Over a year and a half into the Gaza war, Israel’s campaign against Hamas has evolved significantly. What started as a furious push to avenge and neutralize the threat following October 7 has turned into a grinding war of attrition.

Israel’s leaders vowed to dismantle Hamas’s military capabilities, secure the return of Israeli hostages, and ensure that such an attack can never occur again. These goals were clear and, after the shock of Hamas’s onslaught, remain widely supported in Israel.

However, the protracted fighting in Gaza has increasingly revealed a sobering reality: even as the IDF learns and adapts on the battlefield, it is still unclear whether continuing the war indefinitely will achieve Israel’s long-term strategic aims, and how costly it will be in military, humanitarian, and political terms.

The Israeli military has made significant tactical adjustments in Gaza. Early missteps and surprises forced the IDF to rethink its approach in real-time. On paper, Israel now has as many as five divisions committed to the Gaza theater, a massive force for such a narrow strip of land. In practice, however, not all these troops can be fully deployed at once.

The core dilemma has remained consistent since day one: separating Hamas fighters from Gaza’s civilian population is extraordinarily difficult. Gaza’s neighborhoods are filled with families, hospitals, and schools. It is an urban maze where militants hide among civilians. Israeli commanders cannot simply bulldoze through the Strip with all five divisions without causing unacceptable civilian casualties and chaos within their own ranks.

As a result, much of the IDF’s combat power often remains on the sidelines, awaiting clearer targets and safer opportunities to advance. Every Israeli incursion is preceded by efforts to evacuate civilians from harm’s way, including dropping leaflets, sending text warnings, and announcing “safe zones” or humanitarian corridors. These attempts to create a battle space devoid of civilians consistently face logistical delays. Many Gazans are elderly, injured, or have nowhere safe to go, while Hamas actively seeks to keep civilians in place as human shields. The IDF is thus compelled into a frustrating holding pattern: poised to strike, but frequently having to pause as evacuation plans lag and militants slip away.

Gaza’s urban terrain and Hamas’s tactics have further diminished Israel’s conventional superiority. During the initial ground assaults on northern Gaza, Israeli units would sweep through city blocks by day, only to encounter ambushes in their rear by night. Hamas militants became phantoms of the battlefield, disappearing into concealed tunnel entrances as Israeli tanks advanced, then re-emerging behind Israeli lines once the frontline had moved on.

In the first phase of the war, before the January 2025 ceasefire, several Gaza neighborhoods had to be “cleared” by the IDF multiple times. Each time the troops believed an area was secure, gunmen would emerge from basement trapdoors or camouflaged tunnel shafts to sow chaos and force the IDF to double back. This cat-and-mouse guerrilla warfare was enabled by a subterranean labyrinth: Haniyeh’s “City of Jihad.” Hamas spent years constructing it beneath Gaza’s streets, which meant that Israel’s territorial control was often restricted to the exact ground its soldiers physically occupied. Anything not underfoot could swiftly become hostile again.

As I have written before, this operational plan made perfect sense without a clear strategic end state articulated by the Israeli war cabinet. The IDF kept its operational plan flexible, refraining from decisively committing to holding ground. This approach avoided the counterinsurgency quagmire experienced by NATO in Iraq and Afghanistan, prevented significantly higher IDF casualties, kept the Biden White House onside, and allowed them to adapt to whatever strategic end state their political masters eventually chose.

In recent months, however, with the change in the US presidency and the removal of American constraints, the IDF has adjusted its operational approach. Gone are the days of rapid armored thrusts that race through an area and leave it behind.

Israeli forces are now advancing methodically while holding ground behind them. After clearing a zone of Hamas presence, Israeli units increasingly remain in place to secure it, allowing another formation to push forward and expand the perimeter. This leapfrogging tactic is designed to prevent Hamas fighters from re-emerging from tunnels in “liberated” zones once the main force has moved on. It also places significant pressure on Hamas, as the White House has made it clear that it prefers a negotiated end to the war. The combination of holding ground and the successful beginning of the implementation a plan to control humanitarian aid delivery using American contractors is exerting enormous pressure on Hamas.

This strategy reflects a classic adaptation to urban insurgency: hold what you have taken, deny the enemy the ability to infiltrate behind you, and only then proceed to the next block or tunnel entrance. This approach has considerably slowed the tempo of the war, representing a deliberate trade-off of speed for security. Israeli engineers and special units also focus heavily on uncovering and destroying tunnels as they advance, sealing shafts with explosives. The IDF’s territorial control in Gaza remains a cautious patchwork of secured strongpoints, cleared zones and corridors, rather than a broad sweep of dominance. Nevertheless, Israeli forces now hold as much as 70% of the Strip.

Israeli commanders also acknowledge that this war cannot be fought with unchecked momentum. At any moment, a political decision or outside pressure could halt the fighting, as has happened multiple times already with temporary ceasefires for hostage exchanges. According to IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, the ongoing Gaza offensive has been designed with a “pressure-cooker” mindset. Each operational phase is executed intensively and decisively, but with the expectation that a pause may be imposed at any time.

In other words, the IDF is not relying on a continuous, unstoppable drive to victory. Instead, it is waging the war in bite-sized increments, aiming to maximize damage to Hamas in each burst of combat before the next potential ceasefire. On a tactical level, this means troops must be prepared to hunker down and hold their gains during lulls, rather than exploiting momentum to its fullest.

Strategically, this reflects Israel’s acute awareness of diplomatic constraints and the reality that time is always of the essence. This stop-and-go rhythm has prevented Hamas’s outright collapse; each pause allows the remaining militants time to regroup or relocate. The IDF has certainly enhanced its preparedness for when the fighting resumes, but the necessity of constantly bracing for interruptions underscores a larger point: this war is not being fought on Israel’s terms alone.

Every day the conflict continues, Gaza’s civilian population pays a grievous price, and this human cost directly influences the strategic calculus. Large swaths of Gaza City now lie in ruins from months of airstrikes and shelling. Entire families have been wiped out in the bombardment, and the rising death toll of Palestinian civilians has become a significant factor in the diplomatic arena.

Hamas targets embedded near hospitals and in refugee camps as part of their human sacrifice strategy have been struck amid fierce battles with Hamas fighters. Over two million people—almost the entire population of the Strip—have been displaced at one point or another, told to flee one area only to find that nowhere in Gaza is truly safe. The humanitarian emergency appears to be real. Shortages of clean water, food, medicine, and electricity have plagued Gaza for months. While UN figures indicate that sufficient aid entered before the blockade, Hamas and other criminal elements have seized it, holding it and price gouging ordinary Gazans to maintain control of the population and prioritize their own sustenance.

In the fog of urban warfare, avoiding civilian harm has proven nearly impossible when Hamas fighters operate from hospitals, schools, and apartment blocks. The grim arithmetic suggests that continuing the offensive will almost certainly result in more civilian deaths and suffering, regardless of how careful the IDF endeavors to be. Israel insists it never intentionally targets civilians and has implemented unprecedented measures to minimize casualties. While these efforts may have reduced the scale of the tragedy, they have not prevented it.

Such is the horror of war—all wars.

This humanitarian nightmare transcends mere moral implications; it also poses a strategic challenge. Images of deceased and injured Palestinian children, large groups of refugees, flattened urban areas, and unchallenged fake reports about IDF massacres have ignited global outrage. Major international partners, including the United States and European countries, are increasingly uneasy about the war’s impact.

Public opinion in many countries has swung sharply against Israel’s campaign, leading to large protests and political pressure on governments to intervene. Each additional month of bloodshed in Gaza further isolates Israel on the world stage and tests the patience of even its staunchest allies. The suffering inflicted on Gaza’s civilians threatens to seed the ground for future conflict.

On Gaza’s social media and messaging groups, hatred and blame for Hamas are palpable. Coupled with the recent protests, it is clear that Hamas has lost the support of many civilians who view it as responsible for the current situation in Gaza. Preventing Hamas from controlling food supplies may strengthen this trend. Some Israelis present this as a turning point in the war, but it is too early to determine the outcome. Nevertheless, this does not translate into support for Israel. Civilian casualties and widespread trauma in Gaza could serve as fertile ground for a subsequent insurgency, whether under the banner of Hamas or another radical faction. This is a problem that Israeli strategy does not yet appear to have addressed.

Politically, Israel finds itself fighting a war that it can neither entirely abandon nor fully prosecute without restraint. Domestically, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government faces immense pressure to bring the hostages home and ensure that Hamas can never strike Israel again. The trauma of the October 7 attack united Israelis in determination, and for many, stopping short of Hamas’s destruction feels like inviting another massacre in the future.

At the same time, Israelis are acutely aware of the toll the war is taking on their society. The IDF has suffered hundreds of fatalities in Gaza, with thousands more wounded, and many young soldiers remain in harm’s way. Israeli reserve soldiers have been mobilized for far longer than anyone anticipated, disrupting both the economy and family life. A quiet but growing undercurrent of dissent is emerging: the issue of Haredi recruitment remains a touchstone issue, and some reservists, along with high-ranking veterans, have begun to question how much longer this can continue and at what cost to Israel’s moral fabric and international standing. Israel’s leaders must balance these voices with those demanding total victory, creating a precarious political equation.

On the international front, Israel is operating under intense scrutiny. The United States, while supportive of Israel’s right to self-defense, has repeatedly urged caution and pressed for aid to be allowed into Gaza and enabling civilians to escape combat zones. Washington’s backing is not a blank check; it comes with expectations that Israel conducts the war in line with U.S. strategic interests, which include avoiding the escalation of conflict beyond Gaza.

It was predominantly U.S. and Qatari mediation that enabled earlier multi-week ceasefires during which dozens of Israeli hostages were released in exchange for Palestinian terrorists incarcerated in Israeli prisons. Those ceasefires illustrated how diplomatic imperatives can overtake military plans in an instant. Israel had to halt its offensive, however reluctantly, to secure the lives of its captives and to appease its allies’ demands for a respite from Gaza’s suffering. Each pause in fighting provided Hamas with a lifeline: time to regroup fighters, reposition assets, and shore up its control of Gaza. This is a bitter pill for Israel to swallow. Truces for hostage relief and humanitarian purposes save lives and maintain international support, but they also interfere with what the IDF is trying to achieve on the battlefield.

The result is a war fought in fits and starts. Israeli officials privately liken it to “driving with one foot on the gas and one on the brake.” They push hard when they can, then brake when the diplomatic lights flash red. This dynamic is precisely why General Zamir designed the current offensive with flexibility in mind.

The IDF has essentially accepted that it must operate under a ceiling set by world opinion and the White House’s patience. Any plan that assumed a single sustained campaign to crush Hamas has been thrown out. Instead, the military prepares for contingencies such as sudden 48-hour halt orders or partial ceasefires limited to specific areas.

This external constraint on Israel’s war effort means that delivering a decisive knockout blow to Hamas is elusive. Hamas’s leadership is acutely aware of these political limitations on Israel. It knows that if the group can hold out long enough or if there are enough controversial incidents—such as civilian casualties or a desperate firefight in a hospital— international pressure might spare it from total annihilation. In strategic terms, Hamas is fighting for political survival as much as military survival, attempting to outlast Israel’s political will and global tolerance. So far, despite suffering crippling losses, Hamas has not been uprooted entirely, and international politics plays a significant role in this.

Even if the IDF continues to improve its tactics, gradually weakening Hamas’s forces and eliminating its commanders, a stark question looms: what comes after the military campaign? Israel’s maximalist goal of destroying Hamas and eliminating its ability to govern or threaten from Gaza sounds clear in theory, but the endgame remains painfully murky.

If Israel succeeds in killing or capturing most of Hamas’s fighters and commanders, what then? Will Israeli troops reoccupy Gaza indefinitely to prevent the group’s resurgence? That would entail bearing the burden of governing over two million hostile Palestinian civilians, an occupation far more profound and prolonged than anything Israel has attempted since it left Gaza in 2005.

Alternatively, Israel might consider transferring control of Gaza to another entity, such as the Palestinian Authority or an international trusteeship. However, establishing a new governance structure in Gaza would be immensely challenging if residual members of Hamas and other armed factions blend into the populace and launch an insurgency. There is no guarantee either that eliminating Hamas’s visible leadership would eradicate the ideology or resentment that fuels it. On the contrary, the destruction and loss from this war could entrench attitudes and render any new governance arrangement unstable. In blunt terms, Israel still lacks a convincing plan for transforming tactical victories in Gaza into a sustainable political outcome that serves its long-term security. The expectation that, after a limited period of full military control, Israel could allow another force (Palestinian or foreign) to manage civilian matters while retaining responsibility for combating terrorism, as seen in areas under the Palestinian Authority’s control, is somewhat optimistic.

Meanwhile, Hamas’s strategy does not hinge on winning in a conventional sense. Survival itself would be touted as a victory, as demonstrated during the recent “Trump” ceasefire. If even a remnant of Hamas’s organization endures Israel’s onslaught and continues to rule Gaza, whether through a few leaders in hiding or fighters in tunnels, they will claim to have defied a regional superpower.

The longer the war drags on, the more Hamas can position itself as an icon of resistance to the Arab and Muslim world, potentially attracting fresh support or inspiring others to follow in its footsteps. From Israel’s perspective, each month of continued conflict risks diminishing returns. The Israeli military can devastate Hamas’s infrastructure and reduce its manpower, but this comes at a substantial cost to Israel’s international relations, moral authority, and possibly its domestic arena (as harsh measures and nationalist fervor take their toll internally).

Weighing all these factors, it becomes clear that continuing the Gaza war indefinitely is a strategic trap. The Israeli military is fighting smarter and harder, but it is akin to climbing a ladder that extends ever upward with no end in sight. There are key contradictions that highlight why pressing on may ultimately undermine Israel’s goals.

To sum up, the IDF can capture territory, destroy tunnels, and kill Hamas operatives, yet it still struggles to extinguish the insurgency completely. Israel is winning many battles, but it remains unclear whether this translates into a decisive victory in the war. However, recent steps to control humanitarian aid deliver a significant blow to Hamas.

Prolonging the war is creating a rift between Israel and the international community. Critical allies are publicly warning against an open-ended campaign. Israel’s diplomatic capital is rapidly depleting; continued defiance of global concerns could provoke a harsher backlash, ranging from sanctions to the loss of key support. A nation that prides itself on strategic acumen cannot afford to become a pariah over a war that lacks a clear conclusion.

Perhaps most importantly, there is no guaranteed vision for Gaza’s future after Hamas. Without a viable political solution or transition plan, even a significantly weakened Hamas could bide its time until Israel withdraws and then resurface. Alternatively, a power vacuum could lead to chaos. In either scenario, Israel might find itself trapped—either re-engaging in Gaza later or indefinitely policing a humanitarian disaster. The lack of a realistic endgame suggests that continuing the war may merely postpone problems rather than resolve them, with the best-case outcome resembling Judea and Samaria redux.

The IDF’s hard-won improvements on the ground, refined tactics, patience in urban warfare, and willingness to adapt to tunnel threats and stop-and-go fighting demonstrate Israel’s operational learning curve. The military can, and likely will, keep grinding forward, at least in the short term. However, this evolution in warfighting has not changed the fundamental mismatch between Israel’s maximalist objectives and what military force can realistically achieve in Gaza. Continuing the war promises ever-diminishing strategic returns while costs continue to rise. Israel finds itself expending enormous resources and moral capital to pursue an outcome that remains ambitious and challenging.

Ultimately, Israel must consider whether the cost of this campaign yields any lasting security. It seems to be achieving only a temporary suppression of Hamas at the expense of immense collateral damage—a trade that may jeopardize Israel’s long-term security prospects. A decisive victory remains elusive, and every other measure of the war (humanitarian devastation, international censure, strain on Israel’s own society) indicates a conflict that undermines its own objectives.

A ceasefire and hostage return remain the optimal outcome, ideally with Hamas laying down its weapons and surrendering the fight. However, given the significant gaps between the two sides in the negotiations, this outcome presents its own challenges in the short term. Nonetheless, pressure from the White House on both parties may still bring the war to a conclusion.

Israel wants to believe that the growing military pressure on Hamas, the elimination of its key leaders and operatives, and a successful effort to deny the terror organization control over humanitarian aid—along with mounting opposition to Hamas within the Gazan population—will lead to the desired results. However, this assumption is not guaranteed.

If it does not materialize in the foreseeable future, then, no matter how justifiable Israel’s fight against Hamas may be in principle, pursuing it indefinitely along the current path risks leading to a strategic dead end. Israel can win battle after battle in Gaza, but it risks losing the larger war for peace and stability and risks unprecedented international condemnation. The harsh lesson of the Gaza war is that tactical adaptation alone cannot rectify a fundamentally flawed strategy. If continuing the war cannot secure Israel’s long-term safety, one must bluntly ask: what is the point of bleeding on?

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

Photo: IMAGO / Anadolu Agency / Tsafrir Abayov