Israel and the Gulf States: Some Things Change, Some Stay the Same

Advice for Moshe Leon, the incoming Mayor of Jerusalem: Exercise maximum sovereignty and maximal fairness, while seeking to strengthen the unity of Jerusalem; implement Government Decision 3790 to invest NIS 2.1 billion in Arab residents of eastern Jerusalem; advance plans for Jewish and Arab building beyond the 1967 lines in one package; and make higher education and high-quality employment for eastern Jerusalem residents a priority.

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to Oman, the first overt visit in over twenty years by an Israeli prime minister to an Arab country that does not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, is extremely significant. However, formal diplomatic relations between Israel and Arab states will not develop without an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. While it may view positively the steps of other Gulf states to increase the visibility of their ties with Israel and it may even encourage them, Saudi Arabia itself will not formal ties with Israel in the foreseeable future either.

Seventeen years after 9/11, the Long War still lacks a coherent definition. Defeating Islamist totalitarianism in all its forms and factions requires a three-pronged approach that incorporates rather than rejects the key elements of past approaches, supplemented by a solid ideological dimension. Hard power is still crucial, including such measures as destroying Salafi Jihadist forces, maintaining all options to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and re-evaluating the concept of a Western “alliance” with avid supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood such as Turkey and Qatar. At the same time, it is also useful to deny Islamists the leverage of

In recent years there has been much talk in Israel and the US about the “moderate/pragmatic Sunni camp” as a potential regional ally for dealing with Iran and even for pursuing a “creative” solution to the Palestinian issue. However, this “camp” is not really a unified player, but more an expression of Saudi and Emirati aspirations for hegemony. There is also a lack of identity of interests and agendas between these states and Egypt and Jordan, which have long been important strategic partners of Israel. Although Israel should pursue any opportunity to strengthen ties with Arab and Muslim states,

Israel should continue to manage the conflict and advance Palestinian autonomy until the Palestinian Authority is ready to sign an agreement that will satisfy Israeli interests.

The US can and should develop a coherent region-wide strategy, involving US allies including Israel, to impede Iran’s ability to continue developing in ways detrimental to the region’s security. However, Iran is proficient in the practice of using proxies and paramilitary methods, as well as in the combination of paramilitary and political struggle. Its response to a US-led strategy to contain and roll back their influence is likely to focus on these areas.

Egyptian President Al-Sisi's greatest challenges are combatting terrorism in Sinai and beyond, spurring economic growth, capitalizing on the country's energy opportunities, carrying forward great national projects, solving the Nile waters challenge posed by Ethiopia, and addressing critics in Europe and the United States. Given the alternatives, it is very much in the interest of Israel and regional allies to assist Sisi, while simultaneously encouraging him to curb some his regime’s most repressive characteristics.

The growth of Israel’s defense industries is a story of success inseparable from the history of the State of Israel and the entire Zionist project. Israel's defense industries are a source of national pride – and rightfully so.

Seventy Years of Alliances and Strategic Cooperation as a Cornerstone of Israeli National Security Policy

Over the years, on and off, the Soviet Union/Russia has sought to maintain good relations both with the Jewish state and with Arab states. Today’s main Russian interest is strengthening its hold in the Middle East and boosting the restoration of its superpower status, while avoiding excessive confrontation with the West. Russia can be expected to take Israeli interests into account only to the degree that this jives with core Russian interests.

Time is on Israel’s side. A review of the balance of power between Israel and its foes; of the domestic features molding Israel’s national power; and of Israel’s standing in the international community, validates the assessment that Israel has the dominant hand for the foreseeable future.

Over the course of 2017, Israel has secured a series of remarkable and even unprecedented diplomatic achievements. This reflects a growing global and regional recognition of a shared threat from totalitarian Islamism, as well as an appreciation of Israel's capacity to contribute to its partners in a variety of fields. Israel must act to build on these gains, and nourish the conditions which allow for them. This includes developing shared interests with several key Arab countries, and prudent management of the conflict with Palestinians.

The ongoing Egyptian military buildup is an enigma. It is an impressive effort in terms of budget, acquisition of modern weaponry, and training. But why is Egypt investing so heavily in its military? Israel has to be wary, even though a military confrontation with Egypt is not expected.

Which type of war should Israel prepare for: Full-scale war against state armies, or a continued series of limited wars where the home front is the main target? Each of these two types of conflict requires a different force-building strategy and different economic investments.

The struggle for sovereignty in Jerusalem has transitioned from the "Jerusalem of Above" – in the sense of the political summits of Oslo and Annapolis – to the "Jerusalem of Below," in the sense of daily life in the city. Governance and sovereign rule in eastern Jerusalem requires a quantum leap in the level of services provided by Israel, alongside effective community policing efforts.

Iran is on the march, presenting a significant security challenge to Israel and to moderate Sunni countries. It is investing blood, figuratively and literally, in realizing its aspirations for a Shiite corridor to the Mediterranean Sea, in strengthening its influence in the region via militia forces, in building a nuclear option, and in threatening Israel.

Israel’s control of Jerusalem provides strategic depth for the coastal plain; vitally links the coast to the Jordan River as Israel’s eastern security border; and ensures the city’s vibrancy. Maintaining a united Jerusalem is a national mission of existential significance.

The recent referendum on Kurdish statehood is an unmitigated failure and seems to have set the Kurds back once again. The Kurds have fundamental issues to sort out, both at home and abroad, before anyone will take a bid for independence seriously.

Israeli sovereignty in united Jerusalem serves as a vital anchor for the regional “Camp of Stability.” This explains Israel’s decision to take Jordanian and Palestinian interests into consideration when restoring the status quo ante following the July violence on the Temple Mount.

Israeli settlement in Judea and Samaria must be renewed as a means of imposing costs on the Palestinian Authority for trying to delegitimize Israel, and in response to strategically-placed Palestinian settlement expansion.

It is necessary for Israel’s political and military leaders to readjust their conceptual framework concerning deterrence, and to engage the public in an open and effective dialogue on the deterrence equations. Also needed is a more specific and accurate capacity to strike fear into Hamas leadership by signaling both willingness and ability to destroy the assets that they value most.

Despite the fascist roots of Matteo Salvini's "Liga" party, upgrading relations with the current Italian government serves the national interest because it shall help Israel export it's natural gas to Europe as well as break the European consensus on Iran and on Jerusalem's status.

Israel’s security requirements on other fronts, require containment of the conflict on the southern front, while continuing to build the western Negev notwithstanding Hamas’ arson attempts.

Syrian regime closes accounts with West and Israel-linked rebels, as Iran builds and expands its presence in the area.

Natural gas has turned Greece from a rival to an ally just as relations between Israel and Turkey started deteriorating.

Promoting Israeli ties with African countries should be made a diplomatic priority, as this investment can and will yield ‎economic and political dividends for Israel in the global arena. ‎

The historic renewal of Chad-Israel ties will benefit both nations and shows that PM Benjamin Netanyahu's foreign policy is effective.

Israel's strategy toward China doesn't conflict with American interests; rather, it serves and reinforces them. Partnering with Beijing can help stabilize the Middle East. Partnering with Asian nations threatened by Beijing can help build a counterbalance to Chinese power.

Hezbollah’s leadership has come to realize that harsher US sanctions pose a serious threat to the revolutionary regime in Tehran. It will become increasingly difficult for the regime to finance the full spectrum of its revolutionary ambitions. Hezbollah has therefore had to focus on securing its own sources of funding and providing employment for its members and followers through ever-deeper engagement in Lebanon’s economic and financial spheres of activity.

The challenge now is how to make it clear to the Hamas leadership that it should not believe is own supercilious words.

The Greek-Cypriot-Egyptian summit held last month in Crete focused on energy connectivity and Turkish threats, but it also paid lip service to Egyptian pro-Palestinian messages, which is problematic.

The killing of prominent Arab tribal leader Sheikh Bashir Faisal al-Huwaidi has serious implications for the US and Kurdish administered part of Syria, in which Raqqa is located. That administration of Syria has many enemies and remains fragile.

Only a crushing and devastating blow to Hamas will pave the way for a truce that would not be a victory for the terrorists.

Despite the desire of Arabs in eastern Jerusalem for greater integration in Israeli life, their fear of the Palestinian Authority and its agents kept them away from the polls in October. And while seeking pragmatic and constructive integration in Jerusalem, they still adhere to the Palestinian side of the identity axis. Once again, 38% of the capital city's residents remain outside its political arena.

The Lebanese army should be treated as a hostile entity, its camouflage should be stripped away, and the American administration should be supplied with conclusive evidence of the multi-faceted cooperation between it and Hezbollah.

The assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Istanbul is a fascinating story with potentially far-reaching regional and global implications. How will it affect Israel?

The Saudi Crown Prince isn’t a democrat or a strategic savior, but don’t give the evil leaders of Turkey and Iran a victory by weakening US-Saudi ties.

Amidst violent events, it is easy to be tempted to seek decisive "solutions" to the Palestinian problem(s) – in both the PA areas and in Gaza – through drastic military action, or through equally dramatic concessions. But given the lessons of recent history, as well as the unpredictable nature of regional events, it makes sense to adhere to "conflict management" and piecemeal arrangements. This is not as a cowardly choice by hapless political and military leaders, but as a rational choice in irrational circumstances; even more so when the Iranian challenge looms larger than ever on Israel's immediate horizons.

In the past decade, relations between Israel and China have become closer, following a decision in Jerusalem to diversify and expand Israel's ties with emerging powers and countries that do not belong to the European Union and are less identified with the American coalition. The visit to Israel by China's vice president is evidence of the warming of relations between the two countries.

Israel's actions (or at times, inaction) concerning the future of the Gaza Strip cannot be isolated from the broader context of the struggle over the entire region's balance of power. Gaza’s dependence on Egypt, and perhaps Cyprus, constitutes a common interest of the “camp of stability” in the Middle East, to curb the influence of both Turkey and Iran, and to deny Abu Mazen the baneful position of a spoiler.

Reducing enemy capabilities and ambitions in Gaza requires Israeli military readiness and government willingness to use force intermittingly, while maintaining a healthy and resilient Israeli home front.

Iran and the smaller terrorist groups in Gaza want a full-scale war with Israel. Hamas does not. Israel should land a decisive, well-defined blow but back Egyptian efforts to broker a cease-fire.

Although Hamas' cyber capabilities do not now constitute a serious threat to Israel, this reality can quickly change in view of the rapid pace of technological progress.

Russia's accusations against Israel that it is responsible for the downing of its plane is meant primarily for a domestic audience. Until now, Russia has made sure to behave with restraint in the Syrian arena and to operate based on its strategic interests. One of those interests is the Russian desire to minimize Iranian involvement in Syria.

The INSS unilateral disengagement plan is neither new nor logical.

Israel must continue to take the offensive against Iran’s nuclear program, without reliance on international inspectors.

In the absence of a clear American or Turkish determination to confront Iranian encroachment, only Israel has the power to stop it.

Germany is being inconsistent and duplicitous and the time has come to say it loud and clear.

The downing of a Russian plane by Syrian artillery after an Israeli strike proves how vital it is to maintain open lines of communications between Israel and Russia. The IDF may have to exercise more restraint, but it will still do what it must.

Iran is hiding its efforts to establish a presence in Syria, for both internal and external reasons. This policy involves numerous internal contradictions and to avoid admitting to them, the IRGC and Hezbollah are conducting a propaganda campaign.

While Israel should steer away from overt identification with internal challengers in Iran, this is the time to urge the US. and other like-inded nations to ratchet up the pressure on the regime, explaining to the Iranian people the growing cost of their leaders' ambitions.

In the Mideast of today, the US is largely irrelevant, when it is not disruptive, and is certainly not providing clear leadership. With the current disarray in DC, it does not look like this will change any time soon.

Israel has fully joined the battle in Syria—but it's not clear it can achieve any of its goals there.

On restoring relations between Tehran and Washington. If the protests in Iran expand, Trump will be able to exert greater pressure on Tehran.

Russia is actively promoting international involvement in the reconstruction of Syria as a humanitarian effort aimed at creating the conditions for refugees to return, but in practice this will reinforce the foundations of Assad’s rule and territorial control. The US is in no hurry to respond, but the Russian initiative will not remain unanswered.

The US is failing to appreciate the significance of the leverage points that the Syrian arena provides for Russia. This leverage allows Russia to exact a heavy toll for the measures the US is demanding.

Iran's goal in its activity in the Western Sahara is to subvert Morocco, a moderate Sunni state, as part of the Iranian regime's policy of spreading the Shi'ite revolution.