Introduction
The year 2025 stands as the deadliest on record for Israel’s Arab community. According to a year-end report by the Center for the Advancement of Security in Arab Society (Ayalef), produced in cooperation with the Abraham Initiatives, 252 Arab citizens were murdered—an increase of roughly 10 percent over the 230 victims recorded in 2024.
More than 90 percent of the victims were killed by gunfire. The data reveal recurring patterns: multi-victim shootings, a troubling number of young victims—nearly 5 percent were minors—and persistent geographic hotspots. Case-clearance rates remain exceptionally low, with fewer than 15 percent of serious cases solved. Violence has also expanded beyond internal criminal disputes, increasingly affecting public spaces and targeting authorities, relatives of assassination targets, and uninvolved bystanders.
The toll on women is particularly severe. Twenty-three Arab women were murdered in 2025, the highest number recorded to date. Some were victims of domestic violence; others were killed because of their proximity to revenge operations carried out by criminal organizations.[1]
This crisis is not confined to Arab society. It affects the Israeli public as a whole and poses a growing threat to national security. In mixed cities such as Jaffa, Lod, Ramla, and Acre, violence has acquired a political dimension, further eroding the fragile social fabric Israel has worked to sustain.
In the Negev, crime families—mostly from Bedouin tribes—operate large-scale weapons-smuggling networks, using inexpensive drones to move increasingly advanced arms. These weapons fuel not only local criminal feuds but also terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria. The most serious risk is that the spread of weapons and violence could help ignite a third intifada—one that fuses organized crime with nationalist terrorism. A recent incident in the village of Tarabin offered a warning sign when following a police operation to restore law and order local gangs launched retaliatory attacks against nearby Jewish communities, vandalizing property indiscriminately.
This article surveys the problem and examines its cultural, social, and nationalist roots, its implications for national security, and possible responses. As Pirkei Avot (The Ethics of the Fathers) warns, “Were it not for fear of authority, people would swallow one another alive.”[2] Without a basic respect for state authority, society begins to unravel—the consequences can be devastating.
Violence in Mixed Cities—and Beyond
Crime in the Arab sector has spiraled out of control, not only within Arab communities but also in Israel’s mixed cities. Jaffa, long regarded as a symbol of Jewish–Arab coexistence, is a case in point. Home to roughly 35,000 Arab residents and 20,000 Jewish residents, the city has seen rising tensions and repeated incidents of violence between Arabs and Jews. In the most recent case, on January 1, 2026, Rabbi Netanel Abitan of Jaffa’s hesder yeshiva was attacked while walking along Yefet Street. He was beaten and sustained light injuries.
A week earlier, a more serious incident was sparked by allegagtions that Jewish youths had harassed an Arab woman—a claim later found to be fabricated. In fact, the woman and her brother had assaulted Jewish youths passing through the neighborhood. In response to the rumor, large numbers of Arab residents poured into the streets, blocked traffic, and chanted nationalist slogans, including calls in support of an intifada and denunciations of the police and the Shin Bet.
The Jaffa incident was not an exception. Other mixed cities have experienced similar incidents; violence spiralled throughout 2025, turning daily life into a nightmare for residents of these cities. In Lod, a city of roughly 75,000 residents, about half of them Arab, —twelve murders were recorded in 2025, a historic high. The city has become a focal point for feuds between crime families. In June 2025, a multi-victim shooting on a central street left two young men dead and five others wounded, including a 12-year-old passerby. Police linked the attack to a dispute between two families.
The violence also spilled over to Jewish residents: Jewish bystanders were struck by gunfire, state officials were targeted, and cars were bombed near synagogues.
Ramla recorded fifteen murders in 2025, underscoring the persistence of lethal violence in the city. A particularly notable incident occurred in March 2024, when a 25-year-old man was assassinated in the street. Shattered glass injured passersby, including an elderly Jewish woman who was evacuated to hospital. Many victims have been caught up in cycles of revenge between clans, often beginning with disputes over “honor” and ending in gunfire. Arab residents describe the city as “cursed,” while Jewish residents speak openly about being afraid to leave their homes.
Acre, with a population of about 50,000, more than 15,000 of them Arab, has also seen a rise in violent incidents, including gunfire directed at schools, car bombings, and nationalist attacks. In August 2025, a 16-year-old boy was shot on his way to school, triggering violent protests against the police. According to police data, there were 154 nationalist incidents in mixed cities in 2025. Although the figure is lower than in 2021, the year of Operation Guardian of the Walls in Gaza, which saw extensive violence in mixed cities, these figures are still sufficient to erode mutual trust.
It is also important to note the impact of rising levels of violence on Jewish residents—particularly in mixed cities. The dramatic increase in crime in general, including extortion, property theft, and assaults, is shaping the trajectory of these cities and affecting Israeli society more broadly. In Lod, hundreds of Jewish families have left the city amid what the mayor has described as an “atmosphere of war.” When violence in mixed cities threatens to undermine overall stability, it becomes a national problem.
A closer look at the southern region reveals that in 2025 the Negev became the focal point for increasingly sophisticated weapons smuggling, posing a direct threat to national security. Using inexpensive drones, smugglers brought in weapons from Egypt and Jordan—including rifles, medium machine guns, and even grenades—turning the region into a major infiltration route for arms. The phenomenon has intensified over the past two years, as security attention shifted toward Gaza and Judea and Samaria. The Negev’s topography is convenient for smuggling, facilitated by cooperation among Bedouin tribes living on both sides of the border, including the al-Azazmeh and Tarabin tribes. Most of the smuggled weapons are used for assassinations and serious criminal activity, but some appear to be making their way to terrorist groups, particularly in Judea and Samaria.[3]
In our assessment, the roots of the phenomenon lie in a long-standing and deeply entrenched criminal culture. Families that once made their living smuggling goods, drugs, women, and foreign workers have shifted to weapons trafficking and evolved into organized criminal networks. The Negev is not merely a local challenge; it serves as a gateway for crime and terrorism across Israel. Arms smuggling and property crimes—particularly extortion—generate substantial capital for these actors and are enabled by weak governance, which the criminals in turn further erode.
Social and Nationalist Roots
The violence spreading through mixed cities and the Negev is neither random nor episodic. It is rooted in deep-seated cultural, social, and historical dynamics within Arab society in general, and within Israel’s Arab society in particular.[4] Understanding the scale of the problem requires examining these layers—from traditions of blood feuds to spillover into nationalist terrorism. These patterns are exacerbated by weak governance and rising nationalist sentiment among significant segments of Arab society.
At the core of the phenomenon lies a culture of blood feuds. Within Arab society, blood revenge is not viewed merely as a response to violence but as a moral and social obligation tied to the preservation of family honor. In conflicts between families—often rooted in disputes over land or personal honor—cycles of retaliation emerge that can persist for generations. According to the 2025 Ayalef report, approximately 40 percent of reported murders are directly linked to revenge. These disputes often begin with warning shots and end in killings. For example, a conflict between two Bedouin families in Acre that began in 2023 over a financial debt escalated by 2025 into a double murder, carried out by young members of one of the families involved using M-16 rifles stolen from the IDF. This culture educates successive generations to prioritize revenge over the rule of law. “Family honor” is regarded as a supreme value—one that lies above the law of the land.
Alongside blood revenge, family honor and the symbolic value of possessing weapons constitute a central driver of the phenomenon. In Arab society, firearms are not merely tools of self-defense; they function as markers of status, masculinity, and power. Firing weapons into the air at weddings and celebrations—a practice often framed as “tradition”—serves to project family strength, but it also increases the availability of weapons and lowers the threshold for their use in disputes. In 2025, police recorded more than 500 such shooting incidents, some of which resulted in injuries.
Reluctance to report crimes to the authorities is a central factor exacerbating the problem. Fear of retaliation by families or criminal organizations deters victims and their relatives from coming forward, contributing to a clearance rate of less than 15 percent of all murders. The Ayalef report notes that approximately 70 percent of witnesses refused to cooperate with police investigations, citing doubts about the state’s ability to provide protection. This dynamic reinforces weak governance, in which the law is perceived as a tool of the “enemy” rather than as a source of protection. In Lod, for example, the killing of the head of a crime family in 2024 remains unsolved to this day; witnesses present at the scene refused to testify.
Crime families recruit teenagers as “soldiers,” while amplifying nationalist dimensions.[5] Nationalism adds another layer: a sense of being a persecuted minority—sharpened by events such as military operations in Gaza—creates a spillover from criminal activity to terrorism. Young men who begin as petty criminals, engaged in car theft or extortion, gradually graduate to providing assistance to terrorist activity, with some of the weapons they accumulate transferred onward to Judea and Samaria. In 2025, the Shin Bet exposed networks in which crime families in the Negev supplied weapons to Hamas in exchange for money or protection.
This spillover is not incidental; it results from the interaction between a culture that legitimizes violence and a sense of national alienation, in which the “struggle against occupation” serves as a cover for criminal activity. It is also linked to polygamy, as Bedouin men take multiple wives, including women brought from Gaza and Judea and Samaria due to the lower bride price. The sons of these women tend to identify more strongly with their Palestinian roots, increasing the risk of radicalization and involvement in crime and terrorism.
The expansion of organized crime has also been driven by external factors. In 2015, the Israel Police succeeded in dismantling powerful Jewish crime organizations—among them the Abergil and Domrani families—through determined operations that sent their leaders to prison (Case 512). This success created a vacuum, which was quickly filled by Arab crime families. Over the past decade, the combination of economic opportunity (arms smuggling is more profitable than drug trafficking) and a culture that encourages the use of violence has enabled these groups to grow stronger.
Technology has also played a significant role. Inexpensive drones, readily available at a cost of some $100, have made smuggling far more efficient. Getting weapons across the border used to be dangerous and complex but is now relatively easy. Drones originally used to smuggle drugs over the borders with Egypt and Jordan have evolved into a cheap and effective tool for trafficking weapons in large quantities. Some drones are capable of carrying multiple weapons, including medium machine guns.[6]
In sum, these cultural and social roots create a closed cycle of violence, in which blood revenge leads to murder in the name of family honor, which in turn drives weapons acquisition and can spill over into terrorism. Without substantial intervention by law enforcement authorities, the situation will persist and risks turning Israel into a battlefield of domestic crime. We have addressed the underlying deficiencies in the handling of serious crime in the Arab sector in a separate article, “How to Deal with Severe Crime in Israel’s Arab Sector”[7] and will not elaborate further here. That said, an effective response requires coordinated and synchronized action by all enforcement agencies to address the problem more effectively.
Impact on National Security: The Path to a Third Intifada
Violence in Arab society is not just an Arab sector problem; it poses a direct and serious threat to Israel’s national security. The impact is twofold: on the one hand, a rise in crime that affects the entire population; on the other, the spillover of weapons and criminal activity into terrorism, threatening both internal and regional stability. This phenomenon reached a peak in 2025, with implications that could lead to a third intifada triggered by either a nationalist or criminal incident. A scenario in which criminal activity in the Arab sector—armed with vast quantities of weapons of all kinds (rifles, machine guns, anti-tank missiles, and explosives)—evolves into organized terrorism is not far-fetched. Should such a scenario materialize in the foreseeable future, it will not be possible to say that the warning signs were not there to be seen.
The first threat is the increase in crime. Phenomena that were once largely confined to the Arab sector and Arab towns are spilling into mixed cities and even into predominantly Jewish cities. In Lod and Jaffa, extortion of Jewish-owned businesses by Arab crime families has increased by 25 percent, according to police data. In the Negev, gunfire directed at Jewish communities, arson, and violence have eroded trust in the state, accelerated the departure of Jewish residents from mixed cities,[8] and fostered a sense of insecurity that undermines Israeli society.
The second, more dangerous threat is the flow of weapons into the hands of terrorist actors. Smuggling from the Egyptian and Jordanian borders, alongside theft of weapons from the IDF, has created high levels of access to arms within the Arab sector. Some of these weapons are used for criminal activity and killings within the sector, but some find their way to Judea and Samaria, where organizations such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad eagerly await them.
In 2025, the Shin Bet documented numerous cases of weapons transfers from criminal networks in the Negev to Judea and Samaria, including automatic rifles and explosive devices. Weapons-smuggling infrastructure has also been identified in the north.[9] The crime families are able to move weapons and equipment with the security forces unable to respond in the absence of intelligence. Over the past two years, the redirection of the security focus to Gaza and Judea and Samaria has made it easier for criminal actors to expand their operations, in part because reduced focus on the Egyptian and Jordanian borders enabled greater penetration along those routes.
The potential threat stemming from this situation is the ignition of a third intifada—a broad outbreak of nationalist violence, not spontaneous like the first intifada but more organized, combining criminal activity with nationalist terrorism. Palestinian organizations facing constraints in Judea and Samaria view Arab-sector crime within Israel as a “bridge” to escalation. Hamas promotes “internal uprising” in East Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria, with weapons originating from the Negev. If the spillover of arms continues, widespread violence can be expected, including attacks in Judea and Samaria that could spread into Israel’s cities. Destabilization in Judea and Samaria following Mahmoud Abbas’s eventual departure from the political stage could serve as the catalyst for a cycle of violence of the kind described above—one that may include heavily armed Arab criminal actors.
Possible Responses
Addressing violence requires a comprehensive response centered on firm and tenacious enforcement. A key point of reference is the “broken windows” approach associated with former New York mayor Rudy Giuliani, which transformed the city in the 1990s. At the time, New York was notorious for high crime rates—murders, robberies, and graffiti on nearly every block. Giuliani, working with the U.S. attorney general, deployed an additional 27,000 police officers and directed them to address every offense, minor and serious alike, swiftly and decisively. “Broken windows”—a slogan grounded in the discourse of criminology—captured the logic: failure to address minor offenses such as graffiti or broken windows encourages escalation to more serious crime. The result was a 70 percent drop in crime within five years, including roughly 2,000 fewer murders annually. Giuliani projected zero tolerance, restoring both public safety and governance.
In Israel, adopting a comparable approach could be a key component of an effective response. First, this would require firm enforcement, including a sustained increase in police presence in mixed cities and the Negev, supported by specialized units tasked with addressing every incident—from celebratory gunfire to killings. Targeted operations (such as the recent operation in the village of Tarabin in December 2025) can provide localized relief, but they do not offer a comprehensive or long-term solution. The effort must be integrated and coordinated across all relevant authorities, including the Shin Bet, income tax and VAT authorities, the police, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Interior, and other relevant agencies. Coordinated action of that nature could serve as the foundation for an effective response.
The core response must rest first and foremost on high-quality intelligence and the use of robust administrative tools. These include, for example, the closure of entire localities and comprehensive house-to-house searches for weapons—measures that have thus far been avoided due to the position of the attorney general—alongside vehicle seizures, administrative detentions, and related steps. Conventional witness-protection tools present serious limitations, as criminal organizations threaten retaliation against witnesses’ extended families. The state is not equipped to provide protection on such a broad scale.
Along the Egyptian and Jordanian borders, Israel should adopt a technological and security-focused response: reinforcing border fences with sensors and cameras, conducting aerial patrols to counter drones, and expanding enforcement activity. This should be accompanied by a reassessment of the rules of engagement along the border area, enabling effective interdiction of smuggling and legal protocols that allow for the arrest and imprisonment of offenders—rather than the current “revolving door,” in which a smuggler caught with a vehicle today returns to the same route within days. In parallel, close coordination is required among all security bodies—the police, the Shin Bet, and the IDF—to prevent spillover into terrorism. In this context, it is important to note the government decision to designate the activities of crime families as terrorism. This move was supported by the head of the Shin Bet, David Zini, and opposed by the service’s legal advisers. Progress, however, has been delayed due to resistance and foot-dragging by the Attorney General’s Office. Accelerating this process is critical and legislation to this end is currently underway.[10]
Zero tolerance, as practiced under Rudy Giuliani, can restore governance: “The small stuff matters,” as Guliani would say. At the same time, the importance of educational engagement with the Bedouin and broader Arab public, including efforts to enlist local leadership, should not be underestimated. Regrettably, this is something that is not currently happening. Instead, Arab leadership tends to adopt a posture of victimhood, blaming the Israeli government and law-enforcement authorities for insufficient action. What is clear is that without the kind of decisive measures outlined above, violence will continue to spread and may culminate in a violent eruption that could escalate into a third intifada.
Conclusion
The violence in mixed cities such as Lod, Ramla, Jaffa, and Acre, alongside weapons smuggling in the Negev, presents a troubling picture. The 252 murders recorded in 2025 are only the tip of an iceberg of eroding governance, rooted in the strengthening of criminal organizations, a culture of blood feuds, family honor, and rising nationalist sentiment. The spillover into terrorism—through smuggling of weapons over Israel’s borders and escalating crime across the country—threatens to ignite a wide-scale violent eruption that could even escalate into a third intifada. This danger is posed by the fusion of domestic criminality with external threats and undermines national security.
Time is running out. Without immediate action to restore governance through coordinated enforcement, community support, and zero tolerance, the flames will spread, and the warnings of our sages that “people will swallow one another alive” without governance will become reality. Israel, as a Jewish and democratic state, must demonstrate that it can protect everyone—Jews and Arabs alike. Action must be immediate, resolute, and across the board; otherwise, the recent episodes of violence in Jaffa will repeat themselves throughout the country.
[1] Ayalef – Center for the Advancement of Security in Arab Society. Another Year of Eroding Governance and Escalating Crime and Violence in Arab Society: Trends and Data for 2025. December 2025.
[2] “Pray for the welfare of the government, for were it not for fear of authority, people would swallow one another alive.” Rabbi Hanina in Mishnah, Nezikin, Pirkei Avot (Ethics of the Fathers), chap. 3, Mishnah 2.
[3] Rivki Goldfinger. “A Looming Danger, a National Plague: Thousands of Drones Smuggling Weapons from Egypt and Jordan Each Year, While the State Remains Helpless.” Besheva, September 25, 2025. (Hebrew)
[4] Mordechai Kedar. “It Is Time to Speak the Truth: The Escalating Violence in Arab Society Also Stems from Its Culture.” Makor Rishon, June 15, 2023. (Hebrew)
[5] Diaa Haj-Yehia. “When the Sound of Gunfire Is Louder Than the School Bell: Youth Crime in Arab Society in Israel.” Emergency Task Force for Combating Crime and Violence; National Committee of Arab Local Authority Heads. Knesset website, August 2024. (Hebrew)
https://fs.knesset.gov.il/25/Committees/25_cs_bg_5428650.pdf
[6] Josh Breiner. “Shin Bet Links Drone-Smuggled Weapons to Two Attacks Inside Israel for the First Time.” Haaretz, January 1, 2026. (Hebrew)
[7] Gabi Siboni and Erez Winner. How to Deal with Severe Crime in Israel’s Arab Sector. Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), November 25, 2025.
[8] Dan Ezra. “Is Israel About to Part Ways with Beersheba? ‘They Destroyed Our City—Negative Jewish Migration.’” Maariv, December 25, 2025. (Hebrew)
[9] “Shin Bet, Israel Police, and Israel Defense Forces Expose Weapons-Smuggling Infrastructure Exposed in Northern Israel.” Shin Bet website, December 19, 2025. (Hebrew)
[10] Head of the Task Force for Combating Crime in Arab Society: “‘The Law, with the Necessary Balances, Is a Game Changer.’” Knesset website. The National Security Committee begins preparations for first reading of a bill designating criminal organizations as terrorist organizations, December 30, 2025. (Hebrew)
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