Introduction
Israel recovered quickly from Hamas’s surprise attack on the morning of October 7, 2023, and went on the counterattack. Following the IDF’s military successes in the multifront war that followed, politicians and strategic affairs experts have increasingly declared that Israel is a regional power and has changed the face of the Middle East. In Hebrew, the term used is Maatzama Ezorit (regional power), indicating that Israel is viewed as more than just a strong state. There is no doubt that Israel’s military achievements against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the establishment of a security zone in Syria, and the attacks on Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure in Operation Rising Lion in June 2025 and Operation Roaring Lion in 2026 have improved Israel’s security situation and enhanced its regional standing. Israel demonstrated exceptional military and intelligence capabilities while exacting a high price from its enemies. It also achieved a significant diplomatic achievement when the United States joined the military confrontation with Iran—a state that had vowed to destroy Israel and acquired the means to threaten its existence.
A critical examination of the claim that Israel is a regional power , however, raises doubts about whether the Jewish state can consider itself to have attained that status, which requires the ability to exert significant influence beyond a state’s borders and to change the rules of the game in the Middle East. At the time of writing, the confrontation between the United States and Iran, together with Israel’s dependence on decisions made in Washington, reinforces doubts about exaggerated assessments of Israel’s regional standing and power.
The issue matters primarily because it bears on how Israel sets its objectives in the region. States must choose objectives commensurate with the means available to achieve them. Resources should not be wasted on futile attempts to achieve ambitious and unrealistic objectives at the expense of other, attainable ones. The first part of this document discusses the criteria that, in our view, make a strong state a regional power. The second examines whether Israel meets these criteria. The conclusion outlines guidelines for a realistic foreign and security policy in light of Israel’s actual regional standing.
What Is a Regional Power?
The scholarly literature on the classification of states in the international system and its regional subsystems offers no clear and accepted definition of a “regional power.” A regional power—a prominent actor in a regional international subsystem—is generally contrasted with a global superpower, an important actor in the global system. Unlike a global superpower, which has worldwide interests and can exert influence across the globe, a regional power possesses sufficient strength to exert effective influence primarily in its immediate environment but lacks the capabilities to compete with superpowers at the global level. Regional powers can be found in every part of the world: Brazil in South America, Nigeria and South Africa in Africa, India in South Asia, and Iran and Turkey in the Middle East, for example.
Relative rather than absolute measures are the principal criteria for identifying a regional power, since states are assessed against others within a defined geographical region. Yet the concept of a “regional power” is not scalar; it does not exist on a continuum. As in the global system, a state either is a power within the system, or it is not. Not every strong state is necessarily a regional power in its region. Certain threshold conditions must be met.
Complicating such judgments, the boundaries of a region may themselves be unclear, creating uncertainty over whether a particular state should be included within it. One may ask, for example, whether Pakistan belongs to the Middle East because of its Muslim population or whether its connection to the Indian subcontinent makes it an actor in the South Asian subsystem. Some states also occupy an important position in several regional subsystems. Turkey, for example, sees itself as a European and a Middle Eastern actor, as well as an actor in the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions.
Military Power
Historically, military power has been the most important measure of a state’s power, and it remains an important criterion. In the past, the principal measure of national power was the number of soldiers a state could mobilize and deploy on the battlefield. This depended largely on the size of its population and its economic capacity to maintain a standing army. Today, military power is measured not only by troop numbers but also by the sophistication of military equipment and weaponry, the level of training across the armed forces, and the quality of commanders. The importance political leaders attach to military power is evident in the fact that very few states have forgone maintaining armed forces, particularly for the defense of their territorial integrity.
In our view, a regional power must demonstrate the military capability to defend itself against invasion by neighboring states and to establish deterrence—a vague psychological concept—to prevent attacks against it in the first place. Beyond that defensive capacity, it must also be capable of conducting military operations beyond its borders within its geographical region. The ability to project power over long distances through an air force and/or navy larger than those of most neighboring states is characteristic of a regional power.
At times, possession of nuclear weapons or another weapon of mass destruction, together with the ability to deliver them over long distances, is also a hallmark of regional power status. India, which armed itself with nuclear weapons, is an example of a regional power in South Asia.
Military power is intended to inflict pain on rivals so that they agree to the regional power’s demands. Yet every war also involves another calculation: which side can absorb more pain in the form of casualties or economic damage. Democratic states generally show less endurance unless a war is perceived as existential, unavoidable—a “war of no choice” in Israeli political terminology—or as serving very important interests. For a state aspiring to regional power status, willingness to bear the costs of military operations required to attain and preserve that status is therefore essential. Such willingness is necessary if a state is to advance interests that extend beyond its own survival.
There are, however, several regional subsystems in the contemporary world in which the use of military force to achieve intra-regional political objectives is not contemplated. The European Union and North America are examples. In such regions, the military-power criterion appears far less relevant in determining stratification within the subsystem.
Economic Power
Another important criterion is economic power, as it is essential to building a high-quality military force, a task that has become increasingly expensive. GDP is the principal quantitative measurement of economic power and is partly dependent on population size. GDP per capita, by contrast, indicates economic efficiency and the standard of living of a state’s residents and is a secondary measurement. With the exception of the United States, which ranks tenth, the countries with the world’s ten highest GDP-per-capita figures are small states such as Singapore and Luxembourg.
Population size is another element critical for economic power. A populous state generally provides a large and important market for its neighbors, which may consequently become economically dependent on it.
Relative to other states in its region, a regional power generally ranks high on economic indicators. Regional powers usually have larger and more developed economies than their neighbors. Their military staying power is therefore greater, enabling them to sustain prolonged campaigns. The composition of a state’s output must also be considered when assessing economic power. Heavy industry, arms industries, and products incorporating advanced technology confer power and influence, as does control over strategic commodities such as energy, precious metals, and rare minerals. A diversified economy is preferable to dependence on a single product, however important that product may be. Oil-producing states, for example, remain vulnerable to fluctuations in global energy prices.
Very few states can attain an autarkic economy capable of supplying all their own needs. Globalization encourages states to exploit comparative advantage in producing goods in order to lower their costs on the international market. Yet greater integration into the global market also means greater dependence on foreign trade. Such dependence is one characteristic of small states and makes them vulnerable to sanctions and economic boycotts.
Regional Influence
Recognition is the key factor in regional influence: a regional power is a state whose neighbors and other states in its geographical region take its interests into account. That recognition may be public or covert, but it lies at the heart of the interaction between a regional power and the states around it. Without recognition of its senior status by at least some other states in the region, a state will find it difficult to attain regional power status.
Such influence may be expressed through bilateral relations or within regional organizations, where they exist. A regional power is also distinguished by its ability to form regional coalitions and lead interstate negotiations on issues affecting several states. It may have a distinct sphere of influence in which its preferences carry significant weight. When several states in a region are perceived as regional powers because of their military strength and/or economic might, the result is a multipolar subsystem in which they compete for spheres of influence.
“Soft power,” (neither military nor economic) is another form of influence in today’s global system. It is less effective in a Hobbesian international system, where actors tend to pursue their interests primarily on the principle that “might makes right.” In regional systems where the use of military force to achieve political objectives is not contemplated, however, a common language, religion, or culture between a state aspiring to regional power status and the other states in its region may make such status easier to attain. This is, of course, not a sufficient condition; cultural proximity or unity cannot compensate for conflicting state interests. Shiite Iran, for example, supported Christian Armenia in its confrontation with Shiite Azerbaijan over control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
Willingness to Act as a Regional Power
Just as recognition by others is, in our view, a necessary condition for acquiring regional power status, so too is a willingness to act as a regional power. A state that adopts an isolationist policy aimed at reducing its interaction with the states in its region cannot be classified as a regional power. Military and economic strength are critical conditions for regional power status. Without the political will to use these assets to achieve political objectives and exercise leadership, however, other states in the region will recognize the constraint and conclude that a state confining itself to its own narrow sphere cannot be relied upon. Without a willingness to confront other states in the region, militarily, if necessary, a state lacks the potential to become a regional power.
Senior Status in the Subsystem over Time
Regional power status is acquired only through demonstrated superiority over time and across multiple events. That superiority is evident when a state’s involvement produces the outcomes it seeks. A single success does not turn a state into a regional power. Its ability to withstand difficult diplomatic, military, and economic circumstances while continuing to exert influence under such conditions is an important measure of regional power status.
Interim Summary
In our view, a regional power tends to have a large military equipped with advanced weapons, be willing to bear the costs of using military force, possess an economy that is strong relative to those of its neighbors, wield diplomatic influence in its region, and sometimes enjoys cultural or ideological prestige as well. It is capable of shaping events and setting the agenda within its region. Population size is another important variable in generating both military and economic power and also affects the ability to exert cultural influence. A strong state, in our view, becomes a regional power only if it meets all the criteria listed above.
Is Israel a Regional Power?
Measured carefully against these criteria, Israel presents a mixed picture. It clearly performs well on some measures and only partially in others. On several measures, however, its performance is weak, detracting from its ability to become a regional power.
Militarily, Israel possesses one of the strongest and most technologically advanced armed forces in the region, with advanced air, naval, and ground capabilities. According to foreign assessments, it is also the only state in the region with a nuclear capability, which it maintains under a policy of “nuclear ambiguity.” In the war imposed on it since October 7, 2023, Israel demonstrated impressive military capabilities while recovering rapidly from Hamas’s invasion of the western Negev. It weakened its attackers—Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran—although it had difficulty stopping Houthi fire from Yemen. In the past, Israel also achieved decisive victories against Arab armies.
However, Israel’s military capability is primarily preventive. It can avert threats to Israel, such as an escalation of violence by terrorist organizations, or prevent countries from becoming nuclear powers, as it did with Iraq and Syria. This “mowing the grass” doctrine aims to reduce the ability of Israel’s enemies’ ability to harm it through periodic attacks on their military formations and capabilities.
As David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, understood, Israel lacks the power to impose peace on enemy states, change their basic political preferences, or alter the attitudes of the societies surrounding it toward the Jewish state. Under the “Iron Wall” doctrine, the immediate objective of Israeli military force is to delay the next military round in the hope of achieving temporary deterrence. Over time, military action, together with the consolidation of the state, was intended to shape how Israel’s adversaries learned from experience and how they viewed Israel. The hope is that Israel’s military power and victories will set in motion a historical process that ultimately leads to Israel being perceived as a fait accompli.
Repeated defeats may shape how adversaries learn from experience and lead to peace agreements, as happened with Egypt. After several wars and amid internal changes—including concern over a faltering economy, a change in leadership, and the adoption of an American orientation in foreign and security policy—Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. In Cairo, the conflict with Israel had come to be seen as too costly.
The same logic does not necessarily apply to the terrorist armies of radical Islamist actors that enjoy support from the populations among which they operate as well as significant external assistance for their military buildup. Highly motivated Muslim fanatics are less sensitive to the costs they bear in conflict with Israel, making it difficult to weaken their commitment to the country’s destruction. In such cases, “mowing the grass” is intended only to degrade their capabilities to inflict damage on Israel.
Israeli society, for its part, demonstrates considerable social resilience, particularly when a military conflict is perceived as a “war of no choice.” When substantial parts of the Israeli public question the justice or utility of a war or military campaign, however, their willingness to participate in the war effort and bear its costs diminishes. Public-opinion studies of war in democratic countries show a similar pattern. In Israel too, widespread sentiments of this kind affect decision-makers. Indeed, under public pressure, Israeli governments carried out unilateral withdrawals from southern Lebanon and Gaza without securing a corresponding diplomatic gain.
A regional power may be required to conduct military operations that cannot easily be classified as a “war of no choice.” It is by no means certain that military activity of this nature would be welcomed by Israeli society, particularly after the prolonged war since October 7.
Israel does use its military power to influence the region, primarily in areas close to its borders. It actively counters regional threats—Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas—and affects the strategic balance in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. With distance from the Israeli border, however, its influence declines; its assistance to the Kurds is an example of this more limited, secondary form of involvement. Israel also failed, as noted, to prevent Houthi missile and UAV fire from distant Yemen, although the considerable damage it inflicted on them presumably factored into their decision to stop firing on the Jewish state.
Across the Middle East, Israel can project power through its air force, navy, and special forces. It does not, however, have proxies in the region comparable to Iran’s, which act in pursuit of a shared, far-reaching objective—the destruction of the State of Israel. Nor does Israel maintain an overt military presence beyond the buffer zones it has recently established. Turkey, by contrast, maintains a military presence far from its borders in Libya, Qatar, and Somalia. The farther the entity, the more limited Israel’s influence becomes. Its influence over nearby and relatively powerful states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia is likewise very limited.
Nor can Israel use military force to change the character of the regional subsystem or the rules of the game within it. Unlike other global subsystems, all states in the Middle East display high threat perceptions, and the use of military force is accepted as part of the political toolkit. The Middle East is a source of Muslim extremism, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation, and Israel’s military power cannot significantly alter these characteristics. Nor does it appear that Israel’s military successes in the most recent war brought about fundamental changes in the Middle East. We certainly lack the historical perspective needed to substantiate claims that fundamental changes have occurred in the region due to Israeli activities.
More generally, Israel’s repeated use of military force is not viewed favorably in the region, certainly not publicly. Antagonism in the Middle East is also fueled by the fact that Israeli military power rests on a close relationship with the United States—a form of borrowed power. Although many states in the region regard the United States as a provider of security, most of the region’s inhabitants still perceive it as a foreign power with colonialist impulses.
Above all, Israel’s military power is constrained by its political and military dependence on the United States. Washington is also Israel’s principal arms supplier and limits its freedom of action in military operations. Patron-client relations are a major weakness for any small state.
Over the years, Israel has developed an impressive arms industry whose continued existence depends on access to foreign markets. Even if Israel possesses the technological infrastructure to produce almost any military product, and even if there are reasons to produce additional products domestically, doing so would impose an economic burden. There is no substitute for an arms supplier that enjoys economies of scale. The United States, for example, produces fighter aircraft of a single type in runs of thousands.
Another significant factor is Israel’s lack of sufficient operational staying power across all the main domains of warfare, from air to ground operations. The principal weakness lies in the air force—the IDF’s long arm—which has demonstrated exceptional capability in recent years, particularly against long-range threats such as Iran. The Israeli Air Force’s staying power in a high-intensity campaign is limited. A high-intensity campaign against an adversary capable of absorbing the costs of war over a prolonged period, such as Iran or Turkey, could require much greater staying power. In other words, after a limited period of high-intensity fighting, Israel becomes dependent on the decisions, interests, and intentions of a superpower such as the United States, whose willingness to assist determines whether Israel can extend its staying power. This dependence extends, among other things, to precision-guided bombs and spare parts for fighter aircraft, and even wheels. American assistance is also needed to reinforce interception capabilities such as Arrow 2 and especially Arrow 3, which intercepts missiles outside of the atmosphere. This capability is required in light of Iran’s increased use of surface-to-surface missiles carrying cluster warheads.
Moreover, despite its position as one of the region’s most developed economies, its high GDP per capita, and its world-class high-tech industry, Israel’s economic power is limited. Ultimately, like other small states, it is dependent on foreign markets. Israel has integrated successfully into the global economy, but its economy remains small and is more exposed than large economies to global economic trends beyond its control. Israel lacks the scale to be autarkic.
Its trade with states in the region is limited and does not make its regional trading partners dependent on it. Most Middle Eastern states conduct the bulk of their trade with countries outside the region. By contrast, Middle Eastern states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran have economic assets that give them global influence, principally because of their control over energy resources and the revenues these generate and, in Iran’s case, also because of its control over the strategically important Strait of Hormuz.
Reducing dependence on the United States for military force buildup by domestically producing the stockpiles needed for substantial staying power—for example, Arrow 3 missiles—would require enormous defense expenditure. Such a course would carry considerable economic risk: much of the investment could go to waste if the stockpiles were not used, while the expenditure would come at the expense of other defense needs.
Greater operational staying power therefore appears to exceed Israel’s economic capacity. Israel will continue to rely on a strategic ally—namely the United States—for as long as it can. Alliances, however, are not eternal. Demographic changes and political transformations within the United States pose difficulties for Israel, and it may need to prepare for less favorable circumstances.
A similarly mixed picture emerges with regard to Israel’s political and diplomatic power. Israel has successfully leveraged advantages in fields such as military technology, water management, agriculture, communications, and medicine to establish business and security ties. Relations among states are based primarily on interests, and over the years Israel has become a state with something to offer.
Israel has a close strategic relationship with the United States that is both a major asset and a constraint on its freedom of action in the region. The United States continues to attach importance to the Middle East, where it maintains a significant military presence and has political and economic interests. Israel can therefore serve American interests and enhance its strategic value, but it cannot “do as it pleases.”
One familiar example is the ceasefires periodically imposed on Israel by the “diplomatic clock” —a familiar concept in this region. Any renewal of Israeli military activity against Iran awaits a green light from Washington. The United States also tends to intervene in Israeli arms sales—a tool of Israeli diplomacy—based on its own political and economic considerations.
Jerusalem’s close relationship with Washington, together with the strong but declining sympathy for Israel in the United States, has been an advantage. The standing of the United States in the international system naturally affects how its ally is regarded, so a decline in American standing has negative implications for Israel. Israel was regarded as a gateway to Washington, and many states were impressed by the influence of the Israeli lobby, AIPAC, in the United States and sought Israel’s help in handling matters in Washington. Yet changes in American politics that indicate declining support for Israel are widely recognized and harm Israel’s ability to exert influence within the American political system.
Over the years, Israel concluded peace agreements with several Arab states—Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco—and recently signed a framework agreement with Lebanon as a step toward a peace agreement. The United States was an important sponsor of all these agreements.
In certain circumstances, Israel also served in the past as an informal ally of Arab states. Significant security cooperation exists between Israel and Jordan and with the United Arab Emirates, but it is not publicized because such cooperation continues to impose a political burden on the elites of those states. There are also known cases in which valuable intelligence has been transferred to several Arab states. Most inhabitants of the region, however, are still not ready for close relations with the people of the Jewish state and certainly are not prepared to accept Israel as a legitimate regional power.
Notably, states aspiring to regional power status have in recent years become sharp critics of Israel. Iran and Turkey, for example, openly express hostility toward Israel in their language and rhetoric while also investing in nuclear or conventional armament to expand their influence. Their hostility toward Israel resulted from internal political changes—religious radicalization—but was also intended to overcome Arab suspicion of non-Arab Turkey, which ruled the Arab region for hundreds of years, and of Shiite Persia. Both states were once allies of Israel against the Arab world, and their shift to intense hostility casts a shadow over Israel’s political successes in the Middle East.
Muslim states in Central Asia and the Caucasus, which became part of the Middle East following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, have found common interests with Israel and maintain diplomatic and security relations with it. Other Muslim states maintain informal, discreet contacts with Israel. Beyond the region, Israel also maintains a significant diplomatic presence in other parts of the world.
In the eastern Mediterranean, through which more than 90 percent of Israel’s international trade passes, Israel’s standing has benefited considerably from the ties Jerusalem has developed with Athens and Nicosia. Together, these ties form what could be considered as an anti-Turkish alignment. That said, Israel has made clear to both states that it would not use military force in the event of a conflict between the Hellenic states and Turkey.
Despite all this, Israel remains mostly isolated in the Middle East—a Jewish state in an overwhelmingly Arab and Muslim region. Many states in the region do not recognize Israel diplomatically, and in many of them it is perceived as an enemy. Significant segments of the Middle Eastern population hold hostile attitudes rooted in religion and/or culture.
Even where peace agreements exist, societal relations are almost nonexistent because both authorities and the populace have reservations about the Jewish state. The peace is “cold.” Changing these attitudes would require changes in Arab educational systems and may take a long time. Israel, of course, has no cultural influence in the region because it is not perceived as a natural and accepted part of it. Nor does Israel conduct public-relations campaigns capable of winning acceptance in its regional environment. Even if such efforts were undertaken, it is highly doubtful that they could overcome deeply rooted hostility and bear fruit in the coming years.
Israel is perceived negatively among many of the region’s inhabitants; it is seen as foreign and aggressive. To attain regional power status, Israel must foster the perception across the region that its existence is natural, normal, and not subject to doubt or question. To illustrate, consider global superpowers such as the United States or China. People in some parts of the world oppose, and even feel hostility toward their policies, but no one questions their very existence.
It is also far from clear that most Israelis would prefer their state to assume the role of a regional power, which at times entails sending military forces to achieve objectives that do not necessarily serve vital or immediate Israeli security needs. This can be seen as a weakness of Israeli society: military activity that is difficult to define as a “war of no choice” will be met with public opposition. Israel also faces limits on both its freedom of action and its military staying power, in part—as discussed above—because of its heavy dependence on American support.
Any answer to the question of whether Israel is a regional power must also take account of its lack of strategic depth—its small territory and population. In many respects, Israel is a small state with relatively limited operational staying power. It is unclear what minimum population would give a state the potential to attain regional power status in the Middle East. Turkey and Iran each have more than 90 million inhabitants. Egypt, which regards itself as the leader of the Arab world and a central Middle Eastern actor, has an even larger population.
By contrast, Israel aspires to reach a critical population mass that will guarantee its survival. It has reached 10 million inhabitants, including 8 million Jews, yet many in the region still dream of destroying it. Perhaps a population of 20 million would establish Israel as a fait accompli, after which regional power status could be considered.
Conclusion
Examination of Israel’s regional status raises doubts about the widespread assumption that it has become a regional power, a Maatzama Eizorit). There is no doubt about Israel’s military power, which should qualify it as a regional power. The problem, among other things, is that this power depends partly on the United States. That dependence—for fighter aircraft, munitions, and operational staying power—sets limits on Israel’s freedom of military action in most scenarios, as the confrontation with Iran demonstrates. It also limits Israel’s staying power, a critical variable in assessing whether a state can qualify as a regional power.
Israel’s power is tied to the fortunes of the United States in the international arena and to Washington’s willingness to assist and cooperate with it. At the time of writing, the war waged by the United States and Israel against Iran has so far failed to achieve its two principal strategic objectives: denying Iran the capability to acquire nuclear weapons, among other things by removing enriched uranium from Iran, and creating the conditions that would lead to the fall of the Iranian regime.
Israel can indeed take pride in having degraded critical nuclear and missile-production capabilities, perhaps giving it time (possibly as much as two or three years) to address renewed threats and the regime change may yet fall. Iran’ssuccess, however, in withstanding the costs of the war against the United States strengthens its standing while weakening that of Israel and the United States’ regional allies. Against the backdrop of the unsuccessful American war against Iran, Israel’s prospects of becoming a regional power have diminished further.
Another source of concern for Israel is demographic and political change within the United States. Assuming there is no alternative to relying on the United States in the near future, Israel must therefore focus its diplomatic efforts on the United States.
A second issue that constitutes an obstacle to Israel becoming a regional power lies not in its military strength but in how it is perceived. Most inhabitants of the region do not regard Israel as a legitimate political entity that is naturally rooted in the Middle East and viable within it. Moreover, for many in the Middle East , Israel’s military power does not foster recognition of its natural place in the region; rather, it has the opposite effect.
To several states in the region, Israel’s military power poses a threat, and that threat perception serves its interests only partially. A strong Israel capable of degrading the military capabilities of others is frightening to states in the region and this is of course useful for deterrence, but it also intensifies hostile attitudes toward Israel. An overt aspiration to become a regional power could further increase suspicion of Israel. Its negative image therefore obstructs successful integration into the region, and for peace or coexistence based on mutual respect.
Another structural obstacle to regional power status is that Israel is small country with a small population and limited resources. This is why it depends on the United States. Throughout history, small states have always faced threats to their existence. Size is an important variable in international relations, and Israel’s small population gives its much larger enemies hope that they can destroy it.
More than seven decades of Jewish statehood demonstrate that survival does not require regional power status; being a strong state issufficient. Israel’s improved standing in the Middle East since its establishment in 1948, together with the network of relations it now maintains with states in the region, shows that doubts about its very existence have diminished with time.
It is not clear, however, that this is a one-way historical process. Turkey and Iran are attempting to reverse it. Both are large and powerful states and, in recent years, have come to embody the political power of radical Islam—Sunni and Shiite—a major political force in the region.
A worrying trend is the pursuit of nuclear weapons, which threatens Israel’s survival and gives hope to those who seek its elimination. Israel must remain committed to preventing its enemies from acquiring the capability to produce these weapons.
Regardless of whether it is a regional power, Israel must focus its attention on dealing with Iran and Turkey. The fact that two important non-Arab states that once maintained good relations with Jerusalem have been intensely hostile toward it in recent decades casts a shadow over the overall improvement in Israel’s regional standing.
Moreover, the changes in attitudes toward Israel necessary for attaining regional power status may take a long time. If significant integration into the region is not a realistic objective in the short term, and if there is tension between creating deterrence through military threat and aspiring to peace, it is worth considering Yehezkel Dror’s proposal to adopt the complex and internally contradictory posture of “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.”
For many years, Israel has been engaged in continuous military hostilities that compel it at the same time to prepare for war, seek to have its existence recognized as normal and accepted, and signal to the states of the region its desire for peace arrangements. This complex posture is also advisable for preserving social cohesion in Israel and its citizens’ willingness to fight.
Regardless of its aspirations to become a regional power, Israel must make a major effort to increase its population substantially. This would guarantee its survival and put an end to hopes of destroying it. The current wave of rising antisemitism around the world may in fact give Jews in the diaspora an incentive to immigrate to Israel. The State of Israel should take advantage of this window of opportunity to increase its population.
A country in a permanent state of war is not an encouraging destination for immigration. For sound domestic reasons as well, it is therefore desirable to reduce regional tensions so that Israel can reduce its use of military power. A transition to political arrangements that would reduce friction in the region does not, of course, depend on Israel alone, and arrangements that entail a long-term security risks must be avoided.
Preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed state, moreover, is possible only through the use of military force or, alternatively, through regime change—a task that is probably beyond Israel’s capabilities. The State of Israel is not a regional power whose existence is immune to threat, and it will have to continue contending with the tension between seeking to reduce hostility and the need to live by the sword.
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