On September 9, 2025, Israel launched an air strike against the Hamas delegation in Qatar in what it labelled Operation Summit of Fire. The strike however did not eliminate the Hamas leadership and the operation fell short of its objectives. The Israeli strike prompted a series of steps by Qatar and the United States that led to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s public apology in a phone call, promises by U.S. President Donald Trump to take action to appease Qatar, and the establishment of joint coordination mechanisms between Doha and Washington. The United States also made clear that Qatar enjoyed special status regarding protection against military action on its territory.
Around the anniversary of the strike, Qatar appears to be drawing renewed attention to the Israeli attack on its territory. Several parallel steps reflect this effort and together serve a broader strategy to shape perceptions of the incident.
A Qatari security guard who died in the strike has been extensively commemorated and streets have been named after him. Qatari media outlets also published an interview with a Qatari security guard for the Hamas delegation in Qatar describing how the movement’s leaders were rescued during the strike. Reconstructions of the attack accompanied the interview, while previously unseen videos and photographs documenting the day of the strike circulated on social media. The media attention has brought the events back into public focus.
Another, more subtle, means employed by Doha to bring the strike back into the spotlight was the announcement on the day of the anniversary by the Qatari Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson that Qatar had closed the legal case it had opened following the incident. After the 2025 attack, Qatar had announced plans for a diplomatic and legal campaign against Israel, led by the Minister of State at the Foreign Ministry Mohammed bin Abdulaziz al-Khulaifi. A year later, a spokesperson told the Qatari newspaper Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that Qatar had decided to close the case, in part because it was satisfied with Israel’s apology. The announcement served two purposes: On the one hand it was a gesture of goodwill highlighting Qatar’s importance as an actor promoting stability, but on the other the statement brought the attack back into the international spotlight and gave Doha the opportunity to perpetuate its account, which ignores the fact that the strike took place because Qatar hosts the terrorist organization’s leadership.
The announcement accordingly went beyond ending the legal proceedings. The spokesperson used the occasion to contrast Qatar’s conduct with Israel’s, claiming that Israel did not understand Qatar’s mediation role while Qatar itself was acting responsibly. He also rejected calls in Israel to designate Qatar an enemy or hostile state, arguing that these were chiefly messages directed toward domestic political debate.
In the security and technology domain, Qatar is currently promoting a technological system that produces drinking water from moisture in the air. This too serves the Qatari narrative. The initiative is presented in part as a response to fears that arose in Qatar during the war about a possible Iranian strike on its desalination plants, a vital component of the country’s water security. Although the initiative addressed concerns about Iran, it was used to shape perceptions against Israel. The system was introduced under the name “Badr,” after the Qatari security guard killed in the Israeli strike, as noted by official Qatari publications and press reports. The strike has thus become more than a historical event; it has become part of Qatar’s national security narrative.
These three initiatives form part of a broader Qatari effort to shape how the strike is remembered and place it within the country’s political and strategic narrative. Amid rising tensions with Iran, there is growing discussion of the view that Israel enjoys extensive freedom of action in the Gaza Strip while Qatar and Turkey—seen as part of the Islamist camp—help restrain Hamas and thus enable Israel to strike its senior figures. Qatar has an interest in emphasizing that it, too, was a target of Israeli action.
Qatar has launched other initiatives with similar aims, particularly internationally. One involves Sheikha Moza, the current emir’s mother, who heads the Education Above All Foundation. Established at her initiative, the foundation has spent years promoting the protection of education in conflict zones. As part of this work, Qatar promoted the International Day to Protect Education from Attack at the United Nations.
On September 9, 2026, as Qatar moved to end the legal proceedings arising from the Israeli strike in Doha, its UN mission and Education Above All held an exhibition on attacks against education and educational institutions around the world. The exhibition also highlighted the Palestinian case. By placing the Palestinian issue within an international framework addressing “attacks on education,” Qatar can portray Israel as more than a party to a conflict: it can present it as violating one of the universal values the international community is committed to protecting. The event thus gave Qatar another platform to bolster the Palestinian narrative and intensify international criticism of Israel, while lending renewed legitimacy to the demand for a Palestinian state.
At the same time as it criticized Israel, the event also stressed that using educational institutions for military purposes was unacceptable. This message takes on added significance in light of past criticism of Education Above All over how Qatari educational and humanitarian aid may be integrated into settings where Islamist organizations, including Hamas and Hezbollah, operate. There is thus a gap between the universal message the foundation seeks to promote internationally and criticism of how Qatari resources and projects are used in conflict zones where armed organizations operate.
The day after the 2025 strike in Doha, Qatar’s education minister linked it to the International Day to Protect Education from Attack, telling an international gathering that Israel had struck an area near six schools. On the anniversary of the strike in September 2026, she reposted the speech on social media. This illustrated Qatar’s desire to use the attack to tarnish Israel’s reputation in a variety of contexts.
Doha’s use of international fora illustrates a broader approach. Qatar does more than portray itself as a victim of the Israeli strike: it uses international events, UN institutions, and organizations associated with it to recast the attack’s significance. It emphasizes the harm it suffered and Israeli hostility while presenting itself as a responsible humanitarian actor and mediator. This combination allows Qatar to turn an event that harmed it politically, undermined its security, and exposed its role as a state sponsor of terrorism into a means of bolstering its international legitimacy and intensifying criticism of Israel.
An interview given by President Trump’s son-in-law and adviser, Jared Kushner, to mark the anniversary of the Israeli strike reinforced Qatar’s effort to establish a favorable international narrative. Kushner described the Israeli attack as a strategic disaster that allowed him to use Israel’s embarrassment to secure Jerusalem’s acceptance of Trump’s 20-point plan despite its initial opposition. He rejected the interpretation that the strike had helped bring about the deal by demonstrating to Hamas’s leaders just how determined Israel was to strike them. Israeli officials speaking off the record responded that Kushner’s account was the opposite of what had actually happened. The alignment with Qatari talking points, together with Kushner’s extensive business ties with Qatar, suggests that he may have coordinated his message with Doha.
Four main objectives emerge from Qatar’s campaign, reflecting the complexity and cunning that characterize its diplomacy:
First, portraying Qatar as one of the Gulf states harmed by the regional conflict. By highlighting the Israeli strike on its territory, Qatar seeks to reinforce the perception that it is not insulated from the conflict but has suffered directly at the hands of Iran, as other Gulf states have, and at the hands of Israel.
Second, highlighting hostility toward Israel and obscuring the complexity of Qatar’s relations with it. Bringing the events of September 9 back into the spotlight allows Qatar to portray itself as a victim of Israel that continues to confront it diplomatically and in the media. This enables Doha to divert attention from its complex ties with Israel and its actions concerning Hamas and the Gaza war.
Third, promoting Qatar’s diplomatic role as a mediator. The very fact that Israel attacked Qatar allows it to present its continued mediation as proof of its responsible approach and willingness to work to resolve the crisis even when it suffers harm itself. The message is that Qatar is an impartial mediator, rather than a party to the conflict, and is prepared to keep working despite the harm it has suffered. Fourth, delegitimizing Israel. Bringing the strike back into the spotlight, presenting it as Israeli action against a sovereign state, and emphasizing the harm to Qatar allow Doha to cast Israel as the aggressor and Qatar as the victim and as a responsible mediator. This sharpens the contrast between the image Qatar seeks to create for itself and the one it seeks to impose on Israel
