Israel’s overarching strategy seeks to bolster its security and prosperity as the democratic state of the Jewish people. To achieve this, Israel must develop powerful defensive capabilities that allow it to thwart attempts by those who oppose its existence to realize their intentions; preserve and strengthen its special relationship with its strategic ally, the United States; deepen cooperation with pragmatic regional actors that, like Israel, seek stability and prosperity; counter the erosion of its international legitimacy; expand its technological and economic capacities; and maintain internal cohesion as much as possible.

Israel’s two strategic goals in the war that was forced upon it by surprise on October 7, 2023 derive from this overarching strategy. The first is weakening the Iranian axis to the point of collapse and preventing the existential threat it sought to build—its nuclear program, missiles, and proxy “ring of fire.” The second is to impress upon Israel’s enemies that Hamas’s decision to launch the October 7 attack was a disastrous mistake and that none of them should ever contemplate such action again, even if their hostility toward Israel remains intact. These goals must be pursued while minimizing, as much as possible, damage to the other strategic objectives already mentioned, such as relations with the United States and pragmatic Arab states.

The specific aims of the war—derived from these strategic goals and from the unique circumstances of this conflict, especially the hostages held by Hamas—are:

1. The military defeat of Hamas and removal of its ability to govern: in other words, its disarmament and the transfer of power in Gaza to actors who, unlike Hamas, are not committed to the struggle against Zionism, including through the use of terrorism. (This is the main reason the Palestinian Authority is unfit to govern Gaza—beyond its weakness and corruption and the concern that returning Gaza to PA control would intensify demands for a Palestinian state along the French-Saudi model.)
   
   
2. The release of all the hostages at a heavy but reasonable price—meaning a price that does not require abandoning the other aims of the war.
   
   
3. Preventing Gaza from ever again serving as a base for attacks on Israel. This requires placing responsibility for counterterrorism in Israel’s hands, preserving Israel’s freedom of operational action (as in the West Bank or Lebanon), and maintaining an Israeli presence around Gaza’s perimeter and along the Philadelphi Corridor to prevent weapons smuggling. At the same time, over the long term, programs of de-radicalization must be advanced to erode the anti-Israeli hatred that has been inculcated into Palestinian society by opinion-shapers.
   
   
4. Beyond Gaza: exacting a price as punishment and deterrence from Hamas (such as the strike in Qatar) and from actors showing solidarity with it, such as the Houthis in Yemen.
   
   
5. Preventing new threats from emerging against Israel through military initiative and diplomatic efforts, rather than relying on deterrence, containment, and limited action within the framework of the “campaign between wars,” as was the case in the period before the Swords of Iron War.

Although the aims of the war have not yet been fully achieved, Israel has already advanced its strategic goals in significant ways. The Iranian axis has been severely damaged, and the Palestinians—including Hamas—as well as other regional power brokers increasingly recognize that Hamas and the Palestinians as a whole paid a very heavy price for the October 7 attack. Still, the question of how October 7 will be remembered in the Palestinian ethos remains unresolved, as long as Hamas in Gaza retains its weapons and remains in power, even if nominal responsibility for civilian affairs is transferred to others. This is especially true in view of the surge of international mobilization on Hamas’s behalf, including in the West; the public pressure on Israel’s government to forgo—supposedly temporarily—the first and third objectives, concessions that leaks suggest are supported by some senior security officials, including the chief of staff.

All of the above gives Hamas reason to hope that if it stands firm against Israeli military pressure it will remain in control as an armed power in Gaza, enabling it to argue that undermining Israel’s security on October 7, the mass release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails, and broad international recognition of Palestinian statehood all constitute a significant achievement despite the heavy cost. From Hamas’s perspective, these results justify pursuing the same path again once circumstances allow—and actively working to create those circumstances (hence the insistence on Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, including from the Philadelphi Corridor, as part of a hostage-release deal).

This explains why Hamas is so determined to deter Israel from completing the operation to remove it from power in Gaza by force—through the conquest of Gaza City—and why the group is working hard to persuade the civilian population to remain in the city and serve as human shields. This, it believes, will deter Israel from acting and allow Hamas to exploit civilian suffering to rally international support.

In view of the pressure on Israel and its awareness of Israel’s reluctance to assume responsibility for the Strip’s civilian needs through a military government, Hamas still believes that Israel’s threats and preparations for seizing Gaza City—including reservist mobilization, troop deployments, airstrikes on high-rises, and calls for civilians to evacuate—are meant only to pressure it into accepting President Trump’s proposal to release the hostages without guarantees of disarmament, and that the IDF will not actually go ahead with retaking Gaza and imposing military rule. That scenario, it believes, will allow it to continue to present October 7 as a Palestinian achievement.

For Israel, the implication is clear: to convince Hamas and Gaza’s population of the seriousness of its intentions, it must begin a ground operation to seize neighborhoods of Gaza City not yet under its control. The strike against Hamas leaders in Qatar, even though it apparently failed, underscores that Israel will not hesitate to cross red lines—including striking on Qatari soil despite the emirate’s special status and close ties with the United States—to achieve Hamas’s defeat.

Even so, Hamas leaders may yet prefer to keep fighting, since what is being demanded of them is to admit to a grave mistake and give up their most important strategic asset—far more than what has ever been required of Hezbollah or the Houthis. At present, Hamas is preparing to fight in Gaza City with the means still available to it. But sustained Israeli offensives and clear determination could heighten doubts among Hamas leaders in Gaza and abroad about the wisdom of continuing, as this could undermine the core assumption that underpinned the October 7 attack: that Israel would never forcibly remove Hamas from power. This dynamic resembles earlier turning points: the end of the second intifada following the 2007 wanted-men agreement (an arrangement in which Israel removed militants from its wanted list in return for their disarmament and renunciation of terrorism, helping to end the uprising), and the PLO’s departure from Lebanon in 1982. In both cases, Israel surprised the Palestinians with its resolve, compelling them to relinquish strategic goals and assets — although they did not abandon their long-term vision of defeat of Zionism.

If this pressure is still insufficient to compel Hamas to disarm and accept Trump’s initiative, Israel will have no alternative but to complete the takeover of the Strip, even if this entails imposing a military government for as brief an interim as possible. During that time, Israel would continue eliminating the terror cells that will undoubtedly remain. This period would last until Gaza’s population, many of whom already question the logic behind attacking Israel, becomes convinced that Hamas has been defeated and will not return to rule the Strip. Once convinced of this, Gazans could then take the initiative to assume responsibility for self-governance with Arab and international assistance. Some may also choose to emigrate voluntarily, with or without connection to Trump’s plan.

In conclusion, achieving Israel’s overarching strategy and strategic goals requires that it achieve all its aims, while remaining sensitive to the tension—and correlation—between dismantling Hamas and preventing another October 7 on the one hand, and freeing all the hostages while preserving Israel’s relations with the international system and with pragmatic Arab states on the other.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.