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Iran at War: Internal and International Fronts in the Shadow of Operation Rising Lion (June 12-22, 2025)

Iran Israel Illustration - Operation Rising Lion

In the International Arena

On June 21, the United States attacked the nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan with a combined attack assault using and cruise missiles and air force bombers.[1] As of June 22, the precise outcome of the operation remains unclear, but senior U.S. officials have declared it a success: The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that targeted sites suffered “extensive damage and destruction.”[2]

Following the American strike, Iran may consider measures to block the Strait of Hormuz. A senior IRGC official stated June 22 that Iran “intends to close the Strait of Hormuz, but a final decision will be made by the Supreme National Security Council.”[3] Still, the door to diplomacy does not appear to be entirely shut. On the morning after the strike, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi asked, “How can Iran return to the negotiating table that Israel and America have destroyed?””[4] Yet just a few hours later, he struck a more moderate and conciliatory tone, saying, “It is naturally too early to judge whether diplomacy can still take root and flourish. Our position remains that we will not engage with the United States until the Israeli aggression stops. However, in light of the new circumstances, new decisions must be made.” Araghchi also emphasized the U.S. role in enabling the Israeli assault, stating, “We were in the middle of negotiations with the United States when they forced Israel to attack Iran.”[5]

In parallel to the disputes over a resolution to the crisis, Iran has been advancing claims that Israel is committing war crimes by targeting its nuclear program.[6] Tehran is also seeking to justify its own responses to Israeli strikes under the framework of the United Nations Charter.[7] These justifications come even as Iran has launched attacks on Israeli population centers, including a strike on Soroka Medical Center. Araghchi addressed the incident directly, claiming that the hospital “was primarily used to treat Israeli soldiers who participated in the genocide in Gaza, which lies twenty-five miles away.”[8] As a rule, the Iranians claim they are targeting military and security sites that Israel has deliberately placed in the midst of civilian population centers.

Disputes with the IAEA

Tensions between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have sharply escalated in recent weeks, driven in part by Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities during the war. Whereas Iran previously maintained a complex yet consistent dialogue with the agency, it has now begun to voice open hostility toward the IAEA’s leadership—questioning its professional integrity and portraying its latest reports as biased documents that serve to “legitimize Israeli” attacks.

In an official letter to the UN Security Council on June 21, 2025, Iran issued sharp criticism of IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi. According to Iran’s ambassador to the UN, Grossi failed to meet the professional standards required of his role—particularly in light of his response, or lack thereof, to the recent Israeli strikes on facilities that Iran claims are “intended for peaceful purposes.”[9] This line of attack is part of Tehran’s broader effort to cast itself as an innocent victim that is that target of military actions—while international institutions remain silent or complicit.

The criticism has not remained confined to the diplomatic arena. On June 19, Ali Larijani, an adviser to the Supreme Leader, also lashed out at Grossi and the IAEA. He cited Grossi’s own admission that the agency had no evidence Iran was actively pursuing nuclear weapons and questioned why, in that case, a negative report had been issued against Iran.[10] Iranian rhetoric peaked when former foreign minister and vice president Mohammad Javad Zarif publicly called for Grossi to be prosecuted in an international court. Zarif claimed that Grossi’s “irresponsible and misleading” report provided the justification for Israeli aggression, which, in his view, led to the deaths of innocent Iranian civilians.[11]

The Network Arena

Cyber attacks

The cyber domain has become an active front in the ongoing conflict. On the Iranian side, there have been reports of cyberattacks targeting Israeli satellite control stations, communications networks tied to the defense industry, government and national infrastructure, and even webcam systems,[12]and more [13]  As of now, these reports have not been independently verified by non-Iranian professional sources. One group in particular, known as “Handala”—an Iranian outfit operating under the guise of a Palestinian entity—has shown high levels of activity online, targeting a wide array of Israeli systems, primarily in the business sector.[14]

On the Israeli side, there have been no official reports of cyber operations. However, a pro-Israel hacker group has claimed responsibility for several major attacks: the disruption and shutdown of Sepah Bank’s databases,[15]an attack on Bank Pasargad (BPI)[16] (though it remains unclear whether it followed the same pattern as the Sepah breach), and the theft of tens of millions of dollars in cryptocurrency from the Novitex crypto exchange.[17] Iranian officials have acknowledged that all three incidents occurred—adding credibility to the claims. In the case of Sepah Bank,[18] it was reported that customers would be serviced through alternative banks.

At this stage, the pro-Israel cyber front appears primarily focused on operations that exacerbate Iran’s internal governance crisis, rather than on attacks tightly coordinated with kinetic strikes against Iran’s nuclear or missile infrastructure, as some media reports have suggested. Iran, for its part, is concentrating on disrupting Israeli capabilities, conducting espionage, and launching cyber operations aimed at undermining Israel’s civilian home front. In addition to these visible attacks, it is likely that both sides are also employing covert offensive cyber capabilities for intelligence collection and clandestine sabotage.

Internet Blocking

Throughout the early days of the hostilities, Iran has imposed sweeping and severe internet shutdowns. According to NetBlocks, the outage recorded on June 19 was among the most extensive since 2019—more severe even than those during the Mahsa Amini protests in 2022–2023.[19] The Ministry of Communications acknowledged the restrictions but claimed they were intended to prevent “malicious Israeli activity.” Internet blackouts [20] are a familiar tactic used by the Iranian regime during moments of potential domestic volatility, such as protests or disasters (for example, the April 2025 explosion at the Shahid Rajaee port). On June 20, it was reported that, for the first time, the Ministry had permitted Iranians abroad to contact relatives inside the country via domestic messaging platforms.[21]

The Public Arena

Iranian authorities have made a concerted effort to highlight the public’s resilience and composure amid the hardships of war. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated, “We know the situation is very difficult right now, but I believe conditions in Iran are good. The solidarity of the Iranian people is exceptionally strong. Our armed forces are also performing well in defending themselves. What we are doing now is exercising our legitimate right to defend ourselves against the aggression and unjustified attacks of the Zionist regime.”[22] The Israeli strike on Iran’s national broadcasting authority received wide coverage on social media. The regime seized the moment to accuse Israel of targeting purely civilian institutions [23] and to present the broadcaster as the voice of reason in Iran, resisting Israel’s attempts to sway public opinion.[24] The anchorwoman, who remained on air until the moment of the explosion, is being portrayed by the regime as a model figure.

Following the attack, a wide range of essential services in Iran were either disrupted or feared to be at risk. These include healthcare,[25], fuel supply[26], banking and payment systems,[27]as well as the supply of food[28]and medicine[29]. In addition, reports noted heavy traffic congestion on routes out of Tehran[30] as large numbers of residents sought to flee the capital amid Israel’s heavy bombardment.

The Activity of the Financial System

Amid the ongoing fighting, Iran’s economy has endured repeated shocks, even as the regime has made visible efforts to project a sense of relative stability. On June 21, a government spokeswoman emphasized that the country had not yet tapped into its strategic commodity reserves, citing the import of roughly 74,000 tons of basic goods in a single day.[31] On June 14, the Central Bank announced it would allocate $1 billion for the purchase of essential goods to prevent shortages.[32]

Iran’s stock exchange has remained closed throughout the hostilities and, as of June 22, is expected to stay closed. There have been no official statements regarding a timeline for reopening as long as the war continues.

The Regime’s Approach to Suspected Collaborators with Israel

The Iranian authorities have intensified efforts to crack down on suspected Mossad activity inside the country, particularly in the wake of the opening salvo of Operation Rising Lion (June 12–13). The Supreme National Security Council declared that “any action in support of the Israeli regime will be met with severe punishment.”[33] The intelligence minister added that the state would “deal decisively with the few traitorous infiltrators collaborating with the enemy.”[34]
At the same time, Tehran is attempting to coax suspected collaborators into turning themselves in by offering clemency. The Tehran Prosecutor General announced that “a limited window is open for those who were deceived into working with the Zionist enemy: these individuals have until tomorrow [June 22] to benefit from the mercy of Islam and come forward.”[35] The national police chief echoed the appeal, stating, “My message to these traitors is: if you feel the enemy misled you, there is still time to return.”[36]


[1]https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-under-missile-attack-iran-says-all-options-open-after-us-strikes-2025-06-22/

[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg9r4q99g4o

[3] https://t.me/sepah_quds/182094

[4] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/04/01/3340087

[5] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/04/01/3340329

[6] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/03/30/3338985

[7] https://www.irna.ir/news/85864857

[8] https://www.radiofarda.com/a/isarel-iran-attacks-iran-facilities/33441705.html

[9] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/03/31/3339159

[10] https://www.radiofarda.com/a/isarel-iran-attacks-iran-facilities/33441705.html

[11] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/03/29/3338326

[12] https://www.iranintl.com/202506202863

[13] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/03/29/3338452

[14] https://t.me/CyberSecurityIL/7254

[15] https://www.iranintl.com/202506185925

[16] https://nournews.ir/fa/news/229088

[17] https://www.iranintl.com/202506185925

[18] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/04/01/3339942

[19] https://www.radiofarda.com/a/isarel-iran-attacks-iran-facilities/33441705.html

[20] https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6504360

[21] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/03/30/3339006

[22] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/03/31/3339437

[23] https://www.irna.ir/news/85865413

[24] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/03/26/3336804

[25] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/03/25/3335768

[26] https://www.ilna.ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-3/1652789-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AE%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%88%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%A2%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%87%DB%8C%DA%86-%D9%85%D8%B4%DA%A9%D9%84%DB%8C-%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%85

[27] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/03/29/3338165

[28] https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6504506

[29] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/03/30/3338661

[30] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/03/31/3339216

[31] https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6506758

[32] https://cbi.ir/showitem/32512.aspx

[33] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/03/26/3336802

[34] https://www.iribnews.ir/fa/news/4548996

[35] https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6507011

[36] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1404/03/26/3336660


JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.


Picture of Dr. Avi Davidi

Dr. Avi Davidi

Dr. Avi Davidi is a senior Research Fellow at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) and the Elrom Air and Space Research Center, Tel Aviv University. With over 36 years of experience in U.S.-Israel-Iran relations, strategic intelligence, and cyber threats, he is a recognized expert on Iranian affairs. Dr. Davidi previously served as Iran Director at Israel’s Ministry of Strategic Affairs and led digital diplomacy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is also the Editor-in-Chief of the Times of Israel in Persian. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC).

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