Since the events of October 7, 2023, and the ensuing Swords of Iron War, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has faced a growing manpower crisis, driven by sustained strain on the reserve forces and increased demand for regular standing army forces. The situation has led to growing debate over Israel’s conscription model and the principle of equal sharing of the burden of army service. The current enlistment policy does not meet the IDF’s needs. According to the IDF Personnel Directorate chief, Maj. Gen. Dado Bar-Kalifa, reporting to the Knesset on September 17, 2025, there is a shortage of approximately 12,000 soldiers, of whom some 7,000 are combat troops.

Efforts are currently mostly focused on increasing enlistment in the Haredi sector (approximately 15 percent of the population), where enlistment rates are particularly low. However, even if new legislation governing conscription were to be enacted, integration of the Haredi community is likely to be gradual and partial, given the need for deep changes in social norms, as well as the need to overcome significant internal resistance. Without political change, expectations of a rapid and substantial increase in Haredi enlistment are unrealistic.

The Arab sector (approximately 20 percent of Israel’s population) also does not share in the security burden, and there are understandable reasons why compulsory military service is not imposed on Arab citizens. Although Israel’s overall enlistment rate is relatively high by Western standards, the country’s population base is small. We therefore propose examining additional sources of manpower.

One option to augment the IDF’s manpower is to expand the overseas volunteer framework (Mahal) by issuing a public call to young Jews in the Diaspora to volunteer for service. Although this would indeed by a worthy effort, it is unclear to what extent such an appeal would increase enlistment. At present, only a few hundred overseas combat volunteers serve in the IDF, and some of them are the children of Israeli parents.

The existing Mahal framework already permits the enlistment of non-citizen volunteers and this could be expanded in a cautious and gradual manner—for example, through a “Mahal+” track that would establish a foreign legion within Israel. This would be a limited contractual service for foreigners, while ensuring full integration into the IDF, strict security screening, and measured incentives that would not undermine the legitimacy of the “people’s army” model.

The concept of a foreign legion will likely make many Israelis uncomfortable, given the long-standing ethos of national self-reliance in defense. Yet Israel is a small state that has, at times, depended on others to help meet its security needs (in addition to arms supplies). In 1991, U.S. Patriot missile batteries were deployed to defend Israel against Iraqi missile attacks. More recently, foreign militaries actively participated in defending Israel against Iranian attacks. There is no compelling reason to forgo the assistance of foreign volunteers in advancing the Zionist project—an endeavor that also contributes to the preservation of Western civilization. The aspiration to rely exclusively on our own forces is laudable, but present realities make strict adherence to that ideal difficult. Establishing a foreign-volunteer unit within the IDF would not negate the principle of self-defense. The overwhelming share of the security burden would, in any case, continue to fall on Israeli citizens.

Establishing a foreign legion on a limited scale—roughly equivalent to an airborne infantry brigade within several years—would involve relatively modest costs to the state. A preliminary estimate (which requires further staff work) suggests it could save roughly one-third to one-half of the broader economic cost associated with reserve service. This would ease pressure on the state, on reservists’ families, and on the increasingly strained reserve system.

The legion could assume routine security missions, thereby freeing other units for training. Moreover, because legion soldiers would not be Israeli citizens, their deployment in military operations could generate fewer internal political pressures. A force that does not rely on domestic compulsory service could also reduce some of the social tensions surrounding sharing of the burden. In this way, national decision-makers would retain greater freedom of action when weighing military operations.

A two-stage screening process is recommended. Initial screening should take place abroad—for example, through IDF or state representatives operating internationally, where local law permits. The second stage would be completed in Israel and would include full medical, security, and psychological evaluations in accordance with IDF standards for combat soldiers. The entry threshold should exclude candidates with criminal records or clear indications of serious disciplinary problems, even at the cost of reducing the overall pool of applicants.

Motivations for enlistment may vary—ideology, adventure, identity, economic considerations, and more. The lesson from international experience however is straightforward: individuals who risk their lives must see a positive horizon. Accordingly, a pathway could be designed under which, after five years of full service and satisfactory performance, residency would be granted—followed, potentially, by eligibility for naturalization, subject to state criteria. In return, members of the legion would undertake a limited reserve obligation for several additional years, structured to provide a reasonable return on investment for the state, while keeping it attractive for potential candidates.

International experience—most notably that of the French Foreign Legion—indicates that the most significant incentive for volunteers to serve in life-endangering combat roles is the prospect of obtaining residency and, ultimately, citizenship in a developed country. The IDF, which has a global reputation a professional and successful military, could likewise attract idealistic young people and challenge-seekers from around the world, particularly given Israel’s image as a Western stronghold in the struggle against Islamist extremism. This perception is shared by some audiences in Muslim and Arab countries as well, and the implicit message would not hinder further engagement with Israel.

A supportive framework would also be required to ensure that service remains sustainable in terms of welfare and motivation. It is advisable to establish a civilian support structure around the unit—for example, an association or “adoptive” framework modeled on existing support systems for lone soldiers—to facilitate community integration, provide assistance during leave, and address basic social needs. At the conclusion of service, those interested could be offered the opportunity to participate in a formal conversion program.

Finally, there is also a diplomatic and cognitive dimension. Individuals who serve for several years in Israel, learn the language and culture, and experience the country firsthand may later become informal ambassadors of goodwill for the State of Israel. This is not the primary objective, but it would constitute a secondary benefit that could prove particularly meaningful given the current international climate toward Israel.

Alongside its advantages, the “Legion/Mahal+” track carries risks that must be managed to preserve operational effectiveness and public legitimacy. First, there is a security and counterintelligence risk inherent in recruiting non-citizens. This requires rigorous, multilayered screening, including verification of identity, criminal background checks, assessment of extremist affiliations, and a review of a candidate’s ties in their country of origin. Advances in identity verification and data analysis tools can support initial screening, but in practice a dedicated, multi-tiered vetting mechanism and appropriate resources would be required—especially given the diversity of countries from which candidates may apply. During the initial stages of the program, assignments should be limited to roles that do not require high-level security clearance.

Second, disciplinary and functional challenges are likely to arise, including language gaps, the absence of a culture of military service, and unstable motivation. A dedicated training track should therefore be established, incorporating Hebrew instruction, command protocols, and disciplinary standards. This track should be overseen by experienced career officers and include a streamlined discharge mechanism for those who do not meet requirements.

Third, there is a socio-political risk. An overly generous framework could be perceived as circumventing the issue of equal sharing of the burden of service or as creating a “separate army.” The program should therefore be framed explicitly as a limited, complementary measure within the “people’s army” model, with moderate incentives and full transparency.

Fourth, legal and diplomatic complexities must be addressed, including the laws of countries of origin, the legality of recruitment abroad, and the status of participants residing in Israel. Clear interministerial regulation and a lawful, carefully structured recruitment mechanism would be essential. Finally, there are budgetary and administrative considerations—absorption, housing, welfare, and support for lone soldiers. A dedicated support envelope should therefore be funded in advance, accompanied by defined performance metrics (attrition rates, discipline, output, and cost per soldier), with adjustments made following a pilot phase.

Adoption of a Mahal+/Legion track should be accompanied by a public relations effort explaining the specific circumstances that justify its creation and emphasizing that a foreign legion would be a complementary—and possibly temporary—measure designed to address a severe manpower shortage in the IDF. At the same time, policymakers should consider strengthening enforcement mechanisms and economic incentives to reduce draft evasion, for example through adjustments to grants, benefits, or taxation, subject to legal review and distributive justice considerations. Such steps could reinforce the public message regarding the continued importance of the “people’s army” model.

Accordingly, the initiative should be implemented through a phased pilot model. In the first stage (12–18 months), the existing Mahal framework should be expanded into a “Mahal+” track with a defined annual recruitment target and initial assignment to roles for which the candidates have appropriate security classification. In parallel, an interministerial team—comprising representatives from the IDF, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Population and Immigration Authority—together with academic experts in civil-military relations, should be established to define the recruitment mechanism, service conditions, and the package of rights and support for legionnaires. The team’s work should be completed within a defined and limited timeframe.

In the second stage, following performance evaluation, a limited contractual track for foreign nationals could be introduced on a restricted scale. Incentives should not be automatic; rather, residency eligibility could be considered after completion of service and satisfactory performance. Reasonable “return on investment” conditions for the state—for example, a limited reserve commitment—should also be included.

Throughout the process, an annual summary report (subject to security censorship) should be published, incorporating agreed performance metrics: number of recruits, attrition rates, disciplinary incidents, operational output, and total cost relative to alternatives (such as reserve days saved or units staffed). This approach would allow policymakers to assess the program’s actual contribution to combat manpower without creating systemic risks or undermining the core legitimacy anchors of Israel’s conscription model.

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