The brief but intense military clash between India and Pakistan in May 2025 (known in India as “Operation Sindoor”), sparked by the deadly terror attack at the Pahalgam resort, highlighted the tightening alliance between Ankara and Islamabad, marked most visibly by Turkish President Erdoğan’s outspoken support for Pakistan. This alignment did not go unnoticed in New Delhi; on the contrary, it sparked widespread public anger. Calls for a boycott of Turkish products gained traction, and senior political figures voiced support for harsh diplomatic measures against Ankara. Turkey, whose long-standing ties with Pakistan are well known, deepened its involvement in the campaign against India by supplying military equipment—including advanced domestically produced drones—dispatching a warship to Karachi as a deterrent, and spearheading psychological warfare efforts online and through the media. This active role underscored the urgent need for India to rethink its approach to Turkey, not only in terms of deterrence but through broader geostrategic alternatives. In this context, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Cyprus (June 15–16, 2025), followed by a trip to Croatia, served as both a practical and symbolic milestone on the path to building strategic—and economic—ties in the Eastern Mediterranean, including with Greece. For Israel, whose unique relationships with both the Hellenic states and India position it as a natural partner, this shift offers a range of promising opportunities.

Rising Tensions Between Delhi and Ankara

India–Turkey relations have long experienced ups and downs. On one hand, both countries have made repeated efforts to strengthen trade ties; on the other, tensions over Pakistan and the Kashmir issue have flared from time to time. The most recent low point came in 2019, after India revoked Article 370 of its constitution, which had granted special autonomy to the Jammu and Kashmir region. Ankara’s sharp condemnation of India’s actions at the United Nations sparked a diplomatic crisis. It reflected Erdoğan’s self-appointed role as defender of Muslim interests, wherever they may be, his disapproval of India’s shift in Kashmir policy, and his well-known willingness to adopt confrontational positions. In response, the Modi government pursued punitive measures: canceling the prime minister’s planned visit to Ankara, halting defense exports, and scrapping a $2 billion arms deal that had been in the works.

Turkey’s alignment with Pakistan isn’t the only factor driving India’s growing interest in the Eastern Mediterranean. Other developments have played a key role, including India’s entry into the I2U2 quadrilateral forum (India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States), launched in October 2021, which held its first leaders’ summit (partially via Zoom) during President Biden’s visit to Israel in July 2022. Another milestone was Indian tycoon Gautam Adani’s purchase of the Haifa port in January 2023. A close ally of the Modi government, Adani’s move signaled deeper Indian investment in the region. Since then, New Delhi has clearly begun to expand its presence through this emerging diplomatic framework, which also includes strengthening ties with Cyprus and Greece—both of which have long-standing territorial and ideological disputes with Turkey. India’s growing footprint in the region is taking shape through military, infrastructure, and economic partnerships, the most ambitious of which is the IMEC vision (India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor), a major initiative aimed at linking India to Europe via the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, including Israel.

Shaping the Indo–Mediterranean Concept

Alongside the shared economic and strategic interests that bind India and key Eastern Mediterranean countries, including Israel, there is also a foundational alignment in values, rooted in their identities as democracies. Together, these factors create a natural incentive to advance regional cooperation. As of 2024, annual trade between India and Mediterranean states stands at roughly $80 billion. These strong commercial ties have laid the groundwork for deeper collaboration across multiple industries, including renewable energy and digital technology. Such steps reflect India’s readiness to expand its regional footprint and offer meaningful solutions—such as the IMEC initiative, which is expected to bolster India’s maritime security, reduce its reliance on vulnerable trade routes, and provide faster connectivity at lower logistical cost. Once completed, IMEC will integrate Mediterranean economies into a broader transport and commercial network. The project is also viewed as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which likewise seeks to establish a strategic foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean as a gateway to Europe.

Policymakers in Delhi are increasingly embracing the “Indo–Mediterranean” concept as a guiding strategic framework. This idea reflects the growing recognition of a strategic connection between India and the Eastern Mediterranean, grounded in shared geopolitical and economic interests. At the heart of the discussion lies what is being called the “Indo-Abrahamic construct”—a model that envisions a political, cultural, and economic axis linking India with countries representing the three major Abrahamic faiths: Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. According to this emerging concept, the model serves both as a geostrategic framework and as a cultural bridge—one that promotes dialogue and cooperation between two regions with deep historical ties.

The Existing Diplomatic Infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean

In this context, the regional alignment Israel has built with countries in the region offers fertile ground for expanding India’s involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Israel–Greece–Cyprus trilateral framework, established through a series of summits beginning in 2016, has proven effective thus far. It facilitates broader cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean across a range of areas—energy, security, climate change preparedness and mitigation, and emergency response. Although the initiative originated on the Hellenic side, the Israeli government quickly recognized its strategic potential and took steps to institutionalize and expand the partnership, including the establishment of a permanent secretariat. In May 2025, Israel and Cyprus announced new energy development projects under the IMEC framework and highlighted the trilateral forum’s importance in reinforcing the achievements of the Abraham Accords. It is worth recalling that the United Arab Emirates—which also maintains close ties with India—joined the “Paphos Forum” in April 2021, alongside the foreign ministers of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel.

Israel’s flourishing ties with Cyprus and Greece since 2010 have to an extent stemmed from the deterioration of its relations with Turkey. In many ways, these ties were a response to the collapse of key security and economic components in the wake of the rupture with Ankara. Turkey, for its part, views the emergence of this trilateral axis as a threat to its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean—and as a barrier to Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions. Ankara has difficult relations with all three partners: it refuses to recognize the Republic of Cyprus and has obstructed efforts to resolve the Turkish occupation of the island’s north; frictions with Greece continue, including the reassertion of Turkish maritime claims in the Aegean and over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) borders with Greece and Egypt; and its ties with Israel have steadily deteriorated since Erdoğan came to power. This understanding has driven Turkey to countermeasures across the Mediterranean Basin, including support for Hamas and intervention in Libya.

It’s Time to Bring India into the 3+1 Forum

The United States has formally expressed its support for the emerging regional alignment by establishing the 3+1 format (with the U.S. as the “plus one”), which convenes periodically. Although there have been repeated calls for India’s inclusion in various frameworks of the 3+1 forum—including a proposal by the Greek prime minister as early as September 2023—India has yet to take part in any official capacity. At a joint press conference in Nicosia on March 20, 2024, alongside Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides stated: “We reaffirmed our strong commitment to the 3+1 format with the United States and agreed on the value of intensifying 3+1 cooperation, with concrete deliverables also with other countries and we talked specifically about India.” During Netanyahu’s subsequent visit to Cyprus in May, he once again emphasized his desire to bring India into the projects under discussion and noted that he had already brought the matter up with his Indian counterpart.

Conditions have now matured for this to happen. Turkey’s support for Pakistan in May 2025 triggered a chain reaction of geopolitical consequences—from which Israel, too, can reap benefits. India’s inclusion in the 3+1 format would help solidify Israel’s place in the region and strengthen its identity as a Mediterranean state, while also shaping regional architecture that bolsters Israel’s national resilience. This comes at a moment when the war (including the escalation with Iran) has underscored the strategic and logistical importance of Cyprus and Greece to Israel, highlighting the need to safeguard its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and preserve both political and security stability.

Against this backdrop, India, whose strategic relationship with Israel until recently focused mainly on defense purchases and occasional joint air exercises, is now becoming a central pillar in Israel’s security policy. The dynamic is evolving beyond the traditional supplier–customer relationship: India now plays an increasingly active and influential role in multiple theaters, from the Gulf to the Mediterranean. Defense ties have also become a two-way street, as demonstrated following the events of October 7. In the wake of Operation Sindoor, Israel now faces a unique opportunity to deepen its ties with India and promote regional stability through proactive diplomacy.

Advancing India’s participation in the Israel–Greece–Cyprus forum—which New Delhi has publicly expressed openness to, even if it did not initiate the move—could significantly expand the power base of the Eastern Mediterranean alignment and serve as a major counterweight to Ankara. Beyond the clear benefits in infrastructure and trade, this initiative is emerging as a strategic step that addresses the shared interests of all involved.

The Security Dimension of the Regional Alignment

Israel and Greece currently maintain close defense ties, including weapons transfers, long-term training programs, and joint exercises. Israel also supplies arms to Cyprus, which has, inter alia, acquired an advanced air-defense system produced by Israel Aerospace Industries capable of intercepting threats at a range of 150 kilometers. Until the outbreak of the “Swords of Iron” war, Cyprus regularly hosted large-scale training exercises for Israeli commando and special forces units, using topographical scenarios specifically designed to prepare the IDF for operations deep inside Lebanon’s mountainous terrain. Back when it was on its high horse, Hezbollah even attempted, unsuccessfully, to warn Cyprus not to serve as a strategic fallback for Israel in the event of an escalation in the northern arena or the disruption of activity at Haifa Port. Given Lebanon’s geographic proximity to Cyprus, the island was indeed within range of rockets, missiles, and loitering munitions with a range of about 250 kilometers (a 300-kilometer range would suffice to strike most of the island).

As an isolated island state, Cyprus is constantly seeking allies to help it confront Turkey, its regional rival. In this context, India could emerge as a meaningful partner, especially in the area of arms supply, given its growing defense exports.

In parallel with Greece’s strong security ties with Israel, India and Greece also share close military cooperation, including joint training exercises that give Indian Air Force pilots hands-on experience against F-16 fighter jets, which the Pakistani Air Force also possesses.

The consolidation of the “Indo–Mediterranean” concept also gives India a direct stake in protecting assets within Israeli territory that came under attack during the Israel-Iran confrontation. Given that the Haifa port is currently under Indian ownership, India’s interests are now directly exposed to regional threats.

The Challenge of Islamist Terrorism

Another critical area for multilateral cooperation is the fight against terrorism. Although Cyprus is today a strategic ally of Israel, in the past it was considered by the Israeli intelligence community to be an unwilling hub for terrorist activity. Some of these elements remain active on the island. The growing security cooperation between Israel and India in this region could significantly enhance counterterrorism efforts, particularly in light of Iran’s increasing use of Pakistani operatives. 

 One such case occurred in 2023, when two Pakistani nationals were arrested for plotting high-profile attacks on Israeli targets. According to estimates, most of these operatives enter Europe illegally, primarily via Turkey. In October 2021, Cypriot police apprehended a terrorist cell consisting of five Pakistanis and one Azerbaijani national who were planning to target Israeli businesspeople in Cyprus. These operatives were directed by Iranian elements, who frequently recruit proxies outside their borders. 

Such incidents highlight the urgent need for tighter multilateral coordination, especially in the realm of intelligence sharing. Moreover, the terrorist attack in Pahalgam underscores the importance of reassessing Pakistan’s activities in Greece and across Europe, as well as the dangerous implications of illegal migration. This includes identifying vulnerabilities in Europe’s asylum system, border surveillance regimes, and the visa regime in the Schengen Area.

India Can Help Cyprus and Greece Withstand Anti-Israel Pressure

Although Cyprus has not signaled any intention to reconsider its ties with Israel following the “Swords of Iron” war, it is nonetheless subject to a variety of external pressures. At the outbreak of hostilities, Cyprus faced several challenges, including international criticism over the legitimacy of some Israeli operations carried out from its territory, which serves as Israel’s logistical rear and as a transit hub for people and goods in emergencies. Hezbollah and Turkey issued threats over the possibility of Cypriot assistance to Israel in the event of a broader escalation. Israel must remain sensitive to these pressures and do what it can to mitigate them. India’s participation in such a forum could help ease the intensity of criticism directed at Cyprus.

The combination of public calls in India for a boycott of Turkey and the shifting dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean has created a strategic opening for India to assert influence, not just deterrence. By strengthening its ties with Cyprus and Greece (and farther up the Adriatic coast, with Croatia), and in coordination with Israel, India can counterbalance the deepening alignment between Turkey and Pakistan, expand its reach in the Mediterranean, and secure its stake in the IMEC corridor. Given Israel’s close ties with both India and the Hellenic states, it is a key player in any such initiative. Moreover, Jerusalem maintains active communication channels with Ankara due to the volatile situation in Syria, positioning it to mediate and manage risk in ways that New Delhi may well need, should new rounds of fighting erupt. India’s entry into the 3+1 format (Israel, Greece, Cyprus, and the United States)—a forum opposed by Turkey—would send a clear geopolitical signal without triggering direct confrontation, in keeping with the character of Indian foreign policy. More broadly, this is an opportunity for India not just to react to global developments, but to help shape them. Such a move would bolster democratic partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean and support the strategic priorities of both the United States and Israel in the region.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.