The Trump administration’s initiative to renew political dialogue with Russia, while disregarding the concerns of European allies, represents yet another dynamic and disruptive move to reshape the global political order, with strategic implications for Israel. At the grand strategy level, Trump appears to seek a Nixonian 1972-style achievement, aiming to bring Russia closer to the United States and distance it from China. This initiative has led to a painful rift between the U.S. and Europe, raising questions about the future of a partnership based on common values.
Meanwhile, Zelenskyy has been pushed into a difficult dilemma: should he enter negotiations from a severely disadvantaged position or continue fighting while relying on the Europeans, who may be unable to replace American security assistance? The termination of hostilities is likely to be postponed following Zelenskyy’s disastrous meeting at the White House, while Trump may seize the opportunity to pursue a breakthrough with Putin, independent of the status of the war in Ukraine. Moscow is already benefiting from the collapse of Biden’s efforts to isolate it and is now better positioned to fight Ukraine. If the Russian-American détente succeeds, it could heighten the strategic distress of the Tehran regime, which depends on joint backing from Moscow and Beijing. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s central role in facilitating the initial talks between the U.S. and Russia underscores Riyadh’s strengthened international standing—and may bolster its ability to pressure Israel via Washington.
The Trump administration is moving swiftly to restore political dialogue with Moscow, altering the dynamics of the war in Ukraine. Beyond appealing to the isolationist sentiments of his MAGA base, he may well be aiming to reshape the global balance of power. Amid the fog of international politics—where disruptive and dramatic actions unfold almost daily—looms the specter of a profound shift in the principles and practices that define the world order.
The American Initiative and Its Background
According to U.S. President Donald Trump’s lengthy tweet on Truth Social, his February 12 conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin covered topics such as “Ukraine, the Middle East, Energy, Artificial Intelligence, the power of the Dollar, and various other subjects.” Trump lavished praise on his interlocutor, whom the previous administration had boycotted, and played on the most sensitive chord in the Russian collective consciousness — the memory of the “Great Patriotic War” and the U.S.-Russian partnership in World War II. Trump stated that he and Putin agreed on the need for continued collaboration and the immediate start of negotiations, emphasizing the principle of “COMMON SENSE” (capital letters in the original), a slogan of his that he claims Putin has also adopted.
Subsequently, high-level US-Russian negotiations took place on February 18 in Riyadh. The discussions attended by key U.S. officials, led to agreement on a summit between Presidents Putin and Trump, arrangements for negotiations aimed at ending the war in Ukraine, and talks on renewing trade relations between the U.S. and Russia. This was swiftly followed by bilateral meetings between diplomats in Istanbul on February 27 to discuss the normalization of formal relations. The U.S. agreed to accept Alexander Darchiev as the new Russian ambassador to Washington. In recent years, the countries had closed each other’s consulates, minimized diplomatic staff in their embassies, and limited their activities. After the expiration of the Russian ambassador’s term in October 2024, no replacement was appointed. Secretary of State Marco Rubio referred to “extraordinary opportunities” to renew economic partnerships with Russia, namely the resumption of American companies’ operations in the Russian energy and minerals sectors, particularly in the Arctic.
Meanwhile, Europe was left in the dark. Just days after Vice President J.D. Vance scolded Europe in his speech at the Munich Security Conference, arguing that its main challenge is not Russia or China but the suppression of freedom of speech (through limitations on hate speech on social media, delegitimizing the far right, and combating external political interference), U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated on February 12 at the “Ramstein Format” ministerial meeting that it is “unrealistic” for Ukraine to join NATO or restore its international borders, and that American troops will not be involved in providing security guarantees for Ukraine. Those guarantees, he said, “must be backed by capable European and non-European troops.” Hegseth’s remarks reflect a broader context of American disengagement from its historical commitment to Europe’s defense and a shift in focus toward the Chinese challenge.
The administration’s outreach to Russia was not coordinated with Ukraine or its European partners. Immediately after speaking with Putin, Trump called Zelenskyy “to update him.” Concurrently, the administration presented Zelenskyy with a draconian draft agreement that would transfer control of Ukrainian minerals to the U.S. as compensation for the Biden administration’s prior support of Ukraine. Zelenskyy refused to sign it, asserting that it contradicted the Ukrainian constitution and offered no security guarantees. The U.S. and Russia subsequently excluded the Ukrainians from negotiations in Saudi Arabia, prompting Zelenskyy to declare that his country would not be bound by any agreement reached without its involvement.
In response, Trump, on February 19, denied the legitimacy of President Zelenskyy, labeled him a dictator (although he later “walked back” this comment), demanded that he hold presidential elections, and even claimed that Ukraine had initiated the war with Russia. In reality, Ukraine’s constitution prohibits elections during a state of emergency, and Zelenskyy’s approval rating exceeds 50% in all polls, far surpassing that of other politicians. Trump’s statements echoed Russian claims that Zelenskyy is not a legitimate leader, and therefore, agreements signed with him hold no value.
The administration’s efforts to court Moscow while criticizing Ukraine and chastising European allies caused significant political and emotional turmoil within the Transatlantic Alliance. Two incidents epitomize the sudden fracture within what had until now been known as “the Western camp:” The United Nations General Assembly vote—where an unlikely coalition of the U.S., Russia, North Korea, Israel, and a small group of Global South autocracies opposed a Ukrainian-European majority condemning Russian aggression—and the heated argument between Trump, J.D. Vance and Zelenskyy, followed by the expulsion of the Ukrainian delegation from the White House.
Opinion leaders characterized the U.S. as betraying Europe and posing a threat to NATO’s future. In response, European capitals engaged in frantic efforts to organize a military support package for Ukraine and to increase investments in security. Britain’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer, in preparation for his meeting with Trump, suggested raising defense spending to 2.5% or even 3% of GDP to counter Washington’s push for rapprochement with Moscow and prevent Kyiv’s bargaining position from being weakened. Kyiv declared it would continue fighting. The American initiative toward the Kremlin and its ripples across Europe and beyond are part of a vigorous and unprecedented approach to “disruptive diplomacy” that the administration has been implementing since its first day in power. This initiative is explicitly intended to change the rules of the game on the global stage.
Grand Strategy: Changing Russia’s Orientation?
The conceptual language employed by Trump and administration spokespersons about the dangers of the China-Russia-Iran-North Korea axis (abbreviated as CRINK) suggest a long-term strategic vision—one that Trump himself has hinted at in the past—to change the orientation of the leadership in Moscow. This approach would echo President Nixon’s historic initiative in 1972, when he sought to restore relations with China, thereby weakening the Soviet Union.
Ending the war in Ukraine, lifting sanctions, and returning to patterns of cooperation with Russia—if these developments materialize—could create conditions for distancing Russia from China’s sphere of influence. Despite its superpower aspirations, Moscow is currently playing “second fiddle” to Beijing; according to IMF data for 2025, the Chinese economy is nearly ten times larger than Russia’s, at $19.5 trillion compared to $2.2 trillion. The last decade of escalating confrontation between Russia and the U.S.-led Western alliance, particularly the war in Ukraine, has deepened Moscow’s economic and security reliance on Beijing. This dependence contradicts Russia’s interest in maintaining unconditional independence from other great powers and could mark a turning point in Russian history over the past 300 years, during which it has been integrated into the European system.
Lifting sanctions and encouraging American investments in the Russian economy, beyond being an enticement for Moscow, could challenge China’s energy security—relying on Russian and Middle Eastern oversupply—and provide a potential source of rare minerals, which are also abundant in Russia. Furthermore, the White House treating Russia as a great power and loosening the U.S. commitment to European security would instantly bolster the Kremlin’s confidence and enhance its global power posture.
It should be emphasized that Russian suspicion toward the West has reached new heights over the past decade, making it difficult to believe that Moscow will significantly alter its strategic orientation. When Nixon visited China in 1972, China was already an enemy of the Soviets, which eased its decision to get closer to the U.S. In contrast, since the end of the Cold War, the Russian-Chinese partnership has become a cornerstone of Moscow’s security strategy, and Russia is unlikely to “switch sides” anytime soon.
Implications of Trump’s Russia Policy: Regional Analysis
The negotiations conducted in Saudi Arabia underscore Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) success in establishing his country as a global mediator. MBS earned this role by promising Trump substantial investments in the American economy. Meanwhile, the longstanding Russian-Saudi partnership within the “OPEC Plus” oil cartel has provided Moscow with high energy revenues, which have undermined the effectiveness of sanctions. The kingdom, along with other Gulf emirates and Turkey, mediated between Ukraine and Russia during the war years. Russia has since asserted that neutral European countries, such as Switzerland and Finland, can no longer fulfill such a mediating role.
The energy issue raised by senior American, Russian, and Saudi officials may serve as a central motivation behind the American initiative. This initiative aims to enrich these players while putting an end to the “green agenda” that has threatened their interests in recent years.
Consequently, Russian-American detente has significant implications for the Middle East. If an American (and Saudi!) interest emerges in reintegrating Russia into partnership with the U.S. and the West, this could represent a significant opportunity for Israel to deepen Iran’s isolation. The U.S. would need to demand an end to military-security cooperation between Russia and Iran and require Moscow to clarify to Tehran that it will not provide diplomatic backing if Iran decides to “rush to nuclear capability.” Given the urgent challenge of halting Iran’s military nuclear project in the coming months, reaching an understanding on this issue between Washington (and possibly Jerusalem) and Moscow could be critically important.
The connection with Iran is not as critical for Russia as it once was, but over the past three years, Russia has recognized the potential for military and economic cooperation with Iran. While an American administration lasts for four years, China and Iran will remain Russia’s neighbors indefinitely. Therefore, it is unlikely that Russia will sever ties with China and Iran. However, greater flexibility in its relationship with the U.S. may make Russia a less reliable supporter of Iranian and Chinese expansionist agendas.
The inclusion of Steve Witkoff in the negotiations raises questions. He appears to be the “envoy for special matters,” rather than specifically for the Middle East. His ties to the Saudis have created a discreet yet highly influential channel of dialogue for the Russian government, facilitated by Kirill Dmitriev, who has been one of the Kremlin’s central contacts with Riyadh for a decade. Dmitriev, married to a friend of one of Putin’s daughters, manages a national Direct Investments Fund in which the Saudis and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are stakeholders. The combination of these two “business” figures, Witkoff and Dmitriev, may highlight the centrality of this aspect in the overall deal with Russia, and Witkoff’s involvement regarding Gaza may be integrated into a larger plan centered on Saudi Arabia.
This situation may have costs from Israel’s perspective. Even before the Prime Minister’s unfortunate joke about a “Palestinian state in Saudi Arabia,” which provoked anger and harsh reactions in Riyadh, hopes for progress on the normalization track had been waning as long as Israel remained unwilling to commit to the future establishment of a Palestinian state. Current and former senior Saudi officials have expressed fundamental anti-Israeli positions that deny the legitimacy of sovereign Jewish existence in the Land of Israel. Under these circumstances, promoting Saudi Arabia as a significant diplomatic player could translate into Saudi pressure on Trump to “straighten out” the Israeli position.
The Common Values Dimension and Its Implications
At the level of (increasingly eroding?) shared democratic values, the emerging developments raise questions about the degree of the Trump administration’s commitment to countries that uphold democratic ideals. Among the harsh reactions in Europe, the tears of frustration shed by Christoph Heusgen, chairman of the Munich Forum and former German National Security Advisor, stand out. His response reflects the fear and anger in Europe regarding the administration’s apparent direction. Instead of fostering a value-based partnership among free and liberal regimes—which the previous administration emphasized—there seems to be a shift toward a blunt, “transactional” approach, along with political sympathy for authoritarian regimes like those of Putin in Russia and Erdogan in Turkey. Furthermore, the open support from Vice President Vance and Elon Musk for radical-right political movements in Europe exacerbates the divide between the largely centrist European governments and the Trump administration.
For Israel, this presents a challenge in terms of its long-term perspective. The current U.S. administration views the present Israeli government as closely aligned in spirit and values, considering it a strategic asset, as evidenced during Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington. The “transactional” approach can yield impressive results for Israel, provided it delivers achievements that Trump can claim and highlight. However, the downside is that it does not guarantee support during times of crisis or in the face of lesser conflicts of interest. Additionally, growing isolationist sentiments in the U.S. could pose challenges for future assistance, similar to their current impact on aid to Ukraine. This underscores the need for Israel to expand its domestic production capacity for IDF needs, particularly in munitions.
Russia: A Ladder to Climb Down from the War Tree?
Even during Trump’s previous term, Putin regarded him as a more comfortable interlocutor than Obama. He will likely seek to capitalize on the opportunity to restore his status and that of Russia.
Although the American negotiating team in Riyadh explained that restoring relations with Russia would be a lengthy process contingent on Moscow’s actions and consultations with the Ukrainians and Europeans, Russia has already gained a series of valuable concessions that, in its view, enhance its bargaining power regarding the end of the war in Ukraine. From the Ukrainian and European perspective, these concessions should have served as negotiating cards:
- The commitment that Ukraine will not join NATO, along with the implied recognition of the legitimacy of Russian conquests in eastern Ukraine and the withdrawal of the U.S.—the world’s strongest military player—from security arrangements (the latter point may be modified if the Ukrainians agree to the minerals deal).
- The normalization of relations with Russia, which was expected to be conditional on the cessation of fighting and the implementation of security arrangements, is progressing independently of the war between Russia and Ukraine. The high-level American-Russian dialogue shatters the previous administration’s efforts to diplomatically isolate Russia. An immediate increase in the size of the Russian diplomatic staff in the U.S. and the American staff in Russia is anticipated, along with potential gestures toward returning seized Russian diplomatic property. These moves signal to other global players that the risks of maintaining relations and cooperation with Russia have diminished. Russian diplomats have been working hard recently to consolidate these achievements.
- The denial of Zelenskyy’s legitimacy, the demand for elections and Trump’s description of the Ukrainian president as “not ready for peace” look dangerously like a plan to remove Zelenskyy, a goal Putin has failed to achieve since starting the war in 2022. Putin could leverage the insistence on elections to delay the signing of final peace agreements, insisting on negotiating only with a “legitimately elected government.” This would prolong the fighting in Ukraine, giving Russia time to alter the situation on the ground in its favor, as outlined in several plans leaked to the media.
- The system that has enabled Ukraine’s achievements thus far, based on an American-European coalition providing weapons, intelligence, and funding, has been decimated. The cohesion of the Western camp has been compromised, and Ukraine can no longer fully count on the continuous flow of American support.
These factors offer the Kremlin a convenient pretext to continue fighting while enhancing its perceived legitimacy, claiming that Zelenskyy has chosen war, whereas Putinwas willing to negotiate peace with Trump. Putin, who has not altered his maximalist goals of reestablishing Ukraine within Russia’s sphere of influence and weakening Europe, may agree to a ceasefire and subsequent discussions on long-term security arrangements. Before any ceasefire, he will seek to secure additional gains, hoping that Washington’s actions will undermine Ukrainian morale. Following a ceasefire, Putin will attempt to establish a “friendly” regime in Kyiv through political intervention and maintain his hostile posture toward European nations.
Although Russia’s image of power suffered significantly due to the failed invasion in 2022 and the difficulties it has encountered in subduing Ukraine over the past three years, Moscow has somewhat successfully promoted a narrative in the Global South that it withstood an attack from the entire “collective West” and prevailed. Putin will likely use any pause in fighting to rebuild Russia’s military capabilities and may seek to “finish the job” against Ukraine in the future.
For Ukraine: A Strategic and Moral Dilemma — and a Disastrous Meeting
The resilience demonstrated by Ukrainian society during the war, along with military achievements and the development of indigenous technological capabilities, fuels Kyiv’s hopes regarding its ability to hold its ground—whether on the battlefield or in negotiations. After hesitating to cooperate with Trump’s initiative, Zelenskyy publicly refused to engage with it and called for the Europeans to replace American assistance. The emergency summits in Paris and London highlight that Trump’s overtures to Putin had a decisive impact on Europe’s resolve to prioritize security. A coalition of the willing is emerging to support Ukraine militarily and financially, as well as to provide it with security guarantees that Trump refused. Europe is unaccustomed to taking the lead on security matters but now appears to have no choice. From a moral standpoint, recognizing Putin as a legitimate negotiating partner contradicts the fundamental position against Russian aggression, which, until recently, had enabled Zelenskyy to mobilize broad Western support. It would also signal to other rogue regimes that the consequences of aggression have been significantly diminished. But when Zelenskyy attempted to make these points in front of the cameras at the White House, he was publicly berated by both Trump and Vice President Vance in a deliberate act of humiliation. The meeting ended abruptly and disastrously.
Without extensive American aid—which Ukraine received under the Biden administration—Zelenskyy faces an unbearable dilemma: whether to continue fighting and stake everything on Europe developing a significant security capacity for itself and for Ukraine as a substitute for the American role. Alternatively, he could enter the proposed negotiating framework while being at a severe disadvantage. To extricate himself from this position, he reluctantly agreed to a softened version of the minerals “mega-deal” imposed by Trump, hoping to create the conditions for a more favorable visit in Washington and the opportunity to negotiate from a position of relative strength. However, this attempt backfired due to a clash of personalities. For the time being, Zelenskyy has chosen to continue fighting. The Europeans will support Ukraine while seeking to avoid a deep rift within NATO that could have far-reaching consequences for Western security.
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