Half a year ago, I wondered whether the West had crossed the Rubicon with regard to antisemitism and whether it had reached a point at which Jewish life in the largest Jewish communities would no longer be the same.
Today, I think it is fair to say that the answer is yes: the Rubicon has been crossed.
Jewish life in the countries with the largest Jewish populations outside Israel—the United States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—will not be the same as it has been in past decades. Meanwhile, in continental Europe, the downward slide will most likely continue.
Antisemitism, rather than subsiding significantly following the war in Gaza, is showing its resilience, nearly a year after the end of the most intensive fighting. Hostility toward Jews—not to mention Israel—has gained a foothold in broader public sentiment.
At this point, conditions are likely to worsen for Jews in the coming years. Several underlying factors are at work, some of which have nothing to do with Jews or Israel. Absent an unforeseen change, there is little reason to expect a significant reversal of these trends in the foreseeable future.
1. Social and Political Polarization
First and foremost, hate—and antisemitism in particular—has historically flourished during periods of national polarization and social unrest. For reasons unrelated to Jews or Israel, many of the countries with the largest Jewish communities are experiencing sustained political and social turmoil, declining public trust, and economic instability, none of which show signs of abating. (This is especially true of the United States, home to the largest Jewish population outside Israel.)
Under such conditions, people look for scapegoats, and Jews can be blamed for every ill—from COVID and immigration to growing unaffordability and the coming disruption from AI. Throughout history, Jews have repeatedly served as convenient targets for scapegoating. Today, Jews—and increasingly “Zionists”—are once again portrayed as responsible for problems wholly unrelated to them.
2. The Convergence of Antisemitism from the Right and the Left
Second, partly because neither the right nor the left is succeeding in providing real solutions to these real problems, antisemitism on both the (far) right and the (far and not-so-far) left is growing rapidly and converging.
Antisemitic tropes such as “Jews control the government,” “Zionists control the media,” or “Israel is a genocidal ethno-state” are increasingly common across very different political camps.
Hatred of Jews is no longer confined to a particular fringe; it is increasingly shared by extremists—including Western Islamists—who otherwise have little or nothing in common. Groups that disagree on nearly every other political, religious, or ideological issue increasingly find common cause in hostility toward Israel and, frequently, toward Jews. As a result, antisemitism is no longer merely the hallmark of a single ideological camp; it has become a unifying force linking otherwise disparate extremist movements.
3. Growing Hostility in Universities and Cultural Institutions
Third, there is growing animus toward Jews—not merely Zionists—across expanding sectors of academia and cultural institutions. In many cases, this discrimination remains subtle; in others, it has become overt. These institutions often signal where society is headed because they shape the worldview of the next generation and influence cultural norms. The university, in particular, has been one of the principal engines of Jewish social mobility and success in the West for more than a century.
As these institutions become increasingly hostile to Jews and Zionism, the ability of Jews to integrate into broader society, advance professionally, and flourish may diminish in turn.
4. Younger Generations Are More Susceptible to Antisemitism—and More Antisemitic
Fourth, across the world, younger adults hold increasingly negative views of Jews—not to mention Israel—than older adults.
As younger generations acquire greater political influence, we are likely to see governments and political parties that display less sensitivity to antisemitism and the concerns of Jewish communities. This trend is already discernible in countries such as Canada and Australia. If a generation that has grown up with significantly greater exposure to anti-Israel and antisemitic narratives ultimately assumes political leadership, the situation may deteriorate even further.
5. The Incentives of Anti-Israel States and Organizations
Fifth, there is renewed incentive for both state and non-state actors—including Iran, Qatar, and Turkey; organizations affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in the West; and the BDS movement—to intensify their anti-Zionist and increasingly antisemitic campaigns in the West.
These incentives have grown following Israel’s military campaign after October 7, which significantly degraded Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran’s regional military capabilities. For those who oppose Israel’s growing military strength, reducing its public legitimacy and political support in the West has become a strategic objective. This effort has proved increasingly successful.
At the same time, anti-Western powers such as Russia—and, at times, China—which seek to deepen political and social divisions within Western societies, readily amplify conspiracy theories and propaganda online, contributing to growing hostility toward Jews.
6. The Impact of Immigration from Arab and Muslim Countries
Finally, as immigrants—and especially the children and grandchildren of immigrants—from Arab and Muslim countries continue to gain political influence across the West, hostility toward Israel has become a defining element of political identity for many public figures from these communities.
Nothing mobilizes portions of these constituencies more effectively than opposition to Israel, and that hostility is frequently accompanied by antisemitism.
The antisemitic, Israel-denying educational systems and public discourse that have shaped generations in many Arab and Muslim countries have fostered hatred toward Jews even where almost no Jews remain. Those attitudes have also been carried to the West through migration. Antisemitic views once largely confined to the Middle East are increasingly taking root in Western societies propelled by segments of these immigrant populations.
The Future of Western Jewry
With these underlying conditions unlikely to change in the near term, the future for Jews in the West is bleak.
Unexpected developments could always alter the trajectory: the collapse of the Iranian regime and its replacement by one no longer committed to Israel’s destruction; the expansion of the Abraham Accords—particularly if key countries such as Saudi Arabia were to join them; or a significant restoration of social cohesion and political stability in Western countries, especially the United States.
The strengthening of moderate conservative and center-right political forces—already evident in parts of Latin America and potentially emerging in Western Europe—could also slow these trends, although it is doubtful that such developments alone would reverse them.
Barring such unexpected changes, there is little reason to anticipate any significant decline in hostility toward Jews in the foreseeable future.
For Jews living in these countries, this is a moment of profound personal and communal reckoning.
They will increasingly confront a dilemma:
Should they lower their public profile, attempting to weather what may prove to be a prolonged period of hostility by making certain compromises in the public expression of their Jewish—and particularly Zionist—identity?
Or should they deepen their commitment to Judaism, Jewish communal life, and Israel, accepting the greater social and professional costs that may accompany such a decision while serving as a countervailing force against an increasingly hostile environment?
These approaches are not mutually exclusive. Many Jews will likely adopt some combination of the two—for example, exercising greater caution in their professional lives while expressing their Jewish identity more openly within their families, communities, and personal lives.
Strategic Implications for Israel
These trends carry strategic implications for the State of Israel. The strategic alliance with the United States is in jeopardy, and growing hostility toward Jews and Israel will only hasten this process. If, over the last decade, support for Israel shifted from a bipartisan issue to one increasingly associated with Republicans, the recent war with Iran has exposed cracks within the Republican consensus. To the extent possible, Israel must prepare for a greater degree of strategic independence from the United States in the years ahead.
Military Self-Sufficiency
Prime Minister Netanyahu was prescient in arguing that Israel needs to become militarily self-sufficient, even if his comparison to the ancient Greek city-state of Sparta—which fought its wars successfully on its own—was flawed because it suggested that Israel should isolate itself from the world. On the central point, however, he was right: Israel must have the capacity to fight an extended war without depending on the U.S.—or any other country—for arms, munitions, or spare parts. A future U.S. president may simply refuse to provide them. Ensuring such a capability should become a central strategic objective, since future governments of allied countries may prove either unable or unwilling to provide essential military assistance in times of crisis.
Diversifying Strategic Partnerships
Israel should redouble its efforts to build robust alliances with countries less affected by the political and social trends described above. These include India, former Soviet republics, countries in Africa, moderate Muslim countries, the Far East, and South America. In addition, Israel should deepen its ties with Central European countries, cultivate stronger partnerships with moderate states in Asia and the Middle East, and continue expanding its relationships throughout Africa and Latin America.
Among its Western allies, Israel should foster mechanisms of mutual dependence so that abandoning their partnership with Israel would impose tangible strategic, economic, technological, or security costs on those countries.
Creating a Government Strategy
The government should formulate a comprehensive national strategy for confronting antisemitism and the campaign to delegitimize the Jewish state, recognizing both as issues of strategic national importance. This should include a broad and sustained effort against the governments, organizations, networks, and financial backers that promote antisemitism and efforts to delegitimize Israel—including state actors such as Qatar. Such an effort does not necessarily require direct confrontation with every hostile actor. Rather, Jerusalem might focus on supporting alternative centers of influence in academia, politics, media, law, culture, technology, and civil society that can gradually serve as effective counterweights to those promoting hatred and efforts to delegitimize Israel.
Strengthening Relations with World Jewry
Israel must also ensure that its relationship with Jewish communities around the world becomes stronger than ever before. These relationships should be built around the broadest possible Zionist tent, guided by national responsibility rather than narrow partisan or ideological considerations.
This effort should not be one-sided. Representatives from across the Zionist spectrum in Israel should participate in strengthening ties with both their ideological counterparts and those with whom they disagree throughout the Jewish world. Such an approach would broaden Israel’s reach, reinforce solidarity across diverse Jewish communities, and increase the effectiveness of the collective response to antisemitism and delegitimization.
Israel’s Own Responsibilities
Alongside the external threats facing Israel and Jewish communities worldwide, some of the challenges also stem from shortcomings in Israel’s own conduct. Although the current wave of antisemitism is fundamentally driven by instability in Western societies unrelated to Jews or Israel, Israel does not appear to have fully internalized the gravity of the situation. Nor has the government placed the struggle against antisemitism and the delegitimization of Israel—and support for the Jewish communities confronting these phenomena—high enough on its national agenda.
In recent years, several organizational and budgetary initiatives have reflected a growing recognition of the seriousness of these trends. Still, Israel requires a coherent, sustained, whole-of-government strategy to address the challenge effectively. It should designate a permanent national body responsible for coordinating all government efforts to combat antisemitism and delegitimization and strengthen Jewish communities abroad.
Finally, some of the harm is self-inflicted. Treating every criticism of Israel as antisemitic, while leaving little room for introspection and improvement, harms Israel from within as much as it does from without. Israel should therefore distinguish more carefully between legitimate criticism and genuine antisemitism. Failing to do so undermines Israel’s ability to examine its own conduct honestly, improve where necessary, and preserve broad support among democratic allies.
For example, a failure to respond firmly and consistently to incidents of violence or other violations of the law by Jewish extremists against Palestinians weakens Israel’s international standing and erodes the support of many of its friends abroad. This damage is further compounded by irresponsible public statements from both ends of Israel’s political spectrum, which are exploited by Israel’s adversaries and by antisemites in the West. While Israel has only limited ability to prevent such statements, it should recognize the extent to which they are weaponized in international campaigns against the country.
Conclusion
The coming decade is likely to be challenging for both Jewish communities in the Diaspora and the State of Israel. Israel and the Jewish world must adapt to the post–October 7 world, which continues to evolve and whose full implications have yet to become clear. Already, however, it appears that the long “golden age” of Jewish security, assimilation, and prosperity in much of the Western world is gradually eroding, giving way to a different reality.
Jews have an uncanny ability to adapt, survive, and thrive.
The question is therefore not whether Jews and Israel will adapt this time as well, but rather what form this adaptation will take—and what costs, compromises, and opportunities will accompany it.
The sooner Israel and Jewish communities recognize the contours of this new reality and invest in developing effective responses to the challenges it presents, the more successful that process of adaptation is likely to be.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
