In the wake of the successes registered in the multi-front war waged since October 7, 2023, a growing number of Israelis have claimed that Israel’s strategic upgrade heralds the country rise to the status of a regional power. There are also presumptuous claims that Israel’s actions have changed the Middle East.
Such discourse is reminiscent of the post-1967 euphoria, for which Israel paid dearly in 1973. These dispositions are rooted either in intoxication with power, excessive self-confidence, an overly optimistic assessment of the results of the war so far, a misunderstanding of Israel’s basic strategic situation, or a combination of the above.
Israel’s military actions against Hezbollah and against Iran were impressive and contributed to its deterrence capability. It achieved stunning success in Iran, by inflicting significant damage to Tehran’s main nuclear facilities and by eliminating much of the nuclear scientific leadership. Yet Iran’s has not abandoned its nuclear ambitions. If the regime survives it will be determined to renew the nuclear project and might resume attacks on Israel. Should Israel need to act again, it is not certain that circumstances will be as auspicious as they were in the summer of 2025. Iran seeks to acquire more advanced air defense systems, and American participation in a future strike—especially under a different president—is not guaranteed.
A welcome by-product of the war was the fall of the Assad regime, an Iranian ally. This opened the Israeli Air Force’s flight path to Iran. Israel seized the opportunity to destroy large parts of Syria’s army and capture territory to create a buffer zone. But Turkey has also exploited the vacuum to install its proxy in Damascus. This has created a friction point between a large and powerful Turkey and Israel, and heralds the rise of an extremist Sunni axis inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, whose strength draws from Turkey’s power and Qatar’s financial backing. Qatar owns the Al Jazeera network— a media superpower that has inflicted great damage on Israel. The implications of the expansion of the extremist Sunni axis should not be underestimated.
Unfortunately, Syria is also becoming a source of friction between Washington and Jerusalem which hold different visions for the country’s future. Like Turkey, the United States is interested in turning Syria into a centralized state, while Israel, committed to minorities (primarily Druze and Kurds), envisions a different outcome.
Even Hezbollah’s defeat, which greatly weakened the Shiite axis led by Iran, does not guarantee fundamental change in Lebanon. The willingness of Lebanon’s political system to risk civil war to dismantle Hezbollah’s weapons is questionable, even if U.S. pressure to do so increases.
Israel’s ability to engineer the political entities beyond its northern border—Syria and Lebanon—is limited, and Israel should harbor no illusions that its military power can change political realities there. These countries will continue to pose a security challenge in the near future. The Middle East has not changed: it remains conflict-ridden, and use of force is still part of the rules of the game. The region continues to be a source of Islamic zealotry and nuclear proliferation.
Furthermore, the war in Gaza has not yet ended and Hamas still controls parts of the Strip (albeit only 30%). The reluctance to conquer the entire Strip, together with the hostage issue, has prolonged the war and has eroded Israel’s legitimacy at home and abroad. Leaving Hamas entrenched in Gaza City would constitute a victory for the “resistance movement”—the Muqawama—and will reinforce aspirations to eliminate Israel. At present, Israel appears weary and unable to achieve victory over Hamas’s terrorist army even though it is in Gaza that the final perception of who won the war will be forged. So far, when it comes to Gaza, Israel is without a doubt not projecting the image of a regional power.
It is very unfortunate that Israelis forget they live in a small country. This is especially evident when considering the manpower required by the IDF. Israel’s flourishing economy is too small to meet all its needs. Like other small states, it depends on international markets and imported goods. In the era of globalization— in which Israel is well integrated—political considerations are less important.That said, globalization is retreating.
Moreover, the arms market does not follow the laws of supply and demand. It is a market where variables of political nature prevail. As a result, Israel’s dependence on the U.S. is all the more significant. When nearly half the Democratic caucus in the Senate votes to limit weapons supplies to Israel, there is cause for concern. American aid to Israel in the political, security and economic spheres has an existential dimension. Israel’s situation in the U.S. remains strong, but negative trends that do not bode well are evident. Sustaining American support for the Jewish State will require hard work.
Israel must also note that it lives amid a vast Muslim space of 1.5 billion people. The Muslim bloc is not united and it is not easy to mobilize it politically and militarily against Israel, as Turkey is attempting to do today. Nevertheless, Islam has an ambivalent attitude toward Jews and many Muslims display a hostile attitude toward Israel. The existing hostility will not disappear quickly.
Israel’s integration into the region through peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the Abraham Accords, and relations with Central Asian states depends on the interests of Muslim countries, Israel’s strength and its closeness to the U.S. a global power. The trajectory of these variables is not deterministic.
The power Israel projects depends not only on its military strength and technological prowess but also on its national resilience. The rifts within Israeli society as a result of attempts to legislate judicial reform, and Israeli society’s response to the hostage issue conveys an image of a divided and soft society unable to bear the costs of war. Will such a society be ready to send its sons and daughters to fight for far-reaching political objectives in the region as required of a regional power?!
Israel can be proud of tremendous achievements in many fields. However, it has also endured thunderous military failures. It should be modest and pursue realizable goals. Sometimes, there is no escape from decisions that constitute historical gambles, but one must remember that according to the realist outlook the most important virtue in the game among nations is prudence.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
Home page / Articles / Dreams of Becoming a Regional Power
Dreams of Becoming a Regional Power
Photo: Shutterstock
In the wake of the successes registered in the multi-front war waged since October 7, 2023, a growing number of Israelis have claimed that Israel’s strategic upgrade heralds the country rise to the status of a regional power. There are also presumptuous claims that Israel’s actions have changed the Middle East.
Such discourse is reminiscent of the post-1967 euphoria, for which Israel paid dearly in 1973. These dispositions are rooted either in intoxication with power, excessive self-confidence, an overly optimistic assessment of the results of the war so far, a misunderstanding of Israel’s basic strategic situation, or a combination of the above.
Israel’s military actions against Hezbollah and against Iran were impressive and contributed to its deterrence capability. It achieved stunning success in Iran, by inflicting significant damage to Tehran’s main nuclear facilities and by eliminating much of the nuclear scientific leadership. Yet Iran’s has not abandoned its nuclear ambitions. If the regime survives it will be determined to renew the nuclear project and might resume attacks on Israel. Should Israel need to act again, it is not certain that circumstances will be as auspicious as they were in the summer of 2025. Iran seeks to acquire more advanced air defense systems, and American participation in a future strike—especially under a different president—is not guaranteed.
A welcome by-product of the war was the fall of the Assad regime, an Iranian ally. This opened the Israeli Air Force’s flight path to Iran. Israel seized the opportunity to destroy large parts of Syria’s army and capture territory to create a buffer zone. But Turkey has also exploited the vacuum to install its proxy in Damascus. This has created a friction point between a large and powerful Turkey and Israel, and heralds the rise of an extremist Sunni axis inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, whose strength draws from Turkey’s power and Qatar’s financial backing. Qatar owns the Al Jazeera network— a media superpower that has inflicted great damage on Israel. The implications of the expansion of the extremist Sunni axis should not be underestimated.
Unfortunately, Syria is also becoming a source of friction between Washington and Jerusalem which hold different visions for the country’s future. Like Turkey, the United States is interested in turning Syria into a centralized state, while Israel, committed to minorities (primarily Druze and Kurds), envisions a different outcome.
Even Hezbollah’s defeat, which greatly weakened the Shiite axis led by Iran, does not guarantee fundamental change in Lebanon. The willingness of Lebanon’s political system to risk civil war to dismantle Hezbollah’s weapons is questionable, even if U.S. pressure to do so increases.
Israel’s ability to engineer the political entities beyond its northern border—Syria and Lebanon—is limited, and Israel should harbor no illusions that its military power can change political realities there. These countries will continue to pose a security challenge in the near future. The Middle East has not changed: it remains conflict-ridden, and use of force is still part of the rules of the game. The region continues to be a source of Islamic zealotry and nuclear proliferation.
Furthermore, the war in Gaza has not yet ended and Hamas still controls parts of the Strip (albeit only 30%). The reluctance to conquer the entire Strip, together with the hostage issue, has prolonged the war and has eroded Israel’s legitimacy at home and abroad. Leaving Hamas entrenched in Gaza City would constitute a victory for the “resistance movement”—the Muqawama—and will reinforce aspirations to eliminate Israel. At present, Israel appears weary and unable to achieve victory over Hamas’s terrorist army even though it is in Gaza that the final perception of who won the war will be forged. So far, when it comes to Gaza, Israel is without a doubt not projecting the image of a regional power.
It is very unfortunate that Israelis forget they live in a small country. This is especially evident when considering the manpower required by the IDF. Israel’s flourishing economy is too small to meet all its needs. Like other small states, it depends on international markets and imported goods. In the era of globalization— in which Israel is well integrated—political considerations are less important.That said, globalization is retreating.
Moreover, the arms market does not follow the laws of supply and demand. It is a market where variables of political nature prevail. As a result, Israel’s dependence on the U.S. is all the more significant. When nearly half the Democratic caucus in the Senate votes to limit weapons supplies to Israel, there is cause for concern. American aid to Israel in the political, security and economic spheres has an existential dimension. Israel’s situation in the U.S. remains strong, but negative trends that do not bode well are evident. Sustaining American support for the Jewish State will require hard work.
Israel must also note that it lives amid a vast Muslim space of 1.5 billion people. The Muslim bloc is not united and it is not easy to mobilize it politically and militarily against Israel, as Turkey is attempting to do today. Nevertheless, Islam has an ambivalent attitude toward Jews and many Muslims display a hostile attitude toward Israel. The existing hostility will not disappear quickly.
Israel’s integration into the region through peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the Abraham Accords, and relations with Central Asian states depends on the interests of Muslim countries, Israel’s strength and its closeness to the U.S. a global power. The trajectory of these variables is not deterministic.
The power Israel projects depends not only on its military strength and technological prowess but also on its national resilience. The rifts within Israeli society as a result of attempts to legislate judicial reform, and Israeli society’s response to the hostage issue conveys an image of a divided and soft society unable to bear the costs of war. Will such a society be ready to send its sons and daughters to fight for far-reaching political objectives in the region as required of a regional power?!
Israel can be proud of tremendous achievements in many fields. However, it has also endured thunderous military failures. It should be modest and pursue realizable goals. Sometimes, there is no escape from decisions that constitute historical gambles, but one must remember that according to the realist outlook the most important virtue in the game among nations is prudence.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
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Professor Efraim Inbar
Senior Researcher.
Professor Inbar served at the head of JISS (October 2017-January 2025). He also serves as the Head of the program on Strategy, Diplomacy, and National Security at the Shalem College.
Recent publications
Israel’s Veteran Peace Partners: The Role of Egypt and Jordan in the Context of Trump’s Gaza Plan
Former IDF Intel Chief: Can Hamas Release All Hostages in 72 Hours?
A Mediterranean Partnership: A Faded Idea Israel Should Put Back on Its Diplomatic Agenda
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