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Home / Policy Papers / Lebanon
The virus has no political preferences, and its generalized assault has led to cooperation in some arenas between bitter rivals.
The new government is the product of escalating popular protests under way since October 15. The protests are in response to Lebanon’s dire economic state.
Lebanon has neither the desire nor the ability to address Hezbollah’s threat to its sovereignty. The likelihood of Lebanon suffering severe damage in a war against Israel does not change this situation.
Should a large operation inside Lebanon be considered after Hezbollah's tunnels are successfully neutralized?
Hezbollah’s leadership has come to realize that harsher US sanctions pose a serious threat to the revolutionary regime in Tehran. It will become increasingly difficult for the regime to finance the full spectrum of its revolutionary ambitions. Hezbollah has therefore had to focus on securing its own sources of funding and providing employment for its members and followers through ever-deeper engagement in Lebanon’s economic and financial spheres of activity.
The Lebanese army should be treated as a hostile entity, its camouflage should be stripped away, and the American administration should be supplied with conclusive evidence of the multi-faceted cooperation between it and Hezbollah.
The biggest loser in the May 6 elections was the Future Movement of Prime Minister Sa’ad Hariri.
