The establishment of the State of Israel by the Zionist movement marked a major turning point in Jewish history. Israel is a remarkable success that has withstood many severe tests and delivered prosperity to its citizens. Yet the Jewish state is small—both in territory and population, especially when compared with many other countries in the Middle East. Despite its economic prosperity, its resources are also limited.
The appropriate prism for shaping Israel’s grand strategy is that of the “small state,” a well-established category in the field of international relations. Small states face constraints that stem from their limited size. In the wake of Operation Swords of Iron, there is heightened awareness of IDF combat manpower shortages. The straitjacket of small-state status does not permit autarky, and Israel’s economy, like that of other small states, depends on external markets.
Designing a grand strategy requires aligning a small state’s political objectives with the resources at its disposal and avoiding the trap of overextension—grasping at too much and ending up with nothing. Moreover, unlike great powers, a small state lacks the ability to set the rules of the game in its region or to exert decisive influence over its strategic environment. Small states’ policies are therefore influenced by developments in the international system and by the characteristics of the region in which they operate.
The Imperative of Prudence
In general, a small state should adopt a posture of restraint and modesty when defining its political objectives. Israel lacks the capacity to impose peace on its neighbors. Policy formulation should therefore assign significant weight to the realist imperative of prudence, as articulated by Hans Morgenthau. Prof. Yehezkel Dror, who wrote extensively on a grand strategy for Israel, warned against the “hubris of success” and against religious atavism grounded in the presumptuous assumption that we know the will of God and that His assistance is guaranteed.
Israeli declarations—made while the war has yet to conclude—that “we have changed the Middle East” should be viewed with caution. To be sure, the achievements of Operation Swords of Iron against Hamas in Gaza, against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the collapse of the Syrian regime, and the damage inflicted on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and missile force have significantly improved Israel’s security situation and regional standing. Israel has demonstrated that it is a strong state with impressive military capabilities. Still, it would be a mistake to conclude that the Middle East itself has changed.
The Middle East is characterized by a high degree of resistance to change. Neither colonial rule nor the region’s interactions with global powers produced fundamental transformations in the political behavior of its “indigenous” actors. Moreover, all political entities in the Middle East continue to perceive high levels of threat; they persist in arming themselves, and the use of force remains an accepted option in their strategic toolkit. Israel also continues to suffer from a lack of legitimacy in the Arab and Muslim worlds. The Middle East still operates in a different “time zone” from the West, where until recently the use of force was widely viewed as anachronistic.
International Trends Shaping Israel’s Strategic Environment
Three developments in Israel’s strategic environment stand out as shaping the contours of its grand strategy. The first is the continued involvement of the United States in the region. This remains the case despite Washington’s growing need to concentrate strategic attention on Asia and on its principal great-power rival, China, and despite the end to its dependence on Middle Eastern energy. U.S. assistance to Israel during Operation Swords of Iron, its diplomatic activism in brokering ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon, efforts to advance an Israeli–Syrian arrangement, and the use of military force to destroy Iranian nuclear infrastructure all underscore the continuing necessity for Israel to pursue the closest possible level of strategic coordination with Washington. From the earliest days of the Zionist movement, the search for a great-power patron has been a central pillar of foreign policy
Israel’s current strategy should rest on the working assumption that there is no substitute for the United States for at least the next two decades. Repeated waves of scholarship once forecast the erosion of American power and the collapse of its hegemonic position. Those predictions proved wrong. Israel must therefore keep in mind its structural reality as a small state that depends on the diplomatic umbrella of a great power. Its military effectiveness and international standing are closely bound to the quality of its relationship with Washington. State power, more often than not, is power amplified through alliance.
Israel has benefited greatly from its relationship with the United States. But nothing is permanent. Polarization within American society and demographic changes pose a profound challenge that Israel must address seriously, continuously, and creatively. It goes without saying that Israel must not be tempted to place its bets on one side of American politics.
The second trend, in the Middle East and well beyond it, is the continued presence of radical Islam. The role of religion in influencing developments in the international system is not always well understood in the secular West. In the recent war, Israel succeeded in significantly weakening the radical Shiite axis led by Iran. Yet religious zealotry remains a powerful political driver. Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis have not disappeared as armed organizations committed to Israel’s destruction. Iran itself—a large state with hegemonic ambitions, a solid scientific base, and impressive industrial capabilities—survived the war and is reverting to familiar patterns of behavior. Once again, hopes for regime change in Tehran failed to materialize, underscoring, unsurprisingly, the limits of economic sanctions and military pressure.
Moreover, a radical Sunni axis drawing on the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood is gaining strength. This axis is led by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who benefits from the financial backing of wealthy Qatar and from the media power it established, Al Jazeera. At present, contacts are underway that may lead to the accession of Sunni Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to this axis. Pakistan received Turkish assistance in its war last year with India and has also recently concluded a defense pact with Saudi Arabia that includes clauses related to nuclear matters. This axis is hostile to Israel and to the West. Unfortunately, the United States currently lacks sufficiently sharp strategic vision and is not adequately alert to the dangers posed by the radical Sunni axis. It is incumbent on Israel—no matter how difficult the task—to draw Washington’s attention to this challenge.
Muslim extremism is a significant factor in fueling the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and in the futility of efforts to resolve it. From the perspective of radical Islam, the existence of a Jewish state constitutes a sacrilege that demands redress. In the near term, the conflict is likely to remain intractable, because there is no possibility of reaching a historic compromise between the Palestinian national movement and the Zionist movement—and because both peoples still possess the energy to continue fighting over what they regard as vital. In addition, the Palestinians lack the capacity to establish a state that holds a monopoly over the use of force; what emerges instead is a failed state. A defining feature of a failed state is the absence of a strategic address. Under these conditions, there is no alternative to managing the conflict. Change is difficult to envisage. The Palestinian Authority resembles other Arab polities, such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan. Contemporary Arab political culture, it appears, struggles to sustain a viable state framework.
Under these circumstances, Israel must build robust military power. After October 7, there is broad agreement that the Israel Defense Forces must expand so that more troops can be deployed along the borders to protect nearby communities. The IDF must be capable of fighting on two fronts simultaneously and achieving a decisive victory. Developing military capabilities that enable a rapid conclusion to war is an Israeli interest—especially in light of the protracted nature of the current conflict.
Building a larger Israel Defense Forces comes however at a significantly higher cost. Israel’s economy demonstrated considerable resilience during Operation Swords of Iron. Nevertheless, national debt increased, and some public services were cut. Determining the appropriate defense outlays is a difficult question. The margin of security available to a small state is narrow, and it may be necessary to explain to Israeli citizens that national security could require a temporary decline in living standards—fewer trips abroad and postponing the purchase of a new car.
Israel can no longer afford a policy of containment. That is, an end must be put to the tendency, criticized as far back as the Winograd Commission, to absorb violence against Israeli targets and assorted provocations without response. In our region, restraint is interpreted as weakness. Moreover, a shift toward a national security doctrine that emphasizes preemptive and/or preventive action appears unavoidable. Periodic use of force can also reinforce deterrence (a slippery concept that may no longer be useful). Still, fear remains the most widely accepted currency in the Middle East.
A posture that emphasizes military power does not relieve Israel of the need to try to reduce the hostility of states in the Arab and Muslim spheres. Yehezkel Dror called for the adoption of a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde model. A sophisticated policy of that sort of course entails tensions and complexities. Israel’s survival rests in part on adversaries’ fear of Israeli military power and of its destructive consequences, as seen in Gaza. By contrast, a conciliatory policy aimed at reducing an adversary’s anxieties and winning its goodwill contains opposing elements. Even so, Israel has managed to offer incentives to its adversaries—some of whom went on to sign peace agreements with it. Israel’s position in the region today is far better than it was in 1948.
A policy that promotes good neighborly relations is also essential to ensuring that all segments of society will rally in the event of a war imposed upon us. The recognition that such a war is forced upon Israel is vital for unity of purpose and the motivation to fight. Moreover, polarization and social unrest are perceived by Israel’s adversaries as a weakness that erodes deterrence and invites aggression. Caution is therefore required with respect to steps that fall outside the Israeli consensus. Preserving social cohesion is a paramount objective in formulating Israel’s strategy.
The message that Israel seeks peace and is prepared to make concessions must be accompanied by an awareness that, for the foreseeable future, we will have to live by the sword. Conveying this message is the responsibility of the country’s leadership. The Israeli public is sufficiently perceptive and resilient to absorb complex messages that are not always easy to hear.
The third troubling global trend is the erosion of the nuclear taboo and a renewed spread of nuclear proliferation. This is evident in East Asia, where Japan and South Korea are debating whether to develop nuclear weapons. In Australia as well, voices have emerged in favor of acquiring nuclear capabilities in response to the Chinese threat. Against the backdrop of tensions on both sides of the Atlantic and growing fissures within NATO, the likelihood is increasing that several European states may explore developing nuclear weapons.
In our region, Iran still aspires to acquire nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia has announced that it seeks a similar status. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has likewise declared that Turkey is interested in the bomb. There is broad agreement that a regional system comprising several nuclear-armed states would be extremely dangerous for Israel, and that every effort must be made—as in the past—to prevent such an outcome.
In conclusion, humility is required in the face of historical processes that are “larger than us.” At the same time, a serious intellectual effort must be invested in understanding them. It is clear that not everything is under our control, and at times there is no alternative but to choose what Yehezkel Dror termed “historical gambles.” My hope is that fortune will favor us. The sages recognized the arbitrariness of human reality, noting that “even a Torah scroll kept in the sanctuary requires good fortune.”
This article is based on a lecture delivered at a conference held in honor of the late Professor Yehezkel Dror at the Jewish People Policy Institute.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
