After roughly four weeks of Operation Roaring Lion and Epic Fury, the campaign has reached a meaningful strategic inflection point. On the one hand, it has delivered significant results: broad damage to missile-production infrastructure, substantial setbacks to key elements of the nuclear program, and a serious blow to the regime’s leadership and its security apparatus. Yet despite this progress, the more ambitious objectives have yet to be achieved—chief among them creating the conditions for the regime’s collapse, removing enriched uranium from Iran, and suppressing its surface-to-surface missile-launch capabilities.[1] Nor has a workable solution been found to overturn the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, or to achieve Israel’s goals in other theaters, particularly the disarmament of Hamas and Hezbollah. On the other hand, signs are accumulating that the kinetic phase may be nearing its end. Economic and geopolitical pressures tied to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, pressure from regional actors, domestic political constraints in the United States, and a growing sense of diminishing returns as the operational plan approaches completion all point in that direction. At this stage, it is useful to examine the scenarios that may unfold, and to identify the key questions, core considerations, and uncertainties that will shape both its trajectory and its duration.[2]

We identify four plausible scenarios for how the campaign could unfold and ultimately conclude, spanning a spectrum defined by both likelihood (high to low) and potential impact (high to moderate). Two of these scenarios are possible but less likely: a new regional order—an optimistic outcome in which the Iranian regime is replaced by a more friendly government, with Israel playing a central role in a regional architecture built on normalization agreements; and U.S. disengagement—a more dangerous scenario in which Trump declares “victory” without fundamentally altering the situation, U.S. forces withdraw, and Israel is left to face a prolonged war of attrition against Iran, Hezbollah, and additional fronts that may emerge. Two scenarios that appear more likely are a regional quagmire—where both the United States and Israel become drawn into a sustained war of attrition against a weakened yet resilient and disruptive Iranian regime and Hezbollah; and a geopolitical-economic shock. The latter scenario, whose likelihood increases over time, envisions the Strait of Hormuz remaining closed while strikes focus on energy infrastructure, leading to significant economic disruption and growing involvement, albeit not necessarily military, by additional global powers.[3]

Questions, Unknowns, and Implications

The survival of the Iranian regime is the most critical unknown. If the campaign ends with the regime still in place, even if weakened, battered, or operating under altered patterns of control and governance, it will be able to claim “victory” simply by having withstood a war against the world’s leading power, the United States, and its regional ally, Israel. As past conflicts have shown (the Second Lebanon War, Operation Guardian of the Walls, and others), this would not remain a matter of perception alone. It could translate into a tangible reinforcement of the Shiite-messianic worldview and of the “Axis of Resistance.” Such an outcome would likely carry negative implications: it could reduce the willingness of the Iranian public to act against the regime; erode U.S. standing among Gulf and regional states and weaken their readiness to advance the Abraham Accords; and diminish the United States’ global position — at a time when there is a danger of Chinese action against Taiwan, implications for the war in Ukraine, and a greater Russian willingness to initiate additional border confrontations. Such an outcome would also affect Turkey’s regional posture, given its preference for the survival of a weakened Iranian regime. Moreover, an outcome in which the regime survives while retaining enriched uranium (the question of whether the United States or Israel can remove it, by agreement or by force, is critical) and/or the capacity to threaten maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would be seen as a failure by both Washington and Jerusalem. By contrast, achieving the nuclear objectives—above all the removal of enriched material—would be sufficient to frame the campaign as a success, even if the regime remains in place in weakened form and the Strait is reopened without any fundamental change in control over it.

The degree of U.S. resolve is unknown. Thus far, Trump has demonstrated a clear willingness to sustain the campaign until its nuclear-related objectives are achieved and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is secured, and he has correspondingly maintained full support for Israel. His decision to enter the campaign may reflect not only the goal of stripping the Iranian regime of strategic capabilities, but also broader considerations—strengthening the United States vis-à-vis global competitors such as China and Russia, and reinforcing American dominance in global energy markets. At the same time, it is notable that most of Washington’s traditional allies, above all the European Union and the United Kingdom, have not joined the campaign and view the U.S. president as unreliable, and that on other issues (tariffs, Ukraine, and more) he has been less than consistent.

Doubts about his willingness to see the campaign through to a decisive outcome in Iran may also be shaping the cautious posture of Gulf states, including their limited readiness to act offensively against Iran and their renewed focus on a regional defense framework. Over time, a prolonged campaign is likely to erode U.S. resolve, both due to domestic political pressures and because of disruptions to global supply chains resulting from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, including a significant impact on semiconductor production. In this context, the operational ability of the United States and Israel to reopen the Strait and ensure that it remains secure for maritime traffic will be decisive in determining whether Washington can sustain the campaign. This is particularly relevant given assessments that Iran’s missile stockpiles allow it to maintain fire at current levels for several more months.

From Israel’s perspective, the preferred outcome is a new regional order, while U.S. disengagement represents the most dangerous scenario. Between these poles lies a range of possible realities, all more or less favorable to Israel, over which policy can still exert influence. Israel’s top priority should be to reinforce U.S. determination to continue the campaign. This requires decoupling the continuation of the war from narrow Israeli interests and framing it instead as a clear and independent American strategic interest. It is essential to underscore that regardless of the original rationale for U.S. involvement, any conclusion to the campaign that falls short of meaningful achievements—overthrowing the regime, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and removing enriched uranium—will undermine U.S. standing both regionally and globally, and will encourage other actors to challenge core American interests, including in arenas such as Taiwan.

At the operational level, Israel, subject to U.S. consent, should focus its strikes on assets that if left intact could enable a rapid recovery of Iran’s military and nuclear capabilities. This approach reflects the need to avoid any end-state that allows Iran to claim even a minimal perception of victory, or that leaves it with a viable path to rebuild those capabilities. A resumption of unrest inside Iran cannot be predicted and, in any case, is secondary to degrading the industrial base that underpins any future military recovery. The primary constraint on this course of action is the potential impact on global energy markets, which makes Trump’s approval essential.

Regional perceptions of Israel’s role in the campaign, especially among the Gulf states, will also play a significant role in shaping the war’s outcome. Israel should therefore intensify its diplomatic engagement, whether through direct channels or in coordination with the United States, to reassure the Gulf states and key Arab partners, particularly Egypt and Jordan. Specifically, this means addressing their security concerns and reinforcing confidence in the American and Israeli commitment to see the campaign through to its objectives (namely, the removal of the Iranian threat) and to the regional order that will follow. At the same time, Israel must prepare for the possibility that the Iranian regime survives, even if weakened. It should therefore develop a parallel strategy for a reshaped Middle East in which a diminished but vengeful Iran—potentially still holding control over the Strait of Hormuz—continues to pursue nuclear weapons.

Lebanon will remain a secondary theater, requiring continued attention and resources. The question of whether fighting there continues after the campaign in Iran ends will depend on how that campaign concludes, with several possible scenarios. The optimistic, though less likely scenario, is that sustained military pressure on Hezbollah, combined with the displacement of the population in the south, pushes the Lebanese government to move from rhetoric to action and instruct the Lebanese Armed Forces to disarm Hezbollah. This could yield positive results, if successful, but could also lead to chaos if the effort fails. The more likely outcome is continued hesitation on the part of the Lebanese government, ongoing exchanges of fire between Israel and Hezbollah, with the IDF consolidating its control in southern Lebanon. Even here, despite the presence of an actor tasked with disarming Hezbollah, the probability of fully achieving that objective remains low at this stage, although it may increase somewhat as the Iranian regime weakens.

Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser is Head of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and Head of the Institute for the Research of the Methodology of Intelligence. Dr. Noam Alon is a senior researcher at the Institute for the Research of the Methodology of Intelligence.

[1] The objectives of the operation were not formally defined; however, they can be inferred from the public statements made by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel. See: Gabi Siboni and Erez Winner, “Operation Roaring Lion—Taking Stock and Looking Ahead,” Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (March 24, 2026), https://jiss.org.il/en/siboni-winner-operation-roaring-lion-taking-stock-and-looking-ahead/.
[2] This article is based on a joint workshop and discussion held by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and the Institute for the Research of the Methodology of Intelligence. The workshop applied a methodology that analyzed the perspective of each key actor separately (with each expert representing a given actor), focusing on: a low-probability, high-impact scenario; a high-probability scenario with potential effects exceeding expectations; and an analysis of unknowns across the short, medium, and long term, the resolution of which is expected to significantly influence the trajectory of future scenarios. The results—insights and probability assessments—were weighted using artificial intelligence to generate integrated scenarios and derive additional insights, which then served as the basis for a joint expert discussion. Participants in the workshop and discussion included, among others, the following researchers from the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security: Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror; Col. (res.) Prof. Gabi Siboni; Prof. Hillel Frisch; Prof. Efraim Inbar; Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman; Dr. Ariel Admoni; Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak; Dr. Pnina Shuker; Alex Grinberg; Idan Roll; and Shimon Raphaeli; and from the Institute for the Research of the Methodology of Intelligence: Col. (res.) Dr. Ofer Guterman; Dr. Udi Eiran; Tami Goldberg; and David Siman-Tov.
[3] The value of scenario-based thinking lies not in attempting to predict a specific future, but in helping us think through the possible implications and consequences that may arise, thereby supporting decision-makers in the formulation of strategy.