Introduction

Israel is experiencing one of the most severe personal- and public-security crises in its history. Serious crime—and especially organized crime within the Arab sector—has become a strategic threat to the rule of law, national security, and the country’s social fabric. Since the start of 2025, more than 200 Arab citizens have been murdered. This staggering and shocking figure reflects a wave of extreme violence: contract killings, shootings, rocket attacks, car bombs, and armed rampages. Organized crime syndicates, whose power has grown dramatically over the past decade, are crossing every red line. They murder women and children, throw grenades in city centers,[1] attack police officers and municipal inspectors, torch schools, and plant explosive devices.[2]

Although this violence generally remains within the closed circle of rival criminal groups, it sometimes spills over and claims casualties among the public. One of the most striking examples occurred recently on Highway 443 near Modi’in, where gunmen on a motorcycle opened fire on a vehicle in broad daylight as part of an internal feud in the Abu Ketifan crime family. An uninvolved civilian, Sergey Matatov, a reserve officer, engineer and family man, was killed when was caught in the crossfire. The assailants rode a motorcycle made to resemble a police bike and used a long-barreled weapon to fire at the jeep carrying their intended targets.

Alongside the murderous turf wars, these organizations also exact a price from the wider population through extensive extortion rackets (“protection payments”) and the smuggling of vast quantities of weapons and ammunition. These arms fuel criminal violence but could just as easily find their way to terrorist actors.

Government Decision 4618, adopted in 2006, defined “the fight against serious and organized crime and its consequences” as a long-term national objective. The decision, prompted by a sharp rise in organized crime, outlined several key steps: establishing a national task force to shape policy; creating a standing committee to coordinate operations; forming an integrated intelligence team; strengthening interagency cooperation; and advancing legislative amendments. The initiative was influenced by the FATF (Financial Action Task Force),[3] an international body that emphasizes the need to integrate intelligence, criminal, and financial tools, given that organized crime is driven by financial gain—and that undermining its economic foundations is essential to deterrence.

Twenty years later, however, the violence persists unabated. The State Comptroller’s 2020 report criticized the national task force for “meetings without staff work” and recommended formulating and implementing a coherent strategy.

Who Leads the Fight Against Serious Crime?

Who leads the fight against serious crime in Israel? If one were to ask the public, would most likely answer that the government and relevant ministers—especially the Minister of National Security—are at the helm. They indeed bear significant responsibility. Yet, in Israel, the supreme and singular commander of the fight against serious crime is the Attorney General, who heads the entire law-enforcement system. Moreover, the national task force established in 2006 effectively functions as Israel’s war cabinet for combating serious crime. As its chair, the Attorney General is expected to declare an enforcement emergency and formulate the necessary legal tools.

Because of the emergency situation, the Prime Minister instructed the Attorney General to convene the national task force weekly. This directive was not implemented. Asked about this in a Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee hearing, Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara replied: “We notified the Prime Minister that the national task force, which includes all law-enforcement bodies, the police commissioner, and myself, cannot convene every week. The task force convened five times this year.”[4]

The Attorney General has repeatedly asserted that only she is authorized to address concrete issues of law enforcement, and even law-enforcement policy, which, she says, falls under her exclusive responsibility and, through her, under the responsibility of all law-enforcement agencies. This recurring position indicates that exclusive authority rests with her, yet she refuses to involve the government, despite the Prime Minister’s instruction to present an emergency plan to deal with the issue[5] and despite the harsh and deadly reality on the ground.

Following the Prime Minister’s directive, Adv. Roi Kachlon, head of the Arab-Sector Crime-Fighting Task Force at the Prime Minister’s Office, formally called on the Attorney General—in her capacity in charge of the fight against serious-crime and given her failure to exercise that responsibility—to convene weekly meetings of the national task force (September 2025). In his letter, he stressed that “addressing the enforcement emergency is the exclusive responsibility of the law-enforcement system.” He further noted that the Attorney General must lead the formulation of a strategic plan with clear and measurable goals, foremost among them dismantling criminal organizations and neutralizing the economic infrastructure that sustains them. The plan must be comprehensive and reflect the combined actions of all enforcement bodies: the Israel Police, Tax Authority, State Attorney’s Office, Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), Israel Money Laundering and Terror Financing Prohibition Authority (IMPA), and others.[6]

To clarify the Attorney General’s exclusive authority over the fight against crime in the Arab-sector, Kachlon wrote that under the principle of the independence of law enforcement, addressing the enforcement emergency falls solely under the purview of the law-enforcement, which is headed by the Attorney General. Not only is she failing to carry out her role, but she is also preventing others from addressing the crisis. In her written response to Kachlon, the Attorney General prohibited government representatives from engaging in law-enforcement policy. As a result, the government effectively lacks the authority to set the required enforcement policy needed to halt the wave of killings and the growing strength of criminal organizations.[7]

The Attorney General must declare a state of emergency; treat criminal organizations as terrorist organizations (per the Prime Minister’s directive); convene weekly meetings of the national task force; and initiate a comprehensive overhaul of enforcement systems. She heads the law-enforcement apparatus, and only she possesses the authority to act. Her responsibility for managing the fight against serious crime is therefore absolute. Her failure to act is contributing to collapsing deterrence, eroding public trust in law-enforcement institutions, and creating a strategic threat to the rule of law.

The Situation on the Ground: A Wave of Murders and a Deadly Emergency

The situation on the ground is not just about cold statistics; it is a bleeding human tragedy unfolding daily and affecting all of us, not only Israel’s Arab citizens. During January–February 2025, 36 Arab citizens were murdered—a number that rose to 46 by early March. By September 2025, the toll had climbed to 160, including four people killed in a single day. And by October 2025, the number had exceeded 200 Arab citizens murdered since the beginning of the year.

The violence is not limited just to criminals, and it marked by unprecedented audacity: the murder of women and innocent children; rocket fire and grenade attacks in dense urban centers; car bombings in broad daylight; explosives dropped from weaponized drones; arson attacks on educational institutions; damage to national infrastructure such as municipal buildings; shooting at police officers and inspectors; and smuggling massive amount of weapons meant for mass-casualty attacks.[8] Many criminal actors behave as though the long arm of the state will never reach them—as though they are immune to punishment. This sense of immunity is a direct result of weak enforcement, which has allowed these organizations to grow stronger, seize control of local markets, smuggle drugs and weapons, and infiltrate public tenders, including tenders issued by the defense establishment.[9]

The problem manifests in several key phenomena:

Possession of illegal weapons

The volume of illegal firearms in the Arab sector is immense and poses a tangible threat to public safety. This is not only small arms: it includes explosives, anti-tank launchers, grenades, and machine guns. There are likely hundreds of thousands of illegal weapons in Arab communities, held by criminal actors and by seemingly “normative” civilians, often as status symbols or for self-protection. Much of this weaponry originates from thefts from IDF bases and smuggling from Egypt and Jordan.[10] These arms fuel criminal activity but can quickly become a national-security threat during periods of unrest, such as the 2021 riots in mixed cities and on traffic arteries during Operation Guardian of the Walls.

Weapons smuggling and theft from the IDF

Weapons smuggling across the Jordanian and Egyptian borders has expanded significantly. Traditional smuggling routes have increasingly been replaced by drone-based smuggling, which has surged over the past two years. There has also been growing theft of weapons and equipment from IDF bases, especially during the war, when large quantities of materiel were dispersed in staging areas and units and commanders were not able to pay sufficient attention to the phenomenon. Most of these weapons end up being diverted to Arab-sector criminal activity, but some leak into terrorist networks—especially in Judea and Samaria and reports already indicate smuggling into Gaza via drones.

Infiltration into public tenders

Criminal organizations exploit legal loopholes to participate in and win public tenders. The danger is not only in their participation but in the coercive means they use to ensure they win the tenders, and in the large sums of public money that is channeled into the pockets of crime families and finances their operations.[11]

Loss of deterrence

Criminal organizations no longer fear law-enforcement agencies and even claim responsibility for murders they carry out. Killings increasingly target women and children to maximize the shock and terror they generate.[12] The low rate of solved cases (slightly above 10%),[13] combined with lenient court sentencing, further erode deterrence.[14]  On top of this, there is insufficient protection for law-enforcement personnel, government regulators, and witnesses, a phenomenon that exacerbates the harm inflicted by criminal organizations on the state as a whole.

Creation of a parallel “justice system”

Crime organizations function as de facto sovereigns by buying off elected officials and civil servants and by conducting arbitration processes within the Arab sector outside the formal legal system. Many prefer to seek recourse through these alternative “courts,” run by criminal groups capable of enforcing and executing their “verdicts.”[15]

Extortion and protection

The scale of protection payments is massive. Estimates suggest that Arab-sector crime organizations collect roughly NIS 2 billion annually through protection rackets alone, with additional billions in indirect losses to the economy. Multiple industries are affected, including agriculture, construction, and infrastructure. Even state entities pay protection fees: national infrastructure projects have been forced to pay criminal groups for “security” at work sites. According to a report by Hashomer Hachadash, 73 percent of businesses in construction, commerce, agriculture, and industry are required to pay protection.[16]

A recent high-level meeting with the Prime Minister, senior ministers, and top police commanders revealed the severity of the situation through data and case studies. The Prime Minister opened with an urgent warning: “The alarming rise in crime requires declaring an enforcement emergency and intensifying the fight.” The head of the Police Investigations and Intelligence Division admitted: “The growing audacity of criminal organizations exceeds current enforcement capabilities.” The police commissioner added: “We are seeing increased violence against public officials, including shootings at police officers. This undermines deterrence.”[17]

In conclusion, crime organizations are growing stronger as the state loses governance over wide areas of activity. This is a strategic threat not only to the Arab sector but to Israel’s national security as a whole.

The Barriers: Resources, Coordination, and Policy

The barriers to combating serious crime in Israel are multilayered and deep, affecting every stage of the process—from intelligence collection, through investigation and prosecution, to seizure of asset and the economic disruption of criminal organizations.

During the exchange between the Attorney General and members of the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, the Attorney General listed several obstacles that, in her view, undermine enforcement efforts. While the government—through the Arab-Sector Crime-Fighting Task Force at the Prime Minister’s Office—is working to support enforcement, the law-enforcement establishment refrains from involvement under the principle of “law-enforcement independence.”

The first argument concerns a lack of human and budgetary resources, which creates bottlenecks at every stage of enforcement.[18] In her written response to the Constitution Committee, the Attorney General stated: “There is a significant gap between the number of police positions … and the number of positions [in the State Attorney’s Office],” claiming a shortage of roughly 100 prosecutorial positions. This, she argued, causes cases to stall at the prosecution stage, allowing criminal organizations to continue operating freely.

Even if one accepts this argument, the Attorney General’s inaction has nothing to do with a shortage of resources. The points raised by the Constitution Committee chair make this clear:
• The national task force has not received up-to-date research on crime in Israel.
• No comprehensive map of information sources has been prepared to guide strategic decisions on organized crime.
• The frequency of task-force meetings has not increased despite sharply rising crime rates over the past three years.
• No alternative strategic plan suited to the worsening reality has been examined.

Furthermore, the Constitution Committee hearing revealed that the national task force has neither directed nor undertaken the creation of an integrated national intelligence picture; nor has it established a joint intelligence team within the Special Duties Division of the Police Investigations and Intelligence Division, as required. The task force has also failed to promote legislative amendments needed to streamline the fight against serious crime. Finally, the Attorney General has not given the Israel Police the authorization required to employ essential technological tools in the struggle against crime. From all this, it is evident that claims of manpower shortages do not explain the failure of the State Attorney’s Office, and of its boss, the Attorney General, to address serious crime effectively.

Another obstacle is that the national task force has failed to maximalize the potential of interagency cooperation. Its discussions are general and lack structured staff work. Led by the Attorney General, it convenes only three to four times a year, while she blocks integrative discussions involving the government, the heads of enforcement agencies, and relevant officials around one table — again invoking the principle of law-enforcement independence. These obstacles create a vicious cycle where the process is stuck between insufficient interagency cooperation and an absence of coherent staff work across government ministries and enforcement bodies.

The Way Ahead

The failures in addressing this challenge may lead to the painful assumption that Israel is facing a problem with no real solution, and that, at best, the pace of deterioration can only be slowed. One explanation offered is that criminals learn and adapt far more quickly than enforcement bodies. We believe this assumption is mistaken. The situation can be substantially improved. To do so, Israel must adopt the following measures:

1. Declare an enforcement emergency

The most urgent measure is to declare an enforcement state of emergency. Such a declaration would allow immediate mobilization of resources, the allocation of dedicated budgets, and an expansion of the powers granted to enforcement agencies. It must be accompanied by appropriate legal tools enabling effective action against escalating crime.

The national task force must formulate a comprehensive strategic plan. This includes establishing joint emergency teams from the Israel Police, Shin Bet, Tax Authority, and State Attorney’s Office, with adequate budgets and manpower, alongside emergency powers such as temporary administrative detentions and rapid asset seizures. Increased use of administrative tools is essential to fight crime; these include restrictions on movement, confiscation of vehicles, communication bans, and barring criminal figures from access to specific areas.

2. Treat violent crime organizations as terrorist organizations

The second proposal is to change the paradigm for addressing murderous criminal organizations by treating them as terrorist entities. This follows the Prime Minister’s directive and current draft legislation. Such a shift would permit the use of security tools: Shin Bet surveillance of senior crime figures, immediate seizure of economic assets, and global financial sanctions — all with appropriate oversight. In practice, however, legal advisers have been working to impede this directive.

3. Mandate weekly meetings of the national task force

The third measure is to hold regular, weekly meetings of the national task force, including the Arab-Sector Crime-Fighting Task Force, as instructed by the Prime Minister. The goal is to create an operational response to the current emergency. The Attorney General’s refusal to establish an enforcement team, or even to allow a government representative to join the task force on the grounds that this would introduce political considerations, weakens the overall effort. It should be recalled that in the previous government, Deputy Minister Yoav Segalovich headed a government enforcement team to combat Arab-sector crime, with full cooperation from the Attorney General’s Office and the State Attorney’s Office — without any claim that political influence was being introduced.

4. Formulate a national five-year plan with Arab-sector leadership

Israel must also formulate a five-year plan that incorporates Arab communal leadership and mobilizes it in the effort. The plan must include clear goals and measurable indicators, foremost among them dismantling criminal organizations and the economic infrastructure that sustains them. The five-year plan should bring all enforcement bodies to play and authorize the use of technological tools essential to the fight. It should also include enhanced protection of the state’s borders, IDF bases, and military camps. All of this requires a combined approach: intelligence, infrastructure, technology, operations, and—no less critically—legal and enforcement action.

Conclusion

The battle against serious and organized crime in Israel, as analyzed in this article, is not merely a tactical failure — it is a deep systemic failure that threatens the state’s fundamental pillars: the rule of law, national security, and public trust. The national task force created for this purpose is, in principle, an excellent tool, but in recent years it has been poorly operated.

The Attorney General, who heads this task force, must recognize that she leads Israel’s war cabinet against serious crime and cannot evade this responsibility by invoking “enforcement independence.” The system must be overhauled to enable an integrated and effective campaign against surging serious crime.

The call for change is urgent: The Attorney General must declare an enforcement emergency, apply the legal framework used against terrorist organizations to serious crime organizations, convene the national task force weekly and as needed, and formulate a plan with clear goals. The government must support this effort with budgets, and the Knesset— namely through legislation.

Israel cannot afford another year of bloodshed. It must address this threat before it finds itself facing a new “October 7.”

[1] Hassan Shaalan, “Exchange of Fire in Iksal near Nazareth: Two Gunmen Killed, Police Officer Severely Wounded | Footage,” Ynet, 27.4.2025.
[2] Raanan Ben Tzur, “Gang Wars Frustrating Hadera Residents: ‘Gunfire and Grenade Throwing Have Become Routine,’” 24.10.2025.
[3] The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) leads a global effort to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and the financing of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The body sets international standards to ensure that national authorities can effectively trace illegal funds linked to drug trafficking, illicit arms trading, cyber fraud, and other serious crimes.
[4] Knesset Channel, “The Constitution Committee Held a Stormy Debate with the Participation of Attorney General Baharav-Miara and State Prosecutor Aisman on the Fight Against Crime in the Arab Sector and the Work of the Government Inquiry Committee on Spyware,” Knesset website, 30.9.2025. (Hebrew)
[5] Dudi Segal, “Former Acting Commissioner in a Letter Against the Attorney General: ‘A Severe Dereliction of Duty,’” HaMechadesh, 2.9.2025.
[6] Roi Kachlon, “Letter Number Three to the Attorney General: Crime in Arab Society – A State of Emergency,” 1.9.2025.
[7] Ibid.
[8] “Victims of Violence and Crime in Arab Society | 2024 Annual Summary Report,” The Abraham Initiatives.
[9] Kobi Barkat, “Head of the Task Force Warns: ‘The Situation Is Deadly, an Enforcement Emergency Must Be Declared,’” BeHadrei Haredim, 10.11.2025.
[10] Meir Turgeman, “Breached Border, Containers, IDF Bases: The Bloody Route of Illegal Weapons into the Arab Street,” Ynet, 3 October 2023. With the outbreak of the war, the phenomenon of weapons theft from staging areas and from private civilians intensified. See also: Avi Cohen, “In the Wake of the War: More Civilians Are Arming Themselves; The Problem – The Weapons Are Ending Up in the Wrong Hands,” Israel Hayom, 22.2.2024; Shlomi Heller, “An Army of Weapons: How Crime Organizations Are Exploiting the War to Arm Themselves,” Walla, 4.2.2024.
[11] From a discussion of the Knesset National Security Committee on the penetration of criminal organizations into local-government and public tenders, 9.9.202
[12] Hassan Shaalan, “A Bloody Circle of Murders and Protection Rackets: Crime Organizations Terrorize Arab Society,” Ynet, 23.3.2024.
[13] Avishai Grintzeig, “Violence in Arab Society: In 2023 Only 17% of Murder Cases Were Solved,” Kan 11, 16.7.2024.
[14] Yair Kraus, “‘A Judge Cannot Live in a Vacuum’: Appeal over the Sentence of the Acre Hotel Arsonist, and the Previous Rulings,” Ynet, 18.3.2024.
[15] Kalman Liebskind, “With a Big Hug from Arab Leaders, Raed Salah, the Terror Supporter, Is Back in a Big Way,” Ma’ariv, 2.3.2024.
[16] Arnold Natayev, “‘The Scale of Protection Rackets in the South Is Unimaginable’: Data on the Disturbing Phenomenon,” i24News, 10.9.2025.
[17] Protocol of the Subcommittee for the Fight Against Crime in Arab Society in Israel, 19.3.2024.
[18] Letter of response from the State Attorney’s Office, via the coordinator of the national task force and the preparatory team (Legislation and Legal Counsel), regarding the implementation of the government decision titled “The Fight Against Serious and Organized Crime and Its Consequences,” 17.11.2024.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.