Israel’s June 13 assault on Iran’s nuclear and missile sites marked a major escalation in its long-running covert campaign against the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. In conjunction with Mossad intelligence and the deployment of U.S. B-2 bombers equipped with Massive Ordnance Penetrators, key facilities such as Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan were heavily damaged. Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium and manufacture missile components was significantly degraded, and early assessments by Western intelligence agencies suggest a delay of at least two years in Iran’s ability to reach breakout capability.

Yet the twelve-day war revealed both the strengths and limits of conventional force. While Iranian military infrastructure suffered considerable damage and the regime too sustained a heavy blow but is still in place but remains ideologically defiant. Iranian officials have reiterated their commitment to the nuclear path. Faced with a regime still intent on Israel’s destruction, Israel must not only monitor any effort by Tehran to rebuild its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities but must also supplement its shadow campaign against the Islamic Republic’s military nuclear program with strategic erosion of the regime’s confidence, cohesion and capabilities through sustained covert, psychological, and economic pressure.

Mossad Director David Barnea described the Iranian threat as “significantly thwarted,” but cautioned: “We will continue to keep seven eyes on all of Iran’s projects. We will be there, as we have always been.” His words underscore the enduring nature of the challenge: Iran’s nuclear aspirations are deeply embedded within its security doctrine and political identity.

The Islamic Republic’s enmity toward Israel is not a function of temporary grievances or pragmatic calculations. It is rooted in the ideological DNA of the regime. From the writings of Ayatollah Khomeini to the statements of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the call for Israel’s destruction has been a defining theme of Iranian revolutionary identity. This is not rhetorical posturing; it has been translated into institutional structures and regional strategies.

In the weeks since the ceasefire, Quds Force operatives have been apprehended and targeted in both Lebanon and Syria for activities that posed a threat to Israel. Hundreds of cyberattacks emanating from Iran against Israeli businesses have been recorded since the June 22 ceasefire. Even after the setback of Operation Rising Lion, the regime’s long-term objectives remain unchanged.

On the nuclear front, Iranian leaders have moved to project resilience. Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations declared uranium enrichment to be “an inalienable right.” Iran has suspended cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose inspectors have left the country over concerns for their safety.

President Mahmoud Pezeshkian’s statements about “resolving conflicts through dialogue” have been interpreted by some as a window of opportunity for a renewed diplomatic track.

However, such optimism is historically misplaced. The Islamic Republic has long used diplomacy as a tactical tool, not a genuine avenue for compromise. From the 2003 Paris Agreement to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Tehran has leveraged talks to gain time, reduce sanctions pressure, and continue covert nuclear development. In the Iranian playbook, negotiation serves to shield the regime and legitimize its aspirations, not to abandon them.

Moreover, Pezeshkian does not control Iran’s nuclear program or foreign policy. Supreme Leader Khamenei and the IRGC remain the final arbiters. As long as these actors dominate the decision-making process, the gap between reformist rhetoric and regime reality will remain wide.

Diplomacy must remain on the table—but only under strict benchmarks: zero enrichment on Iranian soil; robust, intrusive verification including American inspectors; removing enriched uranium stockpiles from Iran, providing full information about the sites and activities used for the Amad project to develop nuclear weapons that was frozen in 2003 and binding limits on Iran’s missile arsenal and proxy networks. Anything less risks repeating past mistakes.

For three decades, Israel’s strategy toward Iran’s nuclear program has focused on disruption: delaying nuclear development through sabotage, cyberattacks, assassinations, and diplomatic pressure. This approach has succeeded in slowing Iran’s progress but has not fundamentally altered the trajectory of its ambitions.

In the wake of Rising Lion, disruption is no longer sufficient. Israel must adopt a strategy of erosion: the systematic weakening of Iran’s internal cohesion, economic resilience, and strategic confidence. This shift requires a broader, long-term approach that combines kinetic operations with non-military tools of statecraft.

Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett encapsulated this doctrine as “death by a thousand cuts.” Drawing on Cold War analogies, Bennett argued that ideological regimes rarely collapse in sudden coups; they deteriorate under sustained external and internal pressure. For Iran, such pressure can be applied by exposing regime corruption, fueling elite rivalries, amplifying domestic unrest, and undermining confidence in the state’s strategic capacity.

Israel and its allies have indeed long sought to exploit Iran’s internal divisions, encourage popular unrest, and weaken regime cohesion—often with limited effect. As early as 2007, Mossad Director Meir Dagan urged the United States to intensify efforts to foment unrest by supporting student movements and ethnic minorities—Azeris, Kurds, and Baluchis—who together comprise roughly 40 percent of the population and harbor deep resentment toward the regime. Dagan pointed to widespread unemployment, runaway inflation, and growing anger over the regime’s funding of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah while ordinary Iranians suffered. At the time, these vulnerabilities were clear but difficult to activate.

Today, those same fault lines are widening under growing strain. Operation Rising Lion shattered the image of Iranian invincibility, exposing the regime’s military and intelligence weaknesses. Its most effective proxy networks have been degraded; its geopolitical isolation has deepened. Domestically, Iran is mired in its worst economic crisis in decades, with inflation above 40 percent, widespread poverty, food insecurity, and rolling blackouts. Supreme Leader Khamenei is 86 and visibly frail, with no designated successor, and elite factions—from IRGC commanders to hardliners and reformists—are increasingly at odds. Public anger is persistent and growing. The regime may still stand, but the ground beneath it is a lot shakier than it was before the chain of events set in motion by October 7.

To operationalize this doctrine, Israel must take several parallel steps. First, it should sustain covert operations against nuclear infrastructure and military-industrial systems. Second, it must deepen psychological operations that highlight internal regime tensions. Third, it should apply economic pressure by enhancing sanctions enforcement—particularly against the IRGC’s business empire.

Israel should quietly support civil society actors, opposition media, and Persian-language channels that expose regime corruption and repression—especially targeting the security elite. In parallel, Israel must expand strategic ties with regional partners to contain Iranian influence.

Disruption dismantles infrastructure; erosion disorients leadership. It is the difference between halting a project and fracturing the will and ability to restart it. Israel’s objective must not only be to delay Iran’s nuclear program but to foster long-term dysfunction within the system that sustains it and eventually lead to its collapse.

Operation Rising Lion demonstrated that Israel and its allies can impose severe costs on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Yet the regime’s core motivations remain unchanged. Centrifuges can be shattered, but doctrine cannot be bombed. If the regime endures, the threat to Israel persists—albeit greatly diminished at present.

Israel must therefore wage a campaign of attrition—not to produce a quick collapse, desirable as that may be, but to induce strategic exhaustion. 

Its objective should not be merely to delay the next nuclear crisis, but to create the conditions that will eventually lead to the Islamic Republic’s downfall— bringing down the regime is a task for the Iranian people, not for Israel—and with it, a future in which Iran no longer defines itself through opposition to the Jewish state

Until that day comes, Israel must keep cutting—quietly, relentlessly, and with unwavering strategic purpose.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.