Introduction: Not a Breakdown, a Method
Recent reports that Iran blamed attacks on vessels in the Strait of Hormuz on “rogue elements” within its own system, allegedly seeking to derail the memorandum of understanding with the United States, appear at first glance to describe an extraordinary lapse of control in which members of the Iranian security establishment are defying the political leadership. Yet a closer look at Iran’s record over recent decades suggests that the issue is not whether a particular actor acted without authorization, but rather one of deeper mechanisms of policy management.
Over time, the Iranian regime has turned plausible deniability into a core instrument of statecraft. By maintaining ambiguity between Iran’s military and ideological activity and the formal responsibility of its leaders, Tehran can confront its adversaries aggressively while denying direct involvement, limiting is international costs and preserving room for diplomacy.
The “rogue elements” explanation therefore does not necessarily represent a departure from established Iranian practice. It follows the same logic Tehran has long applied to Hezbollah, the Shiite militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. What may be new is the extension of that logic from regional proxies to actors operating within the Iranian state.
For Washington, the central question is not whether Iran’s leaders directly approved every individual operation. It is whether the United States will continue to accept Tehran’s attempt to draw a line between official policy and the actions of forces operating in the regime’s name.
“We Screwed Up”: What the Hormuz Attacks Reveal
According to Reuters, U.S. officials said that Iran had attributed the attacks to “an errant part of their system” attempting to sabotage the memorandum of understanding. The same officials said that Iran acknowledged in the talks that the attacks had been a mistake. A CBS report added that a senior U.S. official described the Iranian response in blunt terms: “They came back to the table and said, ‘We screwed up. We made a mistake. Let’s keep talking.’”
The episode raises an important question. Did it reflect a genuine internal struggle between pragmatists and hardliners or was it another variation on Iran’s established mechanism of denial?
It is possible that Iran’s institutions do compete for power and influence. The Islamic Republic has never operated as a wholly monolithic system. Authority is divided among the presidency, the Foreign Ministry, the Supreme National Security Council, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the ideological establishment surrounding the supreme leader.
That fragmented structure, however, also enables the regime to use ambiguity as a policy tool. Iran’s leaders can give radical actors latitude to operate, then claim that they exceeded their authority when diplomatic considerations make such a distinction useful.
From Regional Proxies to the State Apparatus: A Consistent Pattern of Denial
Iran has used similar approach for years in managing its regional proxies. When Hezbollah carried out military operations that risked escalation with Israel or the United States, Tehran emphasized that it was an independent Lebanese organization that made its own decisions. When Shiite militias in Iraq attacked U.S. bases, Iran described them as “resistance groups” acting on their own judgment.
Tehran has made the same claim regarding the Houthis in Yemen, namely that political support does not amount to operational command. Iran presents the Houthis as part of the “Axis of Resistance” while denying that they act under its direct orders.
The message has remained consistent across all these cases. Iran acknowledges ideological and political ties, and at times military ties as well, but rejects direct responsibility for its partners’ actions.
Strategically, this model gives the regime two advantages. It allows Tehran to pressure its adversaries through armed actors can operate without direct orders from Iran’s senior political leadership. At the same time, this preserves Iran’s ability to deny responsibility and avoid direct confrontation.
If Iran did in fact present the attacks to the United States as the work of “rogue elements” inside its own system, it has expanded the same model. The regime is no longer drawing a distinction only between Iran and its proxies, but also between Iran’s political leadership and elements of its own security apparatus.
Subsequent developments reinforce this conclusion. Shortly after telling the United States that rogue elements had carried out the earlier attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, Iran formally announced (as is the practice of the IRGC in matters concerning the strait) that it was closing it until further notice, prohibited maritime traffic, and said that it had enforced the order by firing warning shots at a vessel that allegedly violated its instructions. Tehran also warned that any further U.S. or Israeli attack would draw a more severe response. This sequence suggests that Iran’s distinction between “rogue elements” and state responsibility does not necessarily signal a change in policy. Rather, Tehran may deploy it tactically. When denial serves its diplomatic objectives, it attributes operations to actors beyond its control; when it seeks to project deterrence and signal escalation, it openly assumes state responsibility.
Ali Khamenei, Mojtaba, and the Familiar Formula: Approval Without Responsibility
The way Iran’s leadership presents agreements with the United States provides further evidence of this strategic continuity.
During the negotiations that produced the 2015 nuclear agreement, Ali Khamenei invoked the concept of “heroic flexibility.” Addressing Revolutionary Guard commanders in September 2013, he argued that tactical flexibility does not mean abandoning principles but rather applying them through calculated maneuver against an adversary.
The meaning was clear. Iran could negotiate without changing its fundamental view of the United States.
Even after the nuclear agreement was signed, Khamenei insisted that it did not reflect trust in Washington. He portrayed it instead as a tactical decision to protect Iranian interests.
Statements attributed to Mojtaba Khamenei regarding the current memorandum of understanding follow a similar formula. the leadership permits the process to move forward while withholding full personal endorsement. The government receives authorization to proceed, but the leader does not fully identify himself with the outcome.
This formula serves an important political purpose. It shields the supreme leader from the political costs of failure while allowing hardliners to oppose the agreement and claim that they represent his true position.
The Hardliners Are Not an Aberration—They Are Part of the System
Analysts often make the mistake of treating Iran’s hardliners as an outside force threatening the government’s policy. In practice, ideological radicalism performs a function within the regime.
When elements such as Kayhan, the newspaper identified with the regime’s ideological line, or conservative clerics and politicians attack negotiations with the United States, they are not necessarily challenging the system. In fact, their criticism can help the leadership preserve room for maneuver.
The regime sends two messages at once: To the United States that there are moderates who seek an accommodation, and to its domestic audience that Iran is not surrendering to the enemy.
This allows the regime to address two constituencies simultaneously—the international community and its domestic revolutionary base.
The Implication for the United States: Stop Accepting Iran’s Distinction
Washington’s principal challenge lies not only in Iran’s actions, but also in the way the United States interprets them.
As long as the United States distinguishes between “official Iran” and “rogue elements,” it is effectively accepting Tehran’s own explanatory framework.
Iran’s leaders need not exercise complete control over every operation for the state to bear strategic responsibility. A government that enables ideologically, financially, or militarily dependent organizations to act against another state cannot escape accountability simply by claiming that it lacks operational control.
Effective U.S. policy should therefore rest on a simple principle. It doesn’t matter who pulled the trigger; responsibility lies with the state that created and sustained the machinery that made the attack possible.
This is critical not only for freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, but also for every broader issue that any future agreement with Iran must address, including the nuclear program, proxy activity across the region, cyber operations, and political influence.
Conclusion
Iran’s claim that “rogue elements” were responsible should not be treated solely as a narrow factual question. It reflects a broader system for managing political risk through plausible deniability. That system enables the regime to pursue strategic objectives, limit the diplomatic costs of doing so, and preserve flexibility in negotiations.
Iran has used this approach for years in its dealings with regional proxies. It has allowed radical actors to operate within a deliberately blurred chain of responsibility while preserving the option of denying involvement or portraying these elements as independent actors. If Tehran did tell the United States that “rogue elements” inside the Iranian system carried out the attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, this would not break the pattern. It would extend it from regional proxies into the institutions of the state.
Iran’s subsequent formal announcement that it had closed the Strait of Hormuz, together with its use of force to enforce that decision, does not contradict this conclusion. It highlights the regime’s ability to move between denial and the open assumption of responsibility as its strategic requirements dictate.
The U.S. demand that Iran publicly and formally accept responsibility for the incidents and commit to preventing their recurrence is therefore more than a symbolic requirement. It reflects an understanding that diplomatic agreements cannot rest on private assurances or retrospective explanations. They require clear state accountability and demonstrated control over every arm of the regime.
Even taken at face value, however, Iran’s explanation presents the regime with an equally serious problem. If elements within the system can launch military operations with strategic consequences against the leadership’s wishes, then the state suffers from a grave failure of control. Its decision-making system lacks coherence, and it is unclear who actually holds the authority to use force in Iran’s name. Under such conditions, the international community has little reason to trust Iranian commitments, even when they come from the country’s most senior echelons.
The policy conclusion for the United States is the same in either scenario. Whether Tehran is deliberately using a mechanism of denial or has genuinely lost control over parts of its own system, future agreements cannot assume that the regime will be able or willing to restrain all the actors operating in its name. Effective deterrence requires making clear that responsibility rests with the Iranian state as a whole and that claims about “rogue elements” will not provide an escape from accountability. Only a policy that holds the regime fully responsible for the actions of both its institutions and its proxies can reduce Iran’s incentive to continue using plausible deniability as a central tool of the Islamic Republic’s foreign and security policy.
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