The recognition by several Western European states of a Palestinian state, the political shift in Hungary (even if it is still too early to determine its impact on bilateral relations), as well as harsher rhetoric in Germany, troubling signals from Italy, and the blunt tone adopted by Spain’s prime minister—together with Europe’s refusal to assist the United States in its confrontation with Iran—have sharpened the challenge Israel faces in the European arena. The underlying causes are complex, and the tendency to dismiss them as the result of the “Islamization” of Europe is overly simplistic.

Radical Muslim elements, particularly in major cities, do indeed play a role in anti-Israel protests. However, this is only part of a broader picture. These protests are also influenced by the negative perceptions of Israel over the past year as a result of the nature of the war in Gaza and events in Judea and Samaria. Moreover, deep currents of post-colonial guilt, especially on the left, which influence positions on the Palestinian issue have also played a role, as have antisemitic undercurrents, including within segments of the far right; a deeply rooted aversion across large parts of European society to the use of military force—even against actors such as Hamas, Iran, or Hezbollah; and a tendency, grounded in historical experience, to treat international law as sacrosanct, while expecting Israel—though not its adversaries, in what may be described as a form of “ racism of low expectations”—to adhere to particularly stringent standards.

To these factors one must now add an additional element of growing importance, unrelated to Israel itself, namely, deep hostility toward President Donald Trump that runs the gamut from Greenland to the papacy. Israel, and particularly its current leadership, is widely perceived as closely aligned with the American president. The Hungarian elections illustrate the extent to which overt American backing now produces effects opposite to those intended.

Despite the growing difficulty—and even though some of its deeper drivers cannot presently be addressed, however much one might wish otherwise—it would be a mistake to underestimate the potential consequences of further deterioration in relations with the European Union, its member states, and the United Kingdom, or to adopt a mindset that treats Europe as a “lost continent.” Israel will continue to need Europe, both for economic reasons—trade, investment, and research funding—and from a strategic perspective that views the Mediterranean basin as a critical arena. Accordingly, even under current conditions, Israel should act where it still can and continue diplomatic and public messaging efforts regarding the threats it faces and strengthening ties with sympathetic partners across Europe.

Israel should therefore:

1. Further strengthen strategic and security ties with Greece and Cyprus, both EU members, against the backdrop of shared concern over Erdoğan and his ambitions; both countries are also in a position to block severe anti-Israel initiatives.
   
   
2. Reassess Israel’s political and security posture toward the war in Ukraine, particularly in light of Russian (and Chinese) support for Iran. For many European states, including close partners such as the Czech Republic, this is now the foremost issue.
   
   
3. Continue cultivating defense ties as a long-term lever of influence: not in the form of rhetorical confrontation (against which Israel’s ambassador in Berlin has warned), but through the partnership embodied in the Arrow 3 deal and other weapons transactions which should shape relations with Germany, the most important country on the continent. More broadly, caution and restraint are required in the use of “punitive” security measures, even if certain steps, such as the removal of Spain from the Civil-Military Coordination Center in Kiryat Gat, may be justified.
   
   
4. Act to reduce significant and unnecessary points of friction, including lawless conduct in Judea and Samaria, which has broad and damaging resonance in Europe (and the United States, where Israel should adopt similar measures vis-à-vis the Democrats). It is also important to engage fully and at all levels, with the assistance of local partners, in a public diplomacy effort to counter the dangerous allegations of “genocide” in Gaza, while current aid policy demonstrates the opposite in practice.
   
   
5. At the same time, Israel must recognize that halting the trend of growing tensions in relations will be difficult, and that in any case Europe’s international standing and its ability to project power are in decline. Israel should therefore strengthen its relations with other actors in the international system—for example in Asia (with an emphasis on India), Latin America, Africa, and, of course, the Arab world. Consolidating and expanding the Abraham Accords will also be beneficial in the European context.

Unprecedented Difficulties in the European Arena

Contrary to a view that has gained traction in Israeli public discourse, Israel’s position in Europe is not beyond recovery. Less than a decade ago, warnings of a looming “diplomatic tsunami” against Israel proved largely unfounded. The early years of Israel’s eighth decade were marked by strategic gains, including in Europe, which strengthened its standing, translated into security and commercial ties, and supported its growing power and continued economic growth. Even in the early stages of the Swords of Iron war, despite demonstrations by Islamist groups and elements of the radical left, Europe still provided clear expressions of understanding for and solidarity with Israel.

However, past experience is not a reliable guide. Over the past year, Israel’s diplomatic position in Europe has deteriorated sharply, both in its dealings with EU institutions and at the level of member states, including countries long regarded as friendly (some of which still present themselves as seeking to “save Israel from itself”). Alongside the longstanding hostility of Ireland, Belgium, and, for reasons not always clear, Slovenia—and the stance of Spain’s current government, whose prime minister, the left-wing Pedro Sánchez, has used particularly harsh language—countries previously seen as friendly have also adopted more critical positions toward Israel and its policies:

1. In the Netherlands, the shift came even before the previous coalition collapsed. That government, anchored by Geert Wilders’s pro-Israel party, saw then–foreign minister Caspar Veldkamp, a former ambassador to Israel once considered broadly sympathetic, call in August 2025 for sanctions on Israel. He later stepped down in the wake of those comments. The current government, led by Rob Jetten, a center-right minority coalition that is more liberal and more pro-European than its predecessor, has maintained a similarly critical line toward Israeli policy.
   
   
2. In Italy, where Giorgia Meloni’s government had been regarded as more supportive of Israel than its predecessors, the prime minister announced on April 14, 2026, that the defense memorandum of understanding with Israel would no longer be renewed automatically. The practical impact is unclear, given the mutual ties between the two countries2 defense establishments. Even so, the decision itself points to growing domestic pressure on Meloni to adopt a more critical stance toward Israel.
   
   
3. Germany’s position is more consequential. In principle, Berlin remains committed to supporting Israel as a core element (Staatsräson) of both policy and post-Holocaust identity. At the same time, alongside continued expressions of solidarity and expanding defense cooperation—most notably the Arrow 3 deal—Chancellor Friedrich Merz has recently voiced open criticism over violence in Judea and Samaria and what is described in Europe as “creeping annexation.” A sharp response from Israel’s finance minister (“you will not impose ghettos on us again”) prompted Israel’s ambassador in Berlin, Ron Prosor, to clarify that the remark had been inappropriate and that Merz remains a friend. Even so, tensions persist, including in light of Germany’s more cautious position on the war with Iran.
   
   
4. In Hungary, it is still too early to determine whether Viktor Orbán’s defeat will lead to a change in bilateral relations. Orbán was a personal ally of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and made no effort to conceal his support. His successor, Péter Magyar, is also regarded as broadly friendly toward Israel. However, his stated intention to return Hungary to the International Criminal Court may complicate future visits by the prime minister to what has been one of the few remaining accessible destinations in Europe.

The Background to the Deterioration of Ties with Europe

In Israeli public discourse, as reflected in social media, a common claim is that these developments reflect that Europe is “lost” and is falling to growing Muslim minorities, driven by unchecked immigration—an argument that echoes, at times more bluntly and at times more subtly, criticism voiced by senior figures in the U.S. administration regarding European immigration policy. European capitals such as Paris, London, and even Berlin are often portrayed as operating under Islamic political influence. Large-scale anti-Israel demonstrations and incidents of physical harassment in European cities have reinforced this perception.

In practice, however, this is only part of the explanation. Not all Muslims in Europe are anti-Israel. While many Muslims in Western Europe do align with the messaging of political Islam, express hostility toward Israel, and show solidarity with Palestinian demands, a significant number of European Muslims reject the political and religious positions of totalitarian Islamist actors such as Iran. Iranian exiles in Europe, for example, have openly supported U.S. and Israeli actions against the regime. The difficulty is that, in the eyes of many Western European governments, those hostile to Israel are often treated as representative of the broader Muslim population.

Beyond the role of Muslim communities, the roots of the current crisis lie in several additional factors:

1. First, the accumulation of negative images that have taken hold in European media and public discourse, particularly since the spring of 2025. At that time, Israel was widely perceived as having halted aid to Gaza and even as deliberately starving the Palestinian population—a perception that later escalated into the use of the term “genocide.” Even relatively friendly governments reacted sharply, and core elements of Israel’s standing as a like-minded partner were eroded. More recently, attention has shifted to developments in Judea and Samaria, including what is described (at times by Israeli voices as well!) as “settler violence” and an attempt at “ethnic cleansing.”
   
   
2. Second, deeper structural currents—particularly in Western Europe, which once dominated much of the world—rooted in a sense of guilt over the colonial past and generations of exploitation. This outlook, especially prevalent on the left but not confined to it, also shapes attitudes toward large-scale immigration from former colonies and from the “Global South,” including Muslim-majority countries. As noted, U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio raised this issue in his Munich speech.
   
   
3. Third, within parts of the political right there are those who view Israel positively, seeing it as aligned with them in opposition to immigration from Muslim countries. At the same time, both on the right (in Europe as in the United States) and on the left, there remain elements that hold explicit and traditional antisemitic views and therefore also support anti-Israel positions.
   
   
4. Fourth, many in Europe, for reasons rooted in the lessons of the first half of the twentieth century, are wary of any use of military force, even against adversaries such as Hamas, Hezbollah, or Iran. This outlook shapes a basic perception of Israel as a “militaristic” state inclined toward the use of force. At the same time, the threat posed by the war in Ukraine since February 2022 has prompted some reassessment of this underlying position.
   
   
5. Fifth, this hesitation to employ force is closely linked to a European tendency to rely on international law as a near-sacrosanct framework. In a pattern that invites scrutiny—sometimes described, pointedly, as a “racism of low expectations”—Israel is expected to meet stringent standards, while its adversaries, despite violating every norm, are treated as actors from whom little more can be expected.

To these factors—some deeply rooted and not easily addressed—another has been added over the past year: growing hostility toward Donald Trump, his administration, and his policies. Viktor Orbán’s decisive defeat, one day after Vice President J. D. Vance visited Budapest to offer explicit support, highlights the political cost of association with Trump. Israel, and particularly its current leadership, is widely seen as aligned with Trump.

This perception reflects a series of developments: dismissive positions on environmental issues; disputes over tariffs; concerns about the future of NATO; Trump’s approach to Volodymyr Zelensky and to support for Ukraine; the crisis over Greenland; and, most recently, his attack on the pope. Together, these have contributed to a situation in which the United States is not consistently viewed as a like-minded partner, as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney argued in his Davos address.

Policy Responses: What Can Israel Do, Despite the Constraints?

As noted, many of the factors outlined above are not easily changed, and Israel’s ability to offset them is limited. Even so, given the depth of Israel’s ties with Europe—historical, geostrategic, economic, scientific, cultural, and societal—it would be a mistake, even in light of Europe’s declining weight, to adopt a “lost continent” approach that dismisses European positions outright and substitutes engagement with blunt criticism, as reflected in recent remarks by Israel’s leadership.

There are still several areas in which coordinated action can help ease the current crisis in relations:

1.  Given the uncertainty surrounding the future of Israel’s relations with Hungary—which until now has been willing, on the basis of close personal and ideological alignment, to act as an effective brake on anti-Israel decisions within EU institutions that require unanimity among all 27 members—efforts should focus on countries still prepared to play a similar role. The Czech Republic can (still?) be counted among them, as reflected in its continued expressions of solidarity, including a recent visit by its foreign minister. At the same time, be the trilateral relationship developed since the early 2010s with Greece and Cyprus, both of which derive strategic benefit from it, should be a focus of Israeli policy. The Eastern Mediterranean framework rests on a shared view of the challenge posed by Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions and on the alignment of the three countries security and economic interests. While both Greece and Cyprus have at times voiced criticism of Israeli policy on the Palestinian issue, there is reason to expect that, behind the scenes, they will act in Brussels to block damaging initiatives against Israel.
   
   
2. The need to repair relations with Europe, alongside the political and security—particularly intelligence—support Russia, together with its partners in the CRINK axis (China and North Korea), has provided to Iran in the current confrontation, warrants a reassessment at the senior level of Israel’s position on Ukraine. Moreover, Ukraine has recently demonstrated resilience and even the capacity for meaningful counteroffensives. For many European countries, including the Czech Republic, a close friend, Ukraine remains the most important issue on their agenda. A shift away from Israel’s image to date as having “kept its distance” on Ukraine would improve its standing in these capitals, and even in Brussels.
   
   
3. In this context, Israel should leverage its defense ties and its ability to contribute to how Europe (which has committed to a sharp increase in defense spending) can address the Russian threat and additional potential threats. Transactions such as the sale of the Arrow 3 and similar arrangements should shape the agenda, rather than political friction. Israel’s primary interest lies in anchoring long-term interdependencies. It would therefore be a mistake to draw a simplistic link between defense cooperation and political positions and to “penalize” critics, even if, in exceptional cases, such as the current Spanish government, measures such as the recent removal of Madrid’s representative from the CMCC in Kiryat Gat may be justified.
   
   
4. Israel should reduce, as far as possible, points of friction, including the conduct of rioters harming the Arab population in Judea and Samaria—an issue that also erodes Israel’s standing among Democrats in the U.S. Congress. It should also give greater visibility and resonance to developments on the ground in Gaza, particularly with regard to the delivery of supplies, and counter the false claim that Israel is pursuing a policy of “genocide” in the Strip. Israel should, with the assistance of local partners, engage in a multi-layered, content-diverse, and effective cognitive campaign.
   
   
5. At the same time, Israel must recognize that reversing the trend of growing friction with Europe is a challenging task, but that Europe’s international standing and its ability to project power are in decline. Israel should therefore deepen its ties with other actors in the international system, including in Asia (with an emphasis on India), Latin America, Africa, and, of course, the Arab world. Consolidating and expanding the Abraham Accords will also serve Israel’s interests in the European context.

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JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

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