Introduction
Conflict management combines the use of political, economic, legal, cognitive, cultural, and military instruments. The arenas in which these tools are employed span several levels and require clarification and clear definition of the basic terms used to describe them and the activities carried out within them, both for professionals and for the broader public. These levels of action begin at the tactical level and proceed through the operational level and the strategic level, up to the national security level, which constitutes the comprehensive political level. At each level, a shared language is required to describe the achievements appropriate to that level of action; in this context, we make frequent use of the terms “decisiveness” and “victory,” often without clarity as to their meaning.
The difference between “decisiveness” and “victory” is not merely semantic; it is essential to understanding the extent to which war can be used as an instrument to improve national security and to prevent the recurrence of strategic failures. In the Israeli context, these terms require renewed discussion following the events of October 7, 2023, which led to the War of Redemption (Swords of Iron) and continue to reverberate amid the fragile ceasefire reached in October 2025.
Over the years, there has been a sustained and active debate over the concepts of decisiveness and victory, primarily in their military dimensions. Nevertheless, the use of these terms in the context of the War of Redemption has at times created confusion among practitioners. This article therefore seeks to analyze the two concepts through insights drawn from the war. We argue, for the purposes of this discussion, that decisiveness is a term that should be applied to the tactical and operational domains of military combat, whereas victory is reserved for the realm of grand strategy and national security and denotes the achievement of the war’s political objectives, which lead to a long-term improvement in the state’s security.
Decisiveness
Defining military terms is not merely a technical matter; it is the foundation of a doctrine that affects operational planning, force training, political decision-making, and public awareness. Over the years, several publications have addressed decisiveness and victory. The IDF Glossary defines decisiveness as “breaking the enemy’s power of resistance to operate effectively against us, by creating a situation in which (in the decision-maker’s assessment) the conditions exist for achieving the mission that was set. Decisiveness is achieved when it is evident that the enemy has lost its ability to operate effectively against us.”
The term “decisiveness” was coined to describe a situation in which the enemy’s capability has been eliminated and it has been brought, in a single act, to a state of helplessness, or to a state in which it surrenders. This definition raises several questions that require attention.
The question of the enemy—in what context the aspect of decisiveness is analyzed. In the military context, the enemy is the sum of its military capabilities to use force against us. In this regard, two types of military capabilities should be distinguished: first, the enemy’s organized military capability—namely, the units of its organized army—and second, its “unorganized” resistance capability—namely, the enemy’s ability to mount resistance outside the framework of organized military units, such as civilian resistance, terrorism, and so on.
The question of the decisive event—here the concept of time must be clarified. That is, two time frames can be distinguished: one prior to attaining decisiveness—a situation in which the enemy still has the capability to mount resistance—and the other post decisiveness—a situation in which the definition above has materialized. The question then is how long decisiveness is preserved. In this context, the question of duration arises, as decisiveness may be for a limited period after which the enemy is able to resume acting against us.
The impetus for this analysis was the need for conceptual clarification of Israel’s military achievements in the War of Redemption, for example in the Gaza theater. An analysis of the term decisiveness should take a comprehensive view and should provide an answer for every theater of combat and its forms. We should remember that a military unit always acts out of a desire to carry out its mission in order to realize, in the best possible manner, the objective of the echelon above it. It does not matter what type of conflict the battle takes place in; the intensity of force deployment is derived solely from the basic need to carry out the mission in the best possible manner.
To present a full analysis of the term decisiveness in its overall military context, an analytical approach divided into two main stages is proposed: (1) characterizing the levels of military combat, and (2) examining the term decisiveness at each level in the context of the questions raised above.
Several levels of military combat can be identified, as follows:
The tactical level—this level of combat is concerned with achieving military missions through defined and measurable physical outcomes (effects). Tactical missions are carried out by combat units equipped with weapons systems. In the IDF, this is generally confined to the brigade and division levels. In the tactical space, the enemy is defined in an immediate and clear manner, and at this level of combat there is no distinction between an enemy organized as a regular military unit and an enemy that is not. Missions are limited in time and space, and their context is immediate. Decisiveness against the enemy in such missions can be achieved either through the physical destruction of the enemy or by creating a situation in which it has no ability or desire to continue resisting.
At this level, several time frames can be identified. Prior to decisiveness—the enemy is active and possesses both the capability and the will to fight. The battle is the event in which decisiveness is achieved. After the battle, a time frame can be identified in which decisiveness continues to exist, because the enemy is no longer relevant in the current operational context. It can therefore be determined that at this level of combat, the concept of decisiveness is clearly applicable.
The operational level—a level of combat concerned with achieving objectives (as distinct from defined missions) and outcomes that are not necessarily physical or quantitatively measurable. This level of combat is generally characterized by a theater of operations bounded by a clear context. Operational objectives are achieved through operational outcomes (in the IDF, it is customary that these outcomes be generated at the level of the regional command). Because this level of combat addresses an overall theater of operations, a substantive distinction exists here between different types of enemies. At this level, there is difference in the ways objectives are realized when facing an enemy organized in regular military frameworks as opposed to an “unorganized” enemy that conducts civilian resistance and terrorism.
This distinction gives rise to the first area of ambiguity regarding the concept of decisiveness. That is, which enemy is to be defeated, and whether the concept of decisiveness as we define it in the tactical context can be applied in the operational context as well. Is it possible to eliminate all the enemy’s capability and all its will to fight—which is, in effect, the definition of decisiveness—or is the elimination of most of its capacity to resist sufficient to achieve the operational objective, without seeking absolute decisiveness?
At times, the rules of the tactical arena can be applied to this domain, primarily if the duration of the campaign can be clearly confined. The time dimension is a critically important dimension in shaping the ability to achieve decisiveness at the operational level; it necessarily extends over a longer period. In other words, the outcome of the campaign must be more enduring than the outcome at the tactical level, and it must persist over a period relevant to the specific campaign. Here, the insight becomes clear that the operational objective does not always need to be decisiveness, and that achieving such an objective does not always require the decisive defeat of the enemy’s capabilities. There may be situations in which the operational objective is the containment of a given theater and the maintenance of a defined and desirable condition within it over time. This was how the IDF operated in the Gaza Strip in a series of deterrence operations (Operation Cast Lead, Operation Pillar of Defense, Operation Protective Edge, Operation Guardian of the Walls), in which the operational objective was to severely damage the enemy and to buy a period of time during which fighting against Israel would not take place.
The strategic level, the national security level—the comprehensive level of military combat, which makes use of all military and national resources in order to achieve objectives defined by the political leadership. Strategic objectives are realized through the use of operational outcomes. In the IDF, this responsibility lies with the General Staff, which enables the attainment of objectives at the state and national security level. The achievement of strategic objectives can be assessed only over a prolonged period; the length of that period is not fixed and depends on the specific context.
For example, one may ask whether the Egyptian army was decisively defeated at the strategic level in the Six-Day War. The answer is no; within six years the Egyptian army had been rebuilt and launched a comprehensive offensive. It is therefore possible that the Egyptian army was defeated in tactical battles and at the operational level but was not defeated strategically. In general, the use of the term “decisiveness” in the strategic domain is highly problematic. More than any other level discussed, the strategic level must define long-term objectives that are attainable and sustainable and avoid the use of the term “decisiveness” in the sense described above.
During the War of Redemption, the IDF achieved impressive decisive outcomes in many engagements in the Gaza Strip theater, including the elimination of Yahya Sinwar (October 2024), the destruction of a large part of Hamas’s infrastructure, and the elimination of most of its command echelon. These outcomes also include the blocking of smuggling corridors along the Philadelphi Corridor and the application of intense and sustained military pressure on Hamas that ultimately led to a ceasefire agreement and the release of nearly all the hostages. This amounted to operational decisiveness that severely constrained Hamas’s ability to operate. However, the decision not to fully occupy the Gaza Strip and impose a military administration to manage civil affairs prevented the attainment of full military decisiveness. Even today, in December 2025, with a ceasefire in place, as the IDF continues to destroy enemy infrastructure and hunt down terrorists trapped in the underground arena in Rafah, military decisiveness remains temporary in the absence of full territorial control and authority over civilian governance.
It is therefore appropriate for the state to define strategic objectives that lead to improvement in the security situation over a prolonged period. In light of this analysis, we propose that the term “decisiveness” be reserved exclusively for the domain of tactical and operational domains of military action and to avoid its use at the level of national security level, where we propose the use of the term “victory.” At the same time, it must be remembered that decisiveness is a necessary step —though not sufficient—step on the path to victory.
Victory
The concept of “victory” has been widely examined in the strategic literature, yet, in our view, this analysis fails to provide adequate answers to the definition required. We therefore propose the adoption of the definition set out in Guidelines for Israel’s Security Doctrine, which defines victory as the enemy’s acceptance of terms of settlement and ceasefire dictated by Israel.
Victory is achieved when the enemy is no longer capable of effective action and either surrenders or reaches the conclusion that continued confrontation will not only fail to achieve its objectives but will inevitably lead to the further erosion of the political, military, and economic assets on which its rule depends—ultimately threatening the leadership’s political survival and personal security.
Such victory is not achieved through military force alone. It results from the integrated application of national power, including military action employing all relevant capabilities: ground maneuver on the front and in depth; strategic and operational strikes based on precise intelligence against both preplanned targets and targets of opportunity; special operations; cyber operations; and offensive activity in the cognitive domain. These efforts are complemented by robust national defensive measures—military and civilian alike—designed to limit damage from enemy actions and preserve the continuity of civilian life, alongside diplomatic efforts to secure international legitimacy for Israel’s objectives and build political coalitions to thwart the enemy’s attempts to achieve its objectives, and to shape a settlement on Israel’s terms.
Ultimately, victory in war is a political achievement at the level of national security. It is attained when long-term political objectives have been achieved through a combination of military force, cognitive blows, and diplomatic negotiations, resulting in an improved national security balance. This concept comprises four principal components: (1) military decisiveness as the initial foundation; (2) a cognitive shift on the part of the enemy, among the local population, and within the international community; (3) a political settlement, for example in the form of a peace treaty or a United Nations Security Council resolution; and (4) strategic improvement, such as territorial expansion, the elimination of an existing threat, or regime change. Victory in war, therefore, is a distinctly political outcome.
Analysis
These definitions serve as the basis for analyzing the military and political levels, illustrating how decisiveness lays the foundation, while victory requires broader integration. An Israeli example is the Six-Day War (1967). The IDF achieved operational decisiveness within hours: Operation Focus destroyed 90 percent of the Arab states’ air forces, enabling the capture of the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, and Judea and Samaria within six days. This constituted tactical decisiveness in the aerial domain and operational decisiveness through the defeat of the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian armies, at the cost of approximately 20,000 Arab fatalities compared with 800 Israeli fatalities. However, full victory was not achieved, as the War of Attrition soon followed, Israel did not secure clear political gains from the war, and hostilities resumed six years later.
A classic example of tactical and operational decisiveness without victory is the Tet Offensive in the Vietnam War (1968). The U.S. military killed approximately 50,000 Viet Cong fighters and effectively achieved tactical decisiveness at the cost of about 4,000 American fatalities. However, the harsh images broadcast by the media shattered public trust and support for the war, ultimately leading to an American defeat and victory for North Vietnam. In effect, as a result of cognitive defeat, military advantage was turned into political weakness.
In the Yom Kippur War (1973), the IDF achieved clear military decisiveness on both the southern and northern fronts. Political victory, however, was achieved only with the Camp David Accords (1978), which altered the balance of power vis-à-vis Egypt, led to peace, and removed an existential threat. Without the policies pursued by Sadat and Begin, the decisiveness would have remained temporary, as was the case with Syria.
In the War of Redemption as well, the same conceptual confusion resurfaced. In the Gaza Strip, Israel achieved impressive results against Hamas, but these were nevertheless tactical achievements that did not bring the organization to surrender or bring the war to an end. At the same time, continued military pressure in Gaza (Operation Gideon’s Chariots II), together with operations in other arenas as well (including the strike in Doha), and alongside political pressure achieved with U.S. support under President Trump’s leadership, and pressure from the mediators led Hamas to agree to a ceasefire.
The ceasefire included the return of all hostages, the continued presence of the IDF inside the Strip, including along the Philadelphi Corridor, and a principled agreement from Hamas to relinquish both its weapons and its rule. This agreement points to the attainment of decisiveness at the operational level. At the same time, this situation may change if Hamas refuses to disarm and Israel decides to return to fighting to complete Hamas’s defeat at the tactical and operational levels. Victory in Gaza can be attained through the dismantling of Hamas’s weapons and its rule and the establishment of an alternative governing authority.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah was defeated at the tactical and operational levels—a defeat dependent on time and context, as detailed below—and therefore agreed to a ceasefire agreement. At the same time, Hezbollah is working to rebuild and strengthen its damaged capabilities, despite international pressure led by the United States to disarm the organization. Here too, completion of the task—whether through international pressure or through Israeli action—could lead to the attainment of victory.
The 12-day attack on Iran dealt it significant damage and forced it to accept a ceasefire agreement. The sequence of blows absorbed by Iran constitutes a clear example of decisiveness at the operational level, meaning the loss of the enemy’s will to fight. If Iran resumes hostilities in the foreseeable future or continues force buildup at a level that creates a threat to the State of Israel—including a ballistic missile arsenal that exceeds the absorption capacity of Israel’s air defense systems—Israel will be required to strike again. This is precisely the essence of decisiveness as dependent on time and context.
Conclusion
In his book War and Strategy, Yehoshafat Harkabi writes that Clausewitz viewed victory as limited to the tactical level of battle. He argued that “in strategy, there is no such thing as victory.” Harkabi further writes that “the strategic-political success of war is assessed by criteria that lie outside the military domain.” In battle, it is possible to determine with certainty whether the enemy has been decisively defeated, insofar as the enemy has ceased to be relevant in that specific battle as a fighting framework—whether through destruction, surrender, or flight. Judgment regarding victory in war, however, is not autonomous, but rather contingent on outcomes that are not always immediate, but are, in essence, delayed.
The distinction between decisiveness and victory lies at the very heart of successful strategy: decisiveness builds the military foundation required for victory, which in turn builds a political future. It is important to use these terms correctly, both to better define for the security establishment what it is required to achieve and to explain to the public what can be achieved and what is intended to be achieved in each campaign. It is particularly important to understand the temporary nature of decisiveness, which is more suited to tactical and operational levels and dependent on time and context whereas the attainment of victory, which is based on the combined application of military and political power, enables sustained quiet from the enemy over time. It should be recalled that military decisiveness is generally a necessary condition (though not a sufficient one) for achieving victory. The path forward runs through updating the national security doctrine, into which requisite concepts must be incorporated, foremost among them the integration of military decisiveness and political victory, whose purpose is long-term improvement in security.
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