After over a year of war, it is important that we remember that the war did not break out because Israel wanted it. The war is Israel’s response to Hamas’ barbaric assault on civilian settlements on October 7, 2023, and it was Hezbollah that opened fire on northern Israel the day after the attack.
The outbreak of war was rooted in Iran’s ambitions and the measures it had taken to prepare for the realization of its dream: Israel’s collapse and destruction. To this end, Iran conceived and implemented the “Ring of Fire” around Israel, which included building up Hamas’ military capability in Gaza and Hezbollah’s even more extensive capabilities in Lebanon.
The strategy envisioned a coordinated campaign from all fronts conducted by terror movements built with Iranian support with the aim of destroying Israel. At the same time, Iran sought to remain behind the scenes, 1,500 kilometers away from Israel, avoiding direct implication in the conflict.
However, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, killed by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on October 16, 2024, did not wait for the full implementation of the Iranian plan. He started the war without coordinating with other elements in the “Ring of Fire”. His unilateral action may have been influenced by several factors: the advancing normalization talks between Saudi Arabia and Israel; a strong sense of religious duty; fears that continued economic progress in Gaza would interfere with his future plans; or perhaps he might just have felt strong and well-prepared, while Israel appeared weak with its army torn apart by internal strife. The publication of a timeline for Israel’s laser defense system to become operational might also accelerated have Sinwar’s actions. It is plausible that a combination of these factors influenced his decision-making; we will never know for sure.
If Sinwar anticipated that the Iranians, Hezbollah, and the West Bank Palestinians would join the war with full force, he made a critical error.
As the senior figure in the “resistance” front against Israel, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (killed by the IDF on September 27, 2024), found himself facing a major dilemma. He could not sit by idly, but he also could not risk a major war without adequate preparation and having lost the element of surprise. Hezbollah opted to join the fight in a restricted fashion, a move that came at a high cost, as its decision to tie its involvement to events in Gaza impaired its flexibility. Over the course of nearly a year, Hezbollah lost considerable capabilities, especially in southern Lebanon. During this time, the IDF secretly prepared for the invasion of Lebanon, including the use of special forces operating in Lebanese territory.
On what became known as the “Night of the Pagers” Israel faced a use-it-or-lose-it moment and decided to push the button activating thousands of booby-trapped pagers. It was Israel too that chose to initiate full scale war in Lebanon. Days earlier, the IDF had successfully completed the first phase of the ground operation in Gaza, dismantling and destroying Hamas’ military capabilities. With almost perfect timing, Israel – whether by design or be chance – was now free to deal with the threat from the north right before it activated the pager attack.
While many Hamas terrorists remain in Gaza, the organization is no longer relevant as a threat to Israel. It now functions primarily as a guerrilla force with limited coordination capabilities engaging in skirmishes with the IDF inside Gaza. No one in Israel asked how Hamas in Gaza would react to the elimination of Sinwar, its leader. Hamas’ only success has been its ability to hold Israeli and other hostages.
As a new administration prepares to take office in Washington, we should present the nature and goals of the war Israel is conducting on the various fronts to clarify the challenges ahead in the hope that we will face them in cooperation with the new administration.
Israel is conducting a war on four levels:
A. For the personal security of Israeli citizens in the Gaza border area, the Galilee, and throughout the country.
B. Over Israel’s status in the region and the world. Those who wished Israel harm saw October 7 as the beginning of the end of the Jewish state, and Israel lost its status as a regional power. The war’s results must therefore enable a process through which Israel regains its standing. Anyone who smelled Israel’s spilled blood and thought to exploit this needs to see that those who spilled its blood are decimated and no longer relevant.
C. For the hearts and minds of Muslims in the region. This war’s end must make clear to the world, especially the Muslim world, that radical Islamic movements, both Sunni and Shiite, bring disaster to their people and destruction to their believers. An Israeli failure would lead to the spread of the Islamic struggle beyond the Middle East – “the West is next” is not an empty slogan, it is an action plan.
D. This is an inter-axis war, so it was important for the U.S. to clarify that it stands beside its ally and that opposing the China-Moscow-Tehran-Hamas-Hezbollah-North Korea axis stands the powerful Washington-Jerusalem-Riyadh-Abu Dhabi/Dubai-Jordan axis.
There is an important additional component to the war against Hezbollah: Hezbollah is Iran’s most robust proxy; the greater the damage done to Hezbollah, the more Iran is weakened.
After Iran on two occasions fired hundreds of missiles of various types at Israel, the actual extent of its military power was revealed, and effectively the Iranian strategy collapsed. The “messengers” were severely hurt and are no longer valuable tools in Iran’s hands. The Israeli operation on the night of October 26, in which about 20 targets in Iran were hit, made clear to the Iranians the price of direct confrontation with Israel and its weakness in the face of the capabilities Israel demonstrated.
Contrary to claims that no strategic framework can be discerned in Israel’s various actions, it appears that even if no formal policy document describing this was issued, there are guiding principles for Israel’s action, some probably shaped during the war:
A. Israel is not operating as in previous wars to achieve “threat postponement” on its borders but based on the understanding that threats must be destroyed (Hamas) or at least drastically reduced in intensity (Hezbollah). The cabinet’s directive to the military on the eve of the incursion into Gaza made this very clear.
B. Israel prefers to concentrate on one arena as much as possible. Therefore, it decided not to attack a very tempting target in Lebanon in the war’s first week, understanding that priority should be given to the Gaza front. For the same reason, Israel also did not hurry to respond strongly to Iran after the significant Iranian attack in April; the IDF was preoccupied in Gaza, and the trajectory of the war in Lebanon was not clear. The IDF only entered Gaza after dismantling Hamas’s military wing, in other words the intensive campaign was over.
C. The third principle is not to determine Israel’s future plans before current achievements enable the implementation of the said plan. Therefore, no determination was made regarding the civilian management of Gaza on “the day after;” any such decision would have added an opinionated partner to the already complex state of affairs in Gaza, and, in any event, no entity can/wants to enter Gaza as long as Hamas isn’t drastically weakened inside the Strip? In Lebanon as well, no force that could deal with Hezbollah has yet to arise. After the agreed cease fire and the fall of the Assad regime in Damascus, this could change.
Nevertheless, I will try to outline what Israel needs to achieve in the end, after the war, despite calls for formal Israeli initiatives in Lebanon or Gaza being called into the void without addressees.
Israel’s goals should be defined as follows:
In Gaza, the most important is to obtain the release of the hostages by force or agreement. In parallel, the IDF needs to turn the entire Gaza Strip into an area that it operates in as it does in Area A territories in the West Bank – this even though it is not yet clear who will take charge of civil affairs in Gaza. It would be preferable that an Arab force take charge of civil affairs in the Gaza Strip and that this force contribute to rehabilitation, clearing the area of weapons, and a revamped educational program. Security control must remain with the IDF, and there should be no Israeli settlement in the Strip.
In Lebanon, two achievements must be secured: No Hezbollah personnel and no Hezbollah infrastructure should remain in Southern Lebanon which should become a “buffer zone” mostly without residents and without the presence of any entity threatening Israel. I believe the IDF will oversee this, as UNIFIL is an organization that lacks any such capability. The buffer zone’s purpose is to prevent flat-trajectory fire toward Israeli settlements and to push Hezbollah’s ground forces beyond the range capable of executing a surprise October 7 style attack. In Lebanon as a whole, the Air Force needs to hit Hezbollah’s firepower and infrastructure severely. This is until the organization is reduced to such a low threat level that it allows the creation of a free operation space for the Air Force in an area including both Syria and Lebanon. In both countries, the IDF should employ the same kind of campaign between wars as it did in in Syria over the last dozen years. The goal after the war is to continue degrading Hezbollah’s capabilities and not allowing it to rebuild and strengthen.
Israel should not take it upon itself to deal with the Houthi threat or get itself involved with the Iraqi quagmire, despite Iranian militias occasionally operating against it from Iraqi territory. It is better to make clear to the Iraqi government that Iraq will pay a price if it hosts Iranians operating against Israel. Two or three covert operations against economically significant Iraqi facilities will have the desired impact.
In Yemen, Israel should if necessary conduct similar strikes against infrastructure targets such as the Hodeidah Port, but not beyond that.
Iran is a great challenge for the future, a multi-year challenge. The most recent attack in Iran (October 28) was a sufficient step for now, but in the face of the Iranian challenge, and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, Israel will need to organize itself differently. As long as this regime remains in power in Iran, Israel will know no rest, as its commitment to destroy the Jewish State is genuine, sincere and strong.
How will the future look for Israel?
If Israel continues to act with wisdom, determination, and patience – then in about a year, Gaza will be a similar threat to that which exists today from Jenin or Tulkarem. Galilee residents will return to their homes, and the Air Force will operate in Lebanon in the way it operated in Syria over the last dozen years, with Hezbollah occasionally trying to fire individual missiles against Israel – and these will be intercepted by Israel’s defense systems, including by the laser defense system due to enter service and ease (as a complementary means) the economic burden of interception.
Israel will focus on a long-term campaign against Iran. It is a serious, intelligent, and dangerous enemy at a great distance, and therefore, the main risk it can create is the one stemming from its missile capability and all the more so if it obtains nuclear weapons in the future. The military must concentrate on these two components and undermine the regime. Iran must not be allowed to build new or renewed threats around Israel’s borders, even at the cost of war.
In Israel’s north as in its south, the state must invest many resources to build the Gaza border communities and the north of the country in a way that creates a more robust, flourishing, and prosperous civilian space.
Broader diplomatic moves should focus on renewing complementary efforts to the “Abraham Accords,” meaning expanding Israel’s connections throughout the Middle East and beyond and formalizing them. A strong Israel – and Israel that has emerged from the October 7 crisis, severely hurt its enemies, proved its internal and military strength and renewed its economic growth – will be an essential component in building a different Middle East. A region where Iran has no strong proxies and Iran itself struggles to handle long-range warfare against Israel and its allies. This situation will strengthen the U.S. position in the Middle East and allow it to rely on Israel when it needs to focus on other regions in the world.
As long as the fighting continues, Israel must continue to prepare diplomatic moves behind the scenes. After the end of the military chapter in Gaza (which will need about a year to be completed), intense diplomatic momentum should be revived. This is where the international community, especially the U.S., can greatly contribute to stabilizing the Middle East and generating prosperity in the region.
The vision of the future presented here is based on a success-oriented approach, commonly used in large-scale projects. This means it reflects an optimistic scenario that does not account for potential errors or setbacks. Naturally, the future is unlikely to unfold exactly this way. However, to define clear goals, understand what to strive for, and determine the right course of action, it is essential to depict the desired future with clarity and precision.
An earlier version of this article was published in The Jerusalem Post.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
Photo: IMAGO / ZUMA Press Wire
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