Iran emerged badly battered from the war waged against it by the United States and Israel, but nevertheless secured a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Washington that is widely perceived as a diplomatic victory over the world’s greatest power. This impression will not fade quickly even if the MoU collapses as a result of Iran’s “triumphalism” and its violations. While its future remains unclear after President Donald Trump declared the MoU “dead” on July 8, this article examines the circumstances that led to its signature and the global implications.
President Trump’s decision to sign the MoU reflects his priorities: domestic politics matter more than strategic considerations. Lowering oil prices ahead of the November 2026 midterm elections took precedence over preventing nuclear proliferation and defeating rogue states that challenge the world order. Given what we know about how politicians think, Trump’s decision to prioritize electoral prospects is not surprising.
Likewise, Western states refrained from supporting the war against Iran and from responding to President Trump’s call to join the short-lived attempt to escort oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz against Iran’s wishes—reflecting the West’s broader reluctance to confront bullying states.
Unlike in the past, this time it was the U.S. that led the capitulation to the economic extortion of Iran’s religious zealots. Iran’s demand to collect transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz, and Washington’s agreement to recognize Iran’s (and Oman’s) right to “manage” the international waterway (Article 5 of the MoU), set a dangerous precedent. Other countries bordering international shipping lanes could follow Iran’s example in violating international law.
The United States—whose Marine Corps still takes pride to this day in having fought pirates and ransom demands in the Mediterranean, far from American shores, as early as the 19th century—capitulated to Iran when it blocked the Strait of Hormuz. Having imposed its own blockade on the strait for ships traveling to and from Iranian ports, the U.S. lost its patience just as Iran was heading toward economic collapse. Every war involves two equations: the first measures which side can inflict greater damage, while the second focuses on each side’s capacity to endure pain. Iran’s higher tolerance for suffering compared to that of the U.S. made it the winner in this violent test of wills.
The rise in fuel prices ahead of the midterm elections apparently overshadowed other considerations in Washington, producing a form of strategic blindness. The world watched a global power fold before a determined group of Islamic extremists. The Iranian regime remains in place, sealing the fate of its people to suffer longer under cruel tyranny, since “help is not on the way.” Washington pledged in the MoU to refrain from interfering in Iran’s internal affairs (Article 2), thereby relinquishing its claim to be the world’s beacon of democracy and its defender. The memorandum and America’s subsequent conduct will certainly not make it “great again.”
The MoU constitutes a blow to American deterrence. It appears to be a victory for the isolationist wing of the Republican Party and carries troubling implications for the international community. The majority in both houses of Congress that voted to end the war signals exhaustion and war fatigue. These developments, together with the Trump administration’s problematic treatment of NATO allies and partners in other regions, erode the credibility of the American security umbrella and reinforce the existing tendency among allies to doubt Washington’s commitment to honoring its obligations.
Moreover, despite Trumpist bravado, the goal of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons has been sidelined. The Iranians succeeded in deferring discussion of the nuclear issue while receiving substantial funds and sanctions relief from the very start of the negotiations. It is difficult to see how the Trump administration will secure nuclear concessions without resorting to military force—an option it is now clearly reluctant to use.
What we are likely witnessing is a replay of Trump’s first-term diplomacy toward North Korea. Then, he held several summit meetings with that country’s leader in pursuit of denuclearization, only to lose interest after meeting persistent resistance and set the issue aside. Iranian intransigence may well elicit the same response. The MoU’s acknowledgment that Iran will retain its current nuclear capabilities (Article 9) amounts to an endorsement of proliferation, increasing other states’ inclination to pursue nuclear options of their own.
Indeed, against the backdrop of Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats, the nuclear weapons debate has been renewed in Europe. This discussion has been further fueled by the cracks in NATO. Turkey’s leader has already declared that he finds it unacceptable for others to possess nuclear weapons while his country does not. South Korea and Japan are witnessing active public debate on the nuclear question, and Australia has rekindled a similar conversation. In the Middle East, the first signs of a nuclear arms race are already visible, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and the Emirates as the most likely candidates.
The MoU strengthens Iran and its regime with a massive infusion of cash. It confers legitimacy on Iran’s presence in Lebanon and rescues its proxy, Hezbollah, from the IDF’s heavy hand — contrary to the position of the Lebanese government, which is finally daring to demand the disarmament of the Shiite militia. The agreement gives a tailwind to radical Islamists in the Middle East and beyond. The involvement of Qatar, which supports Muslim extremists worldwide, and of Pakistan, whose military rulers continually court radical Islamist circles, further empowers the fiercest enemies of the U.S., moderate Arab regimes, and Israel.
Washington also committed to withdrawing its forces from Iran’s vicinity, a clause that enables Tehran to continue pressing for the removal of American bases from Gulf states. The memorandum is a display of American weakness that will only invite further aggression against the U.S. and its allies. Indeed, some Gulf partners are already recalibrating their foreign policies, having lost confidence in Washington and needing to accommodate Iran’s rising regional influence.
The disregard for Israel—an ally that was willing to fight alongside the U.S. against Iran, unlike many others—further damages American credibility. The MoU also undermines the peace process in which the U.S. has been so heavily invested. That process rests on the foundation of a strong Israel backed by a committed United States.
In the near term, the memorandum also complicates Israeli military planning against Iran’s nuclear program—the only realistic means of thwarting it—and risks its most alarming consequence: a nuclear-armed Middle East. A multipolar nuclear Middle East would be a strategic nightmare. Israel, as it has done in the past, must seize every opportune moment to prevent additional states in the region from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Against the backdrop of the worldwide unraveling of alliances, Israel must navigate its relationship with the U.S. with great care. As a small country, Israel has no substitute for its partnership with the United States. It must redouble its efforts to sustain bipartisan support in Washington and maintain its standing among the broader American public. Despite everything, Israel remains a critically important strategic asset—particularly in a region where the U.S. has no other genuine friends who share its core values and have the capability and will to fight. One can only hope that Washington will overcome its isolationist impulses.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
