To divert attention away from the antagonism between the two Arab parties, namely the Assad regime and the opposition, Ankara has designated the Syrian Kurds as the common enemy in order to unite all belligerent Arab parties on opposing sides.
During the recent Turkish charm offensive vis-à-vis the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’s latest statement on Syria urged the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime to find common ground to reach a sustainable peace, signaling yet another radical shift in Turkish foreign policy.[1]
Çavuşoğlu’s recent statement revealing the informal summit with his Syrian counterpart, Faisal Mekdad, at the October 2021 summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade, and Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan’s August 5 statement highlighting the existence of the channel between Turkish and Syrian intelligence agencies, are serious signals of another unusual reversal in Turkish foreign policy.[2]
The Syrian Civil War and Turkey
Turkey and Syria had their last formal diplomatic talks in 2011 when the former Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu visited Damascus. Since then, Ankara and Damascus have found themselves at odds in separate camps due to Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s rejection of Turkish demands to transform Syria into a “popular democracy” that will eventually replace Alawite dominance in favor of a Sunni Muslim Brotherhood-led leadership.
Despite practically daily delegitimization and criticism of the Assad administration, Turkey abstained from joining the conflict with boots on the ground until 2016. It preferred to use Turkmen and so-called “moderate Syrian opposition” groups, which included jihadi fighters.
However, due to the presence of the Islamic State (ISIS) and the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed branch, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) – which Ankara regards as an extension of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) – in northern Syria, Turkey launched three military operations in 2016, 2018, and 2019. Furthermore, when 33 Turkish troops were killed in Idlib, Turkey did not hesitate to confront Assad’s army in 2020.
Turkey intended to establish a PYD-YPG-free zone on the west bank of the Euphrates river and to push Kurdish elements away from its Syrian border. However, the continued presence of Kurds in the Tal Rifaat and Manbij districts compels Turkey to take more measures.
Turkey’s government officially proclaimed its plan to conduct a new military campaign against PYD-YPG positions on May 23.[3] Despite this audacious position, Turkey, appears to have refrained from taking action due to Russian pressure. As observed in previous military assaults, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) launched the offensive only two days after Erdoğan’s previous statements. This was not the case this time. In other words, it became clear that earlier Turkish military actions were carried out with Russian approval, whereas the possible attack on Tal Rifaat and Manbij did not.
Ankara has refrained from initiating a full-scale military intervention in northern Syria since the last conflict between Assad forces and the TSK in 2020, also known as Operation Spring Shield. This should not be read as Ankara abandoning the military option.
Ambiguously, the Turkish president reiterated his administration’s desire to unite the Syrian cantons under Turkish occupation by force at the same ambassadors’ forum at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, where the Turkish foreign minister expressed the need for a sustainable peace between the regime and the Syrian opposition.[4]
It should also be noted that, despite the ongoing Turkish presence and Ankara’s increasing investments in the infrastructure of the occupied cantons in northern Syria, the Erdoğan administration has yet to issue an official statement on the possibility of annexing the cantons or forming them into a contentious political entity akin to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
While this statement conveys the desire to conduct a military operation in Syria at the same time, it also gives the impression that this operation may not necessarily target Tal Rifaat and Manbij but rather the area between Kobani and Ain Issa or the border strip between Rasulayn and the Iraqi border area. By doing so, Erdoğan would not risk Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Russia and Iran while demonstrating power at home by allegedly refusing to accept Russian pressure.
Seeing Turkey as a probable threat, regime forces and the PYD-YPG have already begun to collaborate and create a defensive line against the TSK in the Kobani-Ain Issa region. In their positions along the border, particularly in Kobani, PYD-YPG fighters began to wave the Syrian flag.[5]
Russia’s Game-Changer
Apart from these developments, it appears that Russia’s Rosatom’s plan to send $15 billion to Ankara for the construction of Turkey’s first nuclear reactor in Akkuyu, Mersin, also had a critical role in Turkey’s choice not to irritate Russia.[6]
Russia’s impact on preventing a prospective Turkish assault in northern Syria became clearer when Asharq Al-Awsat’s Turkish edition reported the game-changing Russian offer to Turkey. As a result, during the recent Turkish-Iranian-Russian summit in Tehran on July 19, Moscow effectively ruled out a full-scale Turkish ground offensive in northern Syria. Instead, it gave the go-ahead for Turkish UAV surgical operations against the PYD-YPG, which are currently underway.
After averting a new military confrontation between the Assad regime and Turkey, Russia appears to have seized the opportunity and offered to convene a high-level security summit between the two parties in Moscow to discuss Turkey’s national security concerns. By doing so, Moscow hopes to resurrect and amend the 1998 Adana Agreement, under which Damascus and Ankara agreed not to assist terrorism against each other.[7]
Until now, Russia and the Assad administration appear to have met all of Turkey’s demands. However, Ankara is skeptical of Russia’s desire to officially merge the Syrian Democratic Forces, which comprise the PYD-YPG, into Assad’s Syrian army. From the Russian perspective, this action is required to remove American influence from the PYD-YPG. At the same time, with this act, the Assad force will be able to maintain control of the Euphrates river’s east bank.
Erdoğan acknowledged the dialogue between Turkish and Syrian intelligence organizations during a visit to Sochi on August 5. Furthermore, by not responding to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s emphasis on the importance of the Turkish-Syrian partnership against terrorism, he created a new window of opportunity for Turkey to mend fences with the Assad regime. This demonstrates a shift in the Syrian equation.[8]
Given the general shift in Turkish foreign policy and the new developments in Syria, Erdoğan appears willing to accept Assad as a legitimate player. Nonetheless, Ankara aspires to undertake a coordinated military campaign against the Kurds and the Assad regime.
By doing this, Erdoğan wants to curtail the political autonomy enjoyed by the Kurds and reestablish Damascus’ complete dominance at the expense of the PYD-YPG. That is why Turkey ambiguously keeps the military option on the table.[9]
The bargaining for Syria’s future has become even more heated. Erdoğan and Assad will most likely speak by phone, according to the pro-government “Türkiye” daily. While Damascus has denied the Turkish tabloid’s assertions, the same newspaper alleges that two Muslim countries from the Gulf and Africa are acting as mediators between the two sides.
Furthermore, the same daily highlighted the arrival of Assad’s close colleague Ali Ahmad Said Adonis Isbir in Turkey for negotiations with Turkish authorities.[10] Eventually, if all these developments bear fruit, they will officially end Turkish-Syrian hostilities.
The Syrian Opposition and Possible Ramifications
Unsurprisingly, the Syrian opposition is not pleased with these developments. Feeling threatened by a prospective compromise between Ankara and Damascus, these armed warriors, numbering around 100,000 people, showed their displeasure with Turkey’s recent reconciliation with the Assad regime.
The Syrian opposition staged massive protests against Turkey’s policy change at 33 locations, including Turkish-controlled northern Syrian cantons and Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham-controlled Idlib province. Syrian activists set fire to Turkish flags while brandishing placards with inscriptions such as “No to reconciliation, the revolution continues.”[11] The images of the torched Turkish flags sparked outrage in Turkey. The event fueled animosity toward the 3.7 million Syrian refugees.
The TSK and the Free Syrian Army arrested the six demonstrators accused of flag-burning protests to defuse public tensions. Furthermore, the Turkish pro-government press attempted to distinguish the demonstrators from the rest of the Syrian refugees by accusing them of being “bribed by the PKK to organize unjust mass protests against Turkey.”[12] Indeed, the arrests of the protesters underscored Turkey’s assertion of full sovereignty over northern Syria, as if it had acquired these lands from Damascus.
To quell widespread outrage in Turkey and northern Syria, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement.[13] Senior Free Syrian Army commanders like Sayf Abu Bakr[14] and Hisham Drbele[15] expressed their willingness to act in solidarity, condemning the flag burning.[16]
Despite these statements, many Syrian “moderate” opposition jihadi elements continue to see Turkey as a “taghut state” (طاغوت) – a Muslim country that is not governed by Sharia law and with illegitimate human-made laws.
However, if the Erdoğan administration chooses to normalize relations with Assad by ceasing to provide salaries and weapons to these elements, Turkey will almost certainly suffer a boomerang effect. Given the many Syrian refugees in Turkey, a unilateral Turkish pullback from aiding the Syrian opposition could pose serious security challenges to Turkish national security.
Conclusion
The Turkish economy’s weakness, its growing reliance on Russia, and a drastic shift in Turkish foreign policy compelled Erdoğan to mend ties with Assad, his former adversary. In fact, since joining the Astana Dialogue with Russia and Iran in 2017, Ankara has grudgingly abandoned its policy of ousting Assad.
As a result of the war’s impasse, rising anti-Syrian sentiment in Turkey, and Turkey’s mounting economic burden over the years, Erdoğan wants to reassure his supporters that he was able to resolve the Syrian issue in time for the June 2023 elections.
Despite this strategic and economic imperative, Turkey’s engagement in the Syrian civil war is characterized by accepting Syrian refugees, supplying logistics and ammunition to opposition groups, and deploying TSK members into active war zones, limiting Ankara’s maneuverability.
Ankara must exercise extreme caution and provide security for Syrian rebel elements. In the past, Ankara did not hesitate to use Syrian refugees as a trump card to pressure Greece and the EU to get European Union backing in Syria’s Idlib. Thus, if these elements feel misled by Turkey, the Syrian refugees may turn against Turkey, and Ankara may perceive itself as a victim of a terror wave.
To divert attention away from the antagonism between the two Arab parties, namely the Assad regime and the opposition, Ankara has designated the Kurdish PYD-YPG as the common enemy to unite all belligerent Arab parties on opposing sides. Ankara expects that by implementing such a policy, it will be able to eradicate the Kurdish PYD-YPG autonomous region challenge along its border.
[1] “Fehim Taştekin yorumluyor: Esad’la barış yakın mı? Suriye’de Türkiye’yi ne bekliyor?”, Medyascope, August 12, 2022, https://medyascope.tv/2022/08/12/fehim-tastekin-yorumluyor-esadla-baris-yakin-mi-suriyede-turkiyeyi-ne-bekliyor/ [Accessed: August 14, 2022]
[2] “Suriye politikasında yeni bir döneme mi girildi?”, Yetkin Report, August 10, 2022, https://yetkinreport.com/2022/08/10/suriye-politikasinda-yeni-bir-doneme-mi-girildi/ [Accessed: August 14, 2022]
[3] “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’dan Suriye’ye yeni operasyon sinyali”, BBC Türkçe, May 23, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-61556720 [Accessed: August 14, 2022]
[4] “Suriye politikasında yeni bir döneme mi girildi?”, Yetkin Report, August 10, 2022, https://yetkinreport.com/2022/08/10/suriye-politikasinda-yeni-bir-doneme-mi-girildi/ [Accessed: August 14, 2022]
[5] “Terör örgütü PKK/YPG, rejim bayraklarıyla gizlenmeye çalışıyor”, TRT Haber, July 19, 2022, https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/teror-orgutu-pkkypg-rejim-bayraklariyla-gizlenmeye-calisiyor-695619.html [Accessed: August 14, 2022]
[6] “Rusya, Türkiye’ye ‘Akkuyu’ için 15 milyar dolar kaynak aktarıyor”, AA, July 29, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/rusya-turkiyeye-akkuyu-icin-15-milyar-dolar-kaynak-aktariyor/2648640 [Accessed: August 14, 2022]
[7] “ABD’nin ve Rusya’nın Suriyeli Kürtlere “ihanetleri””, Şarkul Avsat, August 7, 2022, https://turkish.aawsat.com/home/article/3802591/abd%E2%80%99nin-ve-rusya%E2%80%99n%C4%B1n-suriyeli-k%C3%BCrtlere-%E2%80%9Cihanetleri%E2%80%9D [Accessed: August 14, 2022]
[8] “Suriye politikasında yeni bir döneme mi girildi?”, Yetkin Report, August 10, 2022, https://yetkinreport.com/2022/08/10/suriye-politikasinda-yeni-bir-doneme-mi-girildi/ [Accessed: August 14, 2022]
[9] “Çavuşoğlu’nun Suriye Dışişleri Bakanı Mikdad’la görüştüğünü açıklaması ne anlama geliyor?”, BBC Türkçe, August 12, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c72d5eqx385o [Accessed: August 14, 2022]
[10] “Suriye’de ateşi söndürecek adım”, Türkiye, August 9, 2022, https://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/dunya/893820.aspx [Accessed: August 14, 2022]
[11] “Soylu: Azez’de Türk bayrağını yakma girişiminde bulunan iki kişi yakalandı”, BBC Türkçe, August 13, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c80djw5jn8jo [Accessed: August 14, 2022]
[12] “Para alıp halkı kışkırtmışlar”, Türkiye, August 14, 2022, https://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/dunya/896043.aspx [Accessed: August 14, 2022]
[13] “Dışişleri Bakanlığı: Suriye halkıyla dayanışmamız sürecektir”, AA, August 12, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/disisleri-bakanligi-suriye-halkiyla-dayanismamiz-surecektir/2659748 [Accessed: August 14, 2022]
[14] @SeyfEbuBekir, Twitter, August 12, 2022, https://twitter.com/SeyfEbuBekir/status/1558002869781004288?s=20&t=_MNqYbXTWvAnUv5lew5MaA [Accessed: August 14, 2022]
[15] @heshamdrbala, Twitter, August 12, 2022, https://twitter.com/heshamdrbala/status/1557875808856936448?s=20&t=_MNqYbXTWvAnUv5lew5MaA [Accessed: August 14, 2022]
[16] “Suriye’de Türk Bayrağı’nın yakılmasına Suriyelilerden tepki! Suriye geçici hükümeti: “Omuz omuza birlikte savaştık””, Sabah, August 12, 2022, https://www.sabah.com.tr/yasam/suriyede-turk-bayraginin-yakilmasina-suriyelilerden-tepki-suriye-gecici-hukumeti-omuz-omuza-birlikte-savastik-6113493 [Accessed: August 14, 2022]
Photo credit: IMAGO / UPI Photo
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