The Main Message

Israel’s military campaign in Gaza has significantly weakened Hamas, although it has not yet eliminated it. Hamas’s leadership faces intense pressure, yet the group continues to hold Israeli hostages. Israeli operations have shifted from large-scale assaults to more targeted actions for now while still maintaining the threat and capacity to escalate as needed. The challenge will be transitioning from ongoing combat to a stable “day after” scenario. This entails achieving Israel’s core goals — removing Hamas from power and securing the release of the hostages — in a way that also reduces the probability of significant terror activity against Israeli targets once the war is over. At the same time, it must promote economic recovery, diplomatic progress, and the establishment of local governance, particularly assuming that President Trump’s vision of a voluntary Palestinian departure from Gaza is unlikely to materialize.

As of April 2015, we can reasonably assess that Israel’s goal is to achieve an extended hostage deal on its terms. However, at the same time, Israeli policy is to be ready to remove Hamas from power by force if it refuses to accept any further deal. Israel must therefore use the opportunity presented now to weaken Hamas’s ability to inflict severe damage on the IDF in the “day after” and decrease the cost of a temporary military occupation of Gaza. Although this may not be a desired or recommended option, it remains a significant possibility that Israeli efforts to avoid it will fail.

What Should Israel Do in Gaza?

Israel’s current posture reflects a careful strategic calculation aimed at balancing immediate and long-term objectives. Jerusalem seeks to extend the hostage exchange period under conditions that serve its interests, chiefly the safe return of as many captives as possible, but without allowing Hamas to extract lasting concessions or emerge stronger. Officials remain wary that Hamas could exploit any prolonged pause in fighting to regroup and rebuild its arsenal, so they have been reluctant to agree to open-ended ceasefires. By signaling a readiness to swiftly resume offensive operations if Hamas stonewalls, Israel maintains leverage in the talks and reinforces its deterrence posture. Re-establishing a credible deterrent is vital after October 7, and only firm resolve now will dissuade future aggression and prevent a bloodier conflict down the line. This dual-track approach of negotiating under pressure is meant to persuade Hamas that time is not on its side. Israel is pursuing hostage releases on its terms while making clear that an escalation of its military activities remains on the table if those terms are not met.

Operationally, Israel is using this stage of the war to degrade Hamas’s capabilities and shape the battlefield for a possible next phase of the war. Military planners have been steadily increasing pressure by taking control of additional parts of the Gaza Strip (the Morag axis between Rafah and Khan Younis), targeting Hamas infrastructure, operatives, mid-level commanders and officials, gathering forces, and updating invasion plans. This reduces the terror group’s ability to resist when combat resumes. The intent is to diminish the damage Hamas could inflict on Israeli forces in a renewed offensive, thereby lowering the expected cost of any temporary reoccupation of Gaza if that extreme measure proves necessary. Going forward, it is likely Israeli leaders will accept this delicate balance of allowing short pauses for humanitarian and hostage gains but not giving enough time for Hamas to rearm or entrench. Should Hamas ultimately rebuff further agreements, Israel appears prepared to execute the contingency of ousting Hamas by force. This scenario would be a painful last resort. By readying this option yet striving to avoid it, Israel aims to keep Hamas on the back foot through credible threats while still giving negotiations a chance to avert a wider and costlier showdown. This careful stance underscores the strategic trade-off at play: Israel is determined to deny Hamas any opportunity to recover, even as it weighs the heavy price of a full military solution.

Israel must avoid extreme measures that would undermine these goals. Proposals to permanently and forcibly depopulate Gaza or indefinitely reoccupy it have been widely condemned as tantamount to ethnic cleansing and are unnecessary. Instead, Israel’s approach should be grounded in pragmatic steps: sustained military pressure on Hamas, paired with coordinated humanitarian and diplomatic efforts, to pave the way for a post-conflict Gaza without Hamas’s rule. The key military measures in the next one to three months will create conditions for Gaza’s future—without crossing red lines like forced mass displacement or permanent Israeli rule.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) should maintain a calibrated operational tempo that keeps Hamas off balance while minimizing civilian harm. This approach emphasizes frequent targeted raids and precision airstrikes guided by real-time intelligence. For instance, controlling the strategic Netzarim Corridor in central Gaza effectively bisects the Strip and isolates Hamas’s southern strongholds. Such control hinders militants from regrouping. The IDF should continue focused operations like these until Hamas’s capacity to fight is thoroughly crippled while escalating force in a manner that ensures Hamas feels continual, increasing pressure to bend to Israel’s will. This should not require a mass reoccupation of all of Gaza.

Intelligence integration is critical to this effort. Israel’s extensive surveillance and informant network in Gaza enables highly precise strikes on high-value targets. Every identified Hamas bunker, command post, or tunnel entrance should be swiftly targeted based on the latest intelligence. By relentlessly striking leadership figures at all levels and key nodes, the IDF can destroy what remains of Hamas’s command-and-control and governance structures. The greater the damage to Hamas leadership at all levels, the more difficult it will be for Hamas to cause severe damage to the IDF following the day after. Therefore, the price of establishing an alternative to Hamas rule in Gaza will be more manageable.

Special forces will also play a crucial role. Elite IDF units and Shin Bet security agents can infiltrate dense urban areas or tunnel networks to target locations that require close-quarters action. These teams should be prepared for hostage rescue operations whenever actionable intelligence emerges, although these situations are unlikely and challenging. Operation Arnon was the only full-scale hostage rescue attempt of the war, and while it was successful, it came mere seconds from disaster. Every feasible rescue mission should be pursued as a moral imperative to deprive Hamas of its last bargaining chips. Even when a rescue is impossible, raids deep into Hamas hideouts exert pressure, demonstrating that no location in Gaza is safe for those holding Israeli civilians.

The IDF must exercise maximum discipline in all operations to prevent mass-casualty incidents. Each strike should continue to be judiciously timed and scoped to neutralize threats while sparing civilians as much as possible. This is a moral and strategic concern: targeted action that preserves essential civilian infrastructure will facilitate post-war stabilization. In short, Israel can afford to be surgical at this stage. We are no longer in October 2023. There is more to lose than gain from an overwhelming use of force. Patience is a strategic imperative at this point, despite the pressures of IDF reserve mobilization and civic exhaustion with the ongoing war.

In addition to military efforts, Israel must collaborate closely with humanitarian organizations to address the situation in Gaza. This requires two parallel approaches: facilitating relief for Gaza’s civilian population and leveraging Gaza’s dependence on aid to exert pressure on Hamas.

On the relief side, the IDF should take complete control of delivering life-saving assistance and continue to restrict aid until they can ensure that Hamas is not hijacking it. Hamas has created a situation where humanitarian pressure acts as leverage. At this point, Israel has no choice but to engage in this strategy as well. Necessarily, after 18 months of attempting the opposite, Israel halted all supplies into Gaza to urge Hamas to extend a ceasefire and release additional hostages. Such tactics should persist in a calibrated form. Hamas must understand that as long as it holds civilians hostage and continues armed resistance, it will face not only military strikes but also rigorous restrictions that undermine its governance.

The guiding principle should be “reconstruction for demilitarization.” In practice, Gaza’s rehabilitation and economic revival will not proceed if Hamas insists on retaining weapons or authority. The population’s desire to rebuild their homes and livelihoods thus serves as leverage over Hamas. If the local population wishes for Gaza to be rebuilt and to avoid further suffering, they must pressure Hamas to relinquish their weapons and release the hostages.

This pressure must be communicated not as collective punishment but as a pathway to relief. Israeli officials should clearly convey, through public statements and even messages into Gaza, that as soon as Hamas ceases hostilities and surrenders its arms, aid will flow freely, and reconstruction can begin in earnest. By emphasizing that Hamas’s intransigence is the sole barrier to Gaza’s recovery, Israel can encourage local and Arab voices to advocate for change. Essentially, the humanitarian strategy should convince the people of Gaza that the fastest route to normalcy is for Hamas to stand down.

Defeating Hamas militarily is merely a precursor to the ultimate objective: ensuring Gaza does not revert to a terrorist haven. The IDF must establish the security conditions now for a stable handover to legitimate governance that opposes the armed struggle against Israel and has the capability to fend off any opposition. Over the next few months, Israeli forces should secure all key areas in Gaza and eliminate residual pockets of resistance while laying the groundwork for an orderly transition.

Tactically, this means continuing to clear central and southern Gaza of weapons and fighters. Neighborhood by neighborhood, the IDF should dismantle booby traps, seize arms stockpiles, and map and destroy the remaining tunnel segments. Strategic sites such as the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah border crossing to Egypt, the perimeter around the Strip, and Gaza’s coastline must remain under tight control to prevent any influx of arms or the escape of high-value militants. Israel’s campaign to destroy Hamas’s tunnel infrastructure and smuggling routes should persist. For instance, dozens of cross-border tunnels under the Egypt-Gaza frontier have already been demolished by the IDF to cut off Hamas’s supply lines. This effort needs to continue until all underground avenues for rearmament are shut down.

Israel’s military strategy in Gaza must be executed with a vision for the “day after” in mind—whatever Israel and international partners determine that “day after” may look like. Sustained, disciplined military pressure can collapse Hamas’s capabilities and compel it to release the remaining hostages while setting the stage for Gaza’s recovery. This coordinated approach contrasts with “scorched earth” tactics. Instead of reoccupying or depopulating Gaza, Israel can secure its interests by reestablishing deterrence and empowering alternative governance, regional partners, and international donors to rebuild and govern Gaza after Hamas. If battlefield success is combined with political foresight, the end of this war can mark the beginning of a better reality for both Israelis and Palestinians: a Gaza free from Hamas’s grip and a more secure region.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

Photo: IMAGO / Xinhua