In the latest JISS podcast, I was joined by Barak Seener, Senior Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, founder of Strategic Intelligentia and host of The Geo Godfather Wars.
Highlights from Barak’s comments:
- Actors frequently prioritize their ideological or political identity over simple cost-benefit calculations.
- The international system is not binary and most international players hedge their bets. Saudi Arabia, India, and Turkey routinely balance Western security guarantees with Eastern economic or political ties.
- Israel possesses unparalleled tactical and operational capabilities, serving as a highly agile defense-tech nation. However, these strengths often mask a deeper vulnerability.
- Executing brilliant operational wins, such as decapitating the leadership of Hamas or Hezbollah does not equal a strategic victory if there is no plan to permanently cement the “day after.” Israel’s adversaries are able to reconstitute themselves rapidly.
- To transition from an unconscious geopolitical actor to a deliberate one, Israel must align its national identity with a cohesive deployment of all its policy tools, integrating trade, technology, and defense into a single, forward-looking strategy.
- Like many Western democracies, Israel’s long-term strategic planning is heavily hindered by short political cycles, coalition politics that marked its system of Proportional Representation, shifting ministerial agendas, and civil service gridlock.
- In the Iran war, military strikes alone that decapitates the senior military echelons are critical but insufficient against a decentralized, horizontal adversary.
A true strategy for regime collapse must include:
- A direct communications campaign aimed at the Iranian populace.
- Active coordination and support for fragmented opposition groups.
- Significant financial inducements to encourage senior IRGC and Basij leaders to defect and provide intelligence.
- Strategic engagement with regional secessionist groups.
For more, tune in into the episode!
Recommended further reading:
What the Failed Oslo Accords Can Teach Us About Prospects for Middle East Peace