Introduction

The Kingdom of Jordan emerged from the political arrangements Britain established in the Middle East after World War I. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 expressed support for establishing a national home for the Jewish people within the territory of the Mandate. In March 1921, however, Britain effectively divided the territory, granting Abdullah bin Hussein—the son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca—approximately 78 percent of the Mandate’s territory, as a separate emirate known as the Emirate of Transjordan. The move reflected Britain’s desire both to reward the Hashemite family for supporting the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans in 1916–1918 and to establish a stable governing authority east of the Jordan River. In 1946, the emirate gained full independence and became the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan, later renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, under Abdullah I.

Jordan’s creation did more than establish a new administrative framework; it also offered an answer to Hashemite aspirations that had gone unrealized in Syria. Britain, then pursuing extensive geopolitical interests in the region, intended the emirate east of the Jordan River to preserve regional stability, maintain a government relatively friendly to British influence, and provide a buffer between the Land of Israel, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula.

Jordan is more than Israel’s neighbor; it is also an important bridge between the western Middle East and the Arab East. Its relations with the Gulf states, Europe, and the United States give it an important role in regional diplomacy. Those relationships, however, do not guarantee stability. Jordan remains heavily dependent on external economic assistance, while its domestic economy continues to face severe challenges. Israel’s shared land border with Jordan is its longest—309 kilometers, stretching from Mevo Hama in the north through the Jordan Valley, the Dead Sea, and the Arava to Eilat in the south.

The October 1994 peace treaty has preserved relative stability for more than three decades, and the two countries maintain close security cooperation, including intelligence sharing; Israel aids Jordan in water and energy.

Serious pressures nevertheless persist beneath the surface: chronic economic weakness, high youth unemployment, heavy public debt, acute water scarcity, and the large-scale absorption of refugees from Iraq and Syria.

A deep demographic and ideological divide runs through the kingdom. The regime’s traditional power base lies among Bedouin tribes loyal to the Hashemite elite, while the majority of the population identifies as Palestinian. Jordan also faces religious radicalization influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadist elements.

A Jordanian court dissolved the Muslim Brotherhood’s legal framework in 2020. In April 2025, the authorities went further, banning its activities entirely, closing its offices, and confiscating its assets following allegations that elements within the movement were linked to sabotage. The United States’ January 2026 designation of Muslim Brotherhood branches as terrorist organizations gave King Abdullah greater room to tighten oversight of the movement in the kingdom.

This article examines the Jordanian paradox: a monarchy that maintains relative stability and security cooperation with Israel but faces internal economic, demographic, and ideological pressures that could destabilize the kingdom. It also addresses Israel’s largely open eastern border and the high risk of an October 7-style terrorist attack from the east, before setting out recommendations for Israel’s response.

The Roots of Instability in Jordan

Jordan was created without a clearly homogeneous national foundation and lacks the natural resources needed for economic independence. Since independence in 1946, the kingdom has functioned as a classic “buffer state,” surviving largely because of the royal family’s exceptional ability to maneuver among hostile regional forces and international powers with an interest in regional stability.

Jordanian stability depends on a fragile balance between two population groups with conflicting interests, identities, and objectives. The governing system rests on the “East Jordanians,” members of large Bedouin tribes such as the Bani Sakhr, Howeitat, and Bani Hassan. These tribes form the backbone of the kingdom: they staff elite units of the Jordanian military, the Mukhabarat (General Intelligence Directorate), and the government bureaucracy. Their loyalty to the king is a cornerstone of Hashemite rule, and, in return, they receive preferential status and secure employment in the public sector.

By contrast, the Palestinian majority—estimated at between two-thirds and three-quarters of the population—occupies a different position. Palestinians dominate business and the private sector and make up much of Jordan’s economic and educated elite yet feel excluded from military and political centers of power. The divide is ideological as well as social. While the Bedouins regard Jordan as their homeland, a substantial part of the Palestinian public views it as a temporary way station or a platform for the struggle against Israel.

Beyond the broader population that identifies as Palestinian, many people in Jordan also hold refugee status under UN definitions. Estimates put the number of registered Syrian, Iraqi, and Palestinian refugees at roughly 2.6–2.9 million—about one-quarter of the population.

Jordan’s demographic and cultural composition further heightens the risk of domestic instability. Political exclusion of the Palestinian majority, combined with the absorption of Syrian refugees in recent years, has intensified economic and social pressures and widened existing disparities.

The events of October 7, 2023, and the War of Redemption sharpened the risks inherent in this divide. Religious and nationalist incitement helped fuel mass demonstrations in Jordan demanding the cancellation of the peace treaty with Israel.

The Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s most organized political force, exploits Palestinian national sentiment to challenge the king and portray him as collaborating with Israel and the West. The Hashemite regime’s stability therefore depends on its ability to suppress domestic unrest while maintaining belligerent rhetoric toward Israel—a dangerous balancing act that could spin out of control at any moment.

The existence of these pressures should not be confused with the regime’s ability to manage them. So far, the Hashemite monarchy appears to have contained a succession of crises. It helped block Iranian attacks on Israel by intercepting aircraft that entered Jordanian airspace, moved against the Muslim Brotherhood after sabotage cells and weapons infrastructure were exposed, and restored a measure of domestic stability.

The principal concern is that Jordan’s room for maneuver could erode as its territory becomes an indirect arena in the confrontation among the United States, Israel, and Iran. The threat to American bases and forces in Jordan is particularly significant. Continued Iranian attacks and the activation of pro-Iranian proxies could increase pressure on the regime and create new risks of escalation.

The economy may be Jordan’s greatest vulnerability. The kingdom is a “rentier state” that depends almost entirely on foreign assistance, grants from the United States and the Gulf states, and remittances from Jordanians working abroad. With gross national product of approximately $53 billion—less than one-tenth of Israel’s GNP—and public debt above 90 percent, Jordan faces chronic fiscal shortfalls.

Without oil, gas, or other major natural resources, Jordan’s economy relies primarily on services, tourism, and foreign assistance. This dependence makes the kingdom particularly vulnerable to shifts in the international economy. At the same time, high unemployment, especially among young people, is eroding the social contract with the Bedouin tribes, which historically depended to a significant extent on stable public-sector employment.

Israel plays a critical role in preventing Jordan’s economic collapse. Water and gas agreements make Israel a supplier of essential resources to the kingdom. That dependence, however, cuts both ways: among parts of the Jordanian public, reliance on “Zionist gas” and “Zionist water” is seen as a national humiliation.

The Shi’ite Axis and the Iranian Threat — Infiltration from the East and North

Iran and its proxies are increasingly seeking to penetrate Jordan. Tehran sees the kingdom as a vulnerable link through which it can increase pressure on Israel from the east. In the wake of recent regional campaigns that have damaged Iranian infrastructure and Iran-backed militias in Syria and Iraq, alternative smuggling routes, including those through Jordan and the use of drones, have become increasingly important to Iran.

Over the past two years, the Jordan-Syria border has become a scene of persistent confrontation over drug and weapons smuggling. Shiite militias and elements of the Syrian military are involved in moving Captagon and weapons into Jordan. These networks are more than criminal enterprises: they provide financing, facilitate infiltration and influence, and undermine the kingdom’s stability. The fall of the Assad regime disrupted Syria’s old Captagon model, which depended on state sponsorship and military and intelligence elements close to the regime, but it did not end the trade. In place of the regime’s centralized monopoly, a more fragmented and flexible market has emerged, drawing on existing stockpiles, mobile laboratories, local smuggling networks, and militias operating where the new government’s control remains limited.

For Jordan, the form of the threat has changed, but the underlying danger remains. The Syria-Jordan border—especially the southern Syrian sector—continues to serve as an active smuggling corridor, while Captagon still generates income for armed and criminal networks operating under weak state control. For Israel, Iranian or pro-Iranian penetration into Jordan could turn the eastern border from a relatively quiet front into an active arena threatened by regional proxies.

The Israel-Jordan border is long and exceptionally difficult to defend. For years, the IDF’s border doctrine rested on close cooperation with the Jordanian military and on the assumption that Amman, with at least as much interest in stability as Israel, would stop weapons and terrorists before they reached the border. That approach contributed to neglect of the physical barrier in the Arava, gaps in the barrier elsewhere, cuts to intelligence-gathering forces, and the assignment of less capable regular and reserve units to the sector.

The Iranian threat in Jordan extends beyond smuggling. Pro-Iranian militias have also tried to infiltrate the kingdom, while Sunni terrorist organizations such as ISIS exploit Jordanian territory. Jordan has therefore become an arena of competition among radical movements, weakening central government control and increasing the potential for instability.

For Israel, smuggling routes through the Jordan Valley and the Arava are now a direct security challenge, not least because they move weapons into Judea and Samaria and to criminal organizations inside Israel. The use of drones to carry explosives and weapons across the border underscores the need for a sustained technological and operational response. Attacks at crossings such as the Allenby Bridge also show that individuals in Jordan can be influenced by religious incitement and act against either the regime or Israel.[1]

The gravest danger is a “black swan” scenario: armed terrorists suddenly storming the border at several points at once, or vehicles carrying machine guns and antitank weapons crossing open stretches of the Arava frontier. Highway 90 lies only hundreds of meters from the border in places, with isolated civilian communities nearby. An attack there could turn the area into a death trap. Without an effective physical barrier and rapid-response forces, Israel could face a mass-casualty event resembling the October 7 debacle across a front several times wider.

How Should Israel Respond?

Israel’s eastern border with Jordan presents a unique challenge. Security cooperation with Amman remains important, but it cannot substitute for independent Israeli preparedness. Should the kingdom’s stability erode, Israel could suddenly face a new and complex eastern front.

Diplomatically, Israel needs a balanced and cautious policy. The stability of the Hashemite regime is a paramount Israeli security interest. As long as the royal family under King Abdullah remains in control, Israel retains a single diplomatic and security interlocutor, and bilateral cooperation continues to support regional stability. Israel should therefore continue supplying Jordan with water and energy and assist it in its dealings with Washington.

At the same time, Israel cannot treat Jordan as an equal partner on matters of Israeli sovereignty, including the Temple Mount. Jordan’s use of the Waqf’s status against Israel internationally requires a clear diplomatic response. Amman must also understand that Israeli assistance in water, gas, and security must be matched by active efforts to interdict smuggling and reduce anti-Israel incitement in the education system and official media. “Peace through strength” captures the required balance: assistance to Jordan and integration into regional infrastructure and economic projects, coupled with a demand that Amman exercise full sovereign responsibility.

As threats to maritime shipping in the Gulf and the Red Sea have grown, the land bridge through Jordan has become a first-order security and economic lever. Jordan stands to benefit economically by positioning itself as a critical transit hub for international trade, while Israel and the United States would gain additional leverage to press Amman for firm action against incitement and smuggling. Jordan could join the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), but it could also become part of an alternative route to the Mediterranean through Syria. Israel has a clear interest in Jordan choosing IMEC over these alternatives.

Operationally, Israel has begun to shift its approach through two principal measures: building an improved barrier along the Jordanian border and establishing the Eastern Division.

Work on the barrier began in December 2025 and must be completed urgently. The system should be multilayered, combining a smart fence, anti-tunnel sensors—particularly near Israeli communities—optical cameras and radars covering the entire sector, and active drone interception. A barrier can delay attempted breaches. Artillery, mortars, and attack drones should also be available to field forces under direct local control rather than depend on allocation from headquarters.

Establishing the Eastern Division in June 2025 was a prudent decision, but the division must bring intelligence and operations under a single headquarters with deep familiarity with the Jordan Valley and Arava terrain. Israel must also be able to collect intelligence well inside Jordanian territory rather than rely solely on reporting from Jordanian intelligence and the Jordanian military. Early identification of militia or terrorist-cell activity 20–30 kilometers from the border is essential for both warning and interdiction.

Farms along the Jordan River can play an important intelligence and operational role. Some occupy former IDF outposts, giving them a strong physical presence and helping them detect changes in the surrounding area. The IDF should integrate these farms into the broader security concept and support them wherever possible.

Israel should also examine infrastructure projects that would strengthen the Jordan River as a natural barrier. Increasing the river’s flow and making crossings more difficult is one option. The tradeoff is that greater flow would also lead residents of the Jordan Valley on the Jordanian side to draw more water from the river.

Israel must strengthen the defense of Highway 90 with protective walls at vulnerable points and rapid-response forces able to reach any part of the border within minutes. These forces should include reserve units equipped with armored vehicles, mortars, drones, and attack helicopters, backed by stronger security arrangements in nearby communities.

The Arava and Jordan Valley communities should be incorporated into the territorial defense system. Local emergency squads need heavy weapons, while communities should have bunkers and independent communications and medical capabilities so they can hold out even if access routes are cut.

The IDF must establish clear procedures for preemptive action against infiltration attempts, including immediate use of direct and indirect fire without a lengthy approval chain. It should also conduct drills simulating rapid local counterattacks by mobile reserve forces in every sector.

Cooperation with Jordanian intelligence and security agencies remains important, but Israel must also be able to interdict staging areas deep inside Jordanian territory when a clear and immediate danger emerges. Interdiction should target movement routes as well, using fire to disrupt traffic along them. Israel should employ Israeli Air Force capabilities—fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, and UAVs—together with artillery, mortars, and low-altitude attack drones.[2]

Across the sector, IDF outposts should be fortified military positions rather than ordinary camps, with appropriate defenses and mutual cover through fire and observation. IDF forces must deploy forward of civilian communities.

Israel must also strengthen settlement along the Jordanian border. The number of communities and residents is insufficient, and Israel’s history has repeatedly demonstrated that settlement is integral to security. Expansion could use security-oriented frameworks such as the Nahal outposts that operated in the area for many years, as well as yeshivas and pre-military academies. These could include frameworks for members of the ultra-Orthodox sector that combine Torah study with agriculture and guard duty, embodying the idea of “Torah and Labor.”

The following table summarizes the principal points:

Ultimately, Israel needs a multi-layered response along the eastern border: a cautious policy toward Jordan, a stronger barrier and Eastern Division, independent intelligence capabilities, rapid operational readiness, and stronger settlements and farms serving as forward elements of the security system. This approach would preserve the benefits of cooperation with Jordan while reducing the risks of excessive dependence on the kingdom’s continued stability.

Conclusion

Jordan stands at a sensitive strategic crossroads. Persistent economic weakness, demographic and political pressures, growing Iranian influence, and internal ideological unrest are increasing the kingdom’s fragility. Israel can therefore no longer treat the eastern border as simply a quiet frontier; it requires sustained resources, force buildup, intelligence collection, and long-term planning.

The Eastern Division and the new barrier are necessary, but they are only part of the solution. As long as the regime retains effective control of the kingdom, Israel can continue to rely on cooperation with Jordan. At the same time, it must prepare for profound change in the kingdom through a combination of military power, sober diplomacy, and rapid-response capabilities along the Jordan Valley and the Arava.

Within this framework, the Jordan Valley farm project has particular security value. These farms are not merely settlement or agricultural projects; they are practical elements of territorial defense. They create a permanent civilian presence in sparsely populated and remote areas, build daily familiarity with the terrain, help detect unusual activity early, and strengthen continuity among IDF outposts, communities, and open areas.

At former outpost sites or commanding positions near Highway 90 and the Jordan River, the farms can serve as intelligence and operational force multipliers—provided they are integrated into the regional security system, receive appropriate support, and operate in full coordination with the IDF and security agencies.

Israel must also address the gradual expansion of Arab settlement in Area C toward the security fence and along the Jordan Valley route as part of the effort to strengthen security and reduce smuggling.[3] Enforcement measures in this area—including farms and grazing areas on the western side of the border—would strengthen Israel’s hold on the territory, make smuggling more difficult, and improve regional security.

Jordan is a fragile, dependent, yet vital neighbor. Its stability is an Israeli interest, but Israel must ensure that its operational doctrine, forces, and border capabilities can also meet extreme scenarios. Israel’s response should include a physical barrier, an Eastern Division, adequate firepower and intelligence capabilities, and systematic efforts to strengthen settlements, communities, and farms as forward elements of the security system.

The Jordanian regime is committed to peace and controls the use of force from its territory, but that control is not absolute. Israel must therefore prepare both for specific threats that the regime fails to prevent and for a broader deterioration in Amman’s ability to contain security threats originating in Jordanian territory. Israel cannot afford another event resembling October 7. Resources must therefore be allocated to this effort by both the defense establishment and the government.

[1] Hanan Greenwood, “We Must Not Lose”: The Campaign Against Weapons Smuggling from Jordan, Israel Hayom, June 7, 2024.
Also: Israel Police: Weapons Smuggling from Jordan into Israel Thwarted, June 18, 2024.
Also: Ami Rojkes Dombe, Shin Bet, IDF and Police Exposed a Weapons-Smuggling Network from the Jordanian Border to Judea and Samaria, Israel Defense.
[2] Gabi Siboni and Erez Winner, “Sweida as a Warning: Preparing for the Next Cross-Border Jihadist Attack,” JISS, August 8, 2025.
[3] “The Palestinian Campaign for Area C — Shaping a Security Reality on the Ground, Description and Implications,” State of Israel, Ministry of Intelligence, Research Division, June 7, 2021.

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