Discussions over the future of the Gaza Strip have been eclipsed by the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran.

Yet keen observers believe that Trump’s Gaza Plan is doomed; no international stabilization force is ready to step in, while Hamas has cowed the proposed technocrat interim government into staying out of the Strip Nickolay Mladenov, the High Representative for the Board of Peace for Gaza has reported to the United Nations Security Council that establishing an effective transitional civilian authority in Gaza is not possible without first overcoming Hamas’s resistance to disarming.

As the war against Iran draws to an end, attention will move to other arenas. Iran’s proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, has been weakened but remains well-armed and holds veto power over the Lebanese government’s decisions. Similarly, Hamas in Gaza has resisted pressure to disarm and remains the de facto ruler of the territory it controls – over 30 percent of the Strip.

Unsurprisingly, terror armies such as Hezbollah and Hamas cannot be eliminated when their ideology commands broad support among the populations in which they operate and when foreign powers lend military aid and political support.

In Israel, the IDF has presented plans to renew its assault on Hamas in order to achieve disarmament and deliver the “total victory” demanded by politicians. Yet this goal is entirely unrealistic. Notably, Israel has not succeeded in eliminating or disarming Hamas in the West Bank, a territory that has been under IDF military control since 1967. Meanwhile, polls consistently show that Hamas remains popular among Palestinians despite the immense suffering brought upon them by the October 7, 2023 massacre . Furthermore, Hamas still has plenty of military hardware, accrued before October 7. According to media reports, Hamas has rebuilt its weapons-smuggling networks to continue its build-up. It is actively recruiting and training new fighters to recover from the blows dealt by the IDF and in preparation for a new Israeli offensive.

While the IDF could take over the entirety of the Gaza Strip – and the prospect of a “decisive” victory is tempting – the wisdom of “finishing the job” is questionable for several reasons.

A conquest of the entire Gaza Strip would make its impoverished population of approximately two million people Israel’s direct responsibility. Preserving the status quo – a divided Gaza – spares Israel this burden, which has already become a challenge for the international community following the adoption of the Trump Plan for Gaza by the UN Security Council. Israel is still seen as responsible for allowing in the flow of humanitarian aid, but this is a responsibility of a smaller order.

A conquest of the rest of Gaza would also transform the IDF, which currently operates in the roughly 60% of Gaza it controls – areas largely empty of civilian population – into an occupation army functioning among civilians who have been educated for years by Hamas to hate Israelis.

This kind of population provides fertile ground for Hamas to wage guerrilla warfare against Israeli forces. A “hearts and minds” strategy to win over the Gazans is not a realistic option for Israel. Any ambitious deradicalization project faces slim prospects of success, requiring a multi-generational timeframe. Israeli energies would be better directed elsewhere.

The multi-front war since October 7, 2023 has been the longest military engagement in Israel’s history. While Israeli society has displayed remarkable resilience during the war and its economy has demonstrated considerable strength, Israelis would welcome a respite.

The current deployment in Gaza – a strong defensive line, providing security to border communities that were in close proximity to Hamas – requires relatively few troops. Reigniting the Gaza front would necessitate a significant reserve mobilization and would be costly in both lives and resources. The case for a full takeover of  Gaza is not compelling enough at a time when Israelis are longing for some degree of normalcy.

A divided Gaza that leaves Hamas in control of a portion of the territory would also preserve the schism within the Palestinian national movement, Israel’s principal long-term adversary, which shows little sign of moderating its deep hostility toward the Jewish state. This approach reflects Israel’s Gaza strategy following Hamas’s expulsion of the Palestinian Authority from the territory in June 2007. That separation policy weakened the Palestinian national movement and its push for statehood, which is currently opposed by a large majority of Israelis who are not convinced that the Palestinians can become a reliable neighbor in the foreseeable future.

October 7, 2023, did not represent a failure of the separation policy per se. Rather, the failure lay in the IDF intelligence branch’s complacency and, more broadly, in Israel’s policy of restraint and containment.

The separation strategy wrongly embraced a “quiet for quiet” approach, tolerating recurrent missile attacks on its civilian population while allowing Hamas to substantially expand its military capabilities.

Israel failed to act aggressively enough to prevent that buildup. In a protracted and intractable conflict, “mowing the grass” – using military force periodically to degrade enemy capabilities, restore temporary deterrence, and extend the intervals between violent confrontations – is the only viable approach to adversaries, whether hostile states, terrorist organizations, or terrorist armies.

This concept offers no definitive endpoint and no decisive victory. It requires ongoing vigilance and periodic action, while acknowledging that the threat may always reemerge. In Gaza, Israel neglected this imperative.

A Hamas-controlled enclave in Gaza is therefore a bearable outcome,  provided Israel remembers to “mow the grass” frequently enough. It also frees the IDF from occupation duties, which carry their own costs and complications.

Finally, restraint in Gaza may spare Israel the reflexive international criticism that so often greets its use of force, criticism that frequently rests on aversion to war and a fundamental misreading of the situation.

In parallel, it behooves Israel to clarify that it has no intention of annexing the parts of Gaza it controls and opposing the humanitarian response to Gazans in distress.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.