As Israel simultaneously contends with an ongoing military, diplomatic, and cognitive campaign on several fronts, it must also pay close attention to its relations with its neighbors and longstanding peace partners, Egypt and Jordan. Both countries face complex external and domestic pressures, and some aspects of their conduct toward Israel and within the regional balance of forces are troubling, in some cases seriously so. At present, however, there are no grounds for concern that the peace agreements will collapse or that they will turn to military confrontation.

Relations with both countries have indeed stood the test, particularly in the security and economic-infrastructure spheres. Yet public attitudes in both remain highly hostile; each, in its own arena, is involved in measures that run counter to Israeli strategic interests; and the camp led by Turkey and Qatar, now joined by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, is seeking to draw both countries—and Egypt in particular—into its sphere of influence.

Egypt has not signed the mutual-defense agreement concluded in Mecca and has made clear that it is maintaining a balanced policy. Nevertheless, its military cooperation with Turkey is steadily deepening. Until recently, Cairo regarded Turkey as a bitter ideological rival, not least in the struggle for hegemony in Libya and over control in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey, for its part, is seeking to institutionalize Egypt’s inclusion in the grouping that some are already calling STEP—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan. In Jordan’s case, its relations with the new regime in Syria and its response to events in the Druze Mountain are cause for concern. Moreover, Jordan has adopted positions in the international diplomatic arena that are highly problematic from an Israeli perspective.

Nevertheless, Israel continues to share interests with both Egypt and Jordan and retains levers of influence in Amman and in Sisi’s “New Capital.” Jordan assisted in intercepting attacks on Israel, while Iran attacked targets in both countries. Tehran attaches particular importance to destabilizing Jordan so that it can turn the West Bank into a “second Gaza,” as well as to attacking Egyptian energy interests as part of its effort  to inflict damage on the global energy economy. In both cases, Israel has an interest in helping to thwart Iran.

The interests of Egypt and Jordan also converge on Gaza and the Palestinian arena: both countries, each for its own reasons, want to ensure that Hamas does not rebuild its position in Gaza or take control of the Palestinian Authority. Egypt and Jordan also remain partly dependent on essential infrastructure links with Israel: water in Jordan’s case and gas in Egypt’s. This dependence requires both countries to exercise caution. In Egypt, exports to the United States under the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) arrangement—which requires Israeli inputs in Egyptian industrial zones as a condition for tariff exemption—also carry some economic weight. Moreover, the lessons of the past remain well understood, at least among the senior leadership and security establishments of both countries, and particularly within the military establishment that rules Egypt.

Israel must therefore maneuver diplomatically with care. This is not the time for provocative steps. With American backing and perhaps Emirati assistance, Israel should work to renew dialogue with both countries at the highest political level. As noted, despite the difficulties, Israel can build an agenda based common interests with Jordan and Egypt, including standing up to Turkish ambitions. Israel should also avoid steps that could worsen tensions with Cairo and Amman. At the same time, even if the Trump administration is reluctant to use its own levers of influence over them, other channels remain available—particularly in Congress—through which both countries can again be reminded that American security assistance is clearly linked to their commitment to the peace treaties.

A Cold—Even Frozen—Peace Alongside “State-to-State” Cooperation

Relations with Israel’s longstanding peace partners stand in marked contrast to the warm and multidimensional ties—including significant tourism and business ties—that have developed with the three active partners in the Abraham Accords: the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco. (Sudan has, in practice, ceased to function as a state.) Relations with Egypt and Jordan have remained “cold,” largely confined to interaction between governments, particularly their security establishments, along with limited business ties.

Public attitudes remain hostile, particularly among the Egyptian elite and most of the Jordanian population. Among Palestinians in Jordan, this hostility reflects memories of 1948; in Egypt, it reflects the long years of war with Israel. In both cases, it is also fueled by the horrors of the current war as portrayed in the Arab media. At times, the authorities themselves use the issue as an outlet for domestic unrest. In multinational surveys, Jordan has emerged as the country with the highest level of hatred toward Israel in the world. At the same time, civil-society actors in both countries, including professional associations, maintain a sweeping boycott of efforts to strengthen ties with Israel.

Paradoxically, this reality persists—and periodically generates public protests—alongside significant cooperation with both Egypt and Jordan on infrastructure projects. The gas agreement with Egypt supplies approximately one-sixth of the country’s national consumption and helps stabilize its economy during a period of severe economic distress. In addition, under the American QIZ legislation, Egyptian industrial plants in approved zones continue to export to the United States on the terms granted to Israel under the free-trade agreement, provided their products contain a certain proportion of Israeli inputs.

Israel lost a similar lever of influence over its eastern neighbor when Jordan signed its own free trade agreement with the United States. On the vital issue of water supply, however, arrangements with Israel still carry considerable weight. Jordan has negligible water resources, while its population is growing rapidly and has swelled with millions of refugees from Iraq and Syria. The relevant arrangements include those anchored in the Israel-Jordan peace agreement itself as well as additional arrangements beyond it, which are periodically renewed and which Israel sometimes uses as leverage.

The peace agreements have endured at a formal level, although the Israeli embassies in Egypt and Jordan operate mainly from Jerusalem due to security challenges arising from protests and terrorist threats. Security and intelligence channels remain active and, in the Egyptian case, have also proved useful during periods of tension along the Philadelphi Corridor.

Moreover, in an unprecedented development, Egyptian and Jordanian representatives are participating in the work of the Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) in Kiryat Gat alongside representatives of other Arab countries, including partners in the Abraham Accords. Although they do so under an American umbrella, the framework is in practice also managed by the IDF and there is  close cooperation concerning the International Stabilization Force slated to operate inside the Gaza Strip.

Points of Friction—and Common Interests— Vis-à-vis Egypt

There has been no substantive change in Egypt’s consistent positions toward Israel on the fundamental diplomatic issues. Cairo emphasizes the rights of the Palestinian people, denounces Israel’s actions on multiple fronts in which it finds itself in conflict, and continues periodically to demand that Israel’s nuclear facilities be opened to inspection. In international and multilateral arenas, Egypt participates in, and at times leads, efforts to advance resolutions condemning Jerusalem and its policies.

At least at this stage, however, the principal challenge is the possibility that Egypt might formally join the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed on August 7, 2026, by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan. This follows Egyptian participation in military exercises with Turkey, a country that Cairo regarded as hostile only a few years ago. At the diplomatic level, the rapprochement is also reflected in a shared Egyptian-Turkish position against the Israeli strategic presence in Somaliland.

An Egyptian move in this direction could, at least in theory, raise questions about the provisions of the 1979 peace agreement, including the commitment that the agreement takes precedence over other undertakings such as the Arab League treaty. Concerns have emerged in Israel on this matter, however, even if outside actors such as Qatar are clearly seeking to inflame them,  Egypt is not attempting to create the conditions for a surprise attack or to violate the peace treaty. Nevertheless, the issue requires close intelligence scrutiny and consideration of possible responses. The diplomatic, economic, and above all military considerations militating against such deterioration remain firmly embedded in the thinking of Egypt’s political and security leadership. Even at the symbolic level, however, reliance on a regional support system led by actors hostile to Israel carries long-term risks.

Conversely, alongside the bilateral economic issues already noted, Israel and Egypt share several strategic interests:

1. The Iranian attack on the gas facility at Damietta demonstrated that Egypt, too, has become a target of the unrestrained aggression of the Revolutionary Guards regime in Tehran, which is determined to demonstrate its ability to destabilize the global energy economy. Israel has an interest in helping to thwart such threats in the future because of its energy links with Egypt and due to broader considerations.
   
   
2. Renewed Houthi activity against freedom of navigation in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea once again threatens one of Egypt’s principal sources of foreign-currency income—traffic through the Suez Canal—as well as vital Israeli interests. So far, Egypt has refrained from active, or overt, involvement against the Houthis, perhaps in part because of painful memories of Yemen in the 1960s. An escalation of the fighting in Yemen, however, with Saudi Arabia once again involved, could lead to a change in Egyptian policy, including in areas where Israel also has an interest.
   
   
3. Egypt may condemn Israeli actions when it comes to the question of governance of Gaza, but it also has an interest in preventing a force identified with the Muslim Brotherhood—namely Hamas—from being the hegemon in the strip. That interest remains despite Cairo’s rapprochement with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Alongside disagreements over the 15-point Board of Peace Roadmap  for Gaza, there are areas where Egypt and Israel can come to agreements over Cairo’s role as a logistical rear during the initial stages of the modular and gradual implementation of the framework for creating alternatives for part of the population of the Gaza Strip.

Jordanian Policy—Points of Friction and Convergence of Interests

In retrospect, King Abdullah II’s 2019 decision, 25 years after the peace agreement was signed, to demand the return to Jordanian control of border-adjacent areas that had been leased to Israelis for that period appears to mark a turning point in the relationship—from a “honeymoon” to cold peace. The last meeting between Prime Minister Netanyahu and the king took place at the beginning of 2023. Since then, the king has adopted a publicly hostile position. In regional and international forums, Jordan has taken a highly critical line, focusing in particular on warnings against Israeli moves that could lead to the displacement of the Palestinian population in Gaza and Judea and Samaria.

Jordan’s handling of the complex and dangerous reality in Syria, including the serious events in the Jabal -al Druze region, is also causing concern in Israel. The Jordanian regime has largely succeeded in neutralizing the power of jihadist elements on its own territory. Yet when confronted with their activity in Sweida , it has in practice refrained from providing assistance, even though its geographic proximity put such assistance within its capabilities. Closer relations between Jordan and the regime in Damascus could also lead to growing Turkish influence as part of the Mecca Pact’s efforts to expand the circle of participating Sunni states.

Jordan’s lenient approach toward people involved in terrorism is another troubling issue. One example is Ahlam al-Tamimi, who was convicted for her role in the Sbarro bombing during the Second Intifada and released in the Shalit deal in 2011. After years of refusing demands for her extradition, the Jordanians announced at the beginning of 2025, on the eve of a meeting between the king and United States President Donald Trump, that she had been told to leave Jordan. They did not, however, accede to a U.S. extradition request. In practice, she continues to live and operate in Jordan.

At the same time, Israel shares significant interests with Jordan, some of which have led to operational coordination over the past two years:

1. Jordan cooperated (under CENTCOM)  in intercepting Iranian missile, cruise-missile, and UAV attacks directed at Israel during the events of April and October 2024 and during the confrontations in 2025 and 2026. Jordan also became a target of Iranian attacks because of the American military presence on its territory. Destabilizing the Jordanian regime is an explicit objective of Iranian policy, as Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated in 2014, in order to turn the West Bank into a “second Gaza.” Intelligence cooperation against Iran and its proxies therefore remains important.
   
   
2. Jordan also has an interest in preventing its territory from becoming a point of origin for terrorist attacks and smuggling. Its success in combating smuggling, however, is significantly more limited than its achievements against terrorism. Here, too, continuity in relations between the security forces is important.
   
   
3. Jordan, like Egypt, has a long-term interest in uprooting Hamas rule in Gaza and preventing Hamas from taking control of the Palestinian population in the West Bank. This reflects both the direct threat to the kingdom’s security and the potential consequences of a large-scale confrontation. Although it will never acknowledge it, Jordan has a veiled interest  in the IDF continuing to view the Jordan Valley as a strategic barrier.
   
   
4. The provision in the peace treaty regarding Jerusalem, which grants the Hashemite house—which until 1925 was the guardian of the holy places in Mecca and Medina—a unique status on the Temple Mount, creates another veiled interest for the king: ensuring that the political status quo in Jerusalem does not change. Any Palestinian government, if established, can be expected to strip him of his status in the Haram al-Sharif.

What Should Israel Do?

Preserving the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan remains a vital Israeli interest, even if aspects of their policies generate displeasure and concern. At a time when Saudi Arabia appears to be drifting toward the Turkish-Qatari-Pakistani camp, this is also in the interests of those who remain identified with the regional “camp of stability.”
Under the existing circumstances:

1. Israel must act carefully so as not to push President Sisi of Egypt  and  King Abdullah of Jordan into positions that clearly run counter to public sentiment in their countries.
   
   
2. Israel should at the same time reestablish channels of contact at the highest diplomatic levels with the help of friends from the region and beyond. Through these channels, it should convey, insofar as possible, reassuring messages regarding its intentions toward the Palestinian population, whose possible displacement is the issue of greatest concern to Egypt and Jordan.
   
   
3. Given President Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions, it is important to warn Egypt in particular, but Jordan as well, about the long-term consequences of falling into his orbit. Friends in the eastern Mediterranean should be enlisted to convey this message.
   
   
4. Infrastructure issues that have not yet been agreed upon can serve as levers of influence in the short term. In the long term, deepening Egypt’s and Jordan’s dependence on Israel is clearly in Israel’s strategic interest.
   
   
5. When it comes to Washington, it is not easy to enlist President Trump to convey messages or warnings to regimes he regards as allies. In Congress, however—even after the death of Lindsey Graham—there are figures who can be enlisted to convey discreet messages to Egypt and Jordan, reminding them of the link between their commitment to the peace agreements and the scale of U.S. military assistance.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.