Time for an Israeli Peace Initiative

UAVs, which used to be supportive weapons systems, are rapidly maturing into decisive weapons. Israel now faces threats from the entire spectrum of unmanned aerospace vehicles, ranging from Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) to Kamikaze drones and precision ballistic missiles.

Under Erdogan's leadership, Turkey threatens the stability of the region and Israel’s interests too.

Iran’s space program is more than a by-product of its missile program. It is central to the Islamic Republic's quest for regional hegemony and global power.

When Israel declares sovereignty in the Jordan Valley and the Jerusalem Envelope, this must be accompanied by significant economic development and construction.

Iraq is ripe for a nationalist, public-service driven politics where good governance is more important than identity. If Iraqi leaders, with US support, can move the country in a new direction, Iran’s ability to take advantage of Iraqi state weakness to threaten Israel will be drastically curtailed.

This paper reviews the responses of Middle Eastern countries to the spread of the coronavirus and highlights diplomatic and defense implications stemming from the situation. The assessment of JISS fellows is that the coronavirus crisis will not fundamentally change power dynamics in the region or alter the prevailing ambitions and policies of key countries.

Israel should navigate its path based on the assumption that it cannot, at least not in this generation, fundamentally change the situation in the Middle East, neither by political agreements nor by using military force.

Since 2014, Sisi and Putin have brought Egyptian and Russian interests into closer alignment. While Egypt wants to maintain its strategic relationship with the US, it desires to diversify its sources of support. It is in Israel's interest that America maintains its influence in Egypt, and that the common Egyptian and Russian effort in Libya will prevail over Turkey's influence.

A key aspect of the ongoing political crisis in Iraq is the anger directed at foreign meddling, and specifically, at the role played by Iran and its proxies. The IRGC Qods Force has penetrated deep into Iraqi power structures over the last 15 years. Weakening and possibly reducing this Iranian grip, through an appeal to Iraqi nationalism, will not solve Iraq's profound problems. Among other challenges, the Islamic State still has influence in some Sunni areas. Nevertheless, countering Iran's power is still an achievable goal, worth pursuing.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad is ideologically, financially and militarily dependent on Tehran, and it plays an important role in Iran's war against Israel. The IRGC makes use of a range of institutions and charitable foundations that support PIJ. It is important that these be sanctioned by the US.

Most of the regional players are wary an escalation between the US and Iran, a conflict which would be conducted across the Middle East and will have wide implications. If Iranian miscalculation leads President Trump to commit to a significant campaign against Tehran, countries wary of Iranian influence could change their posture, and become more explicitly in line with American positions and interests.

A worldwide network of terrorist groups and alliances is Iran’s strategic weapon for any military escalation scenario. A systematic counterterrorist strategy is necessary to deprive Iran of this powerful tool.

The key to avoiding a Saudi-style debacle in Israel is prior intelligence and seamless early warning systems.

Recent events in Iraq's Nineveh Province demonstrate the apparent helplessness of the Iraqi government in the face of Iran-backed Shia militias.

The taking out of the senior Iranian nuclear scientist is a blow to the Iranian leadership as much as the killing of Qassem Suleimani was. But it is also a signal to the next administration in Washington. The president-elect will not be able to deal with the Iranian nuclear project like just another diplomatic issue.

Israel should seek to persuade the Biden transition team not to offer Iran any premature concessions; it should outline what would constitute an acceptable, "stronger and longer" deal; find other international actors to support the policy suggested by Israel (possibly France and even Russia); and prepare a viable military option, both to strengthen America’s negotiating hand and as an option in the case of failure to reverse Iran's present course.

To acquire greater freedom of action in dealing with Iran's quest for nuclear weapons, Israel needs to minimize tensions with the US on the Palestinian front.

As the largest arms supplier to the Middle East, America plays a critical role in ensuring that its sales uphold and do not adversely affect Israel’s security.

Trump's Middle East peace plan and the recent Israel-Arab peace accords limit Chinese influence in the region. Countering this, China is advancing a collective security concept for the region based on the JCPOA. The US and Israel must stymie this Chinese gambit and reinforce the Abraham Accords.

From his rejection of Obama-era political correctness to his family make-up, Trump has charmed Israelis.

Egypt's public welcome of the normalization between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain and Sudan is one of the payoffs emerging from the important Egypt-Israel partnership in the eastern Mediterranean.

Prime Minister Rabin insisted on defensible borders. He never entertained a return to the 1967 borders nor any territorial swaps.

The efforts of Moscow to assert itself as a power in the eastern Mediterranean should sound a cautionary note.

China aims to play a more proactive role in the Middle East, maintaining cordial relations with all rival countries. Beijing attaches great importance to its ties with Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Egypt, and therefore has welcomed the Abraham Accords (albeit in lukewarm fashion, because of tensions with the Trump administration).

The talks suggest that when common interests exist, Israel can engage beneficially and pragmatically even with enemies, resulting in de-escalation and mutual benefit.

The current political situation in Lebanon is very problematic. Hizbullah enjoys full freedom of action in a country which long ago became dysfunctional. Hence the importance of lending support to the French effort to bring about systemic change in the Lebanese confessional order. Further descent into chaos and/or growing intervention by Turkey would be even more dangerous for Israel.

Israel should reject any overtures from the Assad government, and help keep “maximum pressure” on the regime.

Turkey wants to have it both ways: To act against the Salafists, while using them as dispensable mercenaries against the Kurds.

Turkey’s ambitious and expansionist leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has capitalized on the end of the Cold War and on US isolationist tendencies in enhancing Turkey’s international standing.