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The EastMed Dispute & its Implications for Israel, Part IIDr. Eran Lerman and Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak of JISS look ahead at opportunities for cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean.
The EastMed Dispute & its Implications for Israel, Part I Dr. Eran Lerman and Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak of JISS analyze the factors roiling the Mediterranean region: the newly discovered gas resources in contested Exclusive Economic Zones, and the assertive policy of Turkey under Erdogan.
Video briefing by Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman, vice president of JISS. (August 12, 2020)
Israel is unable to get directly involved in eastern Mediterranean hostilities, should they erupt. But it can and should cooperate closely with Greece in intelligence matters and arms acquisition and coordinate political action with Greece in Washington. The US stance largely will determine the practical scope of Erdogan’s ambitions.
Everything short of a military confrontation needs to be done, though, to deter Erdogan from establishing a barrier diagonally across the Mediterranean, barring Cyprus, Egypt and Israel from connecting their gas infrastructure to Greece and hence to Europe.
Trilateral cooperation among Israel, Greece and Cyprus to build a natural gas subsea pipeline is setting the stage for more tensions with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Israel, Egypt, Greece and Cyprus must encourage the US to assert a higher military and diplomatic profile as a counterweight to Turkish pressures, Russian and Iranian ambitions, and Chinese inroads.
Beyond Elounda, Beersheba, Cairo and Jerusalem. The emerging informal alliance in the eastern Mediterranean is becoming increasingly significant. Egypt’s role, Erdogan's ambitions, energy resources, joint military exercises and coordinated emergency responses contribute to the alliance.
The projected gas pipeline between Israel, Cyprus, Greece and Italy confirms that Israel's regional partnership has shifted from Turkey to Greece and that a new energy hub is emerging in the eastern Mediterranean. Yet this welcome geopolitical change has many opponents. Israel will need to act proactively and assess energy-related power struggles within the EU in order to actualize the pipeline.
For analytical as well as practical and even political reasons, the time has come to re-define Israel’s place in the world in terms of belonging to the “eastern Mediterranean” region, not the “Middle East.”
Iran, Turkey, Russia and other bad actors threaten Western and Israeli security in this strategic zone.
Turkey finds itself at a historic junction where it must decide whether to proceed alone by challenging Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus – or whether to embrace regional cooperation.
The Greek-Cypriot-Egyptian summit held last month in Crete focused on energy connectivity and Turkish threats, but it also paid lip service to Egyptian pro-Palestinian messages, which is problematic.
