Abstract

The October 7, 2023, attacks and the war that followed – known in Israel as the Swords of Iron War – confronted Israel not only with an extraordinary security challenge but also with a prolonged international contest over the meaning of those events. In the process, a substantial gap emerged between the way most Israelis understood the events and the way they were perceived by audiences outside Israel.

Much of the literature and public debate in Israel attributes the shortcomings of Israeli hasbara to external factors that are particularly salient in Israel’s case, including antisemitism and anti-Zionism, political interests, hostile media environments, and disinformation. Other explanations emphasize functional shortcomings, including slow responses, inconsistent messaging, inadequate resources, the erosion of the Foreign Ministry’s standing, and weak interministerial coordination.

This article argues that underlying these explanations is a more fundamental twofold failure in Israel’s influence system. The first is epistemological and conceptual: influence is understood primarily as a matter of explaining and justifying Israel’s conduct through facts, while “hasbara” functions as an umbrella term that creates conceptual ambiguity and blurs distinctions among public affairs, public diplomacy, strategic communications, influence operations, and narrative management. The second failure is organizational and is closely related to the first: conceptual ambiguity both feeds and perpetuates difficulties in allocating responsibility and distinguishing among the professional functions that make up the influence domain.

The article first examines the epistemological and conceptual foundations of “hasbara” and the linguistic ambiguity associated with the term. It then analyzes the organizational structure of Israel’s influence system, focusing on how conceptual ambiguity shapes division of responsibilities, authority, and operating practices. Three comparative cases – NATO, Ukraine, and Germany – then illustrate different approaches to organizing influence. NATO demonstrates a professional conceptual framework that distinguishes among substantive functions and links those distinctions to organizational responsibilities. Ukraine illustrates the role of civilian leadership in giving political and normative meaning to military information and shows how a broad network of governmental and civil-society actors can disseminate a common narrative through a multilayered but coherent effort. Germany demonstrates the contribution of institutional distance, intermediary organizations, and long-term relationships to trust and credibility.

On the basis of these findings, the article cautiously proposes four principles for reforming Israel’s influence system: (1) shifting from a logic of explanation to one of strategic influence; (2) developing a differentiated professional conceptual framework in which strategic communications replaces “hasbara” as the overarching concept for external influence, with a clear distinction beneath it between public diplomacy and public affairs; (3) redesigning the organizational division of labor to reflect that conceptual change, principally by transforming the National Public Diplomacy Directorate into a Strategic Communications Directorate that functions as a policy, staff, and coordination body rather than an operational agency, strengthening the Foreign Ministry as the lead agency for public diplomacy within that framework, and refocusing the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit on fact-based military public affairs rather than public diplomacy; and (4) cultivating an ecosystem of academic and cultural institutions, experts, creators, professional communities, and other actors that can work from a shared set of core messages while retaining appropriate independence.

Introduction

The October 7, 2023, attacks and the Swords of Iron War confronted Israel not only with an extraordinary security challenge and a national tragedy, but also with a continuing struggle over the meaning of those events in the international arena. Hamas’s attack involved a large-scale infiltration of communities in southern Israel, the mass killing of civilians and soldiers, and the abduction of more than 250 people (Israel Defense Forces, 2024). In Israel, the attack was widely perceived as an unprecedented event requiring a large-scale military response. Public-opinion data reflected that view: a 2024 survey found substantial support for continuing military operations, with many Israelis believing that even tougher measures were warranted (Silver & Smerkovich, 2024). Yet from the earliest stages of the war, it became clear that this domestic conviction that Israel’s response was justified did not automatically translate into legitimacy abroad. The contest over international perceptions between Israel and terrorist organizations is asymmetric: Israel devotes substantial effort to justifying its military actions and to “educating” international audiences, while Hamas and similar actors operate within a broader narrative in which Palestinians are cast as victims and Israel as the aggressor (Siman-Tov et al., 2023).

This is not a marginal problem. The delegitimization of Israel is a growing global threat. The “narrative which evolves over time… has intensified over the years. It tends to flare up prominently during periods when Israel conducts high-intensity operations against its adversaries—Operation “Sword of Iron” serves as a contemporary example… This delegitimization has gained traction in increasingly diverse and expanding circles. Consequently, it exerts influence on decision-makers in states and organizations worldwide, even on those who are fundamentally allies or partners of Israel. Such decision-makers impose restrictions on Israel’s actions, diminishing the legitimacy of its operations and responses. This phenomenon has immediate implications during wartime, such as constraints on arms supplies, diplomatic actions against Israel, and other areas. However, its impact is not limited to wartime alone. In peacetime, this delegitimization undermines Israel’s ability to take preventive measures against its adversaries, weakens its deterrence capabilities, and, in the long term, negatively affects its economic and diplomatic relationships” (Matania, 2026, p. 21).

Few dispute that Israel has struggled to counter this growing delegitimization campaign (Schleifer & Snapper, 2014, pp. 1–6). Part of the explanation lies in a varying combination of factors: Palestinian victimhood narratives, modern antisemitism, the association of Israel with colonialism and/or occupation, the number and diplomatic weight at the United Nations of Muslim-majority states and their allies that are hostile to Israel, and domestic and international political interests in many countries (Gilboa, 2006, pp. 730, 735; Schleifer & Snapper, 2014, pp. 90–91; Lederman, 2023, Matania, 2026, Klutstein, 2025).

Important as these explanations may be, they are insufficient. Over the past three decades – particularly since the Oslo Accords, the outbreak of the two intifadas, and the return of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to center stage – a succession of policy papers, studies, and audit reports has identified both Israel’s inadequate response to the intensifying delegitimization campaign and persistent functional failures in its hasbara system, including the absence of unified management and a clear political objective over time; poor coordination and an unclear division of responsibility among the various hasbara bodies; the absence of a clearly designated lead figure and lead agency; weak interagency coordination; unsynchronized messaging; the erosion of the Foreign Ministry’s standing; inadequate resources, particularly compared with those allocated to other security challenges; and the excessive dominance of the IDF Spokesperson in the hasbara effort. Some of these studies have also proposed ways to reform and improve both the system itself and Israel’s broader effort in the domains of perception and influence (State Comptroller of Israel, 2007, pp. 453–455, 461–463; State Comptroller of Israel, 2012, pp. 109–116; State Comptroller of Israel, 2016, pp. 820–823, 850–851; State Comptroller of Israel, 2020, pp. 955–958; Siman-Tov et al., 2023; Tor & Dayan, 2026; Gilboa, 2006, pp. 735–739; Hadari & Turgeman, 2018; Schleifer & Snapper, 2014, pp. 6–9; Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, p. 40).

Researchers and publications examining the weaknesses and challenges of Israel’s hasbara^[1] system have also drawn attention to the use of “hasbara” as an overarching term encompassing public diplomacy, public affairs, public relations, and the development and promotion of narratives. The word hasbara (in Hebrew: הסברה) comes from the verb “to explain,” with the connotation of education or justification. Historically, this usage emerged from assumptions associated with the Zionist movement and prominent Israeli statesmen: if Israel was in the right, clear explanation of its position should be sufficient to overcome delegitimization campaigns and harsh criticism. Other concepts from the broader influence field have since entered Israeli professional usage – notably public diplomacy, which the Foreign Ministry adopted to describe part of its activity – but “hasbara” has not disappeared from either Israeli discourse or institutional practice. It remains embedded in Hebrew institutional names and continues to function as a broad organizing term for Israel’s external communications and influence efforts. The government’s official English name for the body established in the Prime Minister’s Office after the Second Lebanon War is the National Public Diplomacy Directorate; importantly for the argument developed here, its Hebrew name retains the term hasbara. Siman-Tov and Fridman (2020) likewise identify the absence of an overarching and coherent strategic communications framework in Israel and argue for a shift from traditional hasbara thinking toward a more holistic approach to influence (Tor & Dayan, 2026; Gilboa, 2006, pp. 735–736; Jędrzejewska, 2020; Schleifer & Snapper, 2014, pp. 3–5; Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, pp. 20–21, 3535–37, 42).

This article adds another dimension to that discussion by arguing that the conceptual vocabulary through which Israel approaches international influence is related to the organizational structure through which it operates. We show how the epistemological-conceptual and organizational failures are interconnected and together help explain persistent problems in Israel’s hasbara system. This connection also helps explain why limited organizational reforms may fail to produce deeper change when they are not accompanied by greater clarity regarding the objectives, functions, and organizing concepts of the influence system. The article therefore asks: How does the epistemological and conceptual ambiguity surrounding “hasbara” relate to, and shape, the organizational structure and operating patterns of Israel’s influence system?

The article proceeds in four stages. First, it presents the epistemological and conceptual foundations of the term “hasbara” and the linguistic ambiguity associated with it. It then analyzes Israel’s organizational structure, with particular attention to how conceptual ambiguity affects the division of responsibilities, authority, and operating practices. Next, it examines three comparative cases – NATO, Ukraine, and Germany – which illuminate different approaches to structuring influence systems. Finally, drawing on the theoretical and comparative discussion, it cautiously proposes initial principles for conceptual, terminological, and organizational reform of Israel’s influence system.

“Hasbara”: Language and Conception

“Hasbara” is one of the principal terms Israel uses to describe its efforts to influence audiences at home and abroad. Prima facie, the word appears straightforward: it denotes explaining, clarifying, and presenting Israel’s position. Yet that apparent simplicity can encode a limited conception of influence – the assumption that there is a truth, or an Israeli position, that merely needs to be presented clearly to an audience that has failed to understand it. “Hasbara” thus carries a didactic logic: Israel knows; the world does not understand; therefore, Israel must explain. That logic may be appropriate in contexts centered on the transmission of information, but it is less adequate in an international influence environment characterized by intense competition over narratives, perceptions, identities, emotions, and identification, in which messages are processed through preexisting perceptual, cognitive, and linguistic frames (Siman-Tov et al., 2023; Gilboa, 2006, p. 735; Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, pp. 19–21, 26, 36–37, 39; Miskimmon et al., 2013, pp. 11–12, 119,120, 125).

Historically, “hasbara” was developed under distinctive political and social conditions. The Zionist movement and the young State of Israel needed to mobilize international support, explain and legitimize the Zionist project, present their positions and policies to foreign audiences, and contend with the image of a small and threatened state in the Middle East (Rotman, 2024, p. 218; Gilboa, 2006, p. 735; Jędrzejewska, 2020, p. 111; Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, p. 21). The historical development of the term “hasbara” was also connected to a desire to distance these activities from “propaganda,” which acquired strongly negative connotations during the twentieth century because of its association with totalitarian and manipulative practices. Western institutions increasingly preferred terms with positive connotations. In Israel, the shift from “propaganda” to “hasbara” helped frame influence activity as rational and morally grounded: not manipulation, but explanation proceeding from the assumption that Israel’s position was justified (Schleifer & Snapper, 2014, pp. 3–5; Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, pp. 20–21).

The public diplomacy literature emphasizes that international influence in the twenty-first century cannot rest solely on one-way information transmission. It requires relationship-building, listening, adaptation to target audiences, the cultivation of trust, credible messengers, and the ability to connect policy to a broader normative framework (Melissen, 2005, pp. 21–22; Miskimmon et al., 2013, pp. 11–12, 121). In its classical formulation, soft power rests not on coercion but on the ability to make a state’s policies or values attractive, legitimate, or worthy of support (Van Ham, 2005, p. 52; Nye, 2008, pp. 94–95). States therefore compete not only over facts but also over the interpretive frameworks through which facts acquire meaning. Strategic narratives connect events, identities, values, objectives, and interests, enabling audiences to understand not only what happened but what it means and why, in light of the information available, they should support one side rather than another. The existence of an objective reality does not eliminate the interpretive role of narratives; rather, narratives shape how actors perceive and understand that reality (Miskimmon et al., 2013, pp. 5–7, 22–23, 89). Facts, even when accurate, do not operate in a vacuum but are received through preexisting moral and political frames. Strategic narratives can therefore form part of a long-term framework serving national-security and other strategic objectives (Miskimmon et al., 2013, pp. 120–121). Target audiences, in other words, do not constitute a “tabula rasa.” Their existing assumptions and interpretive frameworks must be considered as part of the strategic and political calculus of influence.

By framing much of its public diplomacy and influence activity through “hasbara,” Israel tends to privilege explanation and policy justification through evidence: videos, legal documents, and operational data concerning threats, weapons, and operatives that have been neutralized or destroyed (Siman-Tov et al., 2023; Gilboa, 2006, p. 735; Miskimmon et al., 2013, pp. 123–126). As a democracy, and given Israel’s particular circumstances, Israel must communicate credibly and transparently. Neither credibility nor transparency, however, determines by itself how audiences interpret messages. Target audiences approach events through different frames, including those relating to colonialism, human rights, civilian harm, and unequal power relations. Military facts presented in isolation may therefore often fail to unsettle those frames; the meaning attributed to evidence depends in part on how audiences interpret it (Miskimmon et al., 2013, pp. 125–126). The security establishment’s dominance in the public diplomacy effort may at times even reinforce a security-centered frame, because the messenger can be perceived as part of the institution that is itself under criticism (State Comptroller of Israel, 2012, p. 109; Hadari & Turgeman, 2018, pp. 492–493; Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, p. 40).

The problem is not the use of facts itself. Rather, facts presented without context or an interpretive framework can become a substitute for narrative instead of elements within a story that gives them meaning and connects past, present, and future (Mor, 2012, pp. 413–414; Miskimmon et al., 2013, p. 7). An effort centered mainly on rebutting allegations and justifying actions can become trapped in a reactive pattern, devoting resources to immediate problems and to countering frames and narratives that have already begun to take hold among target audiences (Melissen, 2005, p. 21; Miskimmon et al., 2013, p. 114). Public diplomacy and strategic communications, by contrast, can work proactively and over the long term by building trust, preparing audiences, explaining principles, exposing disinformation methods, establishing interpretive frameworks through which future events can be understood with greater nuance, and planning themes and messages in advance (Nye, 2008, pp. 101–102; Melissen, 2005, pp. 21–22; Miskimmon et al., 2013, pp. 114, 169–170).

The tendency to place facts and justification at the center of influence efforts is, among other things, a manifestation of the conceptual failure. The issue becomes clearer when “hasbara” is compared with established English-language professional terminology. For the purposes of this article, three categories are particularly important: two principal communications functions and an overarching coordinating framework. Public affairs primarily concerns the timely provision of official, accurate, and credible information and engagement with the public and the media. Public diplomacy focuses on engagement with foreign audiences, the development of mutual understanding, trust, and legitimacy, and the cultivation of long-term relationships. Strategic communications, by contrast, is a broader integrative framework intended to align policy, actions, messages, and narratives and to coordinate the activities of different bodies in pursuit of strategic objectives (NATO, 2009; Paul, 2011, pp. 3–8, 14; Reding et al., 2010, pp. 7–12).

Modern Hebrew does not yet provide sufficiently stable and broadly accepted professional equivalents for these terms. Terms corresponding roughly to “spokesperson work” or “public relations” are sometimes used for public affairs, but neither fully captures its professional meaning. “Public diplomacy” is established in academic and professional usage yet remains less firmly embedded in broader public and policy discourse. “Strategic communications” is likewise used by some institutions but has not displaced “hasbara” as an agreed organizing concept; in practice, different institutions continue to work with different terms and approaches (Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, pp. 20, 41–42). As a result, distinct activities are often subsumed under the same umbrella. Military public affairs, digital campaigns, public relations, diplomacy, legal advocacy, countering antisemitism, psychological operations, crisis communication, and narrative management all have distinct professional meanings, yet Israel’s diffuse use of “hasbara” obscures those distinctions. The problem is not any general lack of expressive richness in Hebrew. It is the absence, in the fields of state communications and influence, of a sufficiently professional, stable, coherent, and institutionalized conceptual system capable of expressing these distinctions systematically.

Israel’s Organizational Structure as an Expression of the Conceptual Problem

The Israeli government’s influence activities are not conducted by a single executive body with clear hierarchical authority and a unified chain of command. Responsibility is distributed among several institutions, foremost among them the National Public Diplomacy Directorate in the Prime Minister’s Office, the Foreign Ministry and its missions abroad, and the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit. Other ministries and agencies also participate, particularly the Ministry of Strategic Affairs and the Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, both of which make substantial contributions to the effort. At the same time, any review of government activity should not obscure the significant role played by Israeli and foreign civil-society organizations and online influencers that operate outside the government and are not directed by it. We return to these actors below when considering alternative approaches to influence.

Institutional plurality is not inherently a problem, provided that the participating bodies share a conceptual framework, have clearly defined roles, and operate through effective mechanisms of coordination and professional dialogue. Modern strategic communications systems necessarily involve multiple actors: no single institution can simultaneously conduct public affairs and public diplomacy, conduct audience research, counter disinformation, and manage crises. The Israeli problem is that this plurality has not consistently rested on clear conceptual and functional distinctions. Over time, the result has included overlapping responsibilities, weak working interfaces, gaps in information-sharing, and disputes over authority and resources (State Comptroller of Israel, 2012, pp. 109–115, 125–128; State Comptroller of Israel, 2016, pp. 820–822, 827–830; Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, pp. 42–43).

Because the purpose of this section is not to survey Israel’s entire hasbara system but to identify the relationship between conceptualization and institutionalized government practice, the discussion focuses on the three principal bodies noted above. The first is the National Public Diplomacy Directorate in the Prime Minister’s Office—the government’s official English rendering of the Hebrew institutional name, which retains the term hasbara. The body was established by a 2007 government decision to formulate hasbara policy and coordinate the work of government hasbara bodies and relevant actors beyond government (Prime Minister’s Office, 2007; Rotman, 2024, p. 219). Its location in the Prime Minister’s Office was intended to provide a government-wide perspective, access to senior decision-making forums, and the ability to integrate communications considerations into policymaking (Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, pp. 24–25). The government also established a National Hasbara Forum, chaired by the head of the Directorate and composed of representatives of relevant bodies, to coordinate government activity (Prime Minister’s Office, 2007; Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, p. 25).

The fact that a body established after the turn of the millennium still uses the term hasbara in its Hebrew name points to a conceptual and messaging problem: coordination requires first defining what, exactly, is being coordinated. Is the task media messaging, public diplomacy, narrative management, counter-disinformation, or alignment between policy and communications? The government decision, for example, also assigns the forum responsibilities during emergencies and addresses communication with domestic audiences. The same institutional framework therefore deals with both domestic and international hasbara. The former can involve explanation in the ordinary sense – for example, providing information needed to keep schools, local authorities, and other systems functioning during emergencies – whereas the latter is a multilayered influence effort directly at foreign audiences. Applying the same Hebrew label to both and assigning the same body a leading role across activities that require substantially different skills and expertise reflects a conceptual-organizational problem rooted in an expansive and outdated use of hasbara. It also makes it harder to specify the substantive and organizational functions the system requires.

The Foreign Ministry is another central actor and Israel’s principal civilian government institution for public diplomacy. Its comparative advantages include familiarity with foreign audiences; engagement with foreign governments; sustained work with media in Israel and abroad; relationships with academic institutions, civil-society organizations, and communities around the world; and the capacity to cultivate long-term relationships (State Comptroller of Israel, 2016, pp. 819–824, 833–835; State Comptroller of Israel, 2020, pp. 961–965; Gilboa, 2006, pp. 737–738; Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, pp. 35–38). Over time, the Ministry developed a professional infrastructure for influence activity and trained personnel with substantial field experience. Its standing nevertheless eroded as responsibilities were fragmented among government bodies, budget constraints intensified, and its involvement in some foreign-policy and decision-making processes declined. This impaired its ability to sustain continuous international activity, including long-term projects and partnerships with target audiences, although relations between the Ministry and other bodies in the hasbara system improved to some extent (Eiran, 2018; State Comptroller of Israel, 2016, pp. 821–824; State Comptroller of Israel, 2020, pp. 962, 965, 966–967, 1038). Here too, conceptual ambiguity has organizational consequences. When public diplomacy is placed under the umbrella of “hasbara,” the Foreign Ministry’s distinctive professional advantages are blurred. Relationship-building, listening to audiences, developing trust, and adapting messages to target audiences and cultural contexts can then be perceived as secondary to rapid media responses or the dissemination of official messages (Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, pp. 35–38).

The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit is another major component of Israel’s hasbara system and has long played a central role in communicating with audiences at home and abroad (Magen & Lapid, 2018, p. 287). In wartime, the Unit has direct access to operational information and documentation, can produce and distribute material from the battlefield, and can respond rapidly across traditional and digital media platforms (Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, pp. 27, 30–32). Functionally, several of its core responsibilities fall within the realm of military public affairs: providing official information about military activity, maintaining relations with the media, and responding publicly to events.

In practice, however, the IDF Spokesperson’s role extends beyond military public affairs and affects the shaping of Israel’s political and international messages and narratives. Military public affairs can provide essential information, but it cannot substitute for civilian public diplomacy. The literature has described this development as the militarization of Israeli public diplomacy: weakness in civilian policymaking created an institutional vacuum filled to a significant extent by the IDF, and particularly by the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, giving security considerations greater weight relative to diplomatic and political considerations. This can complicate engagement with foreign audiences because the military identity of the messenger may itself shape the way international audiences receive the message (Hadari & Turgeman, 2018, pp. 486–488, 491–494). The result has been growing involvement by the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit in public diplomacy and in direct engagement with target audiences at home, abroad, and among adversary audiences (Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, p. 37).

The prominence of the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit reflects more than institutional power; it also follows from the conceptual logic of “hasbara.” When influence is defined primarily as explaining and presenting facts, the institution that possesses operational information naturally assumes a central role. If the mission is instead defined as building trust, relationships, and a long-term civilian narrative, the center of gravity should shift toward civilian and diplomatic institutions. Critical audiences, especially when the subject is civilian harm or human rights, may regard a military spokesperson as representing the institution whose conduct is under scrutiny and may therefore accord that messenger less credibility than a civilian interlocutor. The organizational and conceptual problems are thus intertwined: understanding hasbara principally as explanation reinforces a structure in which military information becomes a source of legitimacy.

These problems have recurred at different points in Israel’s history. During the Second Intifada and Operation Defensive Shield, Israel struggled both to respond rapidly to hostile narratives gaining traction in international media and to integrate factual information into a broader and consistent interpretive framework (Gilboa, 2006, pp. 726–727, 735–736; Hadari & Turgeman, 2018, p. 488). The Second Lebanon War exposed discrepancies among the messages issued by different institutions and weaknesses in the formulation and integration of a common national hasbara strategy (State Comptroller of Israel, 2007, pp. 451–453; Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, p. 24). Establishment of the National Public Diplomacy Directorate did not fully resolve these difficulties. The division of responsibility remained partly ambiguous, staffing was limited relative to the scope of the Directorate’s tasks, and sustained coordination during emergencies remained difficult (State Comptroller of Israel, 2012, pp. 109–115, 120–122). The conceptual problem compounded these organizational shortcomings: the organizing terminology remained vague, leaving no agreed professional framework for defining the division of labor among the constituent bodies (Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, pp. 41–42).

These cases suggest that organizational reform alone is unlikely to suffice unless it also redefines institutional missions, functions, and relationships. Creating a coordinating body or transferring authority between ministries does not necessarily solve the underlying problem if the institutions continue to operate under a broad umbrella concept that fails to distinguish among key activities such as media response, public diplomacy, narrative management, and overarching strategic coordination (Hadari & Turgeman, 2018, pp. 486–489; Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, pp. 41–42). Conceptual ambiguity may therefore help explain why, even when institutional reforms have been implemented, operating patterns have often remained reactive and message-centered, particularly during emergencies, when the system relies heavily on organizations with the fastest access to immediate information.

The Swords of Iron War brought these difficulties into sharper relief. Israel operated in an intensely visual and emotional communications environment in which images, videos, legal claims, and moral narratives circulated rapidly across traditional and digital media. Presenting evidence and rebutting allegations were necessary, but they did not always produce a broader and coherent account adapted to the perceptual and linguistic frames of different audiences or capable of competing with the volume of hostile information and messaging directed at Israel (Siman-Tov et al., 2023). The IDF Spokesperson became particularly prominent in international media during the war and one of the figures most closely associated with Israel’s external communication effort (Siman-Tov et al., 2023; Agence France-Presse, 2023). Although the Unit’s efforts produced important results, its prominence, combined with the relative weakness of civilian actors, meant that much of the framing and mediation of the war occurred through a military lens that was not equally suited to every target audience (Rotman, 2024, p. 221).

The digital environment can further amplify the military framing because visual content, emotion, and speed of dissemination play a central role in determining which events gain traction and how different audiences interpret them (Miskimmon et al., 2013, pp. 112–113). The IDF has an inherent advantage in access to original visual material, including footage from body cameras and drones and intelligence imagery (Siman-Tov & Fridman, 2020, pp. 27, 30–32). That access is indispensable for providing information and rebutting false claims. At the same time, it can draw the influence effort toward tactical and operational framing – tunnels, weapons, and targeted strikes – rather than toward a broader civilian and political narrative (Rotman, 2024, p. 221; Hadari & Turgeman, 2018, pp. 493–494). Magen and Lapid (2018) found that the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit adapted to changes in the communications environment primarily at the tactical level, without a fundamental conceptual shift. Controlling documentation and its dissemination, however, does not amount to controlling the meaning audiences attach to it. Evidence is rarely so unequivocal that it forecloses alternative interpretations, because audiences encounter events through different cultural and political frames (Miskimmon et al., 2013, pp. 125–126; Mor, 2012, p. 418).

Israel’s government structure is therefore more than a decentralized collection of institutions with overlapping authority. It also reflects how the state conceptualizes influence. So long as “hasbara” encompasses a wide range of tasks, conceptual ambiguity will continue to impede a stable division of labor among information provision, relationship-building, narrative management, and strategic coordination. Organizational reform cannot therefore consist solely of creating another institution or transferring authority. It must also provide conceptual clarity by defining the functions the system requires, the purpose of each function, and the body responsible for carrying it out.

Comparative Cases: NATO, Ukraine, and Germany

This section examines three comparative cases. The purpose is not to identify models that Israel should simply copy. For reasons that lie beyond the scope of this article, Israel’s circumstances differ fundamentally from those of the cases examined here because it faces a degree and breadth of hostility that are unusual among democratic states. The comparison instead seeks to illuminate the Israeli case from three different angles, which, taken together, offer a broader view of possible approaches to influence. NATO highlights the importance of doctrinal differentiation among communications and influence functions while integrating political and military dimensions within a common organizational framework. Ukraine demonstrates the value of shared core messages, civilian leadership of political and values-based frameworks, and a wartime combination of state activity and civil initiatives. Germany underscores the importance of institutional distance and the contribution intermediary organizations can make to the credibility of public diplomacy. Together, the three cases provide an in-depth perspective on the different ways in which influence activity can be organized and managed.

NATO is a multinational political-military alliance and therefore differs substantially from a small sovereign state such as Israel. That difference is precisely what makes it useful for comparison. NATO demonstrates how a complex organization operating across member states, armed forces, civilian audiences, and operational theaters has developed a professional communications vocabulary that distinguishes among different capabilities while providing a framework for coordinating them. NATO’s 2009 Strategic Communications Policy defined Strategic Communications as an overarching framework for the coordinated use of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Military Public Affairs, Information Operations, and Psychological Operations in support of Alliance policies, operations, and activities and in pursuit of its objectives (NATO, 2009; Paul, 2011, pp. 3–9; Reding et al., 2010, pp. 7–12).

The value of this framework lies not simply in the number of terms it employs, but in the functional distinctions among them. Public Affairs and Military Public Affairs provide information and maintain relations with the public and media in civilian and military contexts. Public Diplomacy encompasses the Alliance’s civilian communications and outreach efforts to build awareness and understanding and foster support for its policies, operations, and activities. Information Operations is primarily a military operational function that coordinates and synchronizes activity in the information environment to produce desired effects, while Psychological Operations more directly seek to influence the perceptions, attitudes, and behavior of designated target audiences. These functions differ in their purposes, authorities, tools, and rules of operation even when their audiences or operating environments overlap to some degree (NATO, 2009, paras. 2, 5–9; Reding et al., 2010, pp. 7–12). Strategic integration does not require erasing the boundaries among these functions; it requires coordinating them within common policies and objectives. Maintaining these distinctions also helps protect the credibility of overt public affairs, whose integration with influence activities can otherwise blur professional boundaries. NATO therefore demonstrates how a professional terminology can serve as an organizing mechanism for assigning responsibility and defining working relationships.

Ukraine offers a closer comparison in terms of the pressures under which influence efforts take place. Like Israel, it is a democratic state facing a major security threat, hostile Russian influence operations and disinformation, and dependence on international legitimacy, including diplomatic, military, and economic support (Nilsson & Ekman, 2024, pp. 24, 35–36). Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine has been comparatively successful in establishing a narrative framework readily intelligible to Western audiences, linking its struggle against Russian aggression to democracy, freedom, sovereignty, and integration with the West (Nilsson & Ekman, 2024, pp. 41, 46, 48). That framework does not replace military information; it gives such information political and moral meaning. Ukraine’s operational updates, battlefield documentation, and appeals by public figures, political leaders, and online influencers are embedded within a broader story. President Volodymyr Zelensky plays a central role in defining and leading this civilian and political framework (Nilsson & Ekman, 2024, pp. 41–42).

One of the defining features of the Ukrainian case is the role of the civilian leadership in the political framing of the war and in the presentation and dissemination of core messages and narratives. Zelensky has used recorded addresses and direct appeals to foreign parliaments and decision-makers. An analysis by the European Parliamentary Research Service found that he tailored his speeches to specific audiences while maintaining consistent messages concerning Ukraine’s humanitarian tragedy and military needs (Del Monte, 2022). Zelensky has played – and continues to play – a major role in Ukraine’s system, becoming the central symbol of its “One Voice” policy. This system has been described as a “communications pyramid” in which core messages are first articulated by the president and then amplified and developed by ministers and other bodies. Yet the system has not revolved around a single person or a single message. It has remained institutionally diverse and has also incorporated bottom-up flows of information and initiatives from civil society. The resulting division of labor is complementary: the military supplies information and updates from the front; civilian actors generate information and initiatives; and civilian political leadership gives that information broader political and strategic meaning (Nilsson & Ekman, 2024, pp. 41–42, 47–48).

The networked and decentralized nature of Ukraine’s influence effort enables two-way communication between state institutions and civil society around shared strategic messages (Nilsson & Ekman, 2024, pp. 41–42). Government institutions are not the sole disseminators of the narrative. Public figures, journalists, cultural figures, civil-society organizations, creators, individual citizens, and online influencers also participate. This diversity of voices allows common messages to be expressed in different forms and contexts without losing their broader framework. During the war, Ukraine’s public diplomacy community expanded to include citizens acting as “civilian diplomats,” while joint projects involving state authorities, civil society, and the business sector contributed to Ukraine’s international presence and image. Some of this activity can be described as People-to-People (P2P) civilian diplomacy (Rotman, 2024, p. 222; Sukhorolskyi & Sukhorolska, 2024, pp. 272–273, 280–281). The Ukrainian case therefore suggests that wartime strategic communications need not depend on a single spokesperson or absolute message uniformity. They can instead rest on a central narrative flexible enough to be expressed by different actors through the voices, tools, and platforms best suited to them (Nilsson & Ekman, 2024, pp. 41–42, 48).

Germany presents a different case. The historical legacy of Nazi propaganda has fostered sensitivity to the concentration of state influence mechanisms and to forms of government communication perceived as manipulative. German public diplomacy therefore relies heavily on intermediary organizations, including cultural, academic, and scientific institutions and programs for student and researcher exchanges. These bodies maintain ties to the state while retaining a degree of institutional distance. That arrangement allows Germany to build relationships and influence without every activity appearing to be a direct government messaging campaign and supports the presentation of Germany as a democratic state committed to dialogue and peace (Zöllner, 2020, pp. 256–263).

A central feature of Germany’s foreign cultural and educational relations and public diplomacy is the use of intermediary organizations that are affiliated with the state and receive state support while retaining institutional distance and a degree of professional autonomy. They include the Goethe-Institut, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and other organizations active worldwide in language, culture, education, and research. The German government presents these organizations as partners in strengthening ties among civil societies rather than as government communications units subject to direct control over every message. The state finances a substantial share of their activity, establishes strategic frameworks and broad objectives, and recognizes their contribution to foreign policy. At the same time, the organizations retain substantial responsibility for designing their own programs and projects. That autonomy enhances their credibility and enables them to develop long-term relationships with local audiences without necessarily being perceived as direct arms of the German state (Bundesregierung, 2020, pp. 5, 7–9, 20, 55–59; Zöllner, 2020, pp. 256–263).

This institutional distance is consistent with a broader understanding of public diplomacy as a process built on dialogue, engagement, and long-term relationships (Melissen, 2005, pp. 21–22). Cultural programs, language study, student exchanges, and academic cooperation create sustained interaction with foreign audiences. Influence in this model does not depend solely on communicating a particular government position; it also develops through personal and professional relationships and through the trust accumulated by the institutions and individuals that sustain them. The German case thus suggests that relinquishing some direct state control and maintaining institutional distance between government and intermediary organizations can strengthen long-term international influence (Zöllner, 2020, pp. 256–257, 260–263).

Discussion

The three case studies represent different but complementary approaches to managing communications and influence in the international arena. NATO demonstrates how a professional conceptual framework can define distinct functions and the mechanisms needed to coordinate and integrate them. Ukraine shows how operational facts can be incorporated during wartime into a broad networked civilian and political narrative. Germany illustrates how institutional distance and long-term relationships can strengthen credibility and sustained influence. The common denominator is that an effective system need not concentrate all activity in a single body or impose absolute message uniformity. It does, however, require functional differentiation, clearly assigned responsibility, coordination and integration, and a multiplicity of actors.

The lesson from NATO is not that Israel should reproduce the Alliance’s organizational structure but that it should adopt the principle of functional differentiation. The principal role of military public affairs should, as the term suggests, be to provide accurate and credible information about military activity without becoming conflated with operational influence efforts or with the broader task of building political legitimacy. Conceptually, the system must distinguish among functions; organizationally, those distinctions must translate into defined spheres of authority and clear boundaries of responsibility. The relevance to Israel lies in the need to coordinate among security, political, diplomatic, and civilian bodies operating simultaneously in the communications and policy arenas. The difference is that Israel’s use of “hasbara” often obscures precisely the distinctions that NATO doctrine seeks to preserve among public affairs, public diplomacy, strategic communications, and operational influence activities.

Any comparison with Ukraine must begin with a fundamental distinction. Many Western audiences have understood Ukraine principally through the frame of an interstate invasion, whereas Israel operates within a protracted conflict marked by greater historical, legal, and reputational contestation. That difference does not invalidate the comparison; if anything, it sharpens the need for Israel, like Ukraine, to distinguish between operational facts and the broader process through which those facts are communicated and embedded in the larger story surrounding them. This requires a clearer distinction between military public affairs and civilian narrative-building as part of public diplomacy and public relations conducted within a broader civilian and values-based framework. In Israel, military information can become the core of the hasbara effort. In Ukraine, by contrast, the military is an essential source of information and documentation, while civilian political leaders have played the leading role in articulating the overarching story and core messages, which are then disseminated through multiple voices in both top-down and bottom-up flows.

When Israel’s external influence effort is organized primarily around “hasbara,” rather than around a coherent civilian narrative that is tailored to different audiences, maintains consistent core messaging, and gives operational facts political, moral, and strategic meaning, the structure of the effort becomes poorly matched to the nature of the challenge. The same problem arises when the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit moves from supplying authoritative military information to leading parts of the broader influence effort. In terms of the twofold failure developed in this article, the Ukrainian case shows that the conceptual problem concerns not only which facts are presented but how those facts acquire meaning within a broader civilian and values-based story. Organizationally, the military can serve as a central source of information and documentation without also becoming the principal institution responsible for formulating the overarching political narrative or presenting it to international audiences. Those functions should be led primarily by civilian political and diplomatic institutions, alongside independent civil-society actors.

The comparison with Germany is important from an Israeli perspective because it shows that credible influence need not be concentrated in the hands of a government or military spokesperson. Civilian, academic, cultural, and professional organizations may in some contexts sustain more credible and durable relationships with foreign audiences. Israel often relies heavily on official representatives as the principal voices of the state, yet some younger, liberal, or otherwise critical audiences may approach governmental or military spokespeople with skepticism, particularly when the messenger is identified in advance with the position of the government or the security establishment. At the epistemological level, the German example therefore illustrates that influence is not synonymous with control over messaging. It can emerge through sustained relationships, language study, exchanges of students and researchers, and cultural cooperation that builds trust and creates social and professional networks. Conceptually, the German model distinguishes official government information from broader public diplomacy; organizationally, it demonstrates how institutional distance can protect the credibility of messengers.

Four complementary principles for reforming Israel’s influence apparatus emerge from this comparative discussion:

The first is a conceptual shift: Israel should move from an approach centered on explanation and rebuttal toward the broader logic of strategic influence. This does not mean abandoning truth, facts, or transparency. On the contrary, credibility is a prerequisite for effective influence. Facts, however, need to be embedded within a civilian and political narrative that explains not only what Israel is doing but why it matters, the values and interests in which those actions are grounded, and how they relate to the interpretive frames and sensitivities of international target audiences.

The second is a terminological shift. Israel should stop using “hasbara” as an umbrella term for the spectrum of state influence activity. For activities directed at foreign audiences, it should consider replacing “hasbara” with strategic communications as the overarching concept, while retaining hasbara in its literal sense of explanation for domestic information functions – for example, communicating practical information to the public during emergencies.

Strategic communications would provide a more precise overarching framework for setting influence objectives for different audiences in accordance with government policy, selecting appropriate methods, assigning responsibility to different organizations, and synchronizing their activities. Two principal communications functions should be clearly distinguished within that framework. The first is public affairs, including public information and media relations, whose core role is to provide accurate, credible, and timely information and maintain relations with the public and the media. The second is public diplomacy, whose purpose is to build trust, relationships, support, and legitimacy among foreign audiences over time through activity adapted to their cultural and social contexts. These distinctions should be reflected in policy documents, professional training, organizational structures, and academic discourse in Israel.

The digital age makes such differentiation even more important. Digital public diplomacy has evolved from a model of broadcasting relatively uniform messages to broad audiences toward one that requires content, language, style, and platform to be adapted to the characteristics and preferences of particular audiences (Manor, 2019, pp. 12–13, 120–123). The digital environment has fragmented information consumption across networks, communities, and sources, while making user interaction and redistribution part of the communications process itself. Among younger audiences, trust in social media may in some contexts exceed trust in traditional media (Rotman, 2024). At the same time, users tend to consume sources that are closer to their existing views, although social networks can also expose them to opposing perspectives (Flaxman et al., 2016, pp. 313, 317–318).

The third principle is organizational reform derived from, and consistent with, the conceptual and terminological shift. The function of coordinating domestic public information should be institutionally distinguished from the function of leading external strategic communications. Accordingly, we propose transforming the National Public Diplomacy Directorate in the Prime Minister’s Office into a Strategic Communications Directorate whose primary role would be policy formulation, staff work, integration, and coordination rather than direct operational execution. The change in name would signal the conceptual shift and clarify the body’s purpose. Its authority should not extend to controlling every message. Rather, it should define the strategic framework and core messages, develop an overarching narrative within which different bodies can engage their respective audiences, establish a clear division of labor, coordinate across ministries, connect policy with communications, and preserve room for independent civilian actors. The Foreign Ministry and other civilian bodies should be strengthened as centers of expertise in target audiences, culture, language, long-term relationships, and civilian narrative – that is, public diplomacy. The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit should remain a central and authoritative source of operational information within the military public affairs function, especially during wartime. At the same time, its mandate should be defined more clearly: (1) It should provide relevant information to bodies responsible for broader influence and public diplomacy; (2) It should remain institutionally distinct from the civilian public-diplomacy function.

Despite the differences among the cases, both Germany and Ukraine underscore the importance of strengthening the civil-society sphere that complements government activity. This sphere has expanded in Israel in recent years. The lead coordinating body should therefore develop mechanisms for making relevant information available to nongovernmental actors without turning them into extensions of the state, thereby enabling them to develop academic, cultural, technological, professional, and social partnerships and relationships with civil-society organizations while retaining operational independence. The fourth principle is thus a substantial networked expansion of the influence system beyond government. Organizational reform asks how responsibilities should be divided and institutions coordinated; network reform asks the broader question of who should be considered part of the influence ecosystem in the first place. Ukraine’s wartime experience illustrates a whole-of-society model in which government bodies, civil-society organizations, private-sector actors, and individuals combine planned coordination with spontaneous initiatives. Germany, in a different institutional context, likewise combines state support with institutional distance, professional autonomy, and room for maneuver among civilian bodies.

We therefore propose understanding Israeli influence as an ecosystem in which the state operates alongside online influencers, social activists in Israel and abroad, influential figures in civil society and the cultural sphere, Jewish and Israeli communities in the Diaspora, technology companies, researchers, academics, entrepreneurs, creators, and other actors. Calling for a stronger civilian sphere does not imply that such a sphere does not already exist. Israel and the Diaspora already have an extensive network of civil-society organizations and social initiatives, some operating on a substantial scale and with a high degree of professionalism. The challenge is to improve the interfaces between these actors and state institutions while preserving their independence.

Conclusion

Israel’s ability to engage effectively with different audiences in the international communications and influence arena is an important component of its diplomatic power and its capacity to pursue national objectives. Public opinion, public discourse, and narratives shape attitudes toward Israel and its actions in routine periods and, especially, in wartime, and can, over time, entrench norms and perceptions. Some of those perceptions are hostile to Israel despite extensive efforts to counter them. Their effects extend across sectors, shaping how actors in academia, industry, and government relate to Israeli counterparts. They can also affect elected officials and political leaders, including the political space available to support and back Israel, identify with it, or adopt hostile positions toward it. More broadly, Israel’s ability to conduct a global influence effort that differentiates among audiences and modes of action and allocates responsibilities effectively among institutions is relevant not only to its international standing but also to its broader freedom of action. This becomes increasingly important if Israel seeks not merely to react to its environment but to act as a regional semi-power capable of shaping its regional and international strategic environment.

This article argues that developing an influence effort of the sophistication Israel requires and building the institutional “muscle” needed to sustain such an effort must begin with recognition of the twofold failure of Israel’s influence system. The first is epistemological and conceptual: influence is understood primarily as explanation and justification, while the term “hasbara” obscures important professional distinctions. The second failure is organizational, both linked to and reinforced by the conceptual failure: the resulting ambiguity makes it harder to allocate responsibility among different bodies and functions. In other words, before addressing the familiar shortcomings of Israel’s hasbara apparatus in execution, budgeting, or coordination, Israel must understand and reform the way it conceives, defines, and organizes influence efforts. The October 7 attacks and the Swords of Iron War did not create this problem, but they exposed with unusual force Israel’s difficulty in operating in an arena where security, an overwhelming flow of competing messages, legitimacy, narratives, and perceptions are deeply intertwined.

The first part of the article examined the epistemological and conceptual foundations of “hasbara.” It showed that the term rests heavily on a logic of explanation, justification, and factual presentation and that Hebrew uses it as an umbrella term for professional functions that differ fundamentally from one another. Distinguishing among public affairs, public diplomacy, and strategic communications demonstrated how linguistic ambiguity hinders not only the precise description of influence activities but also the definition of objectives, target audiences, and measures of success. The article then analyzed the organizational structure of Israel’s influence system and the way this same conceptual ambiguity affects the allocation of responsibilities among the various bodies within the system. The analysis showed that when disparate tasks are all understood as part of “hasbara,” the system struggles to distinguish among essential influence functions, perpetuating both reactive operating patterns and the dominance of particular institutions.

The comparative section examined three cases that illuminate distinct but complementary dimensions of Israel’s problem. NATO demonstrated the value of a conceptual system that defines and differentiates between substantive functions and, correspondingly, organizational responsibilities. Ukraine illustrated both the role of civilian leadership in giving military information political and values-based meaning and the possibility of disseminating a common narrative through a broad network of government and civilian actors, creating an effort that is diverse and multilayered yet coherent. Germany showed how institutional distance, intermediary organizations, and long-term relationships can contribute to trust and credibility.

On the basis of these findings, four complementary directions for reform were proposed: a transition from a doctrine centered on explanation to one centered on strategic influence; development of a differentiated professional conceptual framework; redesign of the organizational division of labor to reflect that conceptual change, centered on a Strategic Communications Directorate responsible for policy and coordination across Israel’s international influence system as a staff and coordinating body rather than an operational agency, a strengthened Foreign Ministry leading public diplomacy within that framework, and an IDF Spokesperson’s Unit focused on fact-based military public affairs rather than civilian public diplomacy; and cultivation of an ecosystem of academic and cultural institutions, experts, creators, professional communities, and other actors working from shared core messages while retaining appropriate independence.

Daniel Chernomorets and Ezra Finkelstein are students in the M.A. program in Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. Eviatar Matania is a professor at Tel Aviv University’s School of Political Science, Government and International Affairs and heads its M.A. program in Security Studies.

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[1] Hasbara (Hebrew: הסברה; literally, “explanation”) is retained in transliteration because no single English term fully captures its historically specific Israeli meaning and institutional usage. We use hasbara without quotation marks when referring to the Hebrew word in its ordinary sense or when discussing institutional name that contain it in Hebrew; we use “hasbara” in quotation marks when treating it explicitly as an umbrella concept for a range of Israeli influence activities.