Armenia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan visited Israel on November 27, 2025, engaging in a series of meetings with senior Israeli officials. Such visits are rare, as relations between the two countries have long remained mostly neutral. The current meeting can be considered historic as it indicates a significant development in the relationship between Israel and Armenia. While closer ties between Jerusalem and Yerevan are welcome, significant obstacles still need to be addressed.

Armenia has always been wary of Israel’s support for Azerbaijan, with which it maintains a strategic partnership encompassing areas ranging from economics to security. However, Israel’s ties with Azerbaijan were established immediately after Azerbaijan gained independence, and the strategic partnership with Baku was never intended to target Armenia. Additionally, Armenia remains aligned with Iran, a regime that is deeply hostile to Israel’s existence.

Israel has also voiced concern over rising antisemitism in Armenia. In recent years, there have been several acts of vandalism targeting Jewish sites, including four attacks on a synagogue in the capital, Yerevan. Antisemitic content on Armenian social media has also increased, particularly in response to Israeli arms deliveries to Azerbaijan. The Armenian lobby in the United States has attempted to pressure Congress to restrict American military aid to Israel unless Jerusalem ceases its provision of weapons to Baku.

A real estate dispute in Jerusalem is also noteworthy. The Armenian Patriarchate sold a parcel of land known as “Gan HaParah” to an Israeli developer for a hotel project but later withdrew amid public backlash. What began as a commercial dispute escalated into a major political scandal, with protests and accusations of “ethnic cleansing” aimed at Israel. The Armenian diaspora in Israel and the U.S., along with Palestinian and Iranian propaganda channels, exploited the dispute to draw parallels with Gaza and amplify claims that “Israelis are expelling not only Palestinians but also Armenians.” On June 24, Hamas welcomed Armenia’s recognition of a Palestinian state.

Israel is concerned about Armenia’s long-standing alignment with Iranian policies. To clarify, Israel’s worries are not about Armenia’s ties with Iran but about Yerevan’s complacency regarding Tehran’s demands in areas unrelated to normal cooperation between neighboring countries. For instance, Armenia assists Iran and Russia in bypassing sanctions. Tehran, in turn, values its partnership with Yerevan and has frequently issued threatening statements toward Azerbaijan regarding this relationship.

However, the timing and purpose of Kostanyan’s visit were deliberate. The main focus was the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), more commonly known as the Zangezur Corridor. This project aims to create an approximately 40-mile transportation route connecting Azerbaijan’s western regions with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, a landlocked Azerbaijani exclave running along the Armenian-Iranian border. If successful, it would establish a direct land connection from Turkey to Azerbaijan and beyond—across the Caspian Sea—to Central Asia and China.

Israel views TRIPP as a promising opportunity to enhance regional economic cooperation, while Iran perceives it as a direct threat to its interests, as it would hinder Iran’s ability to obstruct commercial exchanges along that route. If this project is completed, Iran will indeed lose influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Kostanyan is among the Armenian officials responsible for coordinating the project’s logistics with the United States.

Kostanyan’s involvement highlights Armenia’s effort to move closer to the West, despite potential backlash from Iran. Israel’s primary interests in TRIPP revolve around supporting U.S. and Azerbaijani goals and sidestepping Iran, which could lead to U.S. oversight of Tehran’s border with Armenia. Iran vehemently opposes this route, has conducted military exercises, and has labeled the corridor a “red line.” Nevertheless, Armenia granted Azerbaijan access to Nakhchivan as part of the 2020 ceasefire and later awarded exclusive development rights to the U.S. following discussions with Azerbaijani leaders. Iranian officials have characterized the corridor as a security threat, but Armenia has assured Iran it will respect its boundaries.

For Armenia, TRIPP is critically important due to the substantial economic benefits Yerevan could reap if the project succeeds. Additionally, it would help Armenia gradually reduce its dependence on Russia. This explains why Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is advocating for the Corridor despite facing harsh criticism at home, from the Church and the opposition, and, of course, Iran.

Pashinyan intentionally appointed Kostanyan, a Persian-speaking diplomat with experience in both the U.S. and Iran, to oversee TRIPP. Kostanyan’s subsequent meetings with Iranian officials highlight Armenia’s acknowledgment of Iran’s role in the project’s success. His recent trip to Israel signifies Yerevan’s willingness to risk Iran’s disapproval to advance the initiative and strengthen ties with the U.S. and its allies. Tehran’s next steps remain uncertain.

Iranian Official Reactions

Kostanyan’s visit to Israel demonstrates Armenia’s determination to align with the U.S. by pursuing peace processes with Azerbaijan. Importantly, it also suggests a weakening of Iran’s threat capacity to neighboring countries, as the visit contradicts Armenian officials’ assurances to Iran that they do not intend to implement the agreement with Azerbaijan regarding the Zangezur Corridor.

These recent developments have not gone unnoticed by Iran. While reactions from Iranian official media have been notably restrained, informal statements from regime-affiliated analysts and commentators leave little doubt about the Iranian regime’s true sentiments.

Iranian media’s response was notably measured. Most official and semi-official outlets published brief news items describing the visit as Armenia’s pragmatic effort to “develop bilateral relations in political and economic spheres” and to “explore opportunities for cooperation in technology, medicine, agriculture, and tourism.” Even the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim news sought to find a diplomatic way to avoid delegitimizing Armenia without endorsing Israel’s legitimacy: Kostanyan’s visit was described as a “meeting in TelAviv with Dan Bartal, the director of the Foreign Ministry of Israel’s regime.”

However, Sahar TV, a propaganda network affiliated with the IRGC, aired a program dedicated to the visit—interestingly, not in Persian but on its Azerbaijani-language channel. The motive was clear: to persuade Azerbaijani audiences that Israel is an unreliable partner capable of switching sides at any moment.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met with his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov on December 8 and emphasized during a joint press conference that there should be “no foreign interference in the Caucasus.” He stated that “disagreements and misunderstandings” between the two countries must be resolved through dialogue, adding that Iran will not allow others to jeopardize its ties with Azerbaijan.

Informal Iranian Reactions

In contrast to official responses, informal Iranian reactions have been strikingly caustic: Ehsan Movahedyan, a Caucasus expert known for his anti-Azerbaijan and anti-Israel rhetoric, posted on X that Armenia is treading a “dangerous and slippery path” and may eventually be forced to choose between Israel and Iran. Movahedyan also accuses Armenia of betraying Iran, as Yerevan negotiates with Baku over the potential sale of Azerbaijani oil to Armenia. He also reminds his readers that several years ago, Armenia rejected Iran’s proposal to purchase Iranian oil.

Other commentators accused the Armenian government of disgracing itself by attempting to befriend Israel. A certain Dr. Mirbagheri views this visit as an attempt to plot against Iran.

These reactions reveal the tactics of the Iranian regime: Iran rarely states its concerns openly, adhering to the principles of Taarof (excessive politeness). In practice, this means the regime prefers to exert pressure through diplomatic channels, particularly in its dealings with Azerbaijan. Despite the appearance of normalcy with Azerbaijan, the regime favors dialogue over confrontation. Additionally, TRIPP’s economic prospects seem to concern Tehran: Armenia is reportedly interested in Azerbaijan’s oil and gas. The realization of such economic projects could help Armenia reduce its dependence on Iran, whichis yet another reason for Iran’s concerns.

These reactions indicate that Iran prefers diplomatic approaches over confrontation to maintain economic ties with Armenia. Iran likely recognizes its increasing vulnerabilities and steers clear of escalating rhetoric toward its northern neighbor. It also refrains from its usual practice of conducting military drills near Azerbaijan’s border. Given its challenging situation, Iran understands that any escalation could be counterproductive.

Armenian Opposition Obstructs Peace Process

It is noteworthy that despite the obvious benefits Armenia would gain from successfully completing the TRIPP project, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan faces serious obstacles both domestically and internationally. The Armenian Church coordinates the efforts of the Armenian opposition against Pashinyan’s government and the propaganda employed against him by the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA)—the Armenian lobby in the U.S.

For now, the Iranian regime refrains from openly criticizing Armenia for its outreach to Israel. However, Iran closely monitors the Armenian internal conflict and openly supports the Church, which opposes the peace process with Azerbaijan. Iranian media explicitly blame Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev for meeting Rabbi Arthur Schneier, while accusing him of being hostile to the Armenian Church. Iranian media have also circulated in Persian an interview with Stanford Armenian Studies professor Arthur Khachikian, who blamed American evangelicals for causing a rift within the Armenian Church due to their “staunch support for Israel.” He added that the evangelicals work for the Zionists and Baku.

On December 5, an Armenian weekly published an article about Armenians in Jerusalem, describing them as a discriminated minority under Israeli occupation. The Armenian patriarch of Jerusalem, Nourhan Manougian, characterized the requirement that the Church payof property tax as harassment of Christians during a meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee.

ANCA has opposed Azerbaijan’s participation in the peacekeeping force in Gaza. On December 8, ANCA reposted on X statements by Dr. Bedross Der Matossian, Professor of Modern Middle East History and Vice Chair of the History Department at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, blaming the Republic of Armenia for “not supporting Armenians in Palestine.” He added that the Armenian diaspora plays a critical role as a de facto extension of Armenia.

The role of the Republic of Azerbaijan in realizing TRIPP is crucial. The visit of Armenia’s deputy foreign minister to Israel underscores the priorities of the Armenian leadership, which is working to advance the peace process with Azerbaijan while distancing itself from Iran and Russia. Neither Iran nor Russia has been able to guarantee Armenia’s interests. Currently, the Caucasian nation remains without allies, while Pashinyan’s government must navigate not only Russia and Iran but also disruptive efforts by certain Armenian diaspora organizations that are tacit allies of Iran and Hamas. No reconciliation with Israel will be possible for Armenia unless it addresses these urgent issues. U.S. decision-makers should recognize these challenges and assist Armenia in overcoming them.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

This article is part of a series on Iran and the Former Soviet States