The authors thank Robert Luft, a Bitcoin mining infrastructure developer and U.S. Army veteran, for his comments and insights.
Introduction
Israel should prepare for possible economic and banking sanctions, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned in October 2026, pointing to blockchain and cryptocurrencies as possible tools within what he called a “bypass economy.”[1] While his remarks do not mean sanctions have already been imposed on Israel or are certain to be imposed in the future, political developments in the United States and Europe make such a scenario possible. The importance of the remarks lies in the fact that by raising the prospect of blocked payments, Netanyahu moved the issue from theory to practical national planning. That planning must assess digital money’s capabilities, limits, and costs.
Digital currencies could strengthen Israel’s financial resilience under sanctions, but their contribution has limits. Digital payment infrastructure can support domestic payments during disruptions, diversify settlement channels, and reduce reliance on a single provider. They cannot override the power of states, banks, insurers, ports, manufacturers, or technology providers to refuse a transaction. An alternative payment system cannot by itself persuade anyone to sell Israel goods or services, including weapons.
Israel needs a financial continuity strategy for sanctions scenarios, including the use of digital-asset tools. Preventing sanctions and preserving confidence in the financial system remain preferable, but preparation should also build backup capacity for online payments, settlement channels, links to friendly systems, liquidity reserves, and emergency procedures.
This analysis examines crypto assets’ technological and financial foundations, the threat of financial sanctions to Israel’s economy, and the debate over crypto solutions. It develops practical recommendations for balancing resilience with Israel’s integration into the global economy. The analysis distinguishes three types of digital money: decentralized cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin; stablecoins, usually pegged to the dollar or another asset; and central bank digital currencies. In Israel’s case, the digital shekel is a liability of the Bank of Israel. Calling all three “digital currency” obscures the essential differences in their legal status, value stability, privacy, liquidity, and the state’s ability to operate the system.
Technological, Financial, and Historical Background
Global payment arrangements evolved from commodity-based systems such as gold and silver to currencies controlled by central banks. Cross-border payments later came to rely on clearance networks such as SWIFT. The 2008 financial crisis marked a paradigm shift with Bitcoin’s emergence as the first monetary network without an issuer or central clearing authority.[2]
Blockchain is a publicly verifiable, distributed ledger that lets parties transfer value without intermediaries such as commercial banks or a central clearing system. Its advantage is that its records are generally secure against unilateral alteration or manipulation. That security, however, comes at a cost in speed and efficiency, and errors are very difficult to correct. If someone loses a digital key, the money is lost as well. Moreover, a breach at an exchange or custodian—a risk that has materialized before—can affect many users.[3]
Blockchain and crypto assets have become a key tool for countries under sanctions, including Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, to try to bypass Western banking and rules enforced by U.S. and European regulators such as OFAC.[4] The same technology has also been openly adopted by other governments. In March 2025, the United States established a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve by executive order.[5] New Hampshire and Texas enacted laws allowing state governments to hold Bitcoin with public funds.[6] Bhutan has mined Bitcoin using hydroelectric power as part of a national strategy. Ukraine received tens of millions of dollars in digital-asset donations within days of Russia’s 2022 invasion and used them to purchase supplies.[7]
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are digital money that is not a liability of any state or institution. Markets set their value, which can be volatile. They can serve as investments or ways to transfer value, but they struggle to perform all three functions of money: a stable unit of account, a widely used medium of exchange, and a store of value. Moreover, they provide only partial anonymity. Account addresses do not carry names, but transaction records are public, and analysts can often identify users by combining network analysis with information from exchanges.
A central bank digital currency is sovereign money and a direct liability of the central bank. The Bank of Israel is studying a digital shekel that would operate alongside cash and bank accounts and be available to the public and businesses. Its goals include increased competition, innovation, and resilience in the payments system. The Bank of Israel’s 2025 progress report on the project, published in May 2026, concluded that the expected economic benefits outweigh the costs, though no final decision has been made to issue it.[8]
The types of digital money described above differ in who issues them: private companies issue stablecoins, the Bank of Israel would issue a digital shekel, while Bitcoin has no issuer. New Bitcoin enters circulation through mining, in which specialized computers use electricity to perform calculations; the rate of those calculations is called hashrate. Mining is the only way to obtain new Bitcoin without relying on another party to transfer it. Miners still buy equipment, hosting, and electricity on commercial terms. Because those services can be sourced from a wider range of suppliers, mining shifts some reliance from banks and exchanges to a supplier base that is easier to diversify.
Bitcoin mining is not tied to one location. Machines owned by an Israeli entity could operate in any friendly country with surplus electricity, and the Bitcoin they produce is the same wherever they are. Ownership and control of the machines, and where their output goes, therefore matter more than their location. Mining has spread to places with low-cost or surplus power: Paraguay has surplus hydroelectricity; Oman and the United Arab Emirates have government programs based on cheap electricity; and Norway and Finland produce low-cost hydropower and wind power. The equipment market is mature, and operators can buy or host capacity commercially and move it elsewhere.
Bitcoin transactions go through three stages. When a user broadcasts a transaction, it reaches nearly every computer running Bitcoin software within seconds. Each computer, or node, keeps a full copy of the ledger. Miners collect pending transactions into a proposed block and compete to add it to the chain. The winning miner has already chosen which transactions to include in a block. Most miners combine their computing power in pools, which build blocks on their behalf. That makes the pool a key point of control.
A state with its own mining pool and computing power can build blocks and choose which transactions to include. The pool can select transactions only for the blocks it finds, in proportion to its share of global computing power. At a 1 percent share, it would find a block about once every 17 hours on average.[9] For an economy planning to cope with limited access to international payment channels, this means another actor cannot prevent its transactions from being included in the network indefinitely.
Instead of having to rely on foreign exchanges, access services, or cloud providers, a country can connect to digital currencies through its own nodes and mining pool. The capability is limited, but Israel could build it in advance as part of routine infrastructure planning.
Over recent decades, Israel has developed into a free-market economy closely connected to the Western financial system. International trade, access to U.S. and European capital markets, foreign direct investment (FDI), the high-tech sector, and the defense industries form the backbone of Israel’s macroeconomic resilience. In recent years, awareness has grown of both the benefits and the risks of digital assets. The Bank of Israel and the Israel Securities Authority are advancing crypto-market regulation to encourage technological innovation and prevent money laundering. Traditionally, however, digital assets were viewed as an investment channel or a field of technological activity, not as macroeconomic infrastructure intended to replace currency or settlement systems.
Paying a foreign supplier from Israel depends on a chain that passes through sending and receiving banks, correspondent banks, currency conversion, anti-money-laundering checks, trade credit, and insurance. A blockchain can move value even when a bank refuses a payment, but it cannot make a supplier accept it, require a bank to convert it into local currency, persuade an insurer to cover the shipment, or make a shipping company carry the goods. If the supplier needs dollars, euros, or bank credit, the transaction still depends on the financial system targeted by sanctions. Even a liquid digital asset needs a way into and out of the real economy.
Over recent decades, financial sanctions have expanded from targeted account freezes into a broad political and geoeconomic tool. As a result of U.S. dominance of global finance, especially its leverage over SWIFT, entities can be cut off from international trade. After Russia invaded Ukraine, restrictions on Russian banks and asset freezes prompted efforts to develop alternative payment systems. Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea have used various methods, including cryptocurrencies, barter, and shell companies.
Analyzing the Threat
The threat of sanctions is real and Israel must prepare for extreme scenarios that could disrupt its main trade and financial routes. Netanyahu’s call for independent infrastructure and the ability to operate in crypto reflects recognition that normal conditions can change suddenly. SWIFT and major clearing systems are subject to the laws and authorities of the countries where they operate. If Israeli banks lose access, imports, exports, capital raising, and debt service could all suffer; the scale of the harm would depend on the sanctions imposed, the number of entities affected, and alternative payment and clearance options. Sanctions can target any link in the chain, from the Israeli government or a particular bank to a company, an individual, or an entire sector. The threat of secondary sanctions can also cause foreign entities to avoid transactions so they do not lose access to larger markets.
Several possible sanctions scenarios exist. First, targeted sanctions could be imposed on individuals, organizations, or companies. Their direct effect on the economy as a whole would be relatively limited, but it could spread if banks and suppliers avoid dealing with additional parties to reduce their exposure. Second, restrictions could be imposed on one or more Israeli banks, disrupting trade payments, credit lines, and transfers by businesses and individuals. Third, sectoral sanctions could target areas such as defense, technology, minerals, or settlements. Fourth, systemic isolation could restrict all banks, credit card companies, and access to major markets. The broader the scenario, the less likely an alternative payment rail alone would be to limit the damage.
Legal sanctions are not the only risk: banks, insurers, suppliers, or investors may also reduce activity with Israel because of public pressure or their own risk assessments, even without an explicit legal ban. An alternative payment method cannot overcome that reluctance, as the obstacle is the other party’s unwillingness to complete the transaction, not a technical limitation.
Israel is a small, open economy, whose strength depends on deep ties to global markets, capital, research, and supply chains. Exports of technology services, foreign investment, purchases of medical equipment, and imports of energy, food, chips, and defense inputs all depend on trust. Because the shekel is not a global currency, foreign trade requires conversion into other currencies. Large foreign-currency reserves will not offer full protection if Israel cannot transfer them, use them to pay suppliers, or use them to insure transactions. Israel’s regulated, highly concentrated banking system is connected to Western systems; that supports stability in normal times but also creates vulnerabilities. Dependence on cloud providers, software, databases, identification systems, and credit-card companies adds another layer of technological vulnerability, and sanctions on a major provider could worsen financial damage.
Most widely used stablecoins are managed by private companies subject to U.S. or other Western law. Their issuers can freeze wallets and block funds directly in the code, often at the touch of a button. U.S. law requires them to have that technical capability. Under the GENIUS Act, enacted in July 2025, an issuer may issue payment stablecoins only if it can technically comply with lawful orders to seize, freeze, or block the coins—and will do so if required.[10] Using stablecoins to evade sanctions shifts enforcement power from banks to foreign private companies that can immobilize a state’s assets.
A government or system-wide shift to crypto to circumvent international mechanisms, including anti-money-laundering rules, could lead international authorities and organizations involved in assessing financial risk to view Israel’s system as riskier. These could include money laundering and Anti-Terror financing authorities and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). As a result, foreign banks and institutions, including those in countries that impose no direct sanctions on Israel, might then conduct more stringent checks and cut back ties.
The Israeli economy imports and exports large volumes of energy, food, raw materials, and defense products. Crypto markets may not have enough liquidity to support transactions at that scale without sharp price swings, high conversion costs, or exposure to manipulation. These markets also carry operational risks. Traditional financial systems can sometimes reverse mistaken transfers or provide legal and regulatory remedies. On blockchain networks and in smart contracts, by contrast, a software bug, infrastructure breach, or exploited vulnerability can cause losses that are difficult to recover. Government use of digital assets therefore requires custody, oversight, and recovery mechanisms beyond code alone.
Decentralized networks such as Ethereum and Bitcoin still depend on services outside the protocol, including exchanges, access apps, and cloud providers. A state or coalition of countries could pressure those providers, block access to their services, or require them to filter certain transactions and addresses. Such steps would not necessarily erase a confirmed blockchain transaction or shut down the whole network, but they could make it much harder for Israeli users to convert and hold assets and use them for trade.
Declaring crypto an alternative payment channel could trigger the very reaction Israel wants to avoid: foreign banks might tighten scrutiny, technology companies could reduce their exposure, and commercial partners might see risk in every Israeli payment. At the same time, Netanyahu has called for urgent development of national infrastructure to operate in this field. If Israel refrains from developing alternatives or delays preparation, it could be left without options in an extreme scenario.
Proposed Courses of Action
Given the need to prepare for extreme geopolitical scenarios, and at the same time the dangers inherent in replacing Israel’s financial system with shadow mechanisms, a multidimensional approach is required. The best remedy for sanctions is to prevent them by preserving and strengthening relations with the United States and, as far as possible, the European Union. Proactive diplomacy and preventing regulatory escalation with international oversight bodies are far preferable to developing emergency mechanisms. Still, Israel must consider the possibility that a future U.S. administration may weigh imposing economic sanctions on the country, and it must prepare for that scenario.
In an emergency, digital currencies and technological infrastructures could make four contributions: provide backup payment capacity; enable limited offline payments between devices to keep local activity going during outages; make guarantees and settlement more efficient through programmable money; and establish security standards in advance.
The Bank of Israel’s accelerated development and implementation of a digital shekel will provide the benefits of financial innovation and more efficient payments under full Israeli sovereignty, with transparent regulation and safeguards against misuse. A digital shekel could be vital to maintaining activity inside Israel during a commercial disruption, but it would not provide foreign currency or access to foreign banks. Stablecoins may offer global liquidity, but private companies can freeze them. Bitcoin resists centralized freeze orders, yet its volatility, limited market capacity, and the risk that blockchain analysis could expose transactions make it problematic for trade on a national scale.
The question that arises is whether Israel should hold Bitcoin as a reserve asset. A state purchase of Bitcoin reserve affects the market price and exposes holdings. Reserves built through mining reduce that risk. Rather than buying Bitcoin on an exchange, the state pays for equipment and electricity. Mining has no effect on the market price and involves no intermediary who could refuse a transfer. The holdings remain visible on the public ledger. Bhutan built its holdings through mining powered by government hydroelectricity; Kazakhstan’s 2026 program gives large, approved miners long-term electricity contracts in return for a share of their output, which is transferred to a national fund.[11] For Israel, the policy question is whether to own mining capacity while also buying Bitcoin.
Israel’s first priority should be to reduce the risk of sanctions. The Foreign Ministry, Finance Ministry, Bank of Israel, and National Security Council should jointly track proposed laws and pressure on companies. Israel should set clear rules for legitimate crypto activity, allowing firms to operate under close supervision without turning the country into a sanctions-evasion haven. It should state explicitly that it does not regard crypto as a tool for violating foreign law, but as a means of sustaining permitted activity and protecting citizens. That declared policy would distinguish lawful management of technological risks from a clandestine economy.
The Bank of Israel should also complete a road map for the digital shekel. The system should support offline payments, protect privacy, and include mechanisms to address lost wallets. To protect financial stability, it should set holding limits and use tailored models to prevent capital flight and panic withdrawals from banks during a crisis.
To ensure resilience, Israel should avoid relying on any one technology. It should preserve cash, strengthen domestic settlement, maintain backup communications, and prioritize government payments such as wages, benefits, fuel, food, and energy. It should develop emergency procedures and use a national testing environment to rehearse cloud-provider outages and surges in demand for cash. Regulation should set reserve requirements and customer protections, require external audits of stablecoin issuers, and diversify liquid reserves across currencies and financial centers.
In an emergency, securing the physical supply of critical goods—not making payments—will be the main challenge. Israel will need strategic stockpiles, alternative suppliers, and backup government guarantees and trade insurance for weapons, medicines, food, energy, and chips. It should expand credit and currency-swap arrangements with reliable partners abroad. The National Security Council should lead a permanent working group to develop emergency scenarios and review readiness with the cabinet, while the Bank of Israel remains independent. Israel should implement preparations in stages and measure readiness by recovery speed, financial liquidity, and public confidence.
Finally, Israel should establish a targeted emergency financing facility for small and medium-sized businesses, which are likely to be the first to fail during a crisis or banking cutoff because they lack ready access to credit. It should also prepare to keep financial communications and cybersecurity systems operating, including by maintaining local cloud infrastructure in the event that foreign providers cut service or of cyberattacks targeting the banking system.
Conclusion
The threat of financial sanctions requires Israel to prepare national contingency plans that distinguish scenarios involving localized disruptions from proposals that claim to replace the international financial system. Targeted sanctions, restrictions on banks, sectoral sanctions, and systemic isolation are distinct threats. Each has different levels of severity, vulnerabilities, and required responses.
Digital currencies can strengthen Israel’s resilience, but they cannot end its dependence on markets, suppliers, banks, insurers, and foreign technology systems. Stablecoins remain subject to their issuers and the laws that govern them. Bitcoin and decentralized networks are more resistant to centralized freeze orders, but remain exposed to volatility, limited liquidity, operational risks, and pressure on exchanges, custodians, and access points. Israel can mine Bitcoin itself, giving the currency an essential role in the country’s economic continuity plan. Digital assets can diversify payment channels and provide limited room to maneuver, but they will struggle to serve as a full substitute for the financial system and the supply chains on which Israel depends.
The digital shekel’s main contribution would be to strengthen continuity of operations within Israel. A design that combines offline payments, privacy protections, recovery mechanisms, holding limits, and the ability to operate during an outage at a commercial provider could reduce reliance on a single point of failure. But a digital shekel is not foreign currency, and it cannot ensure that a foreign supplier will accept payment or provide goods in exchange. Its national value would be greater if it were developed as part of a broader system of payment infrastructure, cash, domestic settlement, communications backup, and agreed connectivity with the systems of friendly countries.
Israel’s policy should therefore combine two complementary efforts. First, it should prevent isolation by strengthening diplomatic relations, building trust, and protecting its standing in the global economy; it should also deepen foreign ties and expand its influence in Asia, Eastern Europe, and South America. Second, Israel should build emergency backup capacity through early warning, multiple payment options, a road map for the digital shekel, and regulation of the crypto market.
These preparations cannot rely on technology alone. They require interministerial coordination, regular drills, protection of cloud and cyber infrastructure, indexes to measure readiness, and continual review of Israel’s reliance on foreign currencies and major providers. They must ensure continuity of financial activity while protecting the country’s citizens.
Israel should develop alternatives before a crisis without undermining the confidence on which its economy rests. Diplomacy, reliable banking, diverse payment systems, a resilient digital shekel, regulation, stockpiles, and alternative suppliers together offer more room to maneuver than reliance on any single crypto asset. Israel should prepare as soon as possible; it cannot afford to wake up to an economic October 7.
[1] Yuval Sadeh, “Netanyahu Proposed Moving Israel to Crypto. What Does That Even Mean?” October 23, 2026.
[2] “The Story of a Currency: Bitcoin,” Bits of Gold, May 17, 2023.
[3] Eti Aflalo, “Even the Giant Funds Fell: Behind the Collapse of the World’s Second-Largest Crypto Exchange,” Globes, November 14, 2022.
[4] Tamar Tonik, “The Government’s Long Arm: How the U.S. Sanctions System Works,” Ynet, February 7, 2024.
[5] President Donald J. Trump Establishes the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and U.S. Digital Asset Stockpile, The White House, March 6, 2025.
[6] Ernest Hoffman, “Bitcoin and Gold Are Now Reserve Assets in New Hampshire as Governor Signs the First U.S. State Crypto Bill,” Kitco News, May 7, 2025.
[7] “Crypto Donations to Ukraine and Russia: Breaking Down the Numbers,” Elliptic, May 9, 2023.
[8] Bank of Israel, “Bank of Israel Publishes a Progress Report on the 2025 Digital Shekel Project”, May 13, 2026.
[9] “Solo mining requirement to win a block every day?” Bitcoin Stack Exchange, https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com
[10] President Donald J. Trump Signs GENIUS Act into Law, The White House, July 18, 2025.
[11] Farid Veliyev, “Kazakhstan to Take 10% of Crypto Miners’ Profits for National Reserve,” Kursiv Media, July 23, 2026.
Source: https://jiss.org.il/en/siboni-winner-preparing-israel-for-financial-sanctions/
