The detention and release of the French couple, Cécile Kohler and Jacques Paris, reveal only the tip of the iceberg regarding the Iranian intelligence war with France and other Western democracies. Tehran employs hostage detention tactics to bargain for the release of its arrested agents in Europe. These “intelligence activities” are directly linked to terrorism, as the Iranian regime has consistently attempted to assassinate Iranian dissidents abroad and target Jewish and Israeli civilians worldwide.
In October 2025, French investigative journalists Emmanuel Razavi and Jean-Marie Montali published a book in which they describe the history and current state of Iranian influence in France. The Iranian infiltration in France is a complex network that blends ideological influence with covert operations carried out by the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Far-Left Organizations and Iranian Ideological Influence
France quickly became an early target for Tehran’s propaganda and recruitment efforts. Iranian operatives gained support within far-left and anti-imperialist groups, exploiting common hostility toward the United States, Israel, and capitalism. Over time, these connections expanded to include elements of La France Insoumise, the French Communist Party, progressive NGOs, and student organizations. Iranian influence agents —often operating through cultural centers, academic programs, and friendly think tanks — helped normalize pro-Tehran narratives on campuses and in the media. They promoted Iran as an anti-colonial power and cast its proxies—Hezbollah, Hamas, and the PFLP—as legitimate “resistance” groups. The Quds Force relied on these ideological intermediaries to shape public opinion in France and to isolate pro-Western voices within political and intellectual circles.
From Soft Power to Hostage Diplomacy
Tehran’s strategy—propaganda, infiltration, and the strategic detention of Western nationals—forms a coherent doctrine of hybrid warfare. Every foreigner detained becomes a bargaining chip, and every ideological supporter in Europe serves as a conduit for regime narratives. France, with its large Muslim and Franco-Algerian communities and vocal far-left groups, remains a key focus for this dual effort. The ongoing detention of French citizens in Iran should be seen not just as isolated legal cases but as part of a broader intelligence conflict. In this struggle, Tehran uses both persuasion and terror to gain political leverage and weaken Western unity against the Islamic Republic.
Quds Force Unit 840 on European Soil: Surveillance and Terror
Iranian influence in France extends beyond KGB-style propaganda and agitprop. Beneath the facade of ideological outreach, the true operational force is Iranian intelligence. Unit 840 of the Quds Force is responsible for planning kidnappings, assassinations, and intimidation campaigns against Iranian dissidents and Western targets in Europe. French authorities have linked multiple surveillance and disinformation operations to this unit, including the 2024 arrest in Dijon of Bashir Biazar, a former Iranian state-media official accused of working for Unit 840. Its activities reflect the ongoing connection between Tehran’s influence efforts and its covert coercion of foreign societies.
Iranian intelligence agents assassinated Shapour Bakhtiar in Paris in 1991. He was Iran’s last democratic Prime Minister. In 2020, Iranian intelligence tricked dissident journalist Ruhollah Zem into leaving Paris for Iraq, only to arrest and execute him in Iran. The Iranians used a honey trap, similar to tactics employed by the KGB, to establish contact with Zem.
Terrorist Hybrid War from Europe to the Caucasus
Unit 840 Operations in Europe
Unit 840 of the Quds Force operates in every region of interest to Iran. The Quds Force is generally responsible for executing Iranian policies overseas, including terrorism and subversion.
Yazdan Mir, also known as Sardar Bagheri, currently leads the unit. It consists of various departments, primarily operational units divided by geographic regions: the Middle East and Africa, the Caucasus and Asia, Europe and the U.S., along with an operational department focused on activities against oppositionists. There are also other departments at headquarters.
The Iranian regime is increasingly using foreign nationals of Azerbaijani descent for espionage and terror activities. This includes recruiting individuals from criminal organizations and those with strong ideological beliefs, particularly in Georgia and Russia.
Authorities in Cyprus detained a British citizen of Azerbaijani descent on June 21 on suspicion of espionage and terror-related activities. This is one recent example of the Iranian regime’s use of Azerbaijani community members abroad for the IRGC-Quds Force’s extraterritorial operations. According to media reports, the suspect is believed to have been spying on a British RAF military base in nearby Akrotiri and was allegedly about to carry out an act of terrorism. On the same day, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar announced that an Iranian terror plot was foiled in Cyprus, thanks to close cooperation between local authorities and Israeli security services, and accused the Iranian regime of attempting to target Israeli nationals in Cyprus. The Quds Force recruited ethnic Azerbaijanis of Russian and Georgian nationalities in Greece and the Czech Republic; however, the respective authorities of both countries thwarted their planned operations.
Unit 840’s Activities in the Caucasus
The Quds Force also oversees many paramilitary or proxy groups that, although not Iranian, remain loyal to Iran. One such group is the Husseiniunmovement, also known as Hosseinchiler, which is an ethnic Azerbaijani and Shi’a ideological pro-Iranian organization. The group targets Azerbaijan and models itself after Hezbollah, closely aligning with Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” The leaders of Hosseiniun—especially Tohid Ibrahim Begli—have maintained direct ties with the IRGC Quds Force. Ibrahim Begli has publicly stated that former Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani personally oversaw the group’s founding and support networks.
This connection involves both operational and logistical support, with indications that the Quds Force—potentially via Unit 840—has provided intelligence, funds, and training.
Within its internal divisions, Unit 840 focuses on the Caucasus and Central Asia. Its mission includes developing assets, recruiting local agents, and establishing proxy networks for Iranian interests—especially in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and sometimes Russia and Turkey. Reports indicate activities such as subversion, intimidation, recruiting locals, and providing logistical support for hostile actions.
The Quds Force’s oversight of the activities of the Hosseiniun suggests that terrorist and intelligence operations are likely coordinated. If it were solely about propaganda in Azerbaijani, there would be no need for the IRGC’s chain of command.
Thus, Iran’s terrorism functions as an interconnected system: when pressure subsides in one region, it rises in another. Even in its weakened military state, the regime has expanded its hybrid war against Israel and the West—from Paris to Baku.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
This article is part of a series on Iran and the Former Soviet States
