Israel’s original military doctrine, formulated by David Ben Gurion, emphasized three core elements: deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory. However, Israel suffered major deterrence and intelligence failures on two occasions —October 1973 and October 2023. In both instances, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) failed to deter its adversaries and Israel’s intelligence apparatus did not provide adequate warnings of the impending attacks. The recurrence of these failures calls into questions the centrality of these principles in Israel’s strategic doctrine.

Deterrence is predicated on the assumption that enemies will refrain from attacking out of fear of severe retaliation. Yet, deterrence is an elusive and problematic psychological concept. Military superiority and the threat of retaliation do not always succeed in dissuading an adversary from the attack. Even if the threats are credible, the enemy may decide to pay the costs to achieve its objectives. For Hamas, the anticipated benefits of confronting Israel outweighed the costs of potential punishment, as its religious motivations overrode the logic of rational deterrence. Israel underestimated Hamas’s resolve to destroy it and its belief that this objective is attainable. Furthermore, Israel failed to recognize that its containment policy, implemented over two decades, had eroded its deterrence.

Even if deterrence is effective during a particular period, its efficacy may be temporary, due to numerous factors that affect the adversary’s strategic calculus. Over time, adversaries may decide to test the limits of deterrence due to a change in circumstances, reassessing the risks involved in offensive actions. Surprise attacks are generally perceived as conferring military advantages to the initiating side and the successful execution of surprise attacks undermines the effectiveness of deterrence.

In the aftermath of the 1973 intelligence debacle, the IDF significantly expanded its intelligence corps and improved its capabilities, inter alia through the adoption of advanced technologies. For instance, it gained the capability to identify exactly which lorry in a convoy travelling from Iraq toward Lebanon was carrying arms for Hezbollah. Israeli intelligence provided precision data used in the execution of numerous successful targeted killings of terrorists with minimal collateral damage. Yet, on October 7, 2023, despite the many signals, it failed to provide warning and Israel suffered another strategic surprise.

Intelligence failures stem from several key factors. In Israel’s case, analysts succumbed to confirmation bias, overlooking evidence that did not support existing theories. Notably, Israeli intelligence knew about Hamas’s attack plan, “the Jericho Plan,” but this was not effectively communicated to decision-makers with the appropriate context. Analysts misread signals and intentions. There is growing evidence that the IDF was overly reliant on technological means of intelligence collection at the expense of human intelligence. Additionally, use of the “Devil’s Advocate” unit became a ritual rather than a crucial method for testing reality by considering unlikely scenarios. Overconfidence and the illusion of control further beleaguered Israeli intelligence in 2023.

Human beings are inherently fallible. Consequently, we cannot expect to receive early warning about the erosion of deterrence or an imminent attack. This underscores that deterrence and early warning cannot serve as the cornerstones of Israel’s national security doctrine. We cannot deduce however that we should neglect intelligence or abandon enhancement of deterrence.

Instead of relying on early warning and deterrence, error prone elements, Israel has no choice but to build a better defensive posture, particularly since it may once again find itself facing a multifront scenario. Israel needs a larger standing army that can better protect its land borders, along with larger reserve units in border settlements. Israel must field a stronger and more robust military able to parry enemy attacks and move on the offensive on at least two fronts simultaneously. A larger force is also essential to attain a decisive victory as quickly as possible —an outcome that in turn delays the next round of violence.

Reducing the length of compulsory military service, which shrinks the size of the standing army is no longer an option. The pool of available conscripts must be increased and every effort should be made to recruit the manpower available in the Ultra-Orthodox community.

Additionally, the reserve corps should be expanded by terminating the army’s lenient discharge policy. The reserve units need better training and equipment than in the past and maintenance must be improved. The pre-war assumption within the IDF leadership that reserve units no longer have a central role in waging modern war has been proven unequivocally wrong.

A larger army comes with higher costs. Moreover, both   regular and reserve soldiers should be better compensated for their service and patriotism. A larger defense budget is imperative —even at the expense of social services.

Israel must also abandon the policy of containment/restraint which was primarily intended to prolong periods of calm along the border and conserve blood and treasure. This approach has proven counter-productive. Over time, containment conveys weakness and an aversion to military confrontation— in a region where the political culture values the use of force, which is seenas integral to the rules of the game. Fear remains the most effectivepolitical currency in the Middle East. Moreover, the erosion of deterrence brings the next round of violence closer. In Gaza, containment fostered complacency, unltimately leading to a calamitous strategic surprise.

Israel was satisfied with the formula of “quiet for quiet” in Gaza. However, while this formula may have spared the Israeli population from missile attacks, it gave Hamas time to consolidate its rule and build up its military capabilities unimpeded, creating a greater future risk to Israel, as demonstrated by the Hamas attack of October 7 . Similalry, for years, Jerusalem allowed Hezbollah to amass a huge missile arsenal that acted as a deterrent against Israel. Hezbollah’s missiles did not “rust,” as former Chief of Staff  Yaalon predicted at the turn of the millennium, and they caused enormous damage in the 2006 Second Lebanon War.

Moreover, the policy of restraint normalizes the use of force by Israel’s adversaries. The world grew acustomed to missiles raining down on Israel’s population, and Israel’s success in intercepting them undermined its legitimacy to respond. Restraint has also allowed for a gradual increase in “acceptable” doses of violence against Israel. Hamas extended the range of its missiles, placing more Israeli within their range and making their lives miserable. At the same time, the payloads of its warheads also increased, further exacerbating their threat.

Kicking the can down the road is rarely a prudent course of action. Despite the inherent risks involved, Israel must use preemptive strikes, a core element of its original military doctrine. Today Israel is paying a staggering price for its delay in mounting a strong military response to previous provocations—doing so could have reinforced deterrence and instilled fear in its enemies. After all, fear is the best political currency in the Middle East. In the wake of the events of October 7, it appears that Israel overrelied on containment and that the preventive use of force must be reestablished.

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Photo: IMAGO / CTK Photo / Pavel Nemecek