In this JISS podcast, I sat down with Maj. (Res.) Alexander Grinberg, former IDF Military Intelligence Research Department officer and Iran expert.

Highlights from our conversation:

Despite the pessimistic narratives prevalent in some media circles, Grinberg asserts that Iran has lost strategically, and their loss is comprehensive. The regime’s capabilities have been severely degraded.

However, Grinberg warns against using misleading analogies like a “paper tiger” or a “wounded beast.” Iran has never been a paper tiger; it was a very real, dangerous tiger. This operation has effectively “taken out the tiger’s teeth and claws.” Furthermore, unlike a wounded beast that becomes more dangerous, Iran’s options are severely limited. Aside from traditional overseas terrorism or sending out an easily destructible “mosquito fleet” of speedboats, or remnants of their ballistic arsenal, they have no vast remaining military maneuvers.

The widespread destruction of Iran’s military-industrial complex was intentional and long-lasting. Rebuilding a ballistic missile program is not like buying a replacement smartphone off a shelf. The same is true of rebuilding mobile launchers.

 It requires a highly complex supply chain – refrigeration, encrypted communication, hydraulics, and energy plants. The Iranian nuclear ambitions are hindered; building a nuclear capability isn’t just about having enriched uranium – it requires a massive, coordinated, and highly expensive industrial undertaking that Iran currently cannot sustain or hide.

The situation in the Strait of Hormuz

Regarding the looming American naval blockade, Grinberg sees the US administration’s maneuvering as highly strategic. By blockading movement to and from Iranian ports while promising freedom of maritime navigation for others, the US is challenging the only remaining Iranian leverage play.

Iran’s threats to close the Strait of Hormuz have always been their ultimate trump card, yet they haven’t actually taken physical action (like laying mines or deploying warships) to stop commercial vessels. By placing the onus on Tehran, the US has effectively neutralized this card. If Iran attempts to physically breach the blockade, they provide the US with a casus belli to resume military action. If they do nothing, their leverage evaporates.

Dispelling Myths: Minorities, Clandestine Ops, and Regime Change

The stated goal of the war was the destruction of the regime’s strategic military capacities, not an immediate, mathematically guaranteed regime change.  

Grinberg also challenged common narratives regarding Iran’s ethnic minorities. Iran is actually a highly successful nation-state where citizens view themselves as Iranian first. The grievances of non-Persian minorities are directed entirely at the regime’s failures and oppression, not driven by a desire to fracture the country.

While a full-scale “march on Tehran” by Kurdish rebels is a media fantasy, Iranian Kurdistan, home to several experienced, clandestine anti-regime fighting groups, could serve as an arms distribution or training hub for operations against the IRGC.

The Arab World’s Weakness and the Normalization Trap

Looking beyond Iran, Grinberg notes that the broader Arab world (with the exception of the UAE) has emerged as a major loser in this conflict. The war exposed that despite buying expensive American military “toys,” these nations are highly dependent, weak, and unable to act cohesively.

Because of this, he urges caution regarding Israel’s pursuit of regional normalization. While diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia would be nice to have, Israel must not act out of romanticism or sacrifice tangible strategic assets for such normalization. 

As we look to the future, Grinberg reminds us that while the Iranian civil society has massive potential for change, the ultimate fate of the regime rests on the determination of the Iranian people. Israel can project power, destroy existential threats, and protect its allies, but it must recognize its limits: it cannot unilaterally generate regime change in a country of Iran’s size.