Introduction
Recent reports from the U.S. intelligence community and other sources indicate that Houthi activity along the Horn of Africa is increasing. The northeastern tip of the African continent has long been a hub for trafficking and piracy, but emerging Houthi-al-Shabaab cooperation presents a growing threat to regional stability. This partnership highlights the risk of Sanaa’s collaboration with criminal and terrorist organizations beyond Yemen and, over time, could serve as a model for future Houthi activities abroad.
The Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah is frequently cited as a major entry point for Iranian weapons, arriving via large cargo ships that undergo minimal, if any, inspection by the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM). However, it is also important to note that shipments of Iranian arms to the Houthis are often delivered through indirect piecemeal routes using smaller fishing vessels known as dhows that are common along the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Aden. These smuggling operations frequently use Somalia as a waypoint, where the cargo is unloaded and transferred onto dhows bound for Yemen. Once in Yemeni waters, shipments are either funneled through smuggling networks along the coastline—including areas controlled by the Yemeni government—or left at remote locations for later retrieval by the Houthis. According to maritime intelligence firm Windward, dhows are particularly difficult to detect because they do not transmit their location via AIS tracking systems, relying instead on GPS. Detection and interception typically depend on human intelligence (HUMINT), which is limited in scale and coverage and resource-intensive.
Since 2016, evidence has shown that the Houthi-Somali maritime corridor is a key channel in the illicit weapons trade. Initially, this involved small arms exchanges between the Houthis and criminal groups operating in weakly governed areas along the Horn of Africa. However, Somalia is more than just a waypoint for the Iran-Houthi arms trafficking route. Iranian weapons shipments bound for Yemen have been partially sold to Somali arms dealers along the way or trafficked back to Somali buyers after reaching Yemen. Michael Horton, in his article “Looking West: The Houthis’ Expanding Footprint in the Horn of Africa,” explains that the prices of AK-47s, RPGs, sniper rifles, mortars, and night vision gear are at least five times higher in Somalia than in Yemen, making the Somali arms market especially attractive to Yemeni traders.
What began as a transactional arrangement between smugglers on both sides of the Gulf of Aden now appears to be expanding. The Houthis are increasingly cultivating ties with the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab, strengthening their cooperation in arms trafficking and potentially beyond. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen reported in October 2024 that “the Houthis are evaluating options to carry out attacks at sea from the Somali coast. To that end, they are strengthening ties with the terrorist group Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab).” The same report cited the interception of advanced Iranian missile components along the Somali coast and visits by suspected Houthi arms smugglers to Somalia. Earlier UN statements had only speculated about arms smuggling between Yemen and Somalia, but recent findings point to a more structured and expanding collaboration between the Houthis and a specific Somali terror group.
How Houthi-al-Shabaab Cooperation Took Shape
The growing cooperation between the Houthis, an extremist Shia organization, and al-Shabaab, the Somali branch of Al-Qaeda (AQ), which is a radical Sunni Salafi-jihadi organization, raises important questions. Why do these seemingly opposing sectarian organizations collaborate? How have they overcome ideological and practical barriers to do so? What is the extent of their collaboration?
Historically, the Houthis have fought against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Yemeni branch of the organization. As the Houthis expanded their territorial control over the past decade, AQAP launched numerous attacks against them, viewing the group as heretics with aspirations to rule all of Yemen. According to multiple sources, in 2015, then-U.S. CENTCOM Commander and future Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin saw the Houthis as “an ally against Al-Qaeda.”
However, alliances in Yemen are often fluid. President Ali Abdullah Saleh fought against the Houthi rebels, later allied with them to depose his successor, and was ultimately killed by them when he attempted to defect. Similarly, after years of prioritizing attacks against Houthi forces, AQAP shifted its focus by 2022 to target the anti-Houthi coalition, particularly the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC).
This was followed by a series of developments indicating increased Houthi-AQAP cooperation. In May 2024, The Telegraph reported that the Houthis had supplied AQAP with rockets, drones, and surveillance equipment. Then, in October 2024, the UN Panel of Experts stated:
[The] opportunistic [Houthi-AQ] alliance is characterized by cooperation in security and intelligence, offering safe havens for each other’s members, reinforcing their respective strongholds and coordinating efforts to target the Government’s forces… Sources informed the Panel that both groups have agreed to cease hostilities and exchange prisoners… Since the beginning of 2024, the two groups coordinate operations directly with each other.
The strengthening Houthi-AQAP ties may have been facilitated by both local and external actors.[1] Notably, Iran’s relationship with AQ’s leadership—including its reported hosting of senior members—may have helped bridge the divide between the two groups.
Growing Houthi-AQAP cooperation is driven by strategy rather than ideology. Both groups view the anti-Houthi coalition controlling southern Yemen as their primary threat, with a particular focus on the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The STC, backed by the UAE and represented in Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, seeks South Yemen’s independence and commands perhaps the most powerful military force in the anti-Houthi coalition. The cooperation against the STC benefits both the Houthis and AQAP: the Houthis weaken their strongest military adversary while gaining leverage over the STC, and AQAP targets the local force most actively engaged in Emirati-backed counterterrorism efforts in Yemen.
The initial Houthi-AQAP cooperation appears to have been successful. As a result, AQAP facilitated Houthi collaboration with other AQ affiliates beyond Yemen.[2] Al-Shabaab, AQ’s branch in the Horn of Africa, was a natural partner for the Houthis due to its proximity to Yemen (just across Bab al-Mandeb), strategic position along Somalia’s key arms trafficking routes, and significant size and budget.
In contrast to the strategic motives for Houthi-AQAP cooperation, practical, logistical, and financial incentives likely drove the Houthis to expand their collaboration to include al-Shabaab. First, the Houthis have a growing need for external sources of revenue. Yemen’s economy continues to deteriorate—largely due to Houthi governance—which depletes domestic revenue streams from taxation and state-run monopolies. Al-Shabaab, with annual revenues exceeding $100 million, is one of AQ’s wealthiest branches and could become a significant customer for Houthi weapons and services. Second, this relationship is evolving at a time when the Houthis have demonstrated capabilities valuable to criminal and terrorist networks. Their military achievements in the Red Sea and beyond make them attractive to groups seeking training or equipment, particularly those like al-Shabaab that have previously struggled to acquire and integrate advanced capabilities.
Over the past 15 years, Houthi forces have been provided with Iranian support that enabled them to make a quantum leap in military sophistication. This advancement may situate them particularly well to cultivate undeveloped guerrilla forces such as al-Shabaab. Additionally, as the only prominent “axis of resistance” group not currently facing a crisis, they are the best-positioned Iranian-backed force to take on this role at present. Middle East Institute scholar Guled Ahmed noted that “the Houthis have already sent three engineers to al-Shabaab in southern Somalia to help build sophisticated weapons and bombs for the al-Qaida affiliate.” Reported efforts by the Government of Somalia to lobby the Houthis to end their support for al-Shabaab do not appear to have dissuaded the Yemeni rebels from doing so.
Nevertheless, there are currently no clear indications that the Houthis have supplied al-Shabaab with advanced weapons such as attack drones or anti-ship missiles. One possible reason is that the Houthis need to replenish their own arsenal, having launched these munitions at scale since October 2023, leaving them with no surplus to sell to Somali terrorists. Another factor may be that Iran, the Houthis’ primary backer, would disapprove of them profiting from the sale of advanced and costly military hardware that Tehran provides the Yemeni rebels at little to no cost. Additionally, despite discussions between the two groups about deeper cooperation, they may not have reached an agreement extending their partnership to the realm of advanced weaponry. Finally, one cannot ignore the possibility that the Houthis have already supplied al-Shabaab with such arms, but the Somali terrorist group has yet to use them. Whatever the case, monitoring, exposing, and disrupting this emerging alliance remains crucial to regional security and counter-terrorism efforts.
Implications for the Region
The potential risks of increased cooperation between the Houthis and al-Shabaab must be assessed both as a specific challenge and as part of a broader threat. Policymakers should avoid focusing narrowly on the immediate symptoms to the neglect of more fundamental issues.
The existing terrorism threats in Africa could become more dangerous and sophisticated if groups like al-Shabaab gain access to advanced weaponry provided by the Houthis, enabling Somali terrorists to strike with greater precision and over longer distances. U.S. and other counter-terrorism forces in Somalia and neighboring countries must plan for this eventuality to prevent al-Shabaab from using newfound capabilities to target U.S. and allied assets in the region or to expand their territorial control. While interdiction is an important tool for limiting the military buildup of hostile actors, it is not a silver bullet. Even relatively successful interdiction efforts, when they take place over vast territories and extended periods, cannot fully prevent the eventual accumulation of significant amounts of smuggled arms.
Other destabilizing factors, like piracy, may also intensify as the Houthi-al-Shabaab relationship improves. For example, Somalia’s long-dormant piracy industry has seen a resurgence of late. While some argue this is coincidental—suggesting Somali pirates are simply exploiting the chaos caused by Houthi attacks in the Red Sea—it seems probable the resurgence is coordinated. Somali pirates and al-Shabaab have a long history of cooperation, particularly in the realms of smuggling and other illicit forms of revenue generation. It is possible that Somali pirates are coordinating these activities through al-Shabaab or even directly with the Houthis.
Regarding the potential for Houthi use of Somali territory to launch attacks, as noted by the UN Panel of Experts, that scenario will create policy and operational challenges for the U.S. and its regional allies. The Houthis may attempt to complicate attribution efforts and confuse policy discussions by denying responsibility for attacks outside of Yemen. This may be an attempt to replicate the Iranian proxy model, while adding another layer of complexity due to the opaque nature of the Houthi-run shadow state in northern Yemen and the numerous challenges already facing Western and regional powers in addressing them.
Most importantly, this is just one incident in what is likely to become a dangerous pattern by a malign actor that has been insufficiently countered since its rise to power. The Houthi regime is on track to become a rogue state with a higher tolerance for risk, punishment, and isolation than Iran, even if its level of technological advancement is lower —North Korea is perhaps a more fitting comparison. Sanaa has few assets to offer —lacking natural resources, a skilled workforce, or civilian manufacturing capabilities —and will likely seek external sources of revenue through activities it knows best: smuggling, military production, terrorism, and other illicit operations.
Al-Shabaab could become the Houthis’ first major partner outside of the Iran-backed axis of resistance. If this model proves successful, it could be replicated with terrorist groups and criminal cartels throughout the region, and potentially beyond. Preventing the Houthis from emulating Iranian or North Korean activities, where they not only serve as agents of chaos but also cultivate additional threats that destabilize regions and distract from their actions, is crucial for the region’s future stability.
To address this threat effectively, a consistent and aggressive policy is required to maintain pressure on the Houthi regime. This means rejecting the Houthis’ unofficial January 2025 ceasefire and continuing to undermine the regime in all relevant domains, including military, financial, diplomatic, and domestic.
[1] Maj. Gen. Abdulqader al-Shami, deputy chief of the Houthis’ Security and Intelligence Service (SIS), is believed to have played a key role. His intelligence background and previous roles in Yemen’s southern governorates likely gave him the knowledge, experience, and contacts needed to foster these connections.
[2] Beyond AQAP’s role in facilitating ties with al-Shabaab, Houthi Minister and notorious arms trafficker Fares Manaa may also be involved. He has decades of experience in Somalia’s arms trade and has previously worked with affiliates there. Yemen expert Maged Al-Madhaji also points to Abdelwahed Abu Ras, former SIS Undersecretary of External Operations and now the Houthis’ Deputy Foreign Minister, as likely playing a key role in this venture. Other senior Houthi officials involved in defense procurement, including Muhammad “Abu Jaafar” al-Talbi and Saleh al-Shaer, are also suspected of contributing to these efforts.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
Photo: IMAGO / Hamza Ali
