on the southern front, while continuing to build the western Negev notwithstanding Hamas’ arson attempts.

Syrian regime closes accounts with West and Israel-linked rebels, as Iran builds and expands its presence in the area.

Natural gas has turned Greece from a rival to an ally just as relations between Israel and Turkey started deteriorating.

Promoting Israeli ties with African countries should be made a diplomatic priority, as this investment can and will yield ‎economic and political dividends for Israel in the global arena. ‎

The historic renewal of Chad-Israel ties will benefit both nations and shows that PM Benjamin Netanyahu's foreign policy is effective.

Israel's strategy toward China doesn't conflict with American interests; rather, it serves and reinforces them. Partnering with Beijing can help stabilize the Middle East. Partnering with Asian nations threatened by Beijing can help build a counterbalance to Chinese power.

Hezbollah’s leadership has come to realize that harsher US sanctions pose a serious threat to the revolutionary regime in Tehran. It will become increasingly difficult for the regime to finance the full spectrum of its revolutionary ambitions. Hezbollah has therefore had to focus on securing its own sources of funding and providing employment for its members and followers through ever-deeper engagement in Lebanon’s economic and financial spheres of activity.

The challenge now is how to make it clear to the Hamas leadership that it should not believe is own supercilious words.

The Greek-Cypriot-Egyptian summit held last month in Crete focused on energy connectivity and Turkish threats, but it also paid lip service to Egyptian pro-Palestinian messages, which is problematic.

The killing of prominent Arab tribal leader Sheikh Bashir Faisal al-Huwaidi has serious implications for the US and Kurdish administered part of Syria, in which Raqqa is located. That administration of Syria has many enemies and remains fragile.

Only a crushing and devastating blow to Hamas will pave the way for a truce that would not be a victory for the terrorists.

Despite the desire of Arabs in eastern Jerusalem for greater integration in Israeli life, their fear of the Palestinian Authority and its agents kept them away from the polls in October. And while seeking pragmatic and constructive integration in Jerusalem, they still adhere to the Palestinian side of the identity axis. Once again, 38% of the capital city's residents remain outside its political arena.

The Lebanese army should be treated as a hostile entity, its camouflage should be stripped away, and the American administration should be supplied with conclusive evidence of the multi-faceted cooperation between it and Hezbollah.

The assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Istanbul is a fascinating story with potentially far-reaching regional and global implications. How will it affect Israel?

The Saudi Crown Prince isn’t a democrat or a strategic savior, but don’t give the evil leaders of Turkey and Iran a victory by weakening US-Saudi ties.

Amidst violent events, it is easy to be tempted to seek decisive "solutions" to the Palestinian problem(s) – in both the PA areas and in Gaza – through drastic military action, or through equally dramatic concessions. But given the lessons of recent history, as well as the unpredictable nature of regional events, it makes sense to adhere to "conflict management" and piecemeal arrangements. This is not as a cowardly choice by hapless political and military leaders, but as a rational choice in irrational circumstances; even more so when the Iranian challenge looms larger than ever on Israel's immediate horizons.

In the past decade, relations between Israel and China have become closer, following a decision in Jerusalem to diversify and expand Israel's ties with emerging powers and countries that do not belong to the European Union and are less identified with the American coalition. The visit to Israel by China's vice president is evidence of the warming of relations between the two countries.

Israel's actions (or at times, inaction) concerning the future of the Gaza Strip cannot be isolated from the broader context of the struggle over the entire region's balance of power. Gaza’s dependence on Egypt, and perhaps Cyprus, constitutes a common interest of the “camp of stability” in the Middle East, to curb the influence of both Turkey and Iran, and to deny Abu Mazen the baneful position of a spoiler.

Reducing enemy capabilities and ambitions in Gaza requires Israeli military readiness and government willingness to use force intermittingly, while maintaining a healthy and resilient Israeli home front.

Iran and the smaller terrorist groups in Gaza want a full-scale war with Israel. Hamas does not. Israel should land a decisive, well-defined blow but back Egyptian efforts to broker a cease-fire.

Although Hamas' cyber capabilities do not now constitute a serious threat to Israel, this reality can quickly change in view of the rapid pace of technological progress.

Russia's accusations against Israel that it is responsible for the downing of its plane is meant primarily for a domestic audience. Until now, Russia has made sure to behave with restraint in the Syrian arena and to operate based on its strategic interests. One of those interests is the Russian desire to minimize Iranian involvement in Syria.

The INSS unilateral disengagement plan is neither new nor logical.

Israel must continue to take the offensive against Iran’s nuclear program, without reliance on international inspectors.

In the absence of a clear American or Turkish determination to confront Iranian encroachment, only Israel has the power to stop it.

Germany is being inconsistent and duplicitous and the time has come to say it loud and clear.

The downing of a Russian plane by Syrian artillery after an Israeli strike proves how vital it is to maintain open lines of communications between Israel and Russia. The IDF may have to exercise more restraint, but it will still do what it must.

Iran is hiding its efforts to establish a presence in Syria, for both internal and external reasons. This policy involves numerous internal contradictions and to avoid admitting to them, the IRGC and Hezbollah are conducting a propaganda campaign.

While Israel should steer away from overt identification with internal challengers in Iran, this is the time to urge the US. and other like-inded nations to ratchet up the pressure on the regime, explaining to the Iranian people the growing cost of their leaders' ambitions.

In the Mideast of today, the US is largely irrelevant, when it is not disruptive, and is certainly not providing clear leadership. With the current disarray in DC, it does not look like this will change any time soon.

Israel has fully joined the battle in Syria—but it's not clear it can achieve any of its goals there.

Russia is actively promoting international involvement in the reconstruction of Syria as a humanitarian effort aimed at creating the conditions for refugees to return, but in practice this will reinforce the foundations of Assad’s rule and territorial control. The US is in no hurry to respond, but the Russian initiative will not remain unanswered.

The US is failing to appreciate the significance of the leverage points that the Syrian arena provides for Russia. This leverage allows Russia to exact a heavy toll for the measures the US is demanding.

On restoring relations between Tehran and Washington. If the protests in Iran expand, Trump will be able to exert greater pressure on Tehran.

Turkey faces few good options as the Idlib offensive looms.

Iran's goal in its activity in the Western Sahara is to subvert Morocco, a moderate Sunni state, as part of the Iranian regime's policy of spreading the Shi'ite revolution.

The abject failure of the Oslo Accords has had a salutary effect on Israeli society. Israelis are today quite resilient, ready to endure – if necessary – protracted conflict.

In pursuit of peace, it’s high-time that the PLO be showered with the “tough love” once reserved uniquely for Israel. And Israel’s defense establishment should get behind the ditch UNRWA discourse.