Introduction
Israel cannot allow the ongoing regional war to obscure the threats taking shape inside its own borders. The multi-front campaign is far from over, but the country must also prepare for a different kind of confrontation: the battle for the home front, for rural communities, mixed cities, the Galilee, the Negev, and Judea and Samaria.
The warning signs have been visible for years. Severe violence erupted in Arab cities at the beginning of the Second Intifada in October 2000; rioters blocked main roads were and attacked Jews. By the time of Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021, the threat had grown: severe, coordinated unrest broke out in mixed cities such as Lod, Acre, Jaffa, and Ramla, as well as in additional locations in the Galilee and the Negev. The community of Mitzpe Adi in the Galilee was under siege for many hours, main roads and junctions were blocked, including Shoket Junction in the Negev, leaving pilots unable to reach Nevatim Airbase. These events exposed the gravity of the internal threat faced by Israel. Despite the condemnations voiced by many leaders of the Arab community, the recent terrorist attack near Kochav Yair, carried out by a resident of nearby Tira, provided another painful reminder,
Nationalist violence is only part of the challenge. Serious crime in the Arab sector has become a parallel threat, increasingly spilling over into Jewish cities and communities. A vast industry of weapons smuggling and theft now supplies criminal organizations with advanced weapons that could also serve domestic terrorism.
This threat has become especially acute as the nature of warfare changes. In the past, the defense of frontier communities rested on territorial defense forces. Today, however, the threat has spread across the country, requiring Israel to consider new models of local defense. October 7, 2023, showed how terrorist infiltration into civilian communities can lead to mass slaughter in the absence of an immediate local response. Well-organized and properly equipped community response units saved many lives, but in many places this was lacking.
This paper examines the roots of territorial defense in the pre-state period and traces the system’s erosion over time. It then draws lessons from Operation Guardian of the Walls and October 7, examines the division of authority among the security agencies, and offers practical recommendations for building resilience through proper readiness of the home front.
From Pre-State Self-Defense to Territorial Defense
The concept of territorial defense took shape before Israel’s establishment, when the Jewish community in the Land of Israel was still small and vulnerable. In the 1920s and 1930s, Jewish communities increasingly understood that neither external forces nor British rule could provide sufficient security. Protection against riots and violence would have to rest on armed local forces.
Hashomer, founded in 1909, was the first organization devoted to the defense of Jewish communities. Its armed guards rode on horseback between the agricultural settlements, defending fields, orchards, and villages against robbers and rioters. Hashomer laid the conceptual and practical foundation for Jewish self-defense in the Land of Israel. The Haganah, established in 1920 after the events at Tel Hai and the riots in Jerusalem, crystalized these principles into a more organized form and became the Jewish community’s main defense force. Operating underground, it trained thousands of young people, built secret weapons caches, and protected Jewish communities.
The organization proved its worth during the 1929 riots and the Great Arab Revolt of 1936–1939. Communities such as Gush Etzion, Hulda, Tel Hai, and others became defensive strongholds. The idea was that every community should function as a fortified and organized defensive compound, able to hold out until reinforcements arrived. The Guard Corps, based on local defense forces, was established during the same period.
Local defense was key during the War of Independence in 1947–1949; thousands of residents from the Guard Corps fought alongside the Field Corps and the Palmach, while communities such as Yad Mordechai, Negba, Degania, Kibbutz Dan, and Mishmar Hayarden held out against superior forces. Their ability to provide depth, delay the enemy, and give the IDF time to organize, shaped the thinking of Yigal Allon, the Palmach commander, and informed the defense doctrine he later formulated. After Israel’s establishment in 1948, the state faced a dual challenge: it had to defend long and fragile borders while freeing regular forces for training and future offensives. This understanding led to the formation of two new security bodies:
The first of these was the Border Police. It started out as the “Frontier Corps” in 1949–1950 and in 1953 formally became the Border Police, a police-military force responsible for guarding the borders, preventing infiltrations, and handling routine threats. The second was the territorial defense system, created to defend communities, villages, and the home front. Drawing on the lessons of the War of Independence, Allon treated the communities as a substitute for the geographic depth Israel lacked. In his words: “A dense network of communities, deployed in depth, properly fortified, armed with the best modern weapons, and organized in a solid territorial defense system, can serve as a kind of strategic depth, as a substitute for the geographic depth we do not possess.”
Territorial defense was based on several key principles: community residents formed the core of the force and received the training and weapons needed for that role. Fortifications protected the communities, while forces were organized into blocs and districts subordinate to the IDF’s territorial command. Their mission was to hold out until reinforcements arrived.
Over time, Israel steadily diluted these regional defense units. The geographic depth created by the Six-Day War shifted attention away from territorial defense and toward armor and the air force. Budgets were cut, training deteriorated, and community fortifications fell into decline. The Yom Kippur War brought the issue back to the fore: the evacuation of Golan Heights communities showed that what remained of community-based territorial defense could not stand against the flood of Syrian forces. Partial rehabilitation efforts followed in the 1980s and 1990s, but the rise of terrorism and rocket threats again pushed territorial defense aside in favor of technology and active defense. Neglect of the issue worsened in the years leading up to October 7. In 2019, after numerous incidents in which weapons were stolen from homes and communities, the IDF decided to remove weapons from community response units.
From Guardian of the Walls to October 7
The threat to Israel’s home front did not appear out of nowhere, it developed over time. Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021 was the turning point. Severe, coordinated unrest broke out across Israel on a broad scale. Authorities recorded some 520 incidents involving thousands of Arab-Israeli residents, mainly in mixed cities such as Lod, Acre, Jaffa, and Ramla, as well as in towns in the Galilee and the Negev. Three civilians were killed, hundreds were wounded, including some 306 police officers, and the extent of damage to property reached tens of millions of shekels.
The events revealed a deep vulnerability. Rioters blocked major transportation arteries, attacked Jewish residents, set vehicles on fire, and damaged public property. Mitzpe Adi in the Galilee remained under siege for many hours, while the blocking of the access road to Nevatim Airbase at Shoket Junction made it difficult for fighter pilots to reach the base. These were not merely local disturbances. They reflected a degree of coordination among different actors, fused political protest with nationalist violence, and exposed significant weaknesses in the readiness of the security forces.
The War of Redemption, which began with the events of October 7, 2023, left no room for doubt over the changing nature of the threat to the domestic front. Northern communities, for example, could have faced an invasion by Hezbollah’s Radwan forces without adequate self-defense capabilities.
While Israel’s air defense systems, above all Iron Dome, largely addressed the high-trajectory threat, another threat was growing— the risk of ground raids into communities in the Gaza envelope, along the northern border, in Judea and Samaria, along the seam line, and elsewhere in the country.
After October 7, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad employed shooting attacks, explosive devices, and sabotage as they sought to turn the internal arena into another active front. Between 2024 and 2026, Israeli forces thwarted cell ranging in size from eight to twenty terrorists, who were planning raids on Israeli communities. Central Command’s threat scenarios now include coordinated raids, infiltrations from the Jordanian border, and road blockages—threats that were once seen as negligible but are now very much a possibility.
At the same time, the threat has been compounded by the growth of serious crime in the Arab sector. The year 2025 was the deadliest on record in the Arab sector with 252 murders, some 10 percent more than in 2024. Firearms were employed in about 90 percent of cases. Criminal organizations now possess weapons, including automatic rifles, drones, and antitank missiles that were either stolen from the IDF or smuggled into the country. These weapons do not remain confined to the Arab sector. They can spill over into Jewish communities, mixed cities, and the public sphere, creating potential infrastructure for domestic terrorism.
The worsening threat results from a combination of external drivers—among them incitement, Iranian support, and coordination between terrorist organizations—and serious domestic crime. Operation Guardian of the Walls provided the first warning and on October 7, the threat materialized in full force in the communities of the Gaza envelope. The home front is no longer Israel’s “rear”; it is Israel’s main battleground. Rising to this evolving threat requires a comprehensive doctrine built on strong territorial defense, organized local forces, and a sustained crackdown on crime.
The defense establishment’s traditional focus on external threats is no longer a suitable perspective to deal with the full range of risks facing Israel. Preparing for raids against Israeli communities, whether they originate from its borders or from within requires concrete planning. Conducting a raid does not require advanced technology; it requires determination, familiarity with the terrain, and the ability to exploit shortcomings in defense. On October 7, organized and equipped community response units saved many lives, but where these units suffered from critical deficiencies, heavy losses resulted.
What Needs to be Done?
One of the most serious shortcomings in Israel defense of its rear is the lack of clarity regarding the division of authority among the security agencies responsible for the threat. Internal and regional threats often intersect, leading to significant overlap between the responsibilities of the IDF—through its regional commands or the Home Front Command—and those of the Israel Police and the Border Police. This overlap not only creates operational confusion, it also hampers readiness and coordination of initial response.
The Home Front Command, established in 1992 after the Gulf War, formally oversees home-front defense, civilian emergency management, and coordination between local authorities and the IDF. The regional command handles the defense of border communities, including community response units, defensive measures, and the community defense concept within the command’s area of responsibility. The Israel Police and the Border Police handle public order, disturbances, crime, and domestic terrorism prevention. The Border Police, as a police-military force, often bridges internal security and military missions in complex areas. The Israel Security Agency also carries certain responsibilities in this space, especially intelligence and prevention.
A workable defense concept has to distinguish between different types of communities. Border communities constitute the first category. The second consists of communities in the second line from the border, such as Ashkelon in the south and Kiryat Shmona in the north. The third includes communities along the seam line bordering Judea and Samaria, as well as communities throughout Judea and Samaria. These communities could become targets for raids, including in a scenario in which Palestinian Authority forces turn their weapons on Israel. Every community therefore needs a territorial defense system that includes trained and equipped community response units able to defend communities or neighborhoods independently for several hours, until reinforcements arrive.
Operation Guardian of the Walls exposed the cost of the overlap of responsibilities between the various agencies. The police were overburdened and could not deploy sufficient forces in mixed cities, the Home Front Command was not properly activated, and the IDF was focused on fighting in the Gaza Strip. The result was a vacuum: no one body assumed full responsibility for the initial territorial defense mission.
The coordination model should begin with the frontier communities and extend outward to the surrounding territorial envelope. It should divide responsibilities clearly between the military and the police, integrate and synchronize their activity, and connect both with the rescue services. A National Guard, the establishment of which was approved about three years ago, could play an essential role. Israel should seriously examine whether a national guard should receive overall responsibility for community security, provided it is built and operated with the capabilities and authority required to assume and exercise that responsibility. In our view, Israel needs a National Guard reserve force alongside a small regular core, with a force structure of roughly twenty brigades organized territorially.
Territorial defense units should remain the first layer of defense, subordinate to the regional command. Community response units, by contrast, should operate in routine under local police command and shift to military command during escalation. In order to implement this division, Israel needs to institute reforms and pass legislation defining the lead authority for each type of incident and creating a permanent joint headquarters for all security bodies, along with integrated training and unified information and communications systems.
To deal with the growing threat to Israel’s rear, a comprehensive security concept is required to integrate local forces ( territorial defense and community standby units) into wider framework that includes the military, the Home Front Command, the Israel Police, the Border Police, and the National Guard. Civilian awareness and technological force buildup should reinforce that structure.
The first layer of territorial defense should rest on properly regulated community response units. Since the beginning of the War of Redemption, hundreds of these units have been formed in communities and neighborhoods, but many still operate in a legal and operational gray zone: their authority is unclear, their training is insufficient, and their authority is not clearly defined. A dedicated legal framework should be instituted to cover their official status, purchase of equipment, secure home storage of weapons, insurance and legal liability, and training and exercises. Every community and every urban neighborhood should have a community response unit that is linked to an integrated regional command center. These units are not meant to replace the IDF or the police. Their role is to hold the line until reinforcements arrive—just as communities did during the War of Independence.
Israel must also strengthen and rebuild the broader territorial defense system. It should again treat communities as defensive spaces, giving them fortifications suited to threat scenarios, local warning systems, sensors, cameras, and smart security perimeters, together with mandatory periodic drills together with the IDF, the police, the Border Police, and the Home Front Command. In frontier areas, the territorial defense system, subordinate to the IDF, should be under the regional, as should the community response units and other IDF forces operating in that space.
The National Guard should serve as Israel’s dedicated force for internal security and civilian emergencies. To perform that role, it needs sufficient mass—roughly twenty territorial brigades, deployed throughout the country—built primarily on reserve personnel and supported by a small regular core. Its training should reflect the missions it can be expected to face: nationalist-motivated disturbances, serious crime with security implications, defense of major traffic routes, and assistance with civilian emergency management.
The internal-security effort also depends on a far more forceful response to illegal weapons. Israel needs stronger enforcement against weapons and arms smuggling from Egypt and Jordan and against the illegal weapons that are especially widespread in the Arab sector and pose a grave threat. Law enforcement agencies must seize these weapons punish those who hold them. The current failure to confront serious crime in the Arab sector is simply unacceptable.
Conclusion: Israel Can’t Wait for the Next Commission of Inquiry
Israel now faces an existential campaign, a battle for Israel itself. The country still must contend with complex external threats, but the dangers to the home front are growing. Frontier communities face a range of threat scenarios, while nationalist-motivated disturbances and serious crime spilling over from the Arab sector threaten the wider civilian sphere. These are not theoretical dangers. They materialized during Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021, erupted with catastrophic force in the October 7, 2023, massacre, and continue to surface in violence and crime in Judea and Samaria, the Galilee, the Negev, and in mixed cities.
Israel’s history teaches us an important lesson. Neglecting communities, neighborhoods, and residents themselves has repeatedly left the country exposed to painful blows. Strong territorial defense on the other hand produced the opposite result. In the pre-state period, during the War of Independence, and in Israel’s early years, communities became effective defensive spaces that could hold out under attack and enable the IDF to carry out offensive missions. The failure exposed on October 7 also reflected the gradual erosion of territorial defense, the neglect of community response units, and unresolved overlap between the various security bodies.
The lessons are plain to see. Israel needs regulated community response units and territorial defense forces as the first layer of defense; a trained National Guard of sufficient scale; a determined crackdown on weapons-smuggling and crime; and smart integration of technology together with civilian involvement. Clear legislation, dedicated funding, integrated training, and a defined division of authority among the relevant bodies should anchor the entire effort. Some progress has been made, but substantial work remains.
Israel should take these steps before the next failure produces another fight over a commission of inquiry and its composition, chair, and allocation of responsibility. The current generation has already paid a heavy price. It deserves a state that can defend itself from within: not only with Iron Dome anti-missile batteries and fighter jets, but also with armed, organized, and committed residents, fortified communities, a strong National Guard, and an effective internal-security system.
Israel was founded on the idea of Jewish self-defense. It now has to return to that root principle by securing the country from within. The purpose is to ensure that Israelis can live here safely for years to come, because security within the country itself has become the most important front. Victory in this campaign is not only a security objective; it is an existential necessity. This is a campaign over the future of the State of Israel. The time has come to prepare for it.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
