Key Points
Operation Roaring Lion is not merely another round of fighting in the Lebanese arena but a rare and possibly even one-time opportunity to complete the task begun during the War of Redemption (Swords of Iron) — the dismantling of Hezbollah as a military organization. This opportunity derives from the degraded condition of the organizaiton which has already lost most of its senior leadership, thousands of fighters, and significant capabilities, and from the acute crisis confronting its principal sponsor and financier, the Ayatollah regime in Iran.
To convert this opportunity into a strategic victory, Israel must act decisively and concurrently along three axes: first, establish a broad security buffer zone south of the Litani River, expanding it in the eastern sector to include the Beaufort Ridge; second, sustain systematic, high-intensity strikes to eliminate Hezbollah’s remaining military capabilities across Lebanon—its rocket inventories, production infrastructure, storage facilities, command nodes, and supporting logistical and financial systems. In parallel, Israel must intensify strikes on Iran’s military, economic, and nuclear infrastructure to disrupt the supply, financing, and training chains that sustain Hezbollah. Only the integration of these three components will prevent the organization from regenerating its capabilities.
Concurrently, Israel should leverage the growing and increasingly overt hostility toward Hezbollah within Lebanon—hostility that cuts across sectarian lines and extends into segments of the Shiite population. The combination of sustained military pressure and clear political signaling to Lebanese actors can recast Hezbollah as a liability that many in Lebanon want to remove, thereby materially facilitating its disarmament and the transfer of its weapons to the Lebanese Armed Forces.
Hezbollah’s entry into direct confrontation with Israel during Operation Roaring Lion, even if cautious and calibrated, creates an opportunity to complete the unfinished task of disarming the organization. That effort was halted toward the end of the Biden administration’s term in office, when the November 2024 ceasefire prevented the IDF from capitalizing on the operational momentum it had created.
Introduction
Hezbollah entered the current conflict in a severely degraded state following the pager operation that disrupted its command structure, the elimination of its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah its senior leadership, and extensive damage inflicted to its capabilities. Following the ceasefire, the IDF continued strikes and targeted killings to deepen the damage and impede the organization’s recovery.
Israel now has an opportunity to complete what it began in the War of Redemption. This rests on two key factors: the organization’s weakened state—it has lost thousands of fighters, tens of thousands of rockets, and hundreds of commanders—and the fact that its principal patron, the Ayatollah regime in Iran, is now engaged in a struggle for its own survival. Meanwhile, Syria’s shift following the fall of the Assad regime has made it harder to move weapons from Iran to Hezbollah through Syrian territory, even if limited flows persist. Within Lebanon, Hezbollah has also weakened politically. After years of positioning itself as the “defender of Lebanon” and embedding across state structures, it now faces growing and increasingly overt hostility, not only from Christian and Sunni actors, but also from segments of the Shiite community. The result is that the organization is no long seen as the “protector of Lebanon” but as a burden on the Lebanese state.
This article provides a concise historical overview of Israel’s operations in Lebanon over recent decades and analyzes the objectives of the current campaign and their linkage to the broader confrontation with Iran. Hezbollah functions as an arm of the Iranian state in Lebanon, and its elimination as a military organization will only be achieved if its sponsor is also significantly degraded. Operation Roaring Lion thus presents a rare opportunity, exploiting Tehran’s current existential crisis, to remove the northern threat to Israel once and for all.
Historical Background
Following the establishment of Israel in 1948, Lebanon was widely regarded as the quietest and most stable of the new state’s Arab neighbors. The international border remained relatively calm, and the country functioned as a multi-confessional republic dominated by Maronite Christians under a constitutional framework that granted them political primacy. Lebanon’s economy flourished as a regional commercial and financial hub, and Beirut earned the moniker “the Paris of the Middle East.” By the 1960s, however, a new and increasingly destabilizing dynamic had begun to take shape: waves of Palestinian refugees entered the country after the War of Independence, intensifying after Black September (1970), when King Hussein expelled Palestinian militant organizations from Jordan.
These developments transformed southern Lebanon into a “state within a state,” enabling the PLO to entrench itself there, increasing tensions with the Lebanese government and contributing to the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war. During this period, it became increasingly clear that Lebanon was not functioning as a sovereign state in the Western sense, but rather as an arena in which external actors—Syria, the PLO, and others—engaged in conflict at the expense of both Israel and Lebanon. The Lebanese government’s inability to assert control over its territory turned southern Lebanon into a persistent hostile base.
Operation Litani (March 1978) marked Israel’s first large-scale military intervention in Lebanon. Its objective was straightforward: push PLO forces north of the Litani River and establish a security buffer anchored on the river’s natural line to prevent cross-border infiltration. Although the IDF rapidly seized extensive territory and reached the river, the outcome proved tactical rather than strategic. The PLO soon reestablished its presence in the south, reinforcing a conclusion that would shape future policy: without a sustained Israeli presence, northern Israel would not remain secure.
Following sustained Katyusha fire into northern Israel and the attempted assassination of Israel’s ambassador in London, the IDF launched Operation Peace for Galilee (1982). Israeli forces overran southern Lebanon, advanced to Beirut, and expelled the PLO, culminating in an agreement intended to establish full peace between the states. The assassination of Bashir Gemayel, however, reignited the civil war and led to the collapse of the agreement. In 1985, Israel withdrew to a self-defined “security zone” in southern Lebanon, supported by the South Lebanon Army (SLA). During this period, Hezbollah emerged as a small Shiite militia under direct Iranian patronage and funding. In its 1985 manifesto, the organization set out its core objectives: the destruction of Israel, the expulsion of Western forces from Lebanon, and the establishment of an Iranian-inspired Shiite Islamic state.
In the years that followed, in order to reduce the threat to northern Israel, the IDF operated in southern Lebanon to degrade terrorist organizations, above all Hezbollah, which continued to grow stronger,. Over time, Israeli forces became increasingly fixed in static positions, while domestic debate intensified over mounting casualties and the long-term rationale for maintaining the security zone.
In May 2000, the Barak government ordered a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. The move abandoned thousands of South Lebanese Army soldiers, many of whom fled to Israel, while others were left to Hezbollah’s mercy. Israel withdrew to the international border down to the last inch to secure UN recognition, relinquishing key topographical assets and, in some areas, aligning the border line with adjacent civilian communities. Israel’s failure to respond to the abduction of three soldiers in the Shebaa Farms area (October 2000), together with Hassan Nasrallah’s “spider web” speech in Bint Jbeil (May 26, 2000), reinforced an image of weakness and vulnerability. Hezbollah exploited the resulting vacuum, built up a large-scale military infrastructure with Iranian backing, and emerged as the dominant force in Lebanon.
The Second Lebanon War (July–August 2006) followed Hezbollah’s attack near Zar’it, in which three Israeli reservists were killed and two abducted. Israel’s conduct of the campaign was hesitant and lacked operational coherence, particularly in the use of ground forces. Strikes on Hezbollah’s principal stronghold, the Dahiya district in Beirut, applied pressure on the organization and helped pave the way for UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which was intended to bar Hezbollah from operating in southern Lebanon with an expanded UNIFIL presence tasked with enforcing the resolution. In practice, its provisions were never implemented.
What emerged instead was mutual deterrence. Israel avoided direct confrontation so long as Hezbollah did not overtly breach the rules, while Hezbollah continued to build its capabilities, frequently operating through proxies to preserve plausible deniability. From 2011 onward, the organization deepened its involvement in the Syrian civil war, consolidated its position as a regional actor, and developed cross-border tunnel systems into Israel. Some of these tunnels were exposed during Operation Northern Shield (2018–2019). They were offensive systems, designed to enable infiltration and the seizure of territory inside Israel, similar to the Gazan tunnel networks.
This was the situation on the eve of Hamas’s surprise attack on October 7, 2023. In its aftermath, likely at the direction of its patron in Tehran, Hezbollah entered the fighting on October 8 in a limited and controlled manner, seeking to preserve its capabilities in case Israel moved against Iran’s nuclear program.
After months of containment, as Hezbollah’s attacks escalated and northern Israeli communities were evacuated, Israel shifted to an offensive approach. The initial phase included the pager operation, followed by the killing of Hassan Nasrallah in an aerial strike (September 2024) and much of Hezbollah’s senior command. At the same time, the IDF conducted limited ground operations along the border to dismantle infrastructure prepared for incursions into Israeli territory, including positions dominating nearby communities, and systematically cleared Hezbollah forces from the area.
The ceasefire reached at the end of 2024 under pressure from the Biden administration halted Israel’s operational momentum. Hezbollah was significantly weakened and degraded but remained far from defeated, let alone dismantled. The IDF maintained a presence in five positions across the border area and continued enforcement operations aimed at preventing the restoration of capabilities and the return of operatives to villages on the line of contact. Despite its weakened condition, Hezbollah continued efforts to rebuild and reconstitute its strength.
An Opportunity to Achieve Decisive Victory
Hezbollah’s entry into the fighting during Operation Roaring Lion (March 2026) was cautious, deliberate, and calculated. Having already absorbed significant losses, the organization avoided committing its full force at once. Instead, it escalated gradually while seeking to preserve core strategic assets such as precision-guided rockets, UAV capabilities, and its remaining senior commanders. Even in this limited form, the move marked a turning point, providing Israel with both political and international legitimacy to operate at full intensity, unconstrained by the terms of the late-2024 ceasefire.
The IDF response was immediate, forceful, and targeted. Unlike earlier phases, when Israel operated under significant political constraints, the current campaign reflects the post–October 7 security doctrine of “peace through strength.” The opportunity provided by Hezbollah’s launch of hostilities is not merely a tactical opening but a strategic one. Hezbollah entered the confrontation in a weakened state and with its Iranian patron facing an existential crisis. This convergence of local and regional vulnerability is rare and must be fully exploited. Israel prior to October 7 might have limited its response to calibrated retaliation for the launch of a small number of rockets that caused no damage. Post–October 7, Israel has shifted to a doctrine of prevention and enforcement, targeting capabilities rather than intent, and prioritizing decisive outcomes over managed deterrence.
The current campaign in Lebanon is defined by one overarching strategic objective and two operational objectives. The long-term strategic objective is the elimination of Hezbollah as a military organization and the removal of the threat to Israel. Achieving this objective runs primarily through Iran. Weakening the Ayatollah regime can take several forms. One path would be regime change driven by the Iranian population, leading to a government that ends support for Hezbollah and other proxies. This outcome is difficult to achieve and does not depend solely on Israeli or American action. A second path is the systematic degradation of Iran’s military capabilities and economic base. Such damage would require prolonged recovery and may significantly constrain Tehran’s ability to sustain Hezbollah. If the regime and the economy are sufficiently weakened, domestic unrest in Iran could re-emerge, even if only over time. In any case, sustained pressure on Iran’s economy is essential to prevent the Iranian regime from being able to rehabilitate Hezbollah.
Alongside operations against Iran, Israel must pursue two operational objectives in Lebanon. The first is the establishment of a buffer zone, extending from the international border to the Litani River, with an expanded footprint in the eastern sector that reaches beyond the river to include the Ali al-Taher ridge, where the Beaufort fortress is located.
To achieve this, the IDF has instructed residents of the area to evacuate for their safety, given its status as an active combat zone. The evacuation must be completed systematically, combining sustained military pressure with precise humanitarian warnings. Experience in Gaza with the “yellow line” model demonstrates that it is possible to create areas fully cleared of hostile populations and infrastructures that constitute a threat to Israel. Civilians should not be allowed to return, especially Shiites, as long as Hezbollah remains an active organization. The entire zone should be treated as a sterile security area, with no presence in villages that have historically provided Hezbollah with shelter and support.
The IDF should hold this area through a mix of outposts, technological means, and physical barriers, backed by continuous patrols and mobile defense. The purpose is to control movement, prevent infiltration, and eliminate threats emanating from the area, including incursions, anti-tank fire, and short-range direct and indirect fire.
A second operational objective is to step up the campaign against Hezbollah’s remaining capabilities across Lebanon. Alongside establishment of a buffer zone, the IDF should conduct a, countrywide effort from Beirut to the Bekaa Valley, northern Lebanon, and the Syrian border. The aim is not containment or limited pressure, but the near-total elimination of what remains of Hezbollah’s military capacity.
Strikes should focus on dismantling precision rocket stockpiles, production and assembly sites, large weapons depots, senior command centers, and the economic and logistical infrastructure that supports the organization. It should also target UAV capabilities, communications systems, and strategic tunnel networks, while continuing to eliminate remaining senior commanders. This effort would combine airpower, artillery, specialized ground forces, electronic warfare, and cyber operations, sustained at a high operational tempo.
These two operational objectives are critical but not sufficient on their own. Only a combined approach—establishing a broad security buffer in southern Lebanon, dismantling Hezbollah’s capabilities across the country, and inflicting significant damage on Iran—can deliver the desired strategic outcome: the elimination of Hezbollah as a military force, the removal of the northern threat to Israel and the restoration of security for northern communities for generations to come.
At the same time, Israel should exploit the growing and increasingly open opposition to Hezbollah that has emerged within Lebanon despite the weakness of the Lebanese government and army. Years of domination, corruption, dragging the country into unnecessary wars, and severe economic collapse have generated deep resentment toward the organization, not only among Christians and Sunnis, but also within parts of the Shiite community, particularly in the south and in Beirut’s suburbs. The evacuation of civilians from southern Lebanon and from the Dahiya district has displaced roughly one million Shiite residents. Many, especially from villages in the south, have no homes to return to, and Hezbollah lacks the resources to compensate them. This has translated into visible hostility toward Hezbollah and its supporters, including reluctance among Lebanese residents to assist displaced Shiites or even rent them housing.
Israel should use the growing opposition to Hezbollah as a strategic lever, pressuring the organization to the point that the Lebanese government feels confident enough to act. While the likelihood of such a move remains low, it should be pursued, including a clear demand for the organization’s full disarmament. At the same time, Israel should communicate directly and indirectly to Lebanese political actors opposed to Hezbollah that it has no intention of intervening in Lebanon’s internal affairs but will continue to act forcefully until the northern threat is removed. If leveraged effectively, this internal hostility, together with sustained military pressure and the strain created by large-scale displacement, could lead to most of the Lebanese population viewing Hezbollah as undesirable actor and thus make its disarmament more feasible.
Conclusion
Operation Roaring Lion is not merely another round of fighting in Lebanon but a rare and possibly one-time opportunity to complete the task begun with the War of Redemption: eliminating Hezbollah as a military organization. This opportunity stems from the degradation of the organization, which has lost much of its senior leadership, thousands of fighters, and significant capabilitie, and from the deep crisis facing its principal sponsor, the Ayatollah regime in Iran.
To translate this opportunity into a strategic outcome, Israel must act decisively and in parallel along three lines: establish a broad security buffer south of the Litani River, expanded in the eastern sector to include the Beaufort Ridge; sustain systematic, high-intensity strikes to eliminate Hezbollah’s remaining military capabilities across Lebanon; and intensify pressure on Iran’s military, economic, and nuclear infrastructure to disrupt the supply, financing, and training networks that sustain the organization. Only this combined approach can prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding.
Alongside military action, Israel should capitalize on the growing and increasingly overt hostility toward Hezbollah within Lebanon, hostility that crosses sectarian lines and extends into parts of the Shiite population. Combined with sustained military pressure, clear political messaging to Lebanese actors could recast Hezbollah as a liability, thereby easing the process of disarmament and the transfer of its weapons to the Lebanese Armed Forces.
Ultimately, the campaign in Lebanon must conclude with the full application of Israel’s post–October 7 security doctrine of “peace through strength.” This means moving beyond containment, mutual deterrence, and conflict management, and instead establishing a secure buffer zone to protect northern communities, eliminating enemy capabilities at their source, and enforcing a posture that prevents any future rearmament. If Operation Roaring Lion is pursued with determination and without hesitation or compromise, it can remove the northern threat, allow residents of the Upper Galilee to return safely to their homes, and fundamentally reshape Israel’s national security environment for generations to come.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
