Israel and the Gulf States: Some Things Change, Some Stay the Same

It is highly unlikely that Iran will agree to any limitation on its missile programs, despite Trump administration pressures. For Iran's leadership, to concede on missiles is to concede on the regime’s global ambitions.

Turkey finds itself at a historic junction where it must decide whether to proceed alone by challenging Israel, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus – or whether to embrace regional cooperation.

Advice for Moshe Leon, the incoming Mayor of Jerusalem: Exercise maximum sovereignty and maximal fairness, while seeking to strengthen the unity of Jerusalem; implement Government Decision 3790 to invest NIS 2.1 billion in Arab residents of eastern Jerusalem; advance plans for Jewish and Arab building beyond the 1967 lines in one package; and make higher education and high-quality employment for eastern Jerusalem residents a priority.

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to Oman, the first overt visit in over twenty years by an Israeli prime minister to an Arab country that does not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, is extremely significant. However, formal diplomatic relations between Israel and Arab states will not develop without an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. While it may view positively the steps of other Gulf states to increase the visibility of their ties with Israel and it may even encourage them, Saudi Arabia itself will not formal ties with Israel in the foreseeable future either.

Seventeen years after 9/11, the Long War still lacks a coherent definition. Defeating Islamist totalitarianism in all its forms and factions requires a three-pronged approach that incorporates rather than rejects the key elements of past approaches, supplemented by a solid ideological dimension. Hard power is still crucial, including such measures as destroying Salafi Jihadist forces, maintaining all options to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and re-evaluating the concept of a Western “alliance” with avid supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood such as Turkey and Qatar. At the same time, it is also useful to deny Islamists the leverage of

In recent years there has been much talk in Israel and the US about the “moderate/pragmatic Sunni camp” as a potential regional ally for dealing with Iran and even for pursuing a “creative” solution to the Palestinian issue. However, this “camp” is not really a unified player, but more an expression of Saudi and Emirati aspirations for hegemony. There is also a lack of identity of interests and agendas between these states and Egypt and Jordan, which have long been important strategic partners of Israel. Although Israel should pursue any opportunity to strengthen ties with Arab and Muslim states,

Israel should continue to manage the conflict and advance Palestinian autonomy until the Palestinian Authority is ready to sign an agreement that will satisfy Israeli interests.

The US can and should develop a coherent region-wide strategy, involving US allies including Israel, to impede Iran’s ability to continue developing in ways detrimental to the region’s security. However, Iran is proficient in the practice of using proxies and paramilitary methods, as well as in the combination of paramilitary and political struggle. Its response to a US-led strategy to contain and roll back their influence is likely to focus on these areas.

Egyptian President Al-Sisi's greatest challenges are combatting terrorism in Sinai and beyond, spurring economic growth, capitalizing on the country's energy opportunities, carrying forward great national projects, solving the Nile waters challenge posed by Ethiopia, and addressing critics in Europe and the United States. Given the alternatives, it is very much in the interest of Israel and regional allies to assist Sisi, while simultaneously encouraging him to curb some his regime’s most repressive characteristics.

The growth of Israel’s defense industries is a story of success inseparable from the history of the State of Israel and the entire Zionist project. Israel's defense industries are a source of national pride – and rightfully so.

Seventy Years of Alliances and Strategic Cooperation as a Cornerstone of Israeli National Security Policy

Over the years, on and off, the Soviet Union/Russia has sought to maintain good relations both with the Jewish state and with Arab states. Today’s main Russian interest is strengthening its hold in the Middle East and boosting the restoration of its superpower status, while avoiding excessive confrontation with the West. Russia can be expected to take Israeli interests into account only to the degree that this jives with core Russian interests.

Time is on Israel’s side. A review of the balance of power between Israel and its foes; of the domestic features molding Israel’s national power; and of Israel’s standing in the international community, validates the assessment that Israel has the dominant hand for the foreseeable future.

Over the course of 2017, Israel has secured a series of remarkable and even unprecedented diplomatic achievements. This reflects a growing global and regional recognition of a shared threat from totalitarian Islamism, as well as an appreciation of Israel's capacity to contribute to its partners in a variety of fields. Israel must act to build on these gains, and nourish the conditions which allow for them. This includes developing shared interests with several key Arab countries, and prudent management of the conflict with Palestinians.

The ongoing Egyptian military buildup is an enigma. It is an impressive effort in terms of budget, acquisition of modern weaponry, and training. But why is Egypt investing so heavily in its military? Israel has to be wary, even though a military confrontation with Egypt is not expected.

Which type of war should Israel prepare for: Full-scale war against state armies, or a continued series of limited wars where the home front is the main target? Each of these two types of conflict requires a different force-building strategy and different economic investments.

The struggle for sovereignty in Jerusalem has transitioned from the "Jerusalem of Above" – in the sense of the political summits of Oslo and Annapolis – to the "Jerusalem of Below," in the sense of daily life in the city. Governance and sovereign rule in eastern Jerusalem requires a quantum leap in the level of services provided by Israel, alongside effective community policing efforts.

Iran is on the march, presenting a significant security challenge to Israel and to moderate Sunni countries. It is investing blood, figuratively and literally, in realizing its aspirations for a Shiite corridor to the Mediterranean Sea, in strengthening its influence in the region via militia forces, in building a nuclear option, and in threatening Israel.

Israel’s control of Jerusalem provides strategic depth for the coastal plain; vitally links the coast to the Jordan River as Israel’s eastern security border; and ensures the city’s vibrancy. Maintaining a united Jerusalem is a national mission of existential significance.

The recent referendum on Kurdish statehood is an unmitigated failure and seems to have set the Kurds back once again. The Kurds have fundamental issues to sort out, both at home and abroad, before anyone will take a bid for independence seriously.

Israeli sovereignty in united Jerusalem serves as a vital anchor for the regional “Camp of Stability.” This explains Israel’s decision to take Jordanian and Palestinian interests into consideration when restoring the status quo ante following the July violence on the Temple Mount.

Israeli settlement in Judea and Samaria must be renewed as a means of imposing costs on the Palestinian Authority for trying to delegitimize Israel, and in response to strategically-placed Palestinian settlement expansion.

Iran, Turkey, Russia and other bad actors threaten Western and Israeli security in this strategic zone.

Israel should pay close attention to the widening rift between two of its largest trading partners. Israel needs to clarify the "rules of the road" with the US and establish rigorous foreign investment screening mechanisms.

Should a large operation inside Lebanon be considered after Hezbollah's tunnels are successfully neutralized?

It is necessary for Israel’s political and military leaders to readjust their conceptual framework concerning deterrence, and to engage the public in an open and effective dialogue on the deterrence equations. Also needed is a more specific and accurate capacity to strike fear into Hamas leadership by signaling both willingness and ability to destroy the assets that they value most.

Despite the fascist roots of Matteo Salvini's "Liga" party, upgrading relations with the current Italian government serves the national interest because it shall help Israel export it's natural gas to Europe as well as break the European consensus on Iran and on Jerusalem's status.

Israel’s security requirements on other fronts, require containment of the conflict on the southern front, while continuing to build the western Negev notwithstanding Hamas’ arson attempts.

Syrian regime closes accounts with West and Israel-linked rebels, as Iran builds and expands its presence in the area.

Natural gas has turned Greece from a rival to an ally just as relations between Israel and Turkey started deteriorating.

Promoting Israeli ties with African countries should be made a diplomatic priority, as this investment can and will yield ‎economic and political dividends for Israel in the global arena. ‎

The historic renewal of Chad-Israel ties will benefit both nations and shows that PM Benjamin Netanyahu's foreign policy is effective.

Israel's strategy toward China doesn't conflict with American interests; rather, it serves and reinforces them. Partnering with Beijing can help stabilize the Middle East. Partnering with Asian nations threatened by Beijing can help build a counterbalance to Chinese power.

Hezbollah’s leadership has come to realize that harsher US sanctions pose a serious threat to the revolutionary regime in Tehran. It will become increasingly difficult for the regime to finance the full spectrum of its revolutionary ambitions. Hezbollah has therefore had to focus on securing its own sources of funding and providing employment for its members and followers through ever-deeper engagement in Lebanon’s economic and financial spheres of activity.

The challenge now is how to make it clear to the Hamas leadership that it should not believe is own supercilious words.

The Greek-Cypriot-Egyptian summit held last month in Crete focused on energy connectivity and Turkish threats, but it also paid lip service to Egyptian pro-Palestinian messages, which is problematic.

The killing of prominent Arab tribal leader Sheikh Bashir Faisal al-Huwaidi has serious implications for the US and Kurdish administered part of Syria, in which Raqqa is located. That administration of Syria has many enemies and remains fragile.

Only a crushing and devastating blow to Hamas will pave the way for a truce that would not be a victory for the terrorists.

Despite the desire of Arabs in eastern Jerusalem for greater integration in Israeli life, their fear of the Palestinian Authority and its agents kept them away from the polls in October. And while seeking pragmatic and constructive integration in Jerusalem, they still adhere to the Palestinian side of the identity axis. Once again, 38% of the capital city's residents remain outside its political arena.

The Lebanese army should be treated as a hostile entity, its camouflage should be stripped away, and the American administration should be supplied with conclusive evidence of the multi-faceted cooperation between it and Hezbollah.

The assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Istanbul is a fascinating story with potentially far-reaching regional and global implications. How will it affect Israel?

The Saudi Crown Prince isn’t a democrat or a strategic savior, but don’t give the evil leaders of Turkey and Iran a victory by weakening US-Saudi ties.