A Policy-Oriented Think Tank Addressing Foreign Policy and National Security Issues for a Safe Israel

Iran’s Narco-Terrorism Policy

Organized crime provides Iran with plausible deniability because these acts appear to be carried out informally. Israel must institutionalize and strengthen global and regional collaboration to counter Iran's Narco-Terrorism.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) In Tehran

Two Iranian-affiliated squads were detained on June 16 in Istanbul by Turkish security police. On July 22, another unit was apprehended. According to reports, one of the squads planned to assassinate Yosef Levi-Sfari, the former Israeli consul in Istanbul, and the other two were planning to hurt Israeli tourists.

According to reports, Mossad – Israel’s intelligence agency – which maintains working contacts with their Turkish counterparts – gave specific intelligence information regarding the Iranian operatives to Turkish security services. 

According to Turkish media reports, Iranian intelligence used an “Iranian mafia” group that operates for profit rather than on ideology. The Turkish inquiry discovered that one of the squad members visited Iran four times in two months and met with the boss of one of the mafias on his last trip, only four days before his arrest.[1]

This is not the first time the Iranian administration has used local criminal elements to its advantage. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) routinely employs gangs, drug cartels, and international criminal groups to carry out terrorist activities across the globe.[2]

This pattern of behavior is directly related to the phenomenon of Narco-Terrorism, which refers to the use of organized crime – including drug trafficking, trafficking in illegal products, counterfeiting of products, human trafficking, smuggling of weapons, smuggling of immigrants, money laundering, and gambling – to use the profits for military and organizational strengthening, as well as to pay terrorist operatives and elements related to the organization.

For many years, the IRGC has maintained extensive contacts with top figures in Afghan drug trafficking organizations and other international criminal syndicates to develop a network for distributing narcotics shipments to Western countries. The drug money is subsequently used to fund terrorist operations and supply weapons to terrorist organizations.[3]

For example, the US Department of the Treasury designated Brigadier General Gholamreza Baghbani, head of the IRGC Quds Force in Zahedan on the Iran-Afghanistan border, as a drug lord responsible for the export of heroin to the US and Europe in March 2012. A similar suspicion arose in the case of Lt. Col. Abdullah Araqi, former commander of the Tehran district and deputy commander of the IRGC’s ground force, who was suspected of having connections with international criminal organizations in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania dealing with the distribution of Afghan heroin to Western countries.[4]

Iran also employs Hezbollah, its largest Shi’ite proxy, in extensive international criminal activity. Hezbollah’s activities are carried out mainly in South America, utilizing local Lebanese populations to establish a network of straw companies” for black market transactions and drug money laundering. These funds were used to enhance Hezbollah’s military, among other things. Furthermore, black money assisted Iran in surviving periods when heavy sanctions were imposed on it. As part of this operation, Hezbollah has close ties with Colombian and Mexican drug traffickers. Hezbollah’s illicit conduct allows Iran to improve its military capabilities giving it plausible deniability. 

This pattern of deploying international criminal elements, whether with ties to Iran or acting as mercenaries, necessitates intelligence preparedness on the side of Israel, the United States, and Western European countries to track and monitor these activities. Furthermore, it provides the opportunity for Israel to expose its methods of operation.

Iran’s Use of Transnational Organized Crime

The Iranian manner of operation utilizing organized criminal agents is not novel. The links between Iran’s intelligence agencies and transnational crime organizations have already been documented. For example, in 2011, an Iranian spy (who was later convicted) attempted to recruit a member of the Mexican drug cartel “Los Zetas” to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington via an attack at the Cafe Milano restaurant in Georgetown. The Iranian agent who established contact with a Los Zetas cartel member (a Drug Enforcement Agency informant) also intended to attack the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C., as well as the Saudi and Israeli embassies in Argentina.[5]

Iran has recently used organized crime to carry out attacks against its adversaries, including assassinations and terrorist attacks. Iran’s criminal behavior originates partly from the diminished ability of its proxies to operate in the international arena. For example, Hezbollah has had trouble acting successfully against Israel since the assassination of Imad Mugniyeh and from the economic harm caused by sanctions imposed on it. Furthermore, Iran is generally interested in attaining objectives while minimizing the possibility of retaliation against it.

According to reports, the Mossad prevented an Iranian effort to assassinate Israel’s former consul in Turkey, an American general in Germany, and the French journalist and philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy in April 2022.[6] Mansour Rasouli, the leader of the failed murder attempt in Turkey, was interrogated by Mossad agents on Iranian soil, according to a video released to the media hours after the incident.[7] According to reports, Rasouli, an Iranian Kurd, is a member of a criminal organization that works for the IRGC. Additionally, according to the report, Rasouli’s gang is responsible for laundering money for the IRGC for permission to export and import illicit goods into and out of Iran. Bahman Atami, the group’s leader, supports the Iranian government. The article claims that the Atami and Rasouli families work together with the IRGC to smuggle drugs into Turkey and Iraq. Rasouli is a member of a narcotics cartel hired by the IRGC to carry out assassination operations against targets outside Iran.[8]

The Zindashti cartel, led by Naji-Sharifi Zindashti, an Iranian citizen of Kurdish heritage, is responsible for some of Iran’s narco-terrorism activity in Turkey. Zindashti, born in the northern Iranian city of Urmia, spent several years in Turkey, where he had complete freedom of movement. He developed tight ties with advisers and colleagues of Turkey’s ruling AK Party and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. But over the years, the Turkish media has said that Zindashti was close to Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish opposition leader living in the United States whose group is being persecuted by the government.

The reconciliation with Gulen probably prompted Turkish officials to file criminal charges against him. Several members of the Zindashti cartel, including Zindashti himself, were detained in Turkey in 2018 on suspicion of assassinating Saeed Karimian, the founder and head of Gem TV, an Iranian opposition channel broadcasting in Turkey. After six months, Zindashti and the other detainees were released. According to Turkish media, the disclosures resulted from bribery and pressure by associates and advisers to Erdogan, ostensibly to boost relations with Iran.[9]

Zindashti’s criminal group is also accused of carrying out the assassination of Masoud Mulawi in Istanbul in November 2019 on the orders of Iranian intelligence officers. Mullawi previously worked in the Iranian Ministry of Defense in the field of cyber security and, since fleeing the country in 2018, has emerged as a vocal opponent of the Iranian regime. Abdulvahap Koçak, the activist who murdered Mullawi, has ties to the Zindashti mafia.[10]

In December 2021, Turkish police arrested around 11 members of the Zindashti cartel on suspicion of collaborating with Iranian intelligence in the kidnapping of Habib Chaab, an Iranian regime opponent and the leader of the Ahwaz Liberation Organization in Sweden. Ahwaz, in western Iran, is home to an Arab minority community that seeks independence or autonomy.[11]

Iran also employs the Rigabadi cartel, which is based in Romania. Hussein Karimi Rigabadi (a relative of Zindashti) controls the cartel, which operates a worldwide drug conglomerate that sells heroin in the Middle East, Western Europe, and North America. The cartel has smuggled heroin worth hundreds of millions of dollars from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Iran and Turkey over the last several decades.[12]

According to the London-based Iran International media outlet, the Rigabadi cartel was allegedly responsible for the death of top Iranian judge Gholamreza Mansouri in Bucharest, Romania, in June 2022. In 2019, Mansouri departed Iran. According to media accounts, Zindashti was also implicated in the assassination, allegedly giving the order to kill Mansouri.[13]

Furthermore, Iran makes use of its geographical proximity to Azerbaijan as well as its ethnic identity. Tehran has long used Azeri mercenaries in its terrorist and criminal operations. The arrest of an Azeri citizen named Khalid Mehdiyev in his car in Brooklyn, New York, was reported in the American media on July 31. Mehdiyev was detained on suspicion of orchestrating the assassination of Masih Alinejad, an exiled Iranian writer and social activist who opposes the Iranian regime, on behalf of the IRGC or the Iranian Ministry of Defense.[14] In July 2021, indictments were filed in the United States against four Iranians (one of whom was an Iranian intelligence agent, and the other three emerged as mercenaries) for plotting to kidnap Alinejad from New York and smuggle her into Iranian territory.[15]

Security forces in Cyprus apprehended a Pakistani assassination team led by an Azeri mercenary with Russian citizenship in September 2021, who planned to attack Israeli businessmen.[16] In January 2012, Azerbaijani security forces apprehended a group of operatives who planned to kill the Israeli ambassador and a local rabbi. According to the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense, the group was led by an Iranian national with ties to the Iranian Intelligence Ministry. [17]

The Purpose of Iran’s Involvement in Organized Crime

The use of organized crime provides Iran with plausible deniability because these acts appear to be carried out informally; there is no reason to respond or condemn them.

Iran benefits in several ways from its engagement in criminal activity and drug trafficking. First, it makes money, especially since Iran is subject to economic sanctions that force the regime to look to illicit revenue streams. These payments are also sent to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq, and Ansar Allah (Houthis) in Yemen, among others.

Second, Iran’s drug trade and distribution efforts aim to poison the populations of Western countries, mainly the United States, where most of the trade is focused. According to Iran, which officially opposes drug usage for religious reasons, drug distribution in these countries will damage their society, create economic hardship, increase welfare costs, and diminish national resilience.

Thirdly, Iran uses international crime not just as a way to make money but also as an endless resource for using criminal organizations to support terrorism and even buy material for its nuclear program.

Using criminal elements to achieve military and political goals also has its drawbacks. As a result, Iran’s operatives are frequently inexperienced and incompetent in carrying out sophisticated operational tasks characterized as covert intelligence operations. Iran’s objectives are not achieved in the majority of incidents of reported drug terrorism, which result in arrests and thwarted plots. Additionally, criminals are disloyal and can easily be bought off because they are primarily motivated by financial gain rather than ideology.

Recommendations to Counter Iran’s Criminal Enterprise

Iran’s organized criminal activities have the potential to harm the sovereignty and society of the countries where it operates. Furthermore, by employing organized crime, Iran inhibits the ability of Jerusalem and other parties to respond to its indirect aggression by blurring the distinctions between criminal, terrorist, and military activity. For example, Israel cannot act openly and formally and bear direct accountability on the territory of certain countries with which it has complex and delicate relations (like Turkey, for example). Such behavior risks escalating and hurting ties with these countries.

Except on exceptional occasions, Western countries and security agencies have avoided discussing Iran’s involvement in international crime and drug trafficking. Even among Israel’s and America’s intelligence communities, there was opposition to dealing with Hezbollah’s Narco-Terrorism, which was controlled and sponsored by Iran. There were no agreements or operational measures, even when the topic was raised.

As a result, it is crucial to institutionalize and strengthen global and regional collaboration to counter Iran’s use of organized crime. The cooperation of the Israel Police and the Mossad with Interpol and the DEA should be strengthened, including combined training and exercises, regular meetings, intelligence sharing, and, of course, stopping terrorist attacks against Israelis and Westerners. In this context, Israel should collaborate with the European Union and the United States to promote the formation of a Task Force to tackle the Narco-Terrorist phenomena.

Between 2006 and 2015, such collaboration existed as part of Project Cassandra, which aimed to stop Hezbollah’s international criminal activity, mainly drug trafficking and money laundering task force was formed as part of a project that included Israeli police and intelligence agents, as well as members of the Mossad’s Harpoon unit, which was disbanded in 2016 and parts of it, were transferred to the National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing of Israel at the Ministry of Defense.[18]

However, due to the US administration’s aim to secure a nuclear agreement with Iran, the project lost influence as the funding, staff, and support dropped during the Obama era.  The project was halted entirely when a nuclear deal was reached with Iran in 2015.[19] Since the Obama administration ended Project Cassandra, the DEA has almost entirely stopped dealing with Iran’s Narco-Terrorism. Furthermore, even though it is a strategic concern, it was probably barely discussed by the West or the Americans during the nuclear discussions with Iran, even though it poses a considerable threat.

Such global cooperation will be complicated now, as the Biden administration follows the Obama administration’s course of action to get Iran back into the nuclear accord in exchange for several significant concessions.  In this political climate, Israel will find it difficult to persuade the US administration to undertake coordinated and large-scale operations against criminal organizations affiliated with Iran – a move that could endanger discussions for a renewed agreement. As a result, it is conceivable to offer the Americans a form of compromise in which Israel and the US will focus on prosecuting Hezbollah members involved in Narco-Terrorism while turning a blind eye to such activity affiliated with Iran.

In this context, Israeli and U.S. authorities should discuss the matter internally, with Israel requesting that the United States monitor Iranian criminal elements and designate Iranian operatives and associates. 

Minimal cooperation with the United States and the European Union must include raising public and political awareness of the link between Tehran and international organized crime as an initial step before engaging in enforcement activity.  Thus, it is conceivable to highlight Iran’s ongoing use of the Zindashti cartel, as was done previously concerning Hezbollah’s international criminal activities.

Furthermore, Israel should use the current normalization efforts with Turkey to strengthen intelligence and diplomatic collaboration to limit and undermine the Zindashti cartel in Turkey. Both countries are interested in averting terrorist acts that might harm tourism in Turkey. Since Turkey and Iran have solid diplomatic ties, it may be possible to agree with Turkey about the deportation of cartel members instead of arresting them on Turkish soil. 

Israel must also conduct covert intelligence operations to dissuade and eliminate elements of the narco-terrorist movement collaborating with the IRGC and Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence. Since Israel’s relationships with different countries are so delicate, it isn’t easy to carry out these acts everywhere. Israel should carefully consider which countries these operations can be carried out while leaving a small footprint to avoid embarrassing these countries.

[1] “Turkish media releases new images from foiled Iranian plot against Israelis.” Ynet News, July 11, 2022.


[2] Sinaee Maryam. “Iran’s Guards Use Criminals for Terror Operations: Israeli Official.” Iran International, July 8, 2022.


[3] Hugh Tomlinson, “Iran’s Elite Guard Runs Global Crime Network Pushing Heroin to West,” The Times, November 17, 2011


[4] “Treasury Designates Iranian Quds Force General Overseeing Afghan Heroin Trafficking Through Iran.” Department of the Treasury, March 7, 2012.


[5] Savage Charlie and Shane Scott. “Iranians Accused of a Plot to Kill Saudis’ U.S. Envoy.” The New York Times, October 11, 2011..


[6] “Mossad said to foil plot by Iran’s IRGC to assassinate Israeli diplomat in Turkey.” The Times of Israel, April 30, 2022.


[7] “Mossad reportedly interrogated IRGC member in Iran over triple assassination plot.” The Times of Israel, April 30, 2022.


[8] Bergman Ronen and Fassihi Farnaz. “Israel Tells U.S. It Killed Iranian Officer, Official Says.” The New York Times, May 25, 2022.


[9] “Former Turkish deputy to be investigated over the release of an Iranian drug lord.” Duvar English, February 14, 2022.


[10] “Iranian diplomat nabbed over dissident murder plot in Turkey.” DailySabah, February 11, 2021.


[11] Butler Daren and Coskun Orhan. “Turkey detains 11 over abduction of Iranian dissident -police.” Reuters, December 14, 2020.


[12] “United States Announces Historic Extradition of Iranian Heroin Trafficker To New York.” United States Attorney Southern District of New York, December 13, 2007.


[13] “EXCLUSIVE – International Drug Trafficker Working For Iranian Intelligence From Turkey To Romania.” Iran International, December 20, 2020.


[14] Marino Joe and Reilly Patrick. “Man arrested with AK-47 outside of dissident Iranian journalist’s Brooklyn home.” New York Post, July 31, 2022.


[15] Weiser Benjamin. “Iranian Operatives Planned to Kidnap a Brooklyn Author, Prosecutors Say.” The New York Times, July 13, 2021.


[16] “Cyprus charges six with terror for alleged plot to kill five Israelis.” Times of Israel, November 7, 2021.


[17] Yevgrashina Lada. “Azerbaijan arrests plot suspects, cites Iran link.” Reuters, January 25, 2012.


[18] Levi Eyal. “Economic warfare is the ultimate weapon.”. Israel Hayom, March 9, 2022.


[19] Meyer Josh. “The secret backstory of how Obama let Hezbollah off the hook.” Politico, December 19, 2017.


Photo: IMAGO / NurPhoto

Picture of ד״ר עומר דוסטרי

ד״ר עומר דוסטרי

Dr. Dostri is a specialist in strategy and Israeli national security. He has interned at the Center for Middle East Studies at Ariel University, the Institute for National Security Studies, and the Yuval Ne'eman Workshop for Science, Technology and Security at Tel Aviv University.

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