Iranian media announced on August 3 the creation of a new security body called the “Defense Council”. The new entity will operate under the auspices of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which centralizes strategic military decision-making.

The announcement followed reports by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Fars News of a significant structural overhaul within Iran’s security establishment.  According to these reports, the overhaul would include the establishment of the Defense Council as part of a new governance arrangement in the realm of defense and security. Fars suggested that the Defense Council would focus on “strategic missions of defense policy” without specifying exactly what that means.

The reshuffle occurred just a couple of days after August 1 when Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s top adviser, Ali Larijani, was appointed as the new secretary of the SNSC. The changes are a clear indication of Larijani’s growing power. By contrast, the Defense Council is formally headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, the Council’s secretary has yet to be named. One should bear in mind that the president also chairs the SNSC, making the division of responsibilities even less clear.

The creation of the new security body underscores the limits of the Islamic Republic’s ability to reflect on itself and carry out genuine reforms to address its vulnerabilities. This is mainly because those vulnerabilities stem largely from the strength of informal networks within Iranian politics. It is equally important to understand that the regime’s main goal is not to fix military weaknesses or learn lessons but to preserve its survival by maintaining Khamenei’s rule. 

What is the Defence Council?

The Defense Council is a high-level security body subordinate to the SNSC, which was established in 1989 following a constitutional reform. The SNSC is Iran’s primary decision-making institution for security and foreign policy. Needless to say, all the SNSC’s activities are overseen by Supreme Leader Khamenei. 

The Defense Council consists of the heads of the three branches of power; two representatives of the Supreme Leader; the intelligence minister; the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff; the commanders-in-chief of the IRGC, the Artesh (regular army), and the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, the joint operations command of  all Iran’s military branches. 

Why Now?

The elimination of the top IRGC military commanders by Israel led to the collapse of military centralization during  the war.

Iranian forces failed to coordinate effectively, and not a single Israeli strike was prevented. The dual Iranian military structure, split between the IRGC and the Artesh, was dealt a blow. The IRGC has never been responsible to anyone. At the same time, the Artesh was sidelined.

The IRGC and the Artesh share responsibility, but the structure of cooperation lacks transparency and is not formalized. As a result, the Iranian military has to deal with a dual chain of command. It is unclear who is required to follow the directives of the Tehran General Staff of the armed forces and whose activities are directly overseen by the Office of the Supreme Leader or the Quds Force commander. Even within the IRGC, commanders pursue different approaches. 

Khamenei’s authority has not yet been contested within the Iranian system, but his incapacity to manage war directly became apparent during the twelve-day confrontation with Israel.  Moreover, Khamenei’s health is poor.
 

The move to establish the Defense Council can be seen as an attempt to repair the most evident setbacks and improve the functionality of security decision-making in view of Khamenei’s eventual death and the succession that will follow.

In principle, the overhaul conforms with the law since Article 150 of the Iranian constitution allows the SNSC to establish subordinate bodies, such as a Defense Council, as needed. 

The overhaul comes amid growing concerns over a possible renewed conflict with Israel or the United States, particularly since there is currently no clear outlook for renewed talks between Tehran and Washington on Iran’s nuclear program.  Neither Israel nor the U.S. intends to resume strikes on Iran, but Iranian leaders realize that they have not introduced new countermeasures since the June ceasefire. As a result, fresh Israeli or American strikes may potentially be easier to carry out than the previous ones. At the same time, Iran’s negotiating tactics have yielded no results; no new talks with the U.S. and the E 3 are expected and neither are sanctions likely to be removed.   

A Revival of the Iran–Iraq War Council?

Some media outlets argue that the new Defense Council revives the Supreme Defense Council (SDC), which operated during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). The SDC was formed early in the war and served mainly to coordinate military operations. It later became the predecessor to today’s SNSC, though it had limited decision-making power. For example, it opposed UN Resolution 598 to end the war, yet Iran ultimately accepted that resolution. The main difference is that the old SDC was an ad hoc wartime body, whereas today’s SNSC and, by extension, the new Defense Council are more structured and institutionalized.

Political Reactions

The move has provoked debate inside Iran’s political and media landscapes. Supporters argue that the Council is a logical response to address evident vulnerabilities. Critics, however, warn that it may further shift power away from elected bodies toward executive and military institutions. Arguments for and against the council included:

• Making parliament irrelevant.
  
  Hardline MP Hamid Rasai voiced concerns that parliament could be sidelined after the formation of the Defense Council. “With this approach, the Majlis becomes irrelevant,” he said.
  
  
• Khamenei’s approval is required.
  
  In response, Ali Nikzad, a member of the parliamentary presidium, clarified that the Council would not become operational until it receives approval from Khamenei.
  
  
• “Nothing new.” Some analysts, including Dr Ali Bigdeli, dismissed the controversy, arguing that the formation of the Defense Council is neither new nor extraordinary. “Such councils existed during the war,” he said. “When a country faces the risk of a ceasefire violation and the outbreak of a new war, institutions not directly involved in the war typically do not play a significant role in wartime affairs.”
  
  
• “A necessary move.”
  
  Prominent reformist journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi argued that the new Defense Council could streamline fragmented authority and overlapping duties. He cautioned, however, that its success relies on clear mandates, public trust, and the removal of rival institutions that hinder decision-making. Most importantly, he stressed that the council’s effectiveness depends on appointing credible and innovative members trusted by the public. Without that, he warned, it risks repeating the inefficiencies of other high-level bodies.
  
  
• Vulnerabilities Will Remain. The Defense Council is unlikely to repair the system’s vulnerabilities because it perpetuates the power struggles that are at the heart of Iran’s ongoing security flaws. Rather than resolving issues, the Council expands the influence of Ali Larijani and other veteran politicians who seek greater control over security decision-making. 

High-ranking IRGC officers serve on both the SNSC and the Defense Council, yet their responsibilities remain undefined. The Council does not address the issue of duplication or clarify the opaque chain of command.

Iran’s statecraft is characterized by parallelism—creating new institutions to manage crises while maintaining the Supreme Leader’s overall authority. The Defense Council highlights the flaws of Iranian informal politicking, which often outweighs formal processes. Although the Defense Council has an official structure, its actual purpose is informal. Pro-government narratives frame the establishment of the Council as a technical fix to “address the armed forces’ shortcomings,” but in practice its mission is to centralize crisis authority under the Supreme Leader while spreading the blame for failures across a wider number of actors.

The SNSC emphasizes “security,” while the Defense Council focuses on “defense,” but most real-world incidents involve both (for example, cross-border missile signaling during lulls). This ambiguity reinforces leader-centric decision-making and creates space for extra-bureaucratic actors to intervene. As a result, the Defense Council’s role remains uncertain at best. It represents another step toward normalizing parallel institutions — a pattern in which the Islamic Republic has excelled since its founding. It also remains unclear how the Defense Council will coordinate with the IRGC General Staff. 

The creation of the new security body underscores the regime’s inability to reflect on itself and carry out genuine reforms to address its vulnerabilities. This is mainly because those vulnerabilities stem largely from the strength of informal networks within Iranian politics. It is equally important to understand that the regime’s main goal is not to fix military weaknesses or learn lessons but to preserve its survival by maintaining Khamenei’s rule. 

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