According to an Army Radio report from November 15, Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate assesses that Hezbollah is very likely to join any future military campaign against Iran at its outset or shortly afterward, and to resume fire at communities in northern Israel.
According to the assessment, Hezbollah is exploiting the current ceasefire that ended Operation Roaring Lion in April, and the political constraints under which the IDF strikes mainly within the security zone in southern Lebanon. The organization has resumed recruitment and training, reactivated weapons-production plants, with a focus on drones, and reportedly reactivated projectile production and arms smuggling.
On the night of November 15–16, the Israeli Air Force struck an attempt to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah in the Janta area of the Bekaa Valley, along the Syria–Lebanon border, in what Lebanese media described as the first Israeli strike in the Bekaa in three months.
Some 400 Hezbollah operatives have reportedly been killed since the ceasefire. Meanwhile, Bilal Erdoğan, son of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, visited Lebanon on November 12–14.
A much-weakened organization
Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, Senior Fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and former national security adviser to Prime Minister Netanyahu and chairman of the National Security Council, begins with a caveat.
“I have not the slightest idea whether Hezbollah will join Iran in the event of a war. I hope that the intelligence officials know better than I do,” Amidror says.
Amidror assesses that Hezbollah cannot return to producing weapons systems in Lebanon in significant quantities, since most of its factories were destroyed and the IDF will make an effort to destroy any that are re-established.
Drones are a different matter, he argues. Since they are bought on the civilian market, from China and elsewhere, the purchases are hard to detect, he says. “Therefore, we will see drone capabilities that keep growing,” Amidror warns. The IDF’s defenses against drones are improving in parallel, Amidror assesses, describing “a race in which I do not know who is leading at the moment.”
The capability of Hezbollah to smuggle through Syria has certainly remained, he says, but smuggling does not allow the transfer of large weapons systems, including missiles and defense systems.
Iranian money is not enough to make up for the loss of most of Hezbollah’s command structure and many of its veteran operatives, Amidror says. “The organization is, in my assessment, very far from returning to the strength it had, both in weaponry and in its fighting capabilities. This is an organization whose power has declined greatly.”
Back to the Litani
Col. (res.) Prof. Gabi Siboni, CEO of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and an expert on cyber security, military strategy, and technology, says, “Even if Hezbollah does not join the fighting, I think that we have not completed the job, at least in southern Lebanon.”
The first stage, he says, should be for the IDF to expand the Israeli security zone up to the Litani River and clear all terror infrastructure in the area. The second, he adds, is to renew strikes in depth throughout Lebanon, including in the Bekaa and Beirut, because Hezbollah is building up its strength.
Destroying Hezbollah completely will be difficult given its link to Iran, Siboni says, “but the full solution to Hezbollah will come by dealing with the Iranian problem.” Israel’s restraint in Lebanon stems from the arrangement with the Americans after talks with Iran began, Siboni says, adding, however, that this stage “is already over.”
“This is Israel’s updated security concept: it cannot sit and wait for the enemy to build up its strength but must act to enforce and to strike the enemy’s capabilities everywhere,” Siboni stresses.
Air power and time
Prof. Hillel Frisch, professor emeritus at Bar-Ilan University and former senior researcher at the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, says, “The IDF should respond with air attacks only.” The Israeli home front proved its capacity to absorb attacks even at Hezbollah’s peak, all the more so now, he says, while the army, and especially the reserves, needs time to recuperate and train. “Hezbollah today certainly does not constitute a strategic threat to Israel.”
Israel exaggerated its assessment of the danger posed by Hezbollah before October 7 and must avoid doing so today, Frisch warns. “Time is working in favor of Israel and the IDF, owing to the simple fact that the learning curves and the implementation of lessons are much greater than those of the adversary.”
Turkey’s entry into Lebanon
Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, an expert on contemporary Turkish politics and foreign policy, Turkish-Israeli relations, and the Kurds, says Bilal Erdoğan’s visit carries significance first of all in Turkish domestic politics, as he tries to position himself as his father’s replacement.
“He was received in Lebanon like a king, like a representative, at least, as a representative on behalf of the Turkish government,” Cohen Yanarocak says.
Since the fall of Assad in Syria, Turkey has made enormous efforts to expand its influence in Lebanon as well as Syria, he says. “After the Turks have expanded and deepened their influence inside Syria, they want to turn Lebanon into Syria number two.”
Turkey wants to provide infrastructure, logistics, and construction, to show a military presence, and to send so-called peacekeeping forces to the Israeli-Lebanese border, Cohen Yanarocak says. “So we see that the Turks are becoming a very significant player in the Lebanese arena as well, of course at the expense of Iran and at the expense of Hezbollah.”
Full comments
Major General (res.) Yaakov Amidror, Senior Fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and former National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahu and chairman of the National Security Council:
“I have not the slightest idea whether Hezbollah will join Iran in the event of a war. I hope that the intelligence officials know better than I do, and it seems to me that it is not worth relying on various commentators who, probably like me, do not know. From my familiarity with the field and with Hezbollah’s situation after it lost the land bridge with Iran, I assess, without any intelligence knowledge, that:
Hezbollah cannot return to producing weapons systems in Lebanon in significant quantities, because most of its factories were destroyed and the IDF will make an effort to destroy any such factory if it is re-established; in this matter the restrictions on it are few and relate mainly to southern Beirut.
Hezbollah can buy and assemble drones, because this is purchasing in the civilian world, from China and from other places, and it is therefore difficult to detect these purchases and to strike whoever coordinates the purchases – therefore we will see drone capabilities that keep growing.
I assess that the IDF’s defensive capabilities against drones are improving in parallel; this is a race in which I do not know who is leading at the moment. I hope that today the threat is better understood and that everything is being done to accelerate the capability to defend against drones.
The smuggling capabilities via Syria have certainly remained. Between the two countries there has been smuggling of all kinds during almost all the years of their existence. But this smuggling does not allow the transfer of large weapons systems, including missiles and defense systems; therefore the impact of the smuggling will not be great with regard to Hezbollah’s military force buildup.
Iran is succeeding in transferring money to Hezbollah, and part of it is probably directed to recruiting new operatives, but this is not enough to make up for the loss of most of Hezbollah’s command structure and for the elimination of many of its veteran operatives. The organization is, in my assessment, very far from returning to the strength it had, both in weaponry and in its fighting capabilities. This is an organization whose power has declined greatly.
Moreover, the economic pressure on it is very great and will increase even further toward the approaching winter – because dozens of Shiite communities in southern Lebanon left the area during the fighting in the south, and they expect Hezbollah to help them get through the difficult time in the north. Hezbollah will find it difficult to fully finance both them and its force buildup in parallel.”
Colonel (res.) Prof. Gabi Siboni, CEO of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and an expert on cyber security, military strategy, and technology:
“Even if Hezbollah does not join the fighting, I think that we have not completed the job, at least in southern Lebanon. Therefore, every opportunity must be used, first of all, to take the security strip up to the Litani.
That is the first thing: the first opportunity there is, the IDF should reach the Litani area, expand the security strip up to the Litani and clear all the terror infrastructure up to the Litani. The second thing is the renewal of the attacks in the depth [of Lebanon], because Hezbollah is building up its strength, and it is necessary to act throughout the depth of Lebanon – also in the Bekaa, also in Beirut, everywhere.
Now, it is clear to us that there is a link between Hezbollah and Iran, so destroying Hezbollah completely will be difficult, true; its capabilities must be struck as much as possible, but the full solution to Hezbollah will come by dealing with the Iranian problem.
Israel is not attacking in Lebanon because of the arrangement with the Americans after the talks with Iran began, but that is already over. The link between Iran and Lebanon must be cut, and that’s it, and we must return to attacking. Without any connection to Iran, it would be good for Israel to take the area up to the Litani, and in certain places also beyond the Litani. This is Israel’s updated security concept: it cannot sit and wait for the enemy to build up its strength, but must act to enforce and to strike the enemy’s capabilities everywhere.”
Professor Hillel Frisch, professor emeritus at Bar-Ilan University and former Senior Researcher at the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies:
“The IDF should respond with air attacks only. The home front has proven its capacity to absorb [attacks] even when Hezbollah was at its peak, all the more so today, when Hezbollah’s capabilities are far smaller. The army, and especially the reserve system, on the other hand, need time to recuperate and to train for what lies ahead. Hezbollah today certainly does not constitute a strategic threat to Israel.
Israel exaggerated its assessment of the danger from Hezbollah before October 7, and it certainly must avoid doing so today. Time is working in favor of Israel and the IDF, owing to the simple fact that the learning curves and the implementation of lessons are much greater than those of the adversary.”
Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, an expert on contemporary Turkish politics and foreign policy, Turkish-Israeli relations, and the Kurds, and co-editor of Turkeyscope, a publication of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University:
“First of all, what is the significance of the visit by Erdoğan’s son to Lebanon this month? It has significance in Turkish domestic politics. Since last year, we have begun to see that Erdoğan’s son, whose name is Bilal Erdoğan, is trying to become his father’s successor. He is currently building an image both inside Turkey and outside it, so he is trying to be a more active political player.
Inside Turkey, he runs all the non-governmental organizations in his father’s name, and recently we have begun to see that he is also starting to speak out on foreign policy. He of course levels very harsh criticism against the State of Israel at every opportunity, and for the first time in history we also saw Erdoğan’s son go on a visit to Lebanon.
This carries a very clear message within Turkish domestic politics. He was received in Lebanon like a king, like a representative, at least, of the Turkish government, with all kinds of ceremonies and displays of strength, and so on. We saw that the Lebanese received him very well, and the messages conveyed were that Turkey already has a base [of supporters] inside Lebanon, and that this base supports him. After all, we saw how he also displayed knowledge of religious matters and how he communicated warmly with the Lebanese, so this is a very significant thing.
As for what Turkey seeks to achieve in Lebanon and how this goal fits with its position in Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Syria: since the fall of Assad, we have also seen Turkey making enormous efforts to expand its influence not only in Syria but also in Lebanon. In the past, the Turkish energy minister, Alparslan Bayraktar, said explicitly that Turkey intends to provide energy infrastructure in Lebanon.
After the Turks have expanded and deepened their influence inside Syria, they want to turn Lebanon into Syria number two. That is, the Turks want to provide infrastructure, logistics and construction, and also simply to show a military presence. The Turks are also interested in sending forces – in quotation marks – for peacekeeping on the Israeli-Lebanese border.
So we see that the Turks are becoming a very significant player in the Lebanese arena as well, of course at the expense of Iran and at the expense of Hezbollah. We will see how this plays out.”
Source: https://jiss.org.il/en/weekly-strategic-brief-191126/