* This paper is based on information updated as of April 30, 2026. I am grateful to Daniel Hirschfeld for his extensive research assistance.
Iran’s economy suffered broad, systemic damage during Operation Roaring Lion/Epic Fury. Almost every sector has been affected, directly or indirectly. The damage goes beyond individual sectors; it has created several strategic bottlenecks that now threaten the economy’s overall ability to function. The American naval blockade has disrupted trade in the Persian Gulf. Strikes have hit the petrochemical and steel industries, as well as gas facilities at the South Pars field. The internet has been cut off, while sustained pressure continues in the cyber and financial domains. These pressures come in addition to the severe blows dealt to Iran’s military-industrial sector and nuclear facilities.
The macroeconomic damage is already apparent. According to an estimate published in Iran’s economic press, GDP is expected to contract by 8.8 to 10.4 percent. Even that figure, however, does not fully capture the scale of the damage, as it is compounded by long-standing structural pressures: sanctions, high inflation, continued currency depreciation, and chronic energy shortages. The war, in other words, is not only creating a new crisis. It is accelerating and deepening weaknesses that were already inherent in Iran’s economy.[1]
The full extent of the damage cannot yet be measured, but indicators suggest that the Iranian economy faces several major challenges. The most urgent is crude oil storage. As storage capacity fills up, Iran may have to shut down production from oil wells, a direct consequence of the naval blockade and the blow it has dealt to Tehran’s exports. That would be more than a temporary revenue loss. It could cause lasting damage to production infrastructure and strike at the core of Iran’s economic model, which depends heavily on exports of oil and oil products.
The strategic significance of Iran’s economic distress lies in the possibility that as pressure increases, Tehran may show greater flexibility toward U.S. demands in negotiations over an arrangement to end the war—above all, concessions on major elements of the nuclear program and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic. The regime faces a dilemma: What poses the greater threat to its survival—continued sanctions and a worsening economic crisis, or concessions that could be read at home as weakness? As pressure on Iran mounts, the argument for compromise may appear to gain force. In practice, however, most of Iran’s leadership, now dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, appears to believe that concessions—certainly major concessions—would pose the greater danger. Iran is therefore prepared to offer only limited and gradual flexibility on the resumption of negotiations, and the terms of any arrangement it is willing to offer will likely fall far short of U.S. expectations. Sustained and increasing economic pressure will be needed to bring the IRGC to accept more meaningful concessions.
Iran’s Energy Resources: From Operational Bottlenecks to the Risk of Systemic Disruption
1. The Oil Industry: From Core Revenue Source to Potential Point of No Return
The oil industry, the backbone of Iran’s economy, was not targeted directly in the first wave of Israeli and American strikes. It continued to function, albeit partially, during the first weeks of the war. The American naval blockade imposed on April 12, 2026, changed the picture. Iran’s ability to export oil, the regime’s main source of income, contracted rapidly, in part because tankers were seized. As of April 30, according to U.S. Central Command, 41 tankers carrying 69 million barrels of Iranian oil, worth $6 billion, were prevented from leaving the Gulf.[2]
This has resulted not only in a loss of revenue but has also created a critical operational bottleneck: production is exceeding outflows, pushing crude oil storage capacity to breaking point in the immediate term.[3] This may force Iran to stop production, whether in a controlled or uncontrolled manner. Such a scenario carries the risk of lasting technical damage to the reservoirs and could impair production capacity even after the fighting ends.[4]
Iran’s claim that it can divert surplus oil to domestic consumption or repair the damage quickly appears designed to project control. In practice, it offers only a partial solution. Domestic demand is limited, and refining and distribution infrastructure is under pressure. Iran’s oil sector is approaching a potential point of no return: a stage at which damage affects not only revenue, but production capacity itself, with strategic implications for the regime’s resilience.[5]
2. The Fuel Sector: Logistical Damage and Its Effect on Daily Economic Activity
At the start of the war, on March 7, 2026, the Israeli Air Force struck a fuel storage complex in Tehran, damaging roughly thirty storage tanks.[6] According to Iranian authorities, the strikes destroyed some 70–80 million liters of fuel. The hit sent shock waves through the domestic supply chain and forced authorities to adopt shortage-management measures. The most important of these were restrictions on private vehicle use and an effort to shift demand to public transportation.[7] These steps point to an attempt to stabilize the system under pressure, not to a real solution to the shortage.
The regime has sought to reassure the public that supply will continue uninterrupted.[8] In practice, however, the damage has economy-wide effects. Limits on mobility disrupt supply chains, municipal services, and the daily economic activity of businesses and citizens alike. In this sense, the fuel sector is not merely an infrastructure issue. It is a critical component of day-to-day economic functioning, and damage to it translates into cumulative erosion in productivity and commercial activity.
3. The South Pars Gas Field: Risk of an Economy-Wide Energy Crisis
The South Pars gas field, shared by Iran and Qatar, contains roughly 8 percent of the world’s proven gas reserves and is one of Iran’s most important energy assets. It supplies a substantial share of the country’s domestic energy needs, making it a critical link between the energy sector and the broader economy. Against that backdrop, the March 17, 2026 strike on its production facilities was not an isolated event and had the potential to cause far wider systemic consequences.[9]
Most of the gas produced at South Pars serves the domestic market, above all electricity generation and heavy industry, especially petrochemicals. Any disruption at the field can therefore set off a temporary domino effect of reduced electricity supply, lower factory output, and a further slowdown in economic activity. The damage to South Pars is not just a blow to the energy sector; it threatens the Iranian economy’s ability to function as a coherent system.
As long as the damage remains unrepaired, the gas field becomes a systemic vulnerability: oil affects state revenue; gas affects Iran’s ability to run its domestic economy.
Industry and Trade: Damage to Growth Engines and Supply Chains
1. Industry: Damage to Strategic Production Hubs and Disruption of Value Chains
Israeli strikes during the war focused on several of Iran’s main industrial centers. Major steel plants in Isfahan, Khuzestan, and Hormozgan were hit repeatedly. Petrochemical facilities were also struck, including Mahshahr on April 4 and Assaluyeh on April 6. Iranian media reported that the strikes disrupted plant operations and forced many dependent companies either to halt activity or scale it back, putting the jobs of thousands of workers in large industrial complexes at risk.[10] [11] [12]
The petrochemical sector is one of the most important sectors of the Iranian economy. According to Iranian media, the Mahshahr industrial complex produced roughly $4–5 billion worth of goods in the Persian year 1403 (March 2024–March 2025), accounting for 1–2 percent of Iranian GDP. The strike on Assaluyeh hit one of the sector’s key production centers, shutting the facility down completely. The impact of strikes on industrial centers goes beyond physical damage to factories and plants. Power stations that supply these complexes with electricity and industrial steam have also come under attack, creating a cumulative effect where even facilities that escaped direct strikes struggle to operate. The result is disruption across the industrial value chain.[13] [14] [15]
Iran’s steel industry, another important source of exports and jobs, has also taken a serious hit. Five large steel companies were damaged, among them Mobarakeh Steel in Isfahan, which produces tens of millions of tons of iron and steel and employs some 60,000 people. The company estimates that repairs will take about a year, a timeline that points to lasting damage rather than a brief interruption. The Khuzestan steel plant was also hit. It employs more than 10,000 people and is likewise a major exporter.[16] Together, the blows to petrochemicals and steel do more than damage individual sectors. They weaken two of Iran’s main growth and export engines.
2. Trade: Disrupted Routes and Growing Reliance on Improvised Solutions
The damage to Iran’s production base has been compounded by the fighting in the Persian Gulf and the American naval blockade, which have directly disrupted the country’s ability to conduct foreign trade. Tehran’s trade with the Gulf states has also been hit hard, especially its commercial ties with the United Arab Emirates, a key channel for imports and distribution into Iran.[17] Reports indicate that large quantities of goods are stuck in the UAE and not reaching their destinations. Officials in Tehran are trying to bypass the restrictions by importing through third countries,[18] but that workaround raises costs, slows the movement of goods, and increases uncertainty.
Disruption to Iran’s foreign trade is not confined to the Gulf. Chinese customs data show a steep fall in Iran-China trade, from $907 million in March 2025 to just $184 million in March 2026.[19] That drop of some 80 percent reflects more than logistical disruption, it points to growing caution among major trading partners in view of political risk.
Iran has responded by trying to develop alternative trade routes, including an overland corridor through Pakistan that would be used, among other things, to import wheat, which Iran currently imports mainly from South America.[20] These alternatives, however, are limited in scale and cannot replace seaborne trade. Another sign of the difficulties Iran faces in bringing in imports came on April 4, when the government allocated $1 billion for basic goods, mainly food.[21] That decision suggests a shift from temporary disruption to managing the economy under conditions of shortage.
The Cyber and Digital Front: Financial Disruption and the Paralysis of Online Economic Activity
1. Cyber: A Direct Hit to Iran’s Financial System
Some of the most serious economic damage Iran has suffered during the war has come from targeted cyberattacks on two of its largest and most important banks: Bank Sepah[22] and Bank Melli.[23] These attacks did not cause just limited service outages; they struck critical financial infrastructure that plays a central role in the country’s cash flow.
Bank Sepah had already been hit during Operation Rising Lion in June 2025, when its services suffered severe disruption.[24] The current war also saw widespread disruptions, which, according to the ILNA news agency, led Iranian authorities to suspend restrictions on account holders whose checks had bounced until technical problems were fixed.[25] That move was designed to stop the disruption from spreading through the financial system and turning into a broader liquidity crisis.
2. Internet Restrictions: Cumulative Damage to the Digital Economy
Since the start of the war, Iran’s civilian internet has been shut down, causing massive disruption to economic activity. The impact goes far beyond communications. It directly affects online businesses, financial services, e-commerce, and the systems on which a modern economy depends.
Iranian estimates put the economic cost of the internet shutdown at roughly 3–5 trillion tomans a day, or about $40–50 million.[26] Over time, losses on that scale accumulate to a macroeconomic burden.
At the same time, an official quoted by Fars News said the internet restrictions were intended primarily to reduce exposure to cyberattacks, which have caused heavy financial losses, especially in the banking system. The authorities also said they were providing limited internet access to selected professional groups, including doctors, academics, journalists, and computer programmers, to keep essential sectors at least partially functioning.[27]
In practice, Iran has moved to a “tiered” internet model. It is trying to balance cyber defense with basic economic continuity, but the cost is broad damage to productivity and to the functioning of the digital market.
Conclusion: Iran’s Economy Faces a Decisive Strategic Decision Point
The U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran is inflicting economic damage on a scale that goes far beyond isolated blows to individual sectors. Senior regime officials continue to project control and stress that basic goods are still reaching the public. On the ground, however, supply chains, the financial system, and the economy’s cash flow are all showing serious strain.
Meanwhile, Iran’s hope of generating revenue from transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz has also failed to materialize so far. The American blockade is one reason. Another is the threat of sanctions on payments to the regime and the IRGC for safe maritime passage.[28]
Iran now faces an unprecedented accumulation of pressure across energy, industry, trade, finance, and the digital economy. If the United States maintains a consistent and coordinated pressure campaign, Iran will continue to move closer to economic crisis point, especially in the oil sector, where production and export constraints are becoming increasingly severe.
Tehran may have to choose between compromise that restores access to resources and international capital markets, and a strategy in which it continues to endure pressure while trying to use the Strait of Hormuz as leverage. If the current trajectory continues, however, the risk of long-term economic erosion will grow and could spill into domestic politics, increasing the threat to regime stability.
The key variables shaping Iran’s economic outlook remain unclear and depend on parallel technological, security, and geopolitical developments. The most important factors are the risk that oil wells will have to be shut down as storage reaches capacity, the intensity of military pressure on national infrastructure, the international sanctions regime, and the continued restrictions on Iran’s domestic internet. Each of these variables can affect the system as a whole. In combination, however, they could place much greater strain on the stability of the Iranian economy.
1. Oil Well Operations
Iran’s most serious structural vulnerability lies in the condition of its major oil fields. Years of technological and physical deterioration have weakened assets that remain central to the country’s foreign currency earnings. Because Iran still relies heavily on exports of oil and oil products, especially under sanctions, any sustained drop in production or exports feeds quickly into wider macroeconomic stress. If Iran can no longer export or store sufficient quantities of oil, it may have to shut down production at some wells. Bringing those wells back online would require costly rehabilitation and additional investment. Without it, the energy sector could become a major bottleneck, affecting the state budget, the exchange rate, and Iran’s ability to pay for essential imports.
2. Further Damage to National Infrastructure
Iran’s strategic infrastructure remains vulnerable, especially in energy and maritime logistics, creating a growing risk to the economy’s ability to function. Oil export facilities and key nodes along export routes are critical points of vulnerability. If fighting resumes or escalates, further damage to these sites could disrupt export chains, reduce state revenues, and weaken the operating capacity of the energy sector. The damage would not stop there. Continued vulnerability also discourages potential foreign investment and undermines market confidence.
3. The International Sanctions Regime
Over the medium and long term, sanctions remain the most important variable shaping Iran’s economy. If sanctions continue to tighten, especially alongside financial and technological pressure, Iran’s economic isolation will deepen and its access to the global financial system will narrow further. A meaningful political arrangement with the United States would create a very different trajectory. It could reopen channels for foreign investment, improve access to foreign currency, allow for a partial return of international financial institutions to the Iranian market, and generate a relatively rapid increase in domestic economic activity. This makes sanctions a relatively binary variable, with unusually high potential to transform Iran’s economic outlook.
4. Continued Internet Shutdowns and Restrictions
Prolonged restrictions on internet access, imposed as part of the regime’s internal crisis-management policy, are already weighing on economic activity. The regime has tried to limit damage through selective permissions and tiered access to the global internet, but disruption to online activity remains substantial. Internet restrictions directly harm service-based activity, online commerce, digital payments, and business communications, reducing overall business efficiency. Over the medium term, this damage is likely to widen social and economic gaps and increase domestic pressure on the regime, especially among urban and technology-dependent groups.
[1] “The Burden of War on the Economy” [Persian original: “بار جنگ بر دوش اقتصاد”], Donya-e Eqtesad, April 11, 2026.
[2] “U.S. Blockade Has Redirected 41 Ships So Far, CENTCOM Says,” CBS News, April 29, 2026. https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-trump-warning-strait-of-hormuz-bab-el-mandeb-threat-oil-prices/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[3] “New reporting from Bloomberg shows Iran has 22 more days of available storage…” (Post on Brett Erickson’s X account), X, April 28, 2026. https://x.com/BrettErickson28/status/2048918200491098596
[4] “Iran on brink of ‘irreversible’ damage to oil fields as storage runs out during blockade,” New York Post, April 27, 2026. https://nypost.com/2026/04/27/world-news/iran-on-brink-of-irreversible-damage-to-oil-fields-as-storage-runs-out/
[5] “A Strange Interview with the American Secretary; He Does Not Understand the Difference between Oil and Gasoline” [Persian original: “مصاحبۀ عجیب وزیر آمریکایی؛ او تفاوت بین نفت و بنزین را نمیفهمد”], post on the Fars News Telegram channel, Telegram, April 28, 2026. https://t.me/farsna/432054
[6] “IDF Struck Thirty Oil Storage Tanks in Tehran—for the First Time since the Start of the War: ‘It Served the Iranian Military,’” Ynet, March 8, 2026. https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/skiul7ctwl
[7] “Managing Energy Consumption Is the Country’s Need Today” [Persian original: “مدیریت مصرف انرژی، نیاز امروز کشور”], post on the Tasnim News Agency Telegram channel, Telegram, April 27, 2026. https://t.me/Tasnimnews/411021
[8] “Aref’s New Instructions to Senior Government Officials under Wartime Conditions; from Ensuring Security and Elections to Fuel, Medicine, and Workers’ Salaries” [Persian original: “دستورات جدید عارف به مدیران ارشد دولت در شرایط جنگی؛ از تأمین امنیت و انتخابات تا سوخت، دارو و حقوق کارکنان”], ILNA, April 20, 2026.
[9] “South Pars: The World’s Largest Gas Field and the Lifeline of Iran’s Economy” [Persian original: “پارس جنوبی؛ بزرگترین میدان گازی جهان و رگ حیاتی اقتصاد ایران”], BBC Persian, March 21, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cz783d3w71eo.
[10] “Chemicals on the Grill: The Air Force’s Dramatic Strike in Mahshahr,” Maariv, April 4, 2026, https://www.maariv.co.il/news/military/article-1304902.
[11] “Attack on Petrochemical Facilities in Assaluyeh” [Persian original: “حمله به پتروشیمیهای عسلویه”], Donya-e Eqtesad, April 8, 2026, https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AA-126/4262611-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%88%DB%8C%D9%87
[12] “The Burden of War on the Economy” [Persian original: “بار جنگ بر دوش اقتصاد”], Donya-e Eqtesad, April 11, 2026, https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%DA%AF%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-100/4263389-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF
[13] “Attack on Petrochemical Infrastructure” [Persian original: “حمله به زیرساختهای پتروشیمی”], Donya-e Eqtesad, April 9, 2026, https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA-68/4262796-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%BE%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%85%DB%8C
[14] “Report on the Damage Caused to Iran’s Economy by the War” [Persian original: “گزارشی از آسیبهای جنگ به اقتصاد ایران”], ILNA, April 27, 2026, https://www.ilna.ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7-10/1778679-%DA%AF%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A2%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A8-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86
[15] “Attack on Petrochemical Infrastructure” [Persian original: “حمله به زیرساختهای پتروشیمی”], Donya-e Eqtesad, April 9, 2026, https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA-68/4262796-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%BE%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%85%DB%8C.
[16] “Attack on Petrochemical Infrastructure” [Persian original: “حمله به زیرساختهای پتروشیمی”], Donya-e Eqtesad, April 9, 2026, https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%A9-%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA-68/4262796-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%BE%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%85%DB%8C
[17] “The Burden of War on the Economy” [Persian original: “بار جنگ بر دوش اقتصاد”], Donya-e Eqtesad, April 11, 2026, https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%DA%AF%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C-100/4263389-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF
[18] “Launching a Green Corridor to Accelerate Imports of Goods from the UAE” [Persian original: “راه اندازی کریدور سبز برای تسریع در واردات کالا از امارات”], ILNA, March 24, 2026, https://www.ilna.ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C-4/1765036-%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8%B2-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA
[19] “Iran’s Foreign Trade Suffers Wartime Collapse,” Iran International, April 28, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202604284103.
[20] “The Importance of Launching the Iran-Pakistan Transit Corridor / The Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz Will Not Suffocate Iran” [Persian original: “اهمیت آغاز کریدور ترانزیتی ایران- پاکستان/ محاصره تنگه هرمز ایران را خفه نمیکند”], ILNA, April 13, 2026, https://www.ilna.ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C-4/1772934-%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%A2%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2-%DA%A9%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%BE%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%86%DA%AF%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%B2-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%AE%D9%81%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%AF.
[21] “The Government’s New Decision to Supply Basic Goods” [Persian original: “تصمیم جدید دولت برای تامین کالاهای اساسی / آیا طرح کالابرگ ادامه دارد؟”], Asr Iran, April 24, 2026, https://www.asriran.com/fa/amp/news/1158586.
[22] “The IRGC News Agency Reported Disruptions to Internet Services at Bank Sepah” [Persian original: “خبرگزاری سپاه از اختلال در خدمات اینترنتی بانک سپه خبر داد”], Iran International, March 10, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/fa/202603107349.
[23] “Fars News Agency Confirmed Disruptions to Bank Melli’s Online Services” [Persian original: “خبرگزاری فارس اختلال در ارائه خدمات آنلاین بانک ملی را تایید کرد”], Iran International, March 10, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/fa/202603100475.
[24] “Iran at War: Internal and International Fronts in the Shadow of Operation Rising Lion, June 12–22, 2025,” Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, June 23, 2025, https://jiss.org.il/davidi-iran-war-22-june/.
[25] “The Problem of Removing the Negative Effects of Bank Melli and Bank Sepah Checks Will Be Resolved by Tuesday” [Persian original: “مشکل رفع سوءاثر چک های ملی و سپه تا سه شنبه برطرف می شود”], ILNA, March 29, 2026, https://www.ilna.ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C-4/1766920-%D9%85%D8%B4%DA%A9%D9%84-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AB%D8%B1-%DA%86%DA%A9-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D9%87-%D8%AA%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D9%87-%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%81-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF
[26] “Internet Has Been Shut for Two Months / Damage from Internet Shutdowns Estimated at up to 300 Trillion Tomans” [Persian original: “قطعی اینترنت دوماهه شد / خسارتهای قطعی اینترنت تا ۳۰۰ همت برآورد میشود”], Khabar Online, April 28, 2026, https://www.khabaronline.ir/amp/2211497.
[27] “The Story Behind the Scenes of the Internet Restrictions . . .” [Persian original: “روایتی از پشتپرده محدودیتهای اینترنت…”], post on the Fars News Agency Telegram channel, Telegram, April 26, 2026, https://t.me/farsna/431727.
[28] “1249. Are ‘Toll’ Payments to Iran for Safe Passage through the Strait of Hormuz Authorized?,” OFAC, April 28, 2026, https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1249.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
