The collapse of the regime in Iran—which has become, in effect, the unchecked rule of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—is not a war aim in itself, since this would mean committing to continue the fighting until it falls. It is, however, a desirable and essential outcome of the campaign, whether this occurs during the fighting itself or in its aftermath. In this context, the question of the role of the minorities, particularly the Kurds in northwestern Iran, in driving action that could accelerate the regime’s disintegration has emerged as a subject of public debate — in part due to (unnecessary) leaks and references in the United States.

So far, such actions have not materialized, even though the Kurdish factions joined together on the eve of the war to express their desire to participate in bringing the regime down. The possibility however remains open, if several necessary conditions are met:

1. A willingness and ability on the part of the United States and Israel to provide air support for ground maneuvers by armed militias drawn from minority groups.
   
   
2. A willingness on the part of neighboring states—the Kurdish autonomy (KRG) in northern Iraq; Azerbaijan; perhaps also Pakistan (vis-à-vis the Balochs), although its current position rules this out; and the Gulf states (vis-à-vis the Arabs in Khuzestan)—to allow activity across their borders, as well as provide support and supply lines.
   
   
3. A binding message from the U.S. administration assuring that there will be no repeat of the recent abandonment of the Kurds in Syria – despite their historic role in the campaign against ISIS.
   
   
4. The formulation of a political framework for Iran’s future that would be acceptable both to minority groups and to major Persian opposition forces (including the exiled shah). This will require a careful balance between preserving the unity of the state and defining the horizon of minority aspirations, in terms of cultural autonomy and the decentralization of political powers, possibly in a federal model.

Israel, even if it is clearly a secondary actor in such efforts, can play a role through intensive dialogue with the Trump administration on these issues, while bringing to bear its intelligence capabilities and its ties with Baku and Erbil, and, in parallel, continuing the attrition of the regime’s mechanisms of repression in the relevant parts of Iran.

A Political Map of Iran’s Minorities

For centuries, Iran (or to use its historical name, Persia) has existed more or less within its current borders, under a clear political and cultural-linguistic dominance of the Persian population. At the same time, it remains, in practice, a mosaic of ethnic minority groups, particularly in its peripheral regions. The principal groups among which there is historical evidence of separatist aspirations, or at least efforts to establish political and cultural autonomy, are:

1. The Azeris, who are estimated (Iran does not conduct a census by ethnic identity) to number between 15 and 20 million out of a total population of roughly 93 million, although Azeri nationalists claim their share is higher. They are Shiites, like the Persians, but speak a language closely related to Turkish and are concentrated in northern Iran, along the border with independent Azerbaijan. Estimates suggest they may constitute as much as one-third of Tehran’s population. Across the border, some promote the idea of a “Greater Azerbaijan” that would include significant parts of northern Iran, although this is not the position of the government in Baku, despite the high level of tension between the two countries. Within Iran, manifestations of Azeri nationalist unrest have been rare in recent decades, perhaps in part because Khamenei himself was of partial Azeri origin. There is, however, a precedent for separate national existence: at the end of World War II, when the Soviet Union and Britain divided Iran into zones of control for strategic reasons, Stalin sought to maintain his hold over northern Iran by establishing, under his patronage, two “people’s republics,” Azeri and Kurdish. Firm American intervention led him to abandon this effort, and by 1946 Iran had returned to its previous borders. Today, following Iranian strikes on targets in Azerbaijan, there is, in principle, a possibility that Baku could encourage nationalist unrest—but so far there are no indications of this.
   
   
2. The Kurds, estimated at between 8 and 12 million—roughly 10 percent of Iran’s population—are concentrated in the northwest of the country. As noted, Stalin once sponsored the short-lived establishment of a Kurdish people’s republic there. Unlike the Azeri case, the predominantly mountainous Kurdish regions have seen sustained nationalist unrest, which intensified after the killing of Mahsa Amini (a young woman of Kurdish origin) by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Tehran, an event that sparked the hijab protests across Iran. Several armed underground movements have operated in the region for years, despite the regime’s efforts to suppress them, including PJAK, KDPI, the two factions of Komala, and others. Notably, on February 22, just days before the start of the campaign, they announced the unification of their ranks for a joint struggle. Against this backdrop, reports were leaked to the American media—possibly deliberately, in order to increase pressure on the regime in Tehran—about plans to encourage the Kurdish guerrillas to actively fight regime forces. The United States, however, has so far chosen not to go in this direction (Trump himself stated that he “does not want Kurds to be killed”), and Kurdish hesitation reflects, among other things, a bitter lesson drawn from recent events in Syria.
   
   
3. The Arabs of Khuzestan in southwestern Iran, also referred to as “Ahwazis” after the province’s largest city, number, by most estimates, around two million or fewer. Despite their numbers, they carry strategic weight because of their location on the edge of the Gulf near Iran’s main oil and gas fields. They are an Arabic-speaking, Sunni population that was brought under the Shah of Iran’s rule in the 1920s, when Britain abandoned the local ruler, the Sheikh of Mohammerah, to his fate. Over the years, there have been several instances of violent unrest in the region (which the regime attributed to Britain—still viewed in Tehran as an adversary—and to the Gulf states), but there have been no reports of such activity during the current campaign.
   
   
4. The Baloch—mostly located in southeastern Iran, contiguous with the Baloch minority in Pakistan—are also estimated at around two million. Given the region’s geographic and economic characteristics, as well as their Sunni religious and distinct ethnic identity, the central government has difficulty enforcing its authority over them. In recent years, significant tensions have emerged between Iran and Pakistan over mutual allegations of subversive activity. In this case as well, the regime claims to have identified the fingerprints of Western and Arab intelligence services.

Conditions for Integrating the Kurds and Other Minorities into Efforts to Undermine the Regime

If the regime begins to show signs of collapse—whether as a direct result of military strikes or of the conditions created by such strikes—organized militias drawn from minority groups, particularly the Kurds, could move to accelerate that process, especially with American (and Israeli) backing. Some of these Kurdish forces already receive support from the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq. The possibility of a Kurdish intervention has already been raised in public discussion, although the envisioned Kurdish offensive described in media reporting has not materialized. At the same time, CENTCOM and Israeli Air Force strike missions are already being directed toward regime targets in Iran’s northwestern border regions.

The transition to a more active phase—if the necessary conditions emerge—will depend on four elements that the United States and Israel would need to put in place:

1. Operational coordination under which both CENTCOM’s aerial component (AFCENT, which also has close air support capabilities) and the Israeli Air Force provide direct support to rebel forces on the ground—specifically by striking Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij units in the combat zones.
   
   
2. Support from adjacent or nearby territories is required to conduct sustained operational activity and secure supply lines. This applies particularly to the policy of the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, which in practice operates as a sovereign entity not bound by directives from Baghdad, as well as to how Azerbaijan chooses to respond to the violations of its sovereignty and security in the recent wave of Iranian strikes. Support from the Gulf states for activity by the Ahwazi Arab minority could, if access from southern Iraq is secured, help create a strategic threat to Iran’s main oil-producing regions. The prospects for Pakistani support for the Baloch are more remote, particularly given that Iran has designated Pakistan as one of four countries permitted to receive oil supplies through the Strait of Hormuz.
   
   
3. Credible long-term commitment by the United States is required, particularly in the Kurdish instance, given the bitter lesson of recent events in Syria. The Kurds of Iran are well aware that the Trump administration, largely due to its relationship with Turkey, turned away from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), composed primarily of Kurdish militias, that had fought alongside U.S. forces against ISIS in the previous decade. Leaving the Syrian Kurds to their fate was a mistake in broader strategic terms —even if partly justified by the need to strengthen the new Syrian regime. The ability of local partners to rely on American commitments is a necessary foundation for regional stability. A corrective step is therefore required, and it should be articulated explicitly at the highest political level.
   
   
4. Balance minority aspirations with the risk of state fragmentation. American backing for uprisings does not imply support for dismantling Iran as a sovereign state—a prospect that concerns Persian opposition figures, including supporters of the exiled shah. As part of preparations for activating this element against the regime, structured understandings regarding the expected political horizon for minority groups should be reached in advance: political autonomy (potentially within a federal model), an end to repression, and the ability to cultivate linguistic and cultural identity—all within a single sovereign framework. This is the model currently in place in Iraq, and it could also be applied in Syria.

Implications for Israel

If this course of action is adopted in the next phase, the United States will necessarily lead and shape it, given the need to bring about the regime’s collapse. It will provide both the bulk of the resources and the political framework, as outlined above. Israel, however, can still play a role:

1. By leveraging its existing relationships with the relevant actors—including Azerbaijan and the KRG—which have been built over time, in support of the joint strategic effort.
   
   
2. By conducting discreet but candid preparatory discussions with U.S. officials on the issues at hand, with particular emphasis on conveying to senior policymakers both the need for clear signals of commitment and the importance of balancing that commitment with the preservation of Iran’s sovereign unity in the “day after.”

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.