The American administration’s handling of the crisis in Jabal al-Druze has been marked by contradictory signals that caused confusion and policy zigzags in Jerusalem—and seemingly in Damascus as well. On one hand, Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio issued stern warnings to the regime not to take part in massacres of minority groups. On the other, there were clear statements—especially from Special Envoy to Syria (and Ambassador to Ankara) Tom Barrack, a longtime confidant of President Trump with longstanding ties to Qatar—calling for the disarmament of the Druze and, even more emphatically, of the Kurds (i.e., the SDF), and their reintegration under a new Syrian regime committed to a unified national identity. In this context, the media also reported harsh criticisms of Israel’s conduct during the crisis—allegedly leaked from White House sources. All this came after Trump’s gestures toward Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and the lifting of sanctions on Syria.

For Israel, this presents a twofold challenge. On the immediate level, there is a moral and strategic commitment to protect the Druze. More broadly, the American endorsement of a strong centralized regime in Syria aligns uncomfortably with the ambitions of Turkey under its current leadership. Ankara sees al-Sharaa as a vehicle for advancing its neo-Ottoman agenda, which constitutes a threat not only to regional balance but also to Israel’s long-term interests. Elements of the U.S. administration appear sympathetic to that vision.

In these circumstances, Israel must strike a well-considered balance: setting clear red lines—as it has done to some extent in response to events in Sweida, despite U.S. pressure—while allowing the United States to explore channels of dialogue between Jerusalem and the Syrian regime. Seeking regime change would be neither wise nor constructive. If anything, toppling al-Sharaa would serve Iran’s interests. At the same time, Israel must carefully map the internal dynamics in Washington: between those who favor strategic partnerships with Turkey and Qatar, and those who are more skeptical. The latter camp must be strengthened over time. In this, Israel can lean on Greece’s American friends, who wield significant political clout, and on regional actors who also seek to counter Turkish influence in Syria. No less important is to build a bipartisan base in Congress that will insist on long-term protections for Syria’s minorities and resist any Turkish effort to turn the country into a tool for Erdoğan’s ambitions. That comes on top of the core demand: to prevent any military deployment that threatens Israel from the area south of Damascus, and to block Iran from operating in Syria or transferring weapons to Hezbollah via Syrian territory.

The Trump Administration and the Crisis in Southern Syria

Until recently, the American administration embraced the Syrian new regime—adopting it, in effect, as a partner. It even floated signals about possible steps toward “peace,” or at least some form of accommodation, between the regime and Israel. But it was caught unprepared by the scale and nature of the events in Jabal al-Druze. It was likely also surprised by the force of Israel’s response, which reflected above all the blood pact with the Druze community in Israel and the principled obligation to stand by allies—more than any calculus over Syria’s future or the broader regional and global interests at stake.

The mixed messages coming from Washington in the early days of the crisis may have led al-Sharaa to believe he had a green light to send his forces into Sweida—and he clearly did not expect Israel’s strong response, in both word and deed. Even once the scale of the atrocities became clear—Rubio described them as “shocking and dangerous”—and senior U.S. officials stepped in, holding talks with Jerusalem, Damascus, and Amman to try to contain the crisis between Israel and the Syrian regime, the administration remained divided over the tone and emphasis of its policy:

1. Rubio, who had warned as early as May 20, 2025, that Syria was on the verge of a full-scale civil war, supported strengthening the new regime and was part of the push to lift sanctions. Yet on July 20, he publicly warned al-Sharaa—via his X account—that if he wanted a “united, inclusive, and peaceful Syria, free of ISIS and Iranian control,” he would have to act against the jihadists and bring the perpetrators of atrocities to justice—including members of his own regime. Rubio’s remarks implicitly echoed the Druze narrative and laid down conditions for future stability.
   
   
2. In contrast—or at least expressing a different tone and set of priorities—Special Envoy Tom Barrack (also interim envoy to Lebanon since Morgan Ortagus’s reassignment), made clear in a July 21 interview with the Associated Press that the U.S. is committed to Syrian unity and has no “Plan B.” That is, it opposes decentralization. He also criticized Israel’s intervention as “poorly timed” and disruptive to regional stabilization efforts. “White House sources”—of unclear reliability and uncertain proximity to the president—used even sharper language to express their displeasure. Still, following a trilateral meeting in Jordan with the foreign ministers of Syria and Jordan, Barrack emphasized the need for calm in southern Syria, protection of civilians, and the release of hostages and detainees as a step toward an “inclusive” Syria. In a separate comment, he cast doubt on the regime’s responsibility for the jihadist attacks on the Druze.
   
   
3. Several members of Congress, motivated by their longstanding and justified hostility to the Assad regime, have shown unexpected sympathy for al-Sharaa’s government, downplaying or ignoring the atrocities committed in Sweida. While the administration criticized Israel’s strike in Damascus, it nonetheless used it as leverage to pressure al-Sharaa into agreeing to a ceasefire. In retrospect, even the administration seems to have recognized the advantages of Israel’s policy and has taken advantage of its moves to push the regime toward a more inclusive posture.

Turkey (and Qatar) in the Background

Israel thus faces a complex challenge arising from the diverging positions taken by key figures within the American foreign policy establishment. According to Barrack’s approach, it is not only the Druze who must lay down their arms and accept their place within Syria’s new governing framework. The same applies to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—that is, the Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria, who have established de facto autonomous rule in the region they call Rojava (“the West” in Kurdish). Barrack has publicly warned that the United States cannot remain their “nanny” indefinitely. This, despite the fact that SDF fighters—men and women alike—played a central role over the past decade, fighting shoulder to shoulder with American forces to halt the spread of the Islamic State (ISIS) and ultimately bring about its defeat in Syria.

At this moment in time, there is real cause for concern about how closely this position aligns with Turkey’s grand strategy under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as it is being implemented in the Syrian theater. Several recent reports—consistent with Barrack’s views as stated above —suggest that the United States and Turkey have issued an ultimatum of sorts to the SDF. They have given the Kurdish forces just one more month to implement the March 2025 agreement between SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi and the regime of Ahmed al-Sharaa. That deal stipulates that the Kurdish forces will integrate into Syria’s military framework—effectively ending the Rojava autonomy. In a July 19 post, Barrack noted that he had met with Abdi to discuss the steps needed “toward integration into a unified Syria for a peaceful, prosperous, inclusive and stable future for all Syrians,” and added that the two “agreed the time for unity is now.” At the same time, he thanked General Mazloum for his leadership and for continuing the fight against ISIS in Syria. But the message sounded more like a farewell than a promise of sustained American support.

In this context, it is also worth noting Turkey’s recent historic achievement: the Kurdish PKK inside Turkey has laid down its arms and even staged a symbolic burning of its weapons. Subordinating the Syrian Kurds to the authority of al-Sharaa’s regime—which Ankara as a client state, after years in which Turkish forces in northern Syria served as a buffer between him and Assad’s troops—would mark another step toward consolidating neo-Ottoman hegemony in the region.

Meanwhile, Turkey is reasserting what it calls its “rights” in the Eastern Mediterranean under the “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) doctrine. It has drawn maritime borders with Libya that block potential energy infrastructure routes from Egypt, Israel, and Cyprus to Europe. Ankara also continues to host Hamas operatives and to provide a platform for Islamist clerics who openly call for Israel’s destruction. The alignment between Turkey’s ambitions in Syria and the views of at least some U.S. officials should be a source of deep concern for Israeli policymakers.

These concerns are further compounded by a chorus of American academics and media commentators who were quick to blame the Druze for the recent events, as well as by broader questions about Qatar’s influence. Doha—Erdoğan’s strategic partner and a key supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood across the region—wields influence not only in academic circles but also within the core of the U.S. administration. Ambassador Barrack himself has a long history of ties with both the Gulf states and Qatar; in 2012, he sold the Qataris ownership of the Paris Saint-Germain football club. In late May 2025, immediately after U.S. sanctions on Syria were lifted, he led a major energy deal between Qatar and Syria.

This combination of Qatari influence, American sympathy for Turkish visions of Syria’s future, and President Trump’s recurring focus on conflict resolution, poses a real challenge for Israel. Turkish hegemony in Damascus, under the guise of a strong, centralized Syrian government, runs counter to Israel’s long-term strategic interests.

What Can Israel Do?

Given the new reality on the ground in Syria, Israel must strike a careful balance between two sets of considerations:

1. First, Israel must do all it can to protect the Druze population. This includes providing both military and humanitarian assistance and drawing a clear red line: any renewed violence against the Druze in southern Syria will trigger Israeli military strikes against Sunni militias and, if necessary, against regime forces operating on the ground—if the regime joins in the attacks rather than separating between the sides.
   
   
2. At the same time, and with full U.S. involvement, Israel should resume direct engagement with the al-Sharaa regime. Channels for such dialogue already exist and were used by Ambassador Barrack to broker a meeting in Paris on July 24 between Israel’s Minister for Strategic Affairs, Ron Dermer; National Security Advisor, Tzahi Hanegbi; and the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Al-Shibani. Additional meetings are planned. Israel should also avoid actions—or statements—that could be interpreted in Washington as attempts to undermine the regime’s grip on power. A collapse of the Syrian regime, if it were to occur, could lead to chaos or serve Iranian interests. Israel’s deterrence can be maintained primarily through operations in southern Syria and only if this doesn’t help by striking regime targets in Damascus.

Beyond Syria itself, the greater challenge lies in the dynamics within the Trump administration and the broader American political arena—particularly in relation to Turkey and its ambitions. No less significant is Qatar’s influence over several key players involved in shaping U.S. regional strategy. Wherever figures within the administration or the wider political system show skepticism toward Erdoğan, Qatar, or the Muslim Brotherhood, their position should be reinforced. This includes providing them—directly or through broader public discourse—with clear, compelling information about the risks inherent in aligning U.S. policy with Ankara’s strategic agenda.

In this effort to counter influential forces in Washington, Israel can—and should—rely on three major sources of support. First, the Greek-American lobby, whose political influence is considerable, and which has focused its efforts on countering Turkish ambitions. Its lobbying was instrumental in the decision not to supply F-35 fighter jets to Turkey at this stage. Second, discreet, behind-the-scenes cooperation with regional states that are hostile to the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, and that seek to offer the Syrian regime an alternative path that avoids Turkish subjugation. It is important to coordinate positions with these states. Third, members of Congress—senators and representatives—who are attuned to Israel’s strategic concerns and, in some cases, also to the Kurdish cause. One should recall Senator Lindsey Graham’s role during Trump’s previous term, when he led efforts to convince the administration not to abandon the SDF. Messaging that blends strategic logic with moral outrage at the abuses suffered by the Druze could help build a bipartisan congressional base of support—one capable of counterbalancing the troubling drift in administration policy.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.