Foreign Actors in eastern Jerusalem: A Challenge to Israeli Sovereignty in its Capital

Foreign actors have stepped-up their subversion of Israeli sovereignty in eastern Jerusalem. This includes covert and overt activities, both legal and illegal, ideological and concrete, in the civilian and security spheres. In response, the Israeli government must devise an integrated, inter-ministerial approach to this challenge; prevent illegal activities, especially illegal foreign financing; revise and rigorously implement the law which bars the Palestinian Authority from governmental activity in Jerusalem; and provide enhanced and accessible municipal services to Jerusalemite Arabs, instead of the foreign actors.

The projected gas pipeline between Israel, Cyprus, Greece and Italy confirms that Israel's regional partnership has shifted from Turkey to Greece and that a new energy hub is emerging in the eastern Mediterranean. Yet this welcome geopolitical change has many opponents. Israel will need to act proactively and assess energy-related power struggles within the EU in order to actualize the pipeline.

A Challenge to Israeli National Security Policy.
The construction of the security fence around Jerusalem in 2005 created a civilian, sovereignty, and security challenge in the form of "no man's land" Arab neighborhoods located within Jerusalem but outside the security fence. No law and order obtains in these areas, and they bases of terrorist activity. This paper proposes establishing a joint administration of the IDF, Israel Police, Jerusalem municipality and the national government to increase governance and security in these neighborhoods, involving investment in education, culture, welfare and employment.

Israel’s successful response to the underground threat has significantly limited the strategic abilities of its enemies, just as Israel has severely hampered the efficiency and purposefulness of rocket launches by terrorist organizations. This affords Israel room to maneuver if and when it decides to launch a wide-scale military operation in the Gaza Strip or Lebanon.

The Iraqi Shi'ite militias form a single, numerous and increasingly able component of the military and paramilitary assets available to Iran in its efforts. They substantially increase the scope for Iranian disruption in the region, and may significantly increase Iranian capabilities in the event of a war on Israel’s northern front.

It is highly unlikely that Iran will agree to any limitation on its missile programs, despite Trump administration pressures. For Iran's leadership, to concede on missiles is to concede on the regime’s global ambitions.

Turkey finds itself at a historic junction where it must decide whether to proceed alone by challenging Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus – or whether to embrace regional cooperation.

Advice for Moshe Leon, the incoming Mayor of Jerusalem: Exercise maximum sovereignty and maximal fairness, while seeking to strengthen the unity of Jerusalem; implement Government Decision 3790 to invest NIS 2.1 billion in Arab residents of eastern Jerusalem; advance plans for Jewish and Arab building beyond the 1967 lines in one package; and make higher education and high-quality employment for eastern Jerusalem residents a priority.

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to Oman, the first overt visit in over twenty years by an Israeli prime minister to an Arab country that does not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, is extremely significant. However, formal diplomatic relations between Israel and Arab states will not develop without an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. While it may view positively the steps of other Gulf states to increase the visibility of their ties with Israel and it may even encourage them, Saudi Arabia itself will not formal ties with Israel in the foreseeable future either.

Seventeen years after 9/11, the Long War still lacks a coherent definition. Defeating Islamist totalitarianism in all its forms and factions requires a three-pronged approach that incorporates rather than rejects the key elements of past approaches, supplemented by a solid ideological dimension. Hard power is still crucial, including such measures as destroying Salafi Jihadist forces, maintaining all options to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and re-evaluating the concept of a Western “alliance” with avid supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood such as Turkey and Qatar. At the same time, it is also useful to deny Islamists the leverage of

In recent years there has been much talk in Israel and the US about the “moderate/pragmatic Sunni camp” as a potential regional ally for dealing with Iran and even for pursuing a “creative” solution to the Palestinian issue. However, this “camp” is not really a unified player, but more an expression of Saudi and Emirati aspirations for hegemony. There is also a lack of identity of interests and agendas between these states and Egypt and Jordan, which have long been important strategic partners of Israel. Although Israel should pursue any opportunity to strengthen ties with Arab and Muslim states,

Israel should continue to manage the conflict and advance Palestinian autonomy until the Palestinian Authority is ready to sign an agreement that will satisfy Israeli interests.

The US can and should develop a coherent region-wide strategy, involving US allies including Israel, to impede Iran’s ability to continue developing in ways detrimental to the region’s security. However, Iran is proficient in the practice of using proxies and paramilitary methods, as well as in the combination of paramilitary and political struggle. Its response to a US-led strategy to contain and roll back their influence is likely to focus on these areas.

Assaults on Israeli sovereignty must be met by an Israeli counter-assault.

Arab countries are re-normalizing their relations with the Assad regime, seeking to balance the strong Iranian and Turkish influences in Syria and to achieve some degree of influence in a new Syrian political-strategic structure. This further cements a Russian-oriented strategic architecture in the region. In the long term, this could lead to tensions between conservative Arab states and Israel, if Israel targets the Syrian military and government in the campaign against Iran, or if Israel continues to promote diplomatic recognition of its Golan annexation.

The Iranian media claimed that millions filled the streets on the 40th anniversary of the Iranian revolution. The opposition, however says that fewer people participated. Iran's nuclear program will not protect the regime against the people's antipathy.

One way Iran’s efforts are taking place are below the official Syrian state structures – in the arming and sponsoring of Iran-controlled paramilitary formations on Syria soil.

Lebanon has neither the desire nor the ability to address Hezbollah’s threat to its sovereignty. The likelihood of Lebanon suffering severe damage in a war against Israel does not change this situation.

Russia seeks to be more involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by presenting it as critical to the stability of the whole Middle East. But the legitimacy that it accords to Hamas rules out deeper Russian involvement from Israel’s point of view.

Clear understandings between the political and military echelons are essential in employment of military force and readiness for the next war.

Iran is taking advantage of the crises created by ISIS and the Arab Spring to advance its land route project from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. The American withdrawal from Syria will remove one of the obstacles that stand in Iran’s path, yet Israel has demonstrated its determination to prevent the establishment of this route.

Israel will need to increase the intensity of its operations against the Iranians. US withdrawal from the arena is a good opportunity for Israel to update its strategy in Syria.

The possibility that Iran and Turkey will be emboldened by the American decision, is worrisome. The main counter to that will be robust deterrence from Israel, whose maintenance may increase the likeliness of escalation in Syria and Lebanon, and even more resort to the restraining hand of Russia.

The fitting Israeli response is to demonstrate resilience, and to declare that despite the terror and the pain we will remain in the land of our forefathers.

Military, diplomatic and economic pressures can be brought to bear to preserve SDF and Kurdish autonomy in northeastern Syria, and to deter Turkey and Iran from conquering these areas.

Trump’s hurried exit from Syria, under pressure from a Turkish threat, will be interpreted by all sides as a strategic defeat, an abandonment and a debacle.

Some hard-left Jews are out to sabotage the Birthright program. They are cutting away the limb – love for, and identification with, Israel – upon which all pro-Israel Jewish community activity must be based.

For analytical as well as practical and even political reasons, the time has come to re-define Israel’s place in the world in terms of belonging to the “eastern Mediterranean” region, not the “Middle East.”

Iran, Turkey, Russia and other bad actors threaten Western and Israeli security in this strategic zone.

Israel should pay close attention to the widening rift between two of its largest trading partners. Israel needs to clarify the "rules of the road" with the US and establish rigorous foreign investment screening mechanisms.