Exactly two years on from October 7, and in the wake of the ceasefire, we look back at the course of the fighting —at the decisions that shaped the war, the reasons it dragged on, and the steps still needed to achieve Israel’s declared objectives. If managed prudently, the Trump framework now on the table could provide Israel with a real opportunity to advance those goals.
A common refrain among IDF conscripts is “Until When?” (a countdown to the end of mandatory service). As we approach the second anniversary of the Gaza war, that question keeps returning and intensifying, albeit in different forms. Our argument is that the campaign’s prolongation in Gaza is primarily a function of Israel’s choices and of how the war has been waged to date. In our view, Israel could—and should—have acted differently and reached the war’s objectives in a substantially shorter timeframe.
This paper is published as the Trump framework begins to be implemented. Although it is still too early to predict how the campaign will end, two conclusions can already be drawn. First, effective military pressure produces results—the IDF maneuver into Gaza City and Israel’s demonstrated resolve were the decisive catalyst that pushed Hamas toward a deal markedly different from what it had sought until then. Second, the strike in Qatar made clear to Hamas’s principal backers that Israel will not hesitate to act wherever necessary, and that demonstration helped persuade them to support the Trump framework.
Those objectives, set by the government at the war’s outset in October 2023, were as follows:
Destroy Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s military capabilities and their governing and organizational infrastructure in the Gaza Strip.
Ensure that, once the war ends, Gaza will no longer pose a sustained threat to Israel.
Restore security for the communities of the Gaza Envelope, including the establishment of a security buffer zone inside the Strip.
Create the conditions for the hostages’ return to Israel.
A fifth goal was later added for the northern front: to enable residents of northern Israel to return safely to their homes.
It is important to note—especially in light of the ongoing debate over the war’s aims and the claim that bringing the hostages home should be the overriding priority—that the original order of objectives made strategic sense. The sequence did not diminish the moral urgency of the hostages’ return. As we argued in our earlier article, “The Hostages Who Were Taken Twice,”[1]the fastest and most effective route to that goal was—and remains—the destruction of Hamas’s military and governing infrastructure, just as decisive victory was the key in past Israeli wars when civilians and soldiers held by the enemy.
Phases of the Fighting in Gaza
Over the past two years, the IDF waged several distinct campaigns in the Gaza Strip, each forming part of the broader effort to achieve Israel’s war objectives. To help orient the reader, the following map illustrates the main operational zones of the Strip:[2]
Below we outline the principal stages of the campaign and their defining characteristics.
Restoring Control in the Gaza Envelope (October 7–27, 2023)
This first phase lasted from October 7 to October 27, 2023. During this period, the IDF focused on restoring control in the Gaza Envelope, while simultaneously striking targets across the Strip—primarily from the air. At the same time, it completed mobilization of reserve forces and prepared for ground combat.
It is important to note that this period was marked by an intense professional—and media—debate over the need for and feasibility of a ground maneuver inside Gaza. Several senior figures, including within the defense establishment itself (the Chief of Staff and Defense Minister at the time), sought to avoid a ground incursion in Gaza and preferred to shift focus northward to confront Hezbollah. This reflected a deep lack of confidence in the army’s ground capabilities and, conversely, an inflated perception of the enemy’s strength.
The Campaign in Gaza City (October 27–November 24, 2023)
On October 27, the IDF’s Southern Command launched a ground offensive with three divisions targeting northern Gaza and Gaza City. In the course of this operation, Israeli forces captured most of northern Gaza and Gaza City, destroyed extensive terrorist infrastructure and killed thousands of Hamas fighters.
On November 24, a first ceasefire was declared to enable a hostage-release deal. Southern Command had proposed a combined maneuver: a main effort in northern Gaza and Gaza City—the administrative and military hub of Hamas—and a secondary effort in Rafah, the key artery for Hamas’s resupply.
The decision to focus on Gaza City and the north stemmed from two primary considerations: first, concerns over the army’s ability to conduct two simultaneous, large-scale ground offensives; and second, fears that a move into Rafah would trigger international pressure and a potential diplomatic crisis with Egypt.
The First Ceasefire (November 24–December 1, 2023)
The ceasefire held from November 24 to December 1, 2023. IDF forces remained in the areas they had secured, while limited humanitarian aid began entering Gaza in parallel with the release of 105 hostages—mainly women, children, the elderly, and foreign workers. After Hamas violated the agreement—delaying further hostage releases and resuming rocket fire—Israel renewed combat operations on December 1 from its existing positions.
This first ceasefire and hostage exchange were relatively favorable to Israel: the IDF retained control of captured territory, and the ratio of hostages released to concessions made was far better than in later deals. After a month of intense fighting, Hamas had been dealt heavy blows and was caught off guard by Israel’s response. Crucially, no humanitarian aid was permitted into the Strip until that point.
Shifting the Effort to Khan Yunis (December 1, 2023–April 7, 2024)
During this stage, the IDF shifted its main operational focus to the Khan Yunis area. During this phase, the overall force deployed in Gaza was gradually reduced, and by late January 2024, the 36th Division was redeployed to the northern front. During the first ceasefire, Southern Command and the General Staff debated where to concentrate the next phase of fighting. Southern Command argued that Israel should first consolidate its operational gains in northern Gaza and Gaza City before moving southward.
Two main alternatives were considered for the next focal point—Khan Yunis and Rafah. Khan Yunis served as Hamas’s secondary administrative center and the likely hiding place of senior leadership headed by Yahya Sinwar. Rafah, meanwhile, remained the key smuggling route for weapons and resources into Gaza. Ultimately, the decision was made to concentrate on Khan Yunis, largely due to the Shin Bet’s assessment that this would allow Israeli forces to close in on Sinwar and other top commanders. At the same time, the leadership hesitated to move on Rafah, fearing international backlash and a crisis with Egypt.
Throughout this period, the IDF continued to operate in northern Gaza and Gaza City through targeted raids on Hamas strongholds—tunnel networks, command centers, hospitals, and other locations believed to shelter senior operatives.
Before the 36th Division was withdrawn, it completed a major operation to destroy Hamas’s weapons-production infrastructure, which was dispersed across a network of deep underground tunnels and factories along the central east-west axis of the Strip. This strike effectively wiped out much of Hamas’s military industry and significantly reduced its capacity to replenish rocket and explosives stockpiles.
The main effort of the Southern Command during these months was led by the 98th Division and centered on Khan Yunis. The primary objective was to target Yahya Sinwar and the group of senior Hamas officials surrounding him. The majority of IDF ground forces remaining in Gaza were dedicated to this mission.
Beginning in February 2024, under pressure from the Biden administration—and amid threats of sanctions and a freeze on military aid—Israel began allowing large volumes of humanitarian assistance into Gaza.
Within Southern Command, a discussion took place over the need to control aid distribution and the option of establishing a partial, temporary military administration in the Strip. Then-Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi rejected the proposal. The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and several General Staff officials presented the political echelon with an alarmist briefing, warning that such a measure would require five divisions, cost NIS 20 billion per year, and lead to an increase in the cost of living in Israel. This unrealistic analysis was clearly intended to deter decision-makers from approving a military administration and to shut down any attempt at serious debate on the matter.
As a result, humanitarian aid entered Gaza without IDF oversight or control. Hamas exploited the inflow to rebuild its capabilities, fund its operations, pay salaries, recruit new operatives, and tighten its grip on the civilian population. In effect, even as Israel was conducting intensive military operations, it was simultaneously enabling Hamas to preserve and rebuild its regime.
Shifting the Effort to Rafah (April 7–October 6, 2024)
While talks over a new hostage deal continued and Hamas raised its demands, the debate in Israel focused on Rafah, the last major city in Gaza yet to be taken by Israeli forces. Rafah controls both the border area with Egypt (the Philadelphi Corridor) and the Rafah Crossing, which remained vital arteries for Hamas’s smuggling and resupply operations, even as the fighting continued.
The proposed operation in Rafah met stiff resistance from the Biden administration in the United States, alongside mounting international pressure and internal opposition from the IDF General Staff, which feared a direct clash with Washington and the potential fallout. At the same time, a highly vocal public campaign—driven by retired senior defense officials and amplified by the media—warned against an assault on Rafah, describing it as an impregnable fortress that would exact a heavy toll on Israeli forces. Despite these pressures, the political leadership, pushed on by Southern Command, progressed with plans for the operation.
In preparation for the offensive, the 98th Division withdrew from Khan Yunis on April 7 to regroup for the Rafah assault. The 162nd Division was redeployed south from northern Gaza for the same purpose. In the north, a smaller contingent remained in place to secure the Netzarim Corridor, the key line separating northern Gaza and Gaza City from the south. Southern Command was also allocated the 99th Division, and a further two reserve brigades.
The internal debate over the Rafah operation ended with cabinet approval, but the manner of execution of the manuever was altered. Instead of Southern Command’s original plan, to encircle and capture the city, trapping and destroying the Hamas forces within, another plan was adopted. Under this plan, the 162nd Division advanced from south to north along the Egyptian border, following the Philadelphi Corridor, with a limited advance supervised directly by the Chief of Staff, as if it were a small-scale special forces operation.
The way the operation was structured allowed many Hamas fighters to escape from Rafah toward Khan Yunis with the hostages they held, and forced a slow advance, controlled from above, that made it difficult for tactical forces to conduct continuous combat—even though this often defied any operational logic. In one instance, a unit from an elite brigade came under anti-tank fire from just a few hundred meters away, but outside the division’s assigned sector. Rather than respond immediately, the unit was required to coordinate its counteraction with the General Staff, delaying its response and compromising its effectiveness.
The assault on Rafah began on May 6, 2024, and remained the IDF’s main operational effort until September 12. During this period, the 162nd Division destroyed Hamas’s Rafah Brigade, killing more than 2,000 militants, and systematically demolished the tunnel network connecting Rafah in Gaza to the Egyptian side of the city over the border.
In parallel, the 98th Division, which was not involved in the Rafah encirclement, was employed in a series of division-scale raids. In May 2024, it conducted an operation in the Jabaliya area of northern Gaza; in June, it returned to Khan Yunis as part of Operation Arnon, which freed four Israeli hostages from the Nuseirat area; and in August, it carried out another operation in Khan Yunis.
By September 2024, the 98th Division had been withdrawn from Gaza to prepare for operations on the Lebanese front. At the same time, the 99th Division expanded its control of the Netzarim Corridor, transforming it into a wide, cleared buffer zone free of both aboveground and underground infrastructure.
Recognizing the impact of territorial control and infrastructure destruction on Hamas’s resilience—particularly following the Rafah campaign and the clearing of the Natzarim Corridor—Southern Command developed a new plan for a broad operation in northern Gaza. Given that it was clear there were insufficient resources available for camapign across the entire Strip, the proposal envisioned a limited offensive designed to capitalize on the IDF’s early gains, achieve decisive results, and complete the first war objective: the destruction of Hamas’s military and organizational capabilities in northern Gaza and Gaza City—an area comprising roughly 40 percent of the Strip.
At that stage, approximately 300,000 civilians remained in the area, having not evacuated earlier. The General Staff opposed the plan, preferring to continue with raids and to reduce the amount of forces in the Strip due to concerns about the strain on the reserves, shortages of munitions and spare parts, and the need to preserve capabilities for the northen front.
The Capture of Northern Gaza (October 6 2024 – January 16 2025)
Despite opposition from the General Staff and the redeployment of some forces northward, a limited plan eventually took shape for capturing northern Gaza and destroying Hamas forces there. After several rounds of debate—and with backing from the political leadership— a scaled-down plan was approved.
Its operational scope was confined to the area from Jabaliya northward. To execute it, the 162nd Division redeployed from Rafah, replaced there by the Gaza Division, which assumed responsibility for the Philadelphi Corridor and Rafah, alongside its ongoing defensive mission throughout the Strip.
The offensive was set for October 6, 2024—deliberately timed for the eve of the war’s first anniversary in order to disrupt Hamas’s planned celebrations. The operation unfolded as planned and despite a relatively small order of battle and limited resources, the results were significant: more than 2,000 Hamas fighters were killed and a similar number captured. Substantial underground infrastructure was destroyed, and the bodies of several hostages were recovered for burial in Israel.
More consequential still was the blow the operation dealt to Hamas’s leadership. Statements from that period reveal a sense within Hamas that it was facing a fundamentally different kind of warfare and that if Israel continued, the organization would not survive. This made it essential that the IDF deepen its gains, something that became feasible once the ground campaign in Lebanon concluded at the end of November 2024.
Instead of building on these gains, however, Israel accepted Hamas’s proposal for a second ceasefire in exchange for another hostage deal. This time, the price was far higher: the release of convicted terrorists and the large-scale entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza. Worse still, for the first time Israel paid with the very achievements won in blood. IDF forces withdrew from captured territory, including the Netzarim Corridor, allowing hundreds of thousands of Gazans to return to northern Gaza. This squandered one of Israel’s most important operational accomplishments and a key source of pressure on Hamas—all in return for only a partial deal.
Hamas’s conduct during those weeks made clear that military pressure was working and that ramping up the pressure—along with more effective control over humanitarian aid—could have delivered a far greater strategic success, perhaps even Hamas’s outright defeat.
The Second Hostage Deal (January 19–March 18, 2025)
During this period, a second hostage deal was implemented. As part of the ceasefire and the IDF’s subsequent reorganization, the new defense minister, Israel Katz, instructed the military to prepare for a resumption of fighting, if the agreement was not expanded to secure the release of all remaining hostages. His directive was clear: the goal was to defeat Hamas and complete the conquest of the Strip within six months.
Southern Command drafted a plan accordingly and presented it to Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and to the Cabinet. Soon after, Halevi resigned. He was replaced on March 5, 2025, by Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, who had previously served as Director General of the Ministry of Defense. Upon reviewing Southern Command’s plan, Zamir requested revisions. He expanded the available forces so that Hamas could be defeated within three months rather than six.
The updated plan incorporated lessons learned from the previous year of fighting. It emphasized the need for Israeli control over humanitarian aid to prevent it from reaching Hamas, the need to separate the civilian population from the organization, and the capture of the key territories still under Hamas’s control, foremost among them Gaza City. The plan also sought to align with the emigration initiative outlined by President Trump.
Recognizing the strategic importance of controlling the civilian effort, and in light of the General Staff’s continuing opposition—even under the new Chief of Staff—to establishing even a temporary or partial military administration, alternative aid distribution mechanisms were developed.
The first was the American Gaza Humanitarian Fund (GHF), created to oversee, distribute, and secure humanitarian aid so that it reached civilians directly rather than Hamas. The second involved enlisting local power brokers opposed to Hamas, such as Yasser Abu Shabab, leader of a Bedouin clan in southeastern Rafah.
The plan, approved by Zamir in early March upon taking office, rested on three pillars:
Full control over humanitarian aid entering Gaza, through the GHF.
Separation of the population from Hamas, by relocating civilians to areas under Israeli control after screening and clearance, in coordination with local actors.
The capture of remaining Hamas-held territory, achieved through simultaneous operations in both northern and southern Gaza—in Gaza City and in the Khan Yunis–Rafah area—to accelerate Hamas’s defeat.
Southern Command assessed that executing all three components concurrently would bring Hamas to surrender or disintegration within roughly three months. It was understood, however, that even after the organization’s collapse, several additional months of combat would be required to clear the area and establish full control—tasks that could be carried out with gradually reduced forces while establishing control through regional divisions and brigades.
Operation Might and Sword(March 18–May 16, 2025)
Following the conclusion of the second hostage deal in early March, negotiations toward a follow-up stage—intended to secure the release of additional hostages—failed to advance. Although the ceasefire had formally expired, Israel did not immediately return to full-scale combat. Instead, several attempts were made by the U.S. mediator, Steve Whitkoff, to broker a new partial arrangement that would have secured the release of roughly half of the hostages still alive.
When Hamas refused to compromise, Israel approved a limited, time-bound operation whose purpose was to increase pressure on Hamas to return to the negotiating table under the terms of the proposed partial deal. Southern Command prepared an operational plan accordingly. Its concept was to apply maximum pressure within a short period while retaining a framework that could be expanded into the broader campaign already planned, should Hamas continue to reject the proposal.
Operation Might and Sword began on the night of March 18 with a concentrated wave of Israeli strikes on Hamas targets throughout the Strip. Ground forces then carried out a limited maneuver in selected areas, focusing primarily on southern Gaza and parts of the north. Several days of intense military pressure appeared to have the desired effect, and signs of flexibility were noted within Hamas. However, public debate inside Israel over whether to halt the fighting and pursue a comprehensive “all-for-all” deal convinced Hamas that it had no reason to compromise. As a result, the operation lost its intended leverage.
Although Might and Sword was conceived as a short and focused action, and despite the fact that its core objective—pressuring Hamas into agreement—was not achieved, the deployment continued for nearly two months. During this time Israel lost valuable operational momentum and resources, including its most critical asset: reservists, who had been called up once again to contribute to Hamas’s defeat but instead found themselves engaged in prolonged activity that failed to meet its stated aim.
At this point, the new Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, revised the plan he had previously approved and formulated a new one whose purpose was not the defeat of Hamas but rather the application of pressure to secure the hostages’ release. Within this framework, the IDF concentrated its main effort in southern Gaza, creating a new corridor—known as the “Morag Corridor”—between Khan Yunis and Rafah. Simultaneously, an additional divisional assault was launched against Khan Yunis.
Out of concern for the hostages’ safety, the IDF refrained from entering Gaza City. Instead, it operated in northern and eastern Gaza and on the outskirts of Gaza City, contrary to the operational logic of the broader plan that had been approved only two months earlier. In practice, the campaign focused primarily on destroying Hamas’s above- and below-ground infrastructure, progressing slowly and relying heavily on engineering units to demolish tunnels and strongholds.
At the start of the operation, Israel halted all humanitarian aid entering Gaza (continuing the freeze first imposed during Operation Might and Sword). By late May, however, the GHF began operations, primarily in southern and central Gaza.
Because the IDF had chosen not to relocate civilians from Gaza City—following a legal opinion by the Military Advocate General (MAG) that such a move would be unlawful—a severe food shortage developed inside the city. The MAG presented an opinion that the IDF was obligated to supply aid to civilians who had remained there rather than relying on their ability to move south and access humanitarian aid available in these locations.
Consequently, in contradiction to the original operational plan, to basic military logic, and even to international law, the IDF began permitting uncontrolled humanitarian deliveries into Gaza City.[3] When it became clear that much of this aid was reaching Hamas and strengthening it, Israel’s political leadership ordered an end to the unsupervised shipments and instructed the relevant bodies to develop alternative mechanisms for oversight of aid.
In July 2025, an international campaign alleging famine in Gaza gained momentum. The mounting pressure led the Israeli government to approve the large-scale, unsupervised entry of aid into the Strip. This failure to manage the civilian effort stemmed primarily from two causes. The first was the IDF’s reluctance to fully assume responsibility for the task—it should have established a dedicated headquarters led by a commander who grasped its strategic importance. The second was the obstructive stance of the MAG and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), who resisted the changes needed to enforce effective control over humanitarian assistance. Their opposition effectively restored the flawed previous system, under which aid once again flowed directly to Hamas and reinforced its hold.
The mission of creating a separation between the population and Hamas also made no progress—partly because of the same lack of commitment and command focus within the IDF and Southern Command, and partly because of renewed legal objections raised by the MAG and COGAT. The political leadership directed the IDF to establish a “humanitarian city” in an area cleared by Israeli forces near Rafah. In response, as with the earlier debate over a military administration, defense officials leaked a presentation warning that such a project would require an enormous force, cost NIS 20 billion, and take many months to execute.
Independent analyses carried out in parallel by the GHF and other civilian bodies using UN and comparative data from smiliar operations elsewhere in the world showed that the actual figures were entirely different. Once again, the defense establishment had manipulated cost and manpower projections and used selective leaks to sway public opinion against the Cabinet’s directives, thereby undermining the ability to achieve the war’s declared objectives.
When this operation also failed to compel Hamas to reenter negotiations over the hostages’ release, tensions deepened between the political and military echelons. The government demanded a plan to achieve the war’s stated goals—above all, the destruction of Hamas’s military and governmental infrastructure. The army argued that Operation Gideon’s Chariots had achieved its aims (though Hamas had not agreed even to discuss the release of even half the hostages, and its capabilities remained largely intact). Military leaders further contended that completing the conquest of the remaining Hamas-held areas—chiefly Gaza City—would endanger the hostages’ lives. The Chief of Staff also rejected the idea of establishing a “humanitarian city” in Rafah to which Gaza’s civilians could be transferred after screening, opposed the presence of IDF troops among a civilian population, and pressed instead for another hostage deal, at almost any price.
When it became clear that Hamas was unwilling to reach such an agreement, the army presented an alternative plan: to encircle the remaining Hamas-controlled areas—Gaza City, the central refugee camps, and al-Mawasi—and conduct operations against them through firepower and raids. The political leadership rejected this plan and demanded a different one, modeled on the proposal Zamir had approved at the start of his tenure, aimed at first capturing Gaza City, separating the population from Hamas, and establishing firm control over humanitarian aid.
At this point, a prolonged and contentious dialogue unfolded between the political and military leaderships over how to continue the campaign. The exchanges were accompanied by extensive leaks and briefings from within the security establishment about discussions in the Cabinet, thus eroding any possibility of holding professional deliberations.
The dispute ended with a directive from the political leadership ordering the army to implement the plan presented to it and to fulfill the mission of destroying Hamas’s military and governmental infrastructure, beginning with a ground maneuver into Gaza City. After another round of leaks and media reports—including claims that the Chief of Staff was threatening to resign—the issue was finally settled and the plan was approved for execution.
The government pressed the army to shorten its proposed planning and mobilization timelines, emphasizing the approaching date of October 7 and the need to achieve a significant success before the war’s second anniversary—and, above all, to deny Hamas any chance to mark the occasion. This mirrored the logic that had guided the IDF’s Jabaliya operation a year earlier. As a final act of protest, the military chose to name the new campaign Operation Gideon’s Chariots II, signaling symbolically that it viewed the directive as a continuation of the same approach rather than a new initiative imposed upon it.
Operation Gideon’s Chariots II (from August 14, 2025, onward)
Operation Gideon’s Chariots II began on August 14. The campaign’s military focus was to move the civilian population out of Gaza City toward the south and to capture the city itself. Complementary measures included expanding the GHF Fund’s control over all humanitarian aid entering the Strip, initiating the process of separating the civilian population from Hamas, and preparing for potential migration.
Roughly six weeks into the operation, it could be said that its strategic objectives had been achieved, even if operational execution remained uneven. The strategic success was embodied in the plan to end the conflict that President Trump presented at the White House on September 29. A detailed analysis of that agreement and its implications appears later in this article.
Operationally, however, the same deficiencies noted earlier persisted, particularly regarding management of the effort on the Gaza civilian front. Once again, legal debates were used to delay or restrict the movement of the population southward from Gaza City. This was resolved only after sustained pressure from the political leadership.
Control over humanitarian aid also remained a problematic issue. While Israel was accused in the international arena of waging a“starvation campaign,” aid deliveries to Gaza City and northern Gaza continued without interuption, contrary to the campaign’s operational logic and at the cost of heightened risk to IDF forces in the area. No decisive measures were taken prior to the ceasefire resulting from the Trump plan to relocate civilians to areas under Israeli control or to remove them from Hamas’s authority, and the mobilization of local power elements faced continuing obstacles—though some progress in the days prior to the ceasefire.
It also remains unclear why no dedicated headquarters were established to coordinate and direct the entire civilian effort, a fact that continued to hinder the campaign right up to the ceasefire. Yet, as seen in previous operations, once the IDF demonstrates determination through sustained firepower and maneuver, the population tends to evacuate on its own, and actual resistance in the field proves far weaker than the dire forecasts that preceded the Gaza City offensive.
It is too early to draw final conclusions about Operation Gideon’s Chariots II, but it is already clear that this mode of action—first proposed and detailed by the Southern Command many months earlier—is what ultimately compelled Hamas and the broader system toward the operational breakthrough now unfolding.
Analysis
This section examines the failures of the military campaign, which after two years failed to achieve its principal goal: the destruction of Hamas and the other armed organizations’ military and governing capabilities in the Gaza Strip. At the same time, the implementation of the Trump plan could yet deliver those outcomes—primarily because of the credible threat of seizing Gaza City. Here we seek to identify where Israel went wrong and what could have brought the war to an earlier conclusion. The analysis draws, in part, on lessons from comparable historical cases in which conventional armies prevailed over terrorist or guerrilla forces operating within a civilian population.[4] In all of these examples, three recurring principles emerge: control of the resources that enable the enemy to function (in this case, humanitarian aid); control of the population; and control of territory.
First, regarding humanitarian aid: Israel’s failure to establish control mechanisms—whether through a temporary or partial military administration or through a viable substitute—was a critical mistake from the earliest stages following the first ceasefire in December 2023, and even more so after the second ceasefire ended in March 2025. Similarly, the IDF refrained from imposing an effective siege on Hamas-held areas while ensuring that civilians could receive aid outside the combat zones.
Up until the Trump ceasefire, humanitarian supplies entered combat zones, allowing Hamas to continue functioning as both a military and a governing entity. In the face of opposition from both the former and current chiefs of staff to any form of military administration, internal and external actors created an alternative in the form of the American GHF Fund and the use of local power brokers. Yet these, too, met resistance from within the military system, particularly from legal authorities—the Military Advocate General—and from the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories.
Professional military experience worldwide shows that in this type of conflict, some form of military governance is indispensable. The categorical opposition voiced throughout the campaign was therefore a major obstacle to achieving the war’s objectives.
The same holds true for control over the population. Here, too, practical solutions were proposed—ranging from a military administration to the various alternatives described earlier—but again met with firm resistance, even in the face of explicit directives from the political leadership, such as the order to establish the humanitarian city.
With respect to territorial control, the original operational concept envisioned the systematic destruction of Hamas’s centers of gravity, in accordance with the resources allocated. We have already detailed Israel’s prolonged hesitation to enter Rafah, its failure to complete the northern campaign, and the reduction of forces in early 2025. Even the more modest proposal for a limited northern operation initially met opposition and was ultimately executed only partially, from Jabalia northward.
The shift to a mode of warfare based on raids proved inefficient and wasteful. Repeated entries and withdrawals allowed Hamas to reconstitute itself after every operation. Each renewed incursion exacted a heavy toll on IDF soldiers, forcing them to fight again and again for the same ground.
The pause in fighting during the long January 2025 ceasefire, along with the replacement of the Chief of Staff, offered an opportunity to examine these failures and correct them. Indeed, upon taking office, Eyal Zamir initially voiced his intention to do so and even approved a more aggressive plan. Unfortunately, he soon reversed course and reverted to the same pattern of action as his predecessor.
The final and most significant issue in this analysis is unique to the Gaza campaign: the question of the hostages. As noted earlier, the fact that this goal appeared fourth in the list of war objectives did not reflect any moral indifference or a diminished sense of obligation toward their return. On the contrary, the professional understanding was that achieving the first objective, Hamas’s destruction, would bring about the release of all hostages. This argument has effectively been validated by the agreement announced by President Trump.[5]
After the first ceasefire, during which more than one hundred hostages were freed at a relatively low price, a shift occurred in the public discourse. A powerful civilian campaign demanded that the government prioritize the hostages’ return. Led by a well-funded civilian headquarters (the Hostages and Missing Families Forum) that claimed to represent all hostage families—while disregarding those who held different views—the campaign focused its pressure solely on the Israeli government. Throughout, public and media voices urged concessions that, in effect, encouraged Hamas to raise its demands, delaying any realistic prospect of a deal for the release of the hostages.
Experience proved that military pressure produced results, while easing that pressure—and applying counter-pressure on the Israeli government—had precisely the opposite effect. The conduct of the Hostages and Missing Families Forum, along with that of many politicians and much of the Israeli media, contributed to the war’s prolongation.
The military team originally established to map the hostages’ identities, locations, and to create rescue opportunities gradually redefined its mission as protecting the hostages—from the IDF itself. Over time, this mindset imposed growing constraints on the use of military force—both in firepower and maneuver.
These constraints, in our view, contradicted the war’s stated objectives as given to the IDF, delayed Hamas’s defeat, and did not aid the hostages’ release. In practice, Hamas sought to keep the hostages alive, particularly once only a small number remained. To be clear, our criticism is not directed at the families themselves, who sought to secure the release of their relatives, but at those who, for political reasons, worked to weaken Israel’s effort to defeat Hamas.
The final ceasefire for the purpose of a hostage exchange—paid for with the surrender of territory, the loss of hard-won gains, and months of wasted momentum—constituted a grave strategic failure. Beyond the immediate cost, this conduct set a dangerous precedent that will encourage future kidnappings. The return of Gaza’s civilian population to the north severely undermined Israel’s ability to achieve the war’s objectives within a reasonable timeframe and allowed Hamas to reestablish a functioning regime in Gaza City.
Our assessment is that had the IDF, after the first ceasefire in December 2023, continued the intensive campaign for several more months, continuing the push in Rafah and blocking tunnels along the Philadelphi Corridor at Rafah, while at the same time creating a civilian control mechanism, the Gaza war could have been concluded by mid-2024. Hamas, as a terrorist organization, would have continued to operate sporadically, much as low-level terror persists in Judea and Smaraia more than two decades after Operation Defensive Shield, but on a vastly smaller scale requiring far fewer forces.
It should be recalled that as early as December 2023, the Southern Command produced a strategy document outlining the phases of the war and the actions necessary in each. The plan, approved in January 2024 by then-Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, projected three to five months of high-intensity fighting (from January 2024) followed by roughly two years of declining military operations and increasing civilian engagement—culminating in full control and the establishment of infrastructure for a new governing framework for Gaza. The migration component, introduced after Donald Trump’s election victory, was not yet part of the plan and was only incorporated at the beginning of 2024.
The document was presented to the General Staff and approved in January 2024 by Halevi. The main amendment to the original plan was to shorten the period needed to establish full control from two years to one. In hindsight, it is clear that implementing that strategy as written and approved would have led Israel to achieve the war’s objectives more than a year ago.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have sought to identify the principal reasons the war in Gaza dragged on for two years. Our central argument is that the campaign’s duration stemmed from errors in both military and political leadership. Shortening the war was essential to achieving its declared objectives—destroying Hamas, restoring security, and bringing the hostages home.
From our perspective, throughout the campaign, the swiftest path to securing the return of all hostages was the destruction of Hamas’s military and governing capabilities and an unambiguous demand for its unconditional surrender. This was demonstrated by President Trump’s plan, which was made possible by the assault on Gaza City and the strike in Qatar, which conveyed to Hamas and its supporting states Israel’s determination to defeat the organization. The fundamental failure was in the lack of control over the civilian dimension of the campaign—an element that stands at the core of Israel’s ability to subdue Hamas—coupled with flawed handling of the hostage issue and partial deals that only prolonged the conflict.
The political echelon erred in its management of the hostage negotiations following the first exchange and, in its failure to compel the IDF to pursue the war’s objectives exactly as defined. Certain mitigating circumstances should be acknowledged: internal divisions within the government during the war’s early stages; the former defense minister’s consistent alignment with the chief of staff; the immense media pressure; and the adversarial posture of the Biden administration during the first year of the war—all of which constrained the government’s ability to act decisively. The defense establishment, for its part, advanced an alternative line, using selective leaks and media pressure to shape public opinion in favor of its own positions, as in the debate over a military administration in Gaza.
The senior military leadership, meanwhile, acted unprofessionally—deviating from established military doctrine and ignoring both Israeli and global experience in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency warfare. It resisted establishing any form of military governance or viable substitute, failed to complete territorial objectives, and neglected to concentrate sufficient effort on the civilian front. In addition, elements within the security system actively opposed the government, leaking and briefing distorted information to undermine policy decisions.
Regrettably, even after the replacement of the Chief of Staff and the head of Southern Command—Gen. Yaron Finkelman, notably among the most aggressive and determined commanders from the war’s outset—no substantive change followed. The tone continued to be set by the Military Advocate General and her team, whose legal opinions often contradicted international law; by Maj. Gen. Nitzan Alon and his staff, who prioritized “protecting” the hostages over facilitating their release; and by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, who, along with his subordinates, opposed any form of military administration or to any of the required changes in the management of humanitarian aid.
Today, Israel stands at a turning point. On the international stage, President Trump’s announced agreement has reshuffled the deck, offering an opportunity to reshape the campaign’s trajectory. Two factors led to this moment—both of which could have been achieved much earlier, saving valuable time and lives. The first was the strike in Qatar, which made clear to Doha that it was not immune from Israeli action and prompted it to exert genuine pressure on Hamas to accept the Trump framework. The second was the operation to capture Gaza City, demonstrating that Israel was willing to return to high-intensity combat and would not halt, despite campaigns for the release of the hostages and despite the “starvation” campaign.
It is too soon to predict how implementation of the agreement will unfold. Still, it can already be said that, if carried out to the letter, it will achieve Israel’s war objectives in full. The process is not without danger—chiefly the question of who will govern Gaza “the day after,” and how to prevent a renewed threat from emerging there. Yet the accord—addressing far broader issues than Hamas’s defeat and the hostages’ return—rests on the principle of peace through strength, long championed by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu. It envisions a new regional reality—one that stands to benefit the State of Israel.[6]
A key distinction sets this agreement apart from past accords signed by Israel: the principle of reciprocity. Hamas has returned the hostages and must now disarm; only then will Israel fulfill its side of the arrangement. It is reasonable to expect that Hamas will do everything possible to dilute the agreement, and Israel’s and America’s determination to enforce the deal to the letter will be the true test of its success.
Returning to the question that opened this essay—Gaza: Until When?—we can now glimpse the answer. The end is in sight. The war could have ended long ago had Israel acted differently, as outlined throughout this paper, but much still remains to be done before the country can find peace and security. As the sages teach in the Ethics of the Fathers: “It is not your duty to finish the work, but neither are you free to desist from it.”[7] Israel’s task now is to internalize the lessons of this war, reform its command structure, and prepare for the challenges that still lie ahead.
[1] See Siboni and Wiener, The Hostages Kidnapped Twice: A Moral–Strategic Analysis of the Hostage Crisis in the Gaza War, JISS, April 24, 2025 (Hebrew)
[3] See Gabi Siboni and Erez Wiener, Blockade as a Legitimate Method of Warfare (Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security [JISS], August 31, 2025).
[4] See Gabi Siboni and Erez Wiener, Subduing Terrorism through Military Means, JISS, August 24, 2025.
[5] See Siboni and Wiener, The Hostages Kidnapped Twice: A Moral–Strategic Analysis of the Hostage Crisis in the Gaza War, JISS, April 24, 2025 (Hebrew).
[6] See Gabi Siboni and Erez Wiener, From “The Iron Wall” to “Peace through Strength” JISS, July 22, 2025.
Prof. Siboni was director of the military and strategic affairs program, and the cyber research program, of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) from 2006-2020, where he founded academic journals on these matters. He serves as a senior consultant to the IDF and other Israeli security organizations and the security industry. He holds a B.Sc. and M.Sc. in engineering from Tel Aviv University and a Ph.D. in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) from Ben-Gurion University. More may be found here. His list of publications may be found here.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Erez Winner
Brig. Gen. (res.) Erez Winner is an expert in military affairs and doctrine at the Jerusalem Institute of Strategy and Security. He served in key command roles in the IDF, including as commander of the Duchifat Battalion and the Etzioni Brigade, and later as aide to the Chief of Staff. He also headed the operational planning team in the Southern Command in his reserve service. In the business sector, he has served as CEO of several major Israeli companies, including G. Willi-Food International, Jerusalem Wineries, and currently Jack Deri Real Estate Entrepreneurship Ltd.
By signing up, you agree to our user agreement (including the class action waiver and arbitration provisions), our privacy policy and cookie statement, and to receive marketing and billing emails from jiss. You can unsubscribe at any time.
Sign up for the newsletter
For up-to-date analysis and commentary.
Are You In?
Join 8,000+ Subscribers who enjoy our weekly digest
Home page / COMMENTS ON THE WAR IN GAZA / Gaza: Until When?
Gaza: Until When?
Photo: Shutterstock
Introduction
A common refrain among IDF conscripts is “Until When?” (a countdown to the end of mandatory service). As we approach the second anniversary of the Gaza war, that question keeps returning and intensifying, albeit in different forms. Our argument is that the campaign’s prolongation in Gaza is primarily a function of Israel’s choices and of how the war has been waged to date. In our view, Israel could—and should—have acted differently and reached the war’s objectives in a substantially shorter timeframe.
This paper is published as the Trump framework begins to be implemented. Although it is still too early to predict how the campaign will end, two conclusions can already be drawn. First, effective military pressure produces results—the IDF maneuver into Gaza City and Israel’s demonstrated resolve were the decisive catalyst that pushed Hamas toward a deal markedly different from what it had sought until then. Second, the strike in Qatar made clear to Hamas’s principal backers that Israel will not hesitate to act wherever necessary, and that demonstration helped persuade them to support the Trump framework.
Those objectives, set by the government at the war’s outset in October 2023, were as follows:
A fifth goal was later added for the northern front: to enable residents of northern Israel to return safely to their homes.
It is important to note—especially in light of the ongoing debate over the war’s aims and the claim that bringing the hostages home should be the overriding priority—that the original order of objectives made strategic sense. The sequence did not diminish the moral urgency of the hostages’ return. As we argued in our earlier article, “The Hostages Who Were Taken Twice,”[1] the fastest and most effective route to that goal was—and remains—the destruction of Hamas’s military and governing infrastructure, just as decisive victory was the key in past Israeli wars when civilians and soldiers held by the enemy.
Phases of the Fighting in Gaza
Over the past two years, the IDF waged several distinct campaigns in the Gaza Strip, each forming part of the broader effort to achieve Israel’s war objectives. To help orient the reader, the following map illustrates the main operational zones of the Strip:[2]
Below we outline the principal stages of the campaign and their defining characteristics.
Restoring Control in the Gaza Envelope (October 7–27, 2023)
This first phase lasted from October 7 to October 27, 2023. During this period, the IDF focused on restoring control in the Gaza Envelope, while simultaneously striking targets across the Strip—primarily from the air. At the same time, it completed mobilization of reserve forces and prepared for ground combat.
It is important to note that this period was marked by an intense professional—and media—debate over the need for and feasibility of a ground maneuver inside Gaza. Several senior figures, including within the defense establishment itself (the Chief of Staff and Defense Minister at the time), sought to avoid a ground incursion in Gaza and preferred to shift focus northward to confront Hezbollah. This reflected a deep lack of confidence in the army’s ground capabilities and, conversely, an inflated perception of the enemy’s strength.
The Campaign in Gaza City (October 27–November 24, 2023)
On October 27, the IDF’s Southern Command launched a ground offensive with three divisions targeting northern Gaza and Gaza City. In the course of this operation, Israeli forces captured most of northern Gaza and Gaza City, destroyed extensive terrorist infrastructure and killed thousands of Hamas fighters.
On November 24, a first ceasefire was declared to enable a hostage-release deal. Southern Command had proposed a combined maneuver: a main effort in northern Gaza and Gaza City—the administrative and military hub of Hamas—and a secondary effort in Rafah, the key artery for Hamas’s resupply.
The decision to focus on Gaza City and the north stemmed from two primary considerations: first, concerns over the army’s ability to conduct two simultaneous, large-scale ground offensives; and second, fears that a move into Rafah would trigger international pressure and a potential diplomatic crisis with Egypt.
The First Ceasefire (November 24–December 1, 2023)
The ceasefire held from November 24 to December 1, 2023. IDF forces remained in the areas they had secured, while limited humanitarian aid began entering Gaza in parallel with the release of 105 hostages—mainly women, children, the elderly, and foreign workers. After Hamas violated the agreement—delaying further hostage releases and resuming rocket fire—Israel renewed combat operations on December 1 from its existing positions.
This first ceasefire and hostage exchange were relatively favorable to Israel: the IDF retained control of captured territory, and the ratio of hostages released to concessions made was far better than in later deals. After a month of intense fighting, Hamas had been dealt heavy blows and was caught off guard by Israel’s response. Crucially, no humanitarian aid was permitted into the Strip until that point.
Shifting the Effort to Khan Yunis (December 1, 2023–April 7, 2024)
During this stage, the IDF shifted its main operational focus to the Khan Yunis area. During this phase, the overall force deployed in Gaza was gradually reduced, and by late January 2024, the 36th Division was redeployed to the northern front. During the first ceasefire, Southern Command and the General Staff debated where to concentrate the next phase of fighting. Southern Command argued that Israel should first consolidate its operational gains in northern Gaza and Gaza City before moving southward.
Two main alternatives were considered for the next focal point—Khan Yunis and Rafah. Khan Yunis served as Hamas’s secondary administrative center and the likely hiding place of senior leadership headed by Yahya Sinwar. Rafah, meanwhile, remained the key smuggling route for weapons and resources into Gaza. Ultimately, the decision was made to concentrate on Khan Yunis, largely due to the Shin Bet’s assessment that this would allow Israeli forces to close in on Sinwar and other top commanders. At the same time, the leadership hesitated to move on Rafah, fearing international backlash and a crisis with Egypt.
Throughout this period, the IDF continued to operate in northern Gaza and Gaza City through targeted raids on Hamas strongholds—tunnel networks, command centers, hospitals, and other locations believed to shelter senior operatives.
Before the 36th Division was withdrawn, it completed a major operation to destroy Hamas’s weapons-production infrastructure, which was dispersed across a network of deep underground tunnels and factories along the central east-west axis of the Strip. This strike effectively wiped out much of Hamas’s military industry and significantly reduced its capacity to replenish rocket and explosives stockpiles.
The main effort of the Southern Command during these months was led by the 98th Division and centered on Khan Yunis. The primary objective was to target Yahya Sinwar and the group of senior Hamas officials surrounding him. The majority of IDF ground forces remaining in Gaza were dedicated to this mission.
Beginning in February 2024, under pressure from the Biden administration—and amid threats of sanctions and a freeze on military aid—Israel began allowing large volumes of humanitarian assistance into Gaza.
Within Southern Command, a discussion took place over the need to control aid distribution and the option of establishing a partial, temporary military administration in the Strip. Then-Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi rejected the proposal. The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and several General Staff officials presented the political echelon with an alarmist briefing, warning that such a measure would require five divisions, cost NIS 20 billion per year, and lead to an increase in the cost of living in Israel. This unrealistic analysis was clearly intended to deter decision-makers from approving a military administration and to shut down any attempt at serious debate on the matter.
As a result, humanitarian aid entered Gaza without IDF oversight or control. Hamas exploited the inflow to rebuild its capabilities, fund its operations, pay salaries, recruit new operatives, and tighten its grip on the civilian population. In effect, even as Israel was conducting intensive military operations, it was simultaneously enabling Hamas to preserve and rebuild its regime.
Shifting the Effort to Rafah (April 7–October 6, 2024)
While talks over a new hostage deal continued and Hamas raised its demands, the debate in Israel focused on Rafah, the last major city in Gaza yet to be taken by Israeli forces. Rafah controls both the border area with Egypt (the Philadelphi Corridor) and the Rafah Crossing, which remained vital arteries for Hamas’s smuggling and resupply operations, even as the fighting continued.
The proposed operation in Rafah met stiff resistance from the Biden administration in the United States, alongside mounting international pressure and internal opposition from the IDF General Staff, which feared a direct clash with Washington and the potential fallout. At the same time, a highly vocal public campaign—driven by retired senior defense officials and amplified by the media—warned against an assault on Rafah, describing it as an impregnable fortress that would exact a heavy toll on Israeli forces. Despite these pressures, the political leadership, pushed on by Southern Command, progressed with plans for the operation.
In preparation for the offensive, the 98th Division withdrew from Khan Yunis on April 7 to regroup for the Rafah assault. The 162nd Division was redeployed south from northern Gaza for the same purpose. In the north, a smaller contingent remained in place to secure the Netzarim Corridor, the key line separating northern Gaza and Gaza City from the south. Southern Command was also allocated the 99th Division, and a further two reserve brigades.
The internal debate over the Rafah operation ended with cabinet approval, but the manner of execution of the manuever was altered. Instead of Southern Command’s original plan, to encircle and capture the city, trapping and destroying the Hamas forces within, another plan was adopted. Under this plan, the 162nd Division advanced from south to north along the Egyptian border, following the Philadelphi Corridor, with a limited advance supervised directly by the Chief of Staff, as if it were a small-scale special forces operation.
The way the operation was structured allowed many Hamas fighters to escape from Rafah toward Khan Yunis with the hostages they held, and forced a slow advance, controlled from above, that made it difficult for tactical forces to conduct continuous combat—even though this often defied any operational logic. In one instance, a unit from an elite brigade came under anti-tank fire from just a few hundred meters away, but outside the division’s assigned sector. Rather than respond immediately, the unit was required to coordinate its counteraction with the General Staff, delaying its response and compromising its effectiveness.
The assault on Rafah began on May 6, 2024, and remained the IDF’s main operational effort until September 12. During this period, the 162nd Division destroyed Hamas’s Rafah Brigade, killing more than 2,000 militants, and systematically demolished the tunnel network connecting Rafah in Gaza to the Egyptian side of the city over the border.
In parallel, the 98th Division, which was not involved in the Rafah encirclement, was employed in a series of division-scale raids. In May 2024, it conducted an operation in the Jabaliya area of northern Gaza; in June, it returned to Khan Yunis as part of Operation Arnon, which freed four Israeli hostages from the Nuseirat area; and in August, it carried out another operation in Khan Yunis.
By September 2024, the 98th Division had been withdrawn from Gaza to prepare for operations on the Lebanese front. At the same time, the 99th Division expanded its control of the Netzarim Corridor, transforming it into a wide, cleared buffer zone free of both aboveground and underground infrastructure.
Recognizing the impact of territorial control and infrastructure destruction on Hamas’s resilience—particularly following the Rafah campaign and the clearing of the Natzarim Corridor—Southern Command developed a new plan for a broad operation in northern Gaza. Given that it was clear there were insufficient resources available for camapign across the entire Strip, the proposal envisioned a limited offensive designed to capitalize on the IDF’s early gains, achieve decisive results, and complete the first war objective: the destruction of Hamas’s military and organizational capabilities in northern Gaza and Gaza City—an area comprising roughly 40 percent of the Strip.
At that stage, approximately 300,000 civilians remained in the area, having not evacuated earlier. The General Staff opposed the plan, preferring to continue with raids and to reduce the amount of forces in the Strip due to concerns about the strain on the reserves, shortages of munitions and spare parts, and the need to preserve capabilities for the northen front.
The Capture of Northern Gaza (October 6 2024 – January 16 2025)
Despite opposition from the General Staff and the redeployment of some forces northward, a limited plan eventually took shape for capturing northern Gaza and destroying Hamas forces there. After several rounds of debate—and with backing from the political leadership— a scaled-down plan was approved.
Its operational scope was confined to the area from Jabaliya northward. To execute it, the 162nd Division redeployed from Rafah, replaced there by the Gaza Division, which assumed responsibility for the Philadelphi Corridor and Rafah, alongside its ongoing defensive mission throughout the Strip.
The offensive was set for October 6, 2024—deliberately timed for the eve of the war’s first anniversary in order to disrupt Hamas’s planned celebrations. The operation unfolded as planned and despite a relatively small order of battle and limited resources, the results were significant: more than 2,000 Hamas fighters were killed and a similar number captured. Substantial underground infrastructure was destroyed, and the bodies of several hostages were recovered for burial in Israel.
More consequential still was the blow the operation dealt to Hamas’s leadership. Statements from that period reveal a sense within Hamas that it was facing a fundamentally different kind of warfare and that if Israel continued, the organization would not survive. This made it essential that the IDF deepen its gains, something that became feasible once the ground campaign in Lebanon concluded at the end of November 2024.
Instead of building on these gains, however, Israel accepted Hamas’s proposal for a second ceasefire in exchange for another hostage deal. This time, the price was far higher: the release of convicted terrorists and the large-scale entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza. Worse still, for the first time Israel paid with the very achievements won in blood. IDF forces withdrew from captured territory, including the Netzarim Corridor, allowing hundreds of thousands of Gazans to return to northern Gaza. This squandered one of Israel’s most important operational accomplishments and a key source of pressure on Hamas—all in return for only a partial deal.
Hamas’s conduct during those weeks made clear that military pressure was working and that ramping up the pressure—along with more effective control over humanitarian aid—could have delivered a far greater strategic success, perhaps even Hamas’s outright defeat.
The Second Hostage Deal (January 19–March 18, 2025)
During this period, a second hostage deal was implemented. As part of the ceasefire and the IDF’s subsequent reorganization, the new defense minister, Israel Katz, instructed the military to prepare for a resumption of fighting, if the agreement was not expanded to secure the release of all remaining hostages. His directive was clear: the goal was to defeat Hamas and complete the conquest of the Strip within six months.
Southern Command drafted a plan accordingly and presented it to Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and to the Cabinet. Soon after, Halevi resigned. He was replaced on March 5, 2025, by Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, who had previously served as Director General of the Ministry of Defense. Upon reviewing Southern Command’s plan, Zamir requested revisions. He expanded the available forces so that Hamas could be defeated within three months rather than six.
The updated plan incorporated lessons learned from the previous year of fighting. It emphasized the need for Israeli control over humanitarian aid to prevent it from reaching Hamas, the need to separate the civilian population from the organization, and the capture of the key territories still under Hamas’s control, foremost among them Gaza City. The plan also sought to align with the emigration initiative outlined by President Trump.
Recognizing the strategic importance of controlling the civilian effort, and in light of the General Staff’s continuing opposition—even under the new Chief of Staff—to establishing even a temporary or partial military administration, alternative aid distribution mechanisms were developed.
The first was the American Gaza Humanitarian Fund (GHF), created to oversee, distribute, and secure humanitarian aid so that it reached civilians directly rather than Hamas. The second involved enlisting local power brokers opposed to Hamas, such as Yasser Abu Shabab, leader of a Bedouin clan in southeastern Rafah.
The plan, approved by Zamir in early March upon taking office, rested on three pillars:
Southern Command assessed that executing all three components concurrently would bring Hamas to surrender or disintegration within roughly three months. It was understood, however, that even after the organization’s collapse, several additional months of combat would be required to clear the area and establish full control—tasks that could be carried out with gradually reduced forces while establishing control through regional divisions and brigades.
Operation Might and Sword (March 18–May 16, 2025)
Following the conclusion of the second hostage deal in early March, negotiations toward a follow-up stage—intended to secure the release of additional hostages—failed to advance. Although the ceasefire had formally expired, Israel did not immediately return to full-scale combat. Instead, several attempts were made by the U.S. mediator, Steve Whitkoff, to broker a new partial arrangement that would have secured the release of roughly half of the hostages still alive.
When Hamas refused to compromise, Israel approved a limited, time-bound operation whose purpose was to increase pressure on Hamas to return to the negotiating table under the terms of the proposed partial deal. Southern Command prepared an operational plan accordingly. Its concept was to apply maximum pressure within a short period while retaining a framework that could be expanded into the broader campaign already planned, should Hamas continue to reject the proposal.
Operation Might and Sword began on the night of March 18 with a concentrated wave of Israeli strikes on Hamas targets throughout the Strip. Ground forces then carried out a limited maneuver in selected areas, focusing primarily on southern Gaza and parts of the north. Several days of intense military pressure appeared to have the desired effect, and signs of flexibility were noted within Hamas. However, public debate inside Israel over whether to halt the fighting and pursue a comprehensive “all-for-all” deal convinced Hamas that it had no reason to compromise. As a result, the operation lost its intended leverage.
Although Might and Sword was conceived as a short and focused action, and despite the fact that its core objective—pressuring Hamas into agreement—was not achieved, the deployment continued for nearly two months. During this time Israel lost valuable operational momentum and resources, including its most critical asset: reservists, who had been called up once again to contribute to Hamas’s defeat but instead found themselves engaged in prolonged activity that failed to meet its stated aim.
Operation Gideon’s Chariots (May 16–August 6, 2025)
At this point, the new Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, revised the plan he had previously approved and formulated a new one whose purpose was not the defeat of Hamas but rather the application of pressure to secure the hostages’ release. Within this framework, the IDF concentrated its main effort in southern Gaza, creating a new corridor—known as the “Morag Corridor”—between Khan Yunis and Rafah. Simultaneously, an additional divisional assault was launched against Khan Yunis.
Out of concern for the hostages’ safety, the IDF refrained from entering Gaza City. Instead, it operated in northern and eastern Gaza and on the outskirts of Gaza City, contrary to the operational logic of the broader plan that had been approved only two months earlier. In practice, the campaign focused primarily on destroying Hamas’s above- and below-ground infrastructure, progressing slowly and relying heavily on engineering units to demolish tunnels and strongholds.
At the start of the operation, Israel halted all humanitarian aid entering Gaza (continuing the freeze first imposed during Operation Might and Sword). By late May, however, the GHF began operations, primarily in southern and central Gaza.
Because the IDF had chosen not to relocate civilians from Gaza City—following a legal opinion by the Military Advocate General (MAG) that such a move would be unlawful—a severe food shortage developed inside the city. The MAG presented an opinion that the IDF was obligated to supply aid to civilians who had remained there rather than relying on their ability to move south and access humanitarian aid available in these locations.
Consequently, in contradiction to the original operational plan, to basic military logic, and even to international law, the IDF began permitting uncontrolled humanitarian deliveries into Gaza City.[3] When it became clear that much of this aid was reaching Hamas and strengthening it, Israel’s political leadership ordered an end to the unsupervised shipments and instructed the relevant bodies to develop alternative mechanisms for oversight of aid.
In July 2025, an international campaign alleging famine in Gaza gained momentum. The mounting pressure led the Israeli government to approve the large-scale, unsupervised entry of aid into the Strip. This failure to manage the civilian effort stemmed primarily from two causes. The first was the IDF’s reluctance to fully assume responsibility for the task—it should have established a dedicated headquarters led by a commander who grasped its strategic importance. The second was the obstructive stance of the MAG and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), who resisted the changes needed to enforce effective control over humanitarian assistance. Their opposition effectively restored the flawed previous system, under which aid once again flowed directly to Hamas and reinforced its hold.
The mission of creating a separation between the population and Hamas also made no progress—partly because of the same lack of commitment and command focus within the IDF and Southern Command, and partly because of renewed legal objections raised by the MAG and COGAT. The political leadership directed the IDF to establish a “humanitarian city” in an area cleared by Israeli forces near Rafah. In response, as with the earlier debate over a military administration, defense officials leaked a presentation warning that such a project would require an enormous force, cost NIS 20 billion, and take many months to execute.
Independent analyses carried out in parallel by the GHF and other civilian bodies using UN and comparative data from smiliar operations elsewhere in the world showed that the actual figures were entirely different. Once again, the defense establishment had manipulated cost and manpower projections and used selective leaks to sway public opinion against the Cabinet’s directives, thereby undermining the ability to achieve the war’s declared objectives.
When this operation also failed to compel Hamas to reenter negotiations over the hostages’ release, tensions deepened between the political and military echelons. The government demanded a plan to achieve the war’s stated goals—above all, the destruction of Hamas’s military and governmental infrastructure. The army argued that Operation Gideon’s Chariots had achieved its aims (though Hamas had not agreed even to discuss the release of even half the hostages, and its capabilities remained largely intact). Military leaders further contended that completing the conquest of the remaining Hamas-held areas—chiefly Gaza City—would endanger the hostages’ lives. The Chief of Staff also rejected the idea of establishing a “humanitarian city” in Rafah to which Gaza’s civilians could be transferred after screening, opposed the presence of IDF troops among a civilian population, and pressed instead for another hostage deal, at almost any price.
When it became clear that Hamas was unwilling to reach such an agreement, the army presented an alternative plan: to encircle the remaining Hamas-controlled areas—Gaza City, the central refugee camps, and al-Mawasi—and conduct operations against them through firepower and raids. The political leadership rejected this plan and demanded a different one, modeled on the proposal Zamir had approved at the start of his tenure, aimed at first capturing Gaza City, separating the population from Hamas, and establishing firm control over humanitarian aid.
At this point, a prolonged and contentious dialogue unfolded between the political and military leaderships over how to continue the campaign. The exchanges were accompanied by extensive leaks and briefings from within the security establishment about discussions in the Cabinet, thus eroding any possibility of holding professional deliberations.
The dispute ended with a directive from the political leadership ordering the army to implement the plan presented to it and to fulfill the mission of destroying Hamas’s military and governmental infrastructure, beginning with a ground maneuver into Gaza City. After another round of leaks and media reports—including claims that the Chief of Staff was threatening to resign—the issue was finally settled and the plan was approved for execution.
The government pressed the army to shorten its proposed planning and mobilization timelines, emphasizing the approaching date of October 7 and the need to achieve a significant success before the war’s second anniversary—and, above all, to deny Hamas any chance to mark the occasion. This mirrored the logic that had guided the IDF’s Jabaliya operation a year earlier. As a final act of protest, the military chose to name the new campaign Operation Gideon’s Chariots II, signaling symbolically that it viewed the directive as a continuation of the same approach rather than a new initiative imposed upon it.
Operation Gideon’s Chariots II (from August 14, 2025, onward)
Operation Gideon’s Chariots II began on August 14. The campaign’s military focus was to move the civilian population out of Gaza City toward the south and to capture the city itself. Complementary measures included expanding the GHF Fund’s control over all humanitarian aid entering the Strip, initiating the process of separating the civilian population from Hamas, and preparing for potential migration.
Roughly six weeks into the operation, it could be said that its strategic objectives had been achieved, even if operational execution remained uneven. The strategic success was embodied in the plan to end the conflict that President Trump presented at the White House on September 29. A detailed analysis of that agreement and its implications appears later in this article.
Operationally, however, the same deficiencies noted earlier persisted, particularly regarding management of the effort on the Gaza civilian front. Once again, legal debates were used to delay or restrict the movement of the population southward from Gaza City. This was resolved only after sustained pressure from the political leadership.
Control over humanitarian aid also remained a problematic issue. While Israel was accused in the international arena of waging a“starvation campaign,” aid deliveries to Gaza City and northern Gaza continued without interuption, contrary to the campaign’s operational logic and at the cost of heightened risk to IDF forces in the area. No decisive measures were taken prior to the ceasefire resulting from the Trump plan to relocate civilians to areas under Israeli control or to remove them from Hamas’s authority, and the mobilization of local power elements faced continuing obstacles—though some progress in the days prior to the ceasefire.
It also remains unclear why no dedicated headquarters were established to coordinate and direct the entire civilian effort, a fact that continued to hinder the campaign right up to the ceasefire. Yet, as seen in previous operations, once the IDF demonstrates determination through sustained firepower and maneuver, the population tends to evacuate on its own, and actual resistance in the field proves far weaker than the dire forecasts that preceded the Gaza City offensive.
It is too early to draw final conclusions about Operation Gideon’s Chariots II, but it is already clear that this mode of action—first proposed and detailed by the Southern Command many months earlier—is what ultimately compelled Hamas and the broader system toward the operational breakthrough now unfolding.
Analysis
This section examines the failures of the military campaign, which after two years failed to achieve its principal goal: the destruction of Hamas and the other armed organizations’ military and governing capabilities in the Gaza Strip. At the same time, the implementation of the Trump plan could yet deliver those outcomes—primarily because of the credible threat of seizing Gaza City. Here we seek to identify where Israel went wrong and what could have brought the war to an earlier conclusion. The analysis draws, in part, on lessons from comparable historical cases in which conventional armies prevailed over terrorist or guerrilla forces operating within a civilian population.[4] In all of these examples, three recurring principles emerge: control of the resources that enable the enemy to function (in this case, humanitarian aid); control of the population; and control of territory.
First, regarding humanitarian aid: Israel’s failure to establish control mechanisms—whether through a temporary or partial military administration or through a viable substitute—was a critical mistake from the earliest stages following the first ceasefire in December 2023, and even more so after the second ceasefire ended in March 2025. Similarly, the IDF refrained from imposing an effective siege on Hamas-held areas while ensuring that civilians could receive aid outside the combat zones.
Up until the Trump ceasefire, humanitarian supplies entered combat zones, allowing Hamas to continue functioning as both a military and a governing entity. In the face of opposition from both the former and current chiefs of staff to any form of military administration, internal and external actors created an alternative in the form of the American GHF Fund and the use of local power brokers. Yet these, too, met resistance from within the military system, particularly from legal authorities—the Military Advocate General—and from the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories.
Professional military experience worldwide shows that in this type of conflict, some form of military governance is indispensable. The categorical opposition voiced throughout the campaign was therefore a major obstacle to achieving the war’s objectives.
The same holds true for control over the population. Here, too, practical solutions were proposed—ranging from a military administration to the various alternatives described earlier—but again met with firm resistance, even in the face of explicit directives from the political leadership, such as the order to establish the humanitarian city.
With respect to territorial control, the original operational concept envisioned the systematic destruction of Hamas’s centers of gravity, in accordance with the resources allocated. We have already detailed Israel’s prolonged hesitation to enter Rafah, its failure to complete the northern campaign, and the reduction of forces in early 2025. Even the more modest proposal for a limited northern operation initially met opposition and was ultimately executed only partially, from Jabalia northward.
The shift to a mode of warfare based on raids proved inefficient and wasteful. Repeated entries and withdrawals allowed Hamas to reconstitute itself after every operation. Each renewed incursion exacted a heavy toll on IDF soldiers, forcing them to fight again and again for the same ground.
The pause in fighting during the long January 2025 ceasefire, along with the replacement of the Chief of Staff, offered an opportunity to examine these failures and correct them. Indeed, upon taking office, Eyal Zamir initially voiced his intention to do so and even approved a more aggressive plan. Unfortunately, he soon reversed course and reverted to the same pattern of action as his predecessor.
The final and most significant issue in this analysis is unique to the Gaza campaign: the question of the hostages. As noted earlier, the fact that this goal appeared fourth in the list of war objectives did not reflect any moral indifference or a diminished sense of obligation toward their return. On the contrary, the professional understanding was that achieving the first objective, Hamas’s destruction, would bring about the release of all hostages. This argument has effectively been validated by the agreement announced by President Trump.[5]
After the first ceasefire, during which more than one hundred hostages were freed at a relatively low price, a shift occurred in the public discourse. A powerful civilian campaign demanded that the government prioritize the hostages’ return. Led by a well-funded civilian headquarters (the Hostages and Missing Families Forum) that claimed to represent all hostage families—while disregarding those who held different views—the campaign focused its pressure solely on the Israeli government. Throughout, public and media voices urged concessions that, in effect, encouraged Hamas to raise its demands, delaying any realistic prospect of a deal for the release of the hostages.
Experience proved that military pressure produced results, while easing that pressure—and applying counter-pressure on the Israeli government—had precisely the opposite effect. The conduct of the Hostages and Missing Families Forum, along with that of many politicians and much of the Israeli media, contributed to the war’s prolongation.
The military team originally established to map the hostages’ identities, locations, and to create rescue opportunities gradually redefined its mission as protecting the hostages—from the IDF itself. Over time, this mindset imposed growing constraints on the use of military force—both in firepower and maneuver.
These constraints, in our view, contradicted the war’s stated objectives as given to the IDF, delayed Hamas’s defeat, and did not aid the hostages’ release. In practice, Hamas sought to keep the hostages alive, particularly once only a small number remained. To be clear, our criticism is not directed at the families themselves, who sought to secure the release of their relatives, but at those who, for political reasons, worked to weaken Israel’s effort to defeat Hamas.
The final ceasefire for the purpose of a hostage exchange—paid for with the surrender of territory, the loss of hard-won gains, and months of wasted momentum—constituted a grave strategic failure. Beyond the immediate cost, this conduct set a dangerous precedent that will encourage future kidnappings. The return of Gaza’s civilian population to the north severely undermined Israel’s ability to achieve the war’s objectives within a reasonable timeframe and allowed Hamas to reestablish a functioning regime in Gaza City.
Our assessment is that had the IDF, after the first ceasefire in December 2023, continued the intensive campaign for several more months, continuing the push in Rafah and blocking tunnels along the Philadelphi Corridor at Rafah, while at the same time creating a civilian control mechanism, the Gaza war could have been concluded by mid-2024. Hamas, as a terrorist organization, would have continued to operate sporadically, much as low-level terror persists in Judea and Smaraia more than two decades after Operation Defensive Shield, but on a vastly smaller scale requiring far fewer forces.
It should be recalled that as early as December 2023, the Southern Command produced a strategy document outlining the phases of the war and the actions necessary in each. The plan, approved in January 2024 by then-Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, projected three to five months of high-intensity fighting (from January 2024) followed by roughly two years of declining military operations and increasing civilian engagement—culminating in full control and the establishment of infrastructure for a new governing framework for Gaza. The migration component, introduced after Donald Trump’s election victory, was not yet part of the plan and was only incorporated at the beginning of 2024.
The document was presented to the General Staff and approved in January 2024 by Halevi. The main amendment to the original plan was to shorten the period needed to establish full control from two years to one. In hindsight, it is clear that implementing that strategy as written and approved would have led Israel to achieve the war’s objectives more than a year ago.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have sought to identify the principal reasons the war in Gaza dragged on for two years. Our central argument is that the campaign’s duration stemmed from errors in both military and political leadership. Shortening the war was essential to achieving its declared objectives—destroying Hamas, restoring security, and bringing the hostages home.
From our perspective, throughout the campaign, the swiftest path to securing the return of all hostages was the destruction of Hamas’s military and governing capabilities and an unambiguous demand for its unconditional surrender. This was demonstrated by President Trump’s plan, which was made possible by the assault on Gaza City and the strike in Qatar, which conveyed to Hamas and its supporting states Israel’s determination to defeat the organization. The fundamental failure was in the lack of control over the civilian dimension of the campaign—an element that stands at the core of Israel’s ability to subdue Hamas—coupled with flawed handling of the hostage issue and partial deals that only prolonged the conflict.
The political echelon erred in its management of the hostage negotiations following the first exchange and, in its failure to compel the IDF to pursue the war’s objectives exactly as defined. Certain mitigating circumstances should be acknowledged: internal divisions within the government during the war’s early stages; the former defense minister’s consistent alignment with the chief of staff; the immense media pressure; and the adversarial posture of the Biden administration during the first year of the war—all of which constrained the government’s ability to act decisively. The defense establishment, for its part, advanced an alternative line, using selective leaks and media pressure to shape public opinion in favor of its own positions, as in the debate over a military administration in Gaza.
The senior military leadership, meanwhile, acted unprofessionally—deviating from established military doctrine and ignoring both Israeli and global experience in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency warfare. It resisted establishing any form of military governance or viable substitute, failed to complete territorial objectives, and neglected to concentrate sufficient effort on the civilian front. In addition, elements within the security system actively opposed the government, leaking and briefing distorted information to undermine policy decisions.
Regrettably, even after the replacement of the Chief of Staff and the head of Southern Command—Gen. Yaron Finkelman, notably among the most aggressive and determined commanders from the war’s outset—no substantive change followed. The tone continued to be set by the Military Advocate General and her team, whose legal opinions often contradicted international law; by Maj. Gen. Nitzan Alon and his staff, who prioritized “protecting” the hostages over facilitating their release; and by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, who, along with his subordinates, opposed any form of military administration or to any of the required changes in the management of humanitarian aid.
Today, Israel stands at a turning point. On the international stage, President Trump’s announced agreement has reshuffled the deck, offering an opportunity to reshape the campaign’s trajectory. Two factors led to this moment—both of which could have been achieved much earlier, saving valuable time and lives. The first was the strike in Qatar, which made clear to Doha that it was not immune from Israeli action and prompted it to exert genuine pressure on Hamas to accept the Trump framework. The second was the operation to capture Gaza City, demonstrating that Israel was willing to return to high-intensity combat and would not halt, despite campaigns for the release of the hostages and despite the “starvation” campaign.
It is too soon to predict how implementation of the agreement will unfold. Still, it can already be said that, if carried out to the letter, it will achieve Israel’s war objectives in full. The process is not without danger—chiefly the question of who will govern Gaza “the day after,” and how to prevent a renewed threat from emerging there. Yet the accord—addressing far broader issues than Hamas’s defeat and the hostages’ return—rests on the principle of peace through strength, long championed by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu. It envisions a new regional reality—one that stands to benefit the State of Israel.[6]
A key distinction sets this agreement apart from past accords signed by Israel: the principle of reciprocity. Hamas has returned the hostages and must now disarm; only then will Israel fulfill its side of the arrangement. It is reasonable to expect that Hamas will do everything possible to dilute the agreement, and Israel’s and America’s determination to enforce the deal to the letter will be the true test of its success.
Returning to the question that opened this essay—Gaza: Until When?—we can now glimpse the answer. The end is in sight. The war could have ended long ago had Israel acted differently, as outlined throughout this paper, but much still remains to be done before the country can find peace and security. As the sages teach in the Ethics of the Fathers: “It is not your duty to finish the work, but neither are you free to desist from it.”[7] Israel’s task now is to internalize the lessons of this war, reform its command structure, and prepare for the challenges that still lie ahead.
[1] See Siboni and Wiener, The Hostages Kidnapped Twice: A Moral–Strategic Analysis of the Hostage Crisis in the Gaza War, JISS, April 24, 2025 (Hebrew)
[2] “Gaza Strip,” Wikipedia (Hebrew), https://he.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?curid=1974140.
[3] See Gabi Siboni and Erez Wiener, Blockade as a Legitimate Method of Warfare (Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security [JISS], August 31, 2025).
[4] See Gabi Siboni and Erez Wiener, Subduing Terrorism through Military Means, JISS, August 24, 2025.
[5] See Siboni and Wiener, The Hostages Kidnapped Twice: A Moral–Strategic Analysis of the Hostage Crisis in the Gaza War, JISS, April 24, 2025 (Hebrew).
[6] See Gabi Siboni and Erez Wiener, From “The Iron Wall” to “Peace through Strength” JISS, July 22, 2025.
[7] Ethics of the Fathers 2:16.
may interest you
“Iran in Light of the Nuclear Talks” – Biweekly Status Report (May 11 – May 25, 2025)
Star Wars Rebooted
The Japan, China, Iran Triangle: Strategic Implications for Israel
Houthi Expansion to the Horn of Africa: Understanding the Nature of the Threat
With Sudan’s Parallel Government Deepening the Divide, Can Common Ground Still Be Reached?
Trump’s Initiative to Normalize Russia and End the War in Ukraine: Initial Strategic Implications
The Palestinian Authority’s ‘Pay-to-Slay’ Reform is a Sham
President Trump’s Gaza Proposal Shifts the Diplomatic Landscape
Colonel (res.) Prof. Gabi Siboni
Prof. Siboni was director of the military and strategic affairs program, and the cyber research program, of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) from 2006-2020, where he founded academic journals on these matters. He serves as a senior consultant to the IDF and other Israeli security organizations and the security industry. He holds a B.Sc. and M.Sc. in engineering from Tel Aviv University and a Ph.D. in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) from Ben-Gurion University. More may be found here. His list of publications may be found here.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Erez Winner
Recent publications
The Presidential Order Initiating Proceedings to Designate Branches of the Muslim Brotherhood as Terrorist Organizations and the Qatari Dilemma
How to Deal with Severe Crime in Israel’s Arab Sector
The New Mechanism for Paying Salaries to Palestinian Prisoners and the Families of ‘Martyrs’ – Public Criticism and Widespread Distrust of Abu Mazen’s Move
By signing up, you agree to our user agreement (including the class action waiver and arbitration provisions), our privacy policy and cookie statement, and to receive marketing and billing emails from jiss. You can unsubscribe at any time.
Sign up for the newsletter
For up-to-date analysis and commentary.