The debate in Israel over Egypt’s intentions has gained traction recently both in media and research circles. The trigger was an Egyptian military exercise in Sinai in April 2026, though it had been coordinated in advance. The discussion reflects troubling elements in Egypt’s military posture and significant gaps between Jerusalem and Cairo on a range of issues, from Egypt’s position on the campaign against Iran to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. At the strategic level, the central question concerns Egypt’s relationship to the emerging alignment involving Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Although this “Sunni” camp appears to be taking shape as a response to Shiite Iran and its proxies, Israel has reasons to view it with growing concern, especially if Egypt ultimately joins it. At the same time, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s regime can still be seen as both a partner in the struggle against radical Islamism and as part of the region’s pro-American alignment.
The renewed Israeli focus on Egypt is important, since the Egyptian question is too often pushed to the margins amid the constant churn of events in the region. Egypt is Israel’s most important neighbor. It has been at peace with Israel for two generations—a cold peace, but one that is now anchored in a long-term gas deal—and, with a population of 120 million, it is the most populous country in both the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin. It also has a large regular army, a powerful air force, and an advanced navy that includes a submarine arm. Egypt’s geostrategic location and diplomatic standing add further weight to its importance and to the grave implications of any deterioration in relations if mutual suspicions deepen.
Israel therefore needs a careful, well-calibrated policy that balances two requirements: providing a security response to legitimate concerns, while also identifying areas of convergence and shared interests that can strengthen the peace treaty. The IDF’s force buildup equations should, in the long term, account for Egyptian power—on land, in the air, and at sea—as a risk factor, though not yet a “threat,” even in the absence of current aggressive intent. Israel must preserve its deterrent posture in this context. The intelligence community should also keep Egypt under close watch, prioritizing it in collection requirements, with particular attention to open-source intelligence, which can reveal to a trained eye core policy positions, economic constraints, and deeper social and ideological currents. At the same time, if Israel inflates its suspicions, Cairo will interpret that in kind, and the resulting vicious cycle will narrow the space for dialogue.
Sisi’s visit to the United Arab Emirates—a country whose positions overlap with Israel’s on many of the issues noted above, including Iran, Turkey, and the Horn of Africa, and during which the Egyptian Air Force’s contribution to its defense (alongside Israeli systems!) was revealed—signals that Egypt is preserving its freedom of action; that it is not set on an alignment with Turkey, whose ideology and long-term intentions it continues to view with suspicion; and that it sees a need to contribute to the response to Iran. Israel and Egypt can also find common ground on Hamas, given its ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, provided Israel does not pursue “solutions” that would push Gaza’s population across the border.
Sources of Concern: Egyptian Power as a Risk Factor
Egypt’s military presence in Sinai has for some time exceeded the limits set by the military annex to the 1979 peace treaty. Cairo justifies that presence by the genuine need to fight murderous terrorist organizations, above all the Islamic State’s Sinai Province, Wilayat Sinai, mainly in the north of the peninsula. The buildup in Area B was generally carried out with Israel’s knowledge and in coordination with it, and in the past Israel was also directly involved in assisting Egyptian military operations there. Still, some features of the Egyptian deployment do not match counterterrorism needs, even though the forces are not organized in divisional combat formations of the kind required for a campaign against a regular military such as the IDF. There are also indications of infrastructure being built to allow the Egyptian Air Force to deploy to more forward bases in Sinai in an emergency. In addition, there has been a dramatic improvement in military transport capabilities and the road network in Sinai. There are voices in Jerusalem who warn that these developments point to Egyptian intentions to return one day to war with Israel. These warning have given the debate about Egypt’s intentions resonance.in the media.
The concern is rooted in the overall strength of the Egyptian military, which continues to arm itself on a substantial scale, using both U.S. military aid funds and paid procurement from a range of suppliers on both sides of the geopolitical divide—France and Germany, but also Russia and China. Egypt has 12 regular divisions, most of them armored or mechanized (based on U.S.-supplied Abrams tanks); a large air force that includes advanced attack helicopters; and a large, modern navy, including a submarine arm. Beyond considerations of military prestige and institutional status, the reference threat used to justify procurement on this scale is clearly the IDF, as reflected in General Staff-level exercises. It is certainly not the armies of Egypt’s two other neighbors: Libya, whose eastern region is controlled by Sisi’s ally “Field Marshal” Khalifa Haftar, or Sudan, which is mired in a devastating civil war. Nor do the specific features of Egypt’s force buildup fit the possibility of a confrontation with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
Caution and close intelligence monitoring are warranted. Emphasis should be placed on open sources, which can reveal policy trends and public moods, economic constraints and crisis potential, deeper social currents, and risks of instability or the rise of radical forces. Policymakers and planners at the political level and within the defense establishment should treat Egypt’s military potential in all its dimensions—land, air, air defense, and sea—as a significant factor in the IDF’s force buildup equations. This should be treated as a “reference risk,” even if it is not currently an active threat—that is, even if Egypt does not currently have any intentions to violate the peace treaty.
If Israel accompanies its force buildup with clarifications regarding its motives—namely that it has no intention of harming Egypt’s security or expelling Gaza’s residents into Egypt—this would help strengthen deterrence, a factor that played a role from the outset (and even more so after the results of the Yom Kippur War!) in Egypt’s decision to seek peace.
Points of Friction and Egypt’s Strategic Orientation
The renewed debate over Egypt’s objectives also reflects several issues on which significant differences emerged between the two countries during the war with Iran and against the backdrop of wider regional developments:
- Like many Arab states—and, for that matter, European countries—Egypt has taken a grave view of Israel’s conduct in the war in the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon, as well as the scale of harm to the Palestinian civilian population and has joined moves to condemn Israel in the international arena. It also leads the Arab League on this front.
- Cairo has also been troubled by the erosion of its traditional role as mediator between Israel and Gaza with Qatar taking over that role, with all the implications that this shift entails—despite the fact that in 2014 Israel itself had insisted that Egypt should be the only actor to manage these efforts.
- Israel’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence also drew Egyptian displeasure. Cairo quickly affirmed its support for Somalia’s unity and, against the backdrop of the dam crisis with Ethiopia, views the move as aligned with the interests of its rival.
- The most important divergence concerned the campaign against Iran. Egypt appeared to be trying to position itself as a mediator, maintaining channels of contact with Tehran—or at least with the Iranian foreign minister—while distancing itself from both the war and its objectives.
More broadly, Egyptian diplomatic messaging during the war and in its aftermath has created the impression that Cairo may be moving closer to a regional alignment combining diplomatic standing and conventional military power (Turkey), nuclear weapons (Pakistan), and vast economic resources (Saudi Arabia)—an alignment some have described as a “Muslim NATO” or as the “Sunni axis.” Egypt’s possible entry into this framework could have far-reaching strategic implications and its trajectory, given Turkey’s leadership, should be of concern to Israel. Even so, this should not be treated as a fait accompli, or even as an inevitable trend. As discussed below, Egypt has recently demonstrated again that it is careful to preserve its independence, and, with considerable justification, remains suspicious of Erdoğan’s goals despite the gestures of friendship during his visit to Egypt in February 2026.
Areas of Convergence with Israel and the Significance of Sisi’s UAE Visit
Despite the points of friction, Israel and Egypt still have significant areas of agreement, including on energy. The $35 billion multiyear gas deal signed in December 2025 has become a long-term strategic anchor for the relationship and has deepened both countries’ shared interest in stability in the eastern Mediterranean. Its significance is all the greater because it was concluded after more than two years of war, despite intense negative public sentiment against the deal in Egypt and commercial reservations in Israel.
Another shared interest is reflected in Egypt’s firm position, coordinated with Greece, against legislative moves by Ankara designed to give ostensible legal standing to Turkey’s interpretation of the Law of the Sea that would deny islands such as Rhodes, Karpathos, and Crete any status in the delineation of exclusive economic zones, enabling it to claim control up to Libya’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundary. For Egypt—and for Israel—the result would be the loss of a continuous maritime link to Greece and Europe, leaving both dependent on Turkey’s goodwill. The question now is whether Sisi will try to appease Turkey or take a firm stand, which Israel would support.
Sisi’s visit to the United Arab Emirates points to another convergence of interests. During the visit, it emerged that Egypt had deployed Rafale fighter jets to help defend the UAE, at the same time that an Israeli missile-defense capability was deployed there. This was an unusual event in its own right: Egyptian and Israeli capabilities were present “in the same trench.” This showed that Egypt:
- is now prepared to play its part in defending against the Iranian threat;
- sees the Emiratis as important partners, despite—or perhaps because of—their tense relations with the Saudis;
- is acting in the knowledge that the UAE, alongside India and Israel, views the regional balance of forces from a different perspective than the Saudis. In this context, it should be recalled that the UAE supports Somaliland and Israel’s recognition of the breakaway state.
Sisi’s regime still serves as a political and ideological anchor against the forces of totalitarian Islamism in the region, including Hamas, even as it maintains certain channels of political or intelligence contact with some of them. That reality, together with the dead end reached in Nikolay Mladenov’s contacts with Hamas, creates potential for mapping shared interests with Egypt, maintaining a discreet high-level channel, and shaping reciprocal messages to calm tensions. Caution requires Israel to prepare and ensure that its force buildup accounts for extreme scenarios, but sound statecraft also requires it to avoid making mountains out of molehills or inflating the threat. There is reason to fear that a more confrontational public debate over Egypt’s intentions could in turn generate suspicions in Cairo and deepen mutual tensions, precisely when a window has opened to identify areas of convergence with Egypt.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
