Since the launch of U.S. “Operation Rough Rider” on March 15, 2025, both the number of airstrikes and reported Houthi casualties have exceeded 100. The campaign, aimed at degrading Houthi military infrastructure and leadership, has targeted nearly every governorate under full or partial Houthi control—with the possible exception of al-Mahwit. The operation underscores Washington’s ability to counter the resourceful, Iran-backed rebel group and disrupt Houthi momentum at minimal cost in terms of American lives and resources.

While the Houthis have attempted to retaliate by targeting U.S. military assets in the region, their efforts have yielded minimal results. To the author’s knowledge, none of their drone or missile attacks have damaged U.S. ships or injured American personnel. Similarly, Houthi missile strikes on Israel—perhaps intended to pressure the U.S. into halting its campaign—have caused no damage or casualties, although prior to the American campaign a drone strike resulted in one death in Tel Aviv in July 2024. The most notable Houthi success to date is the downing of an MQ-9 unmanned aerial vehicle, valued at approximately $30 million. However, if the group aimed to surprise U.S. forces with a uniquely novel or dangerous response, it has so far fallen short; around 20 MQ-9s have been shot down by the Houthis since 2017.

In addition to their counterattacks, the Houthis are making concerted efforts to shape a favorable media narrative and obscure the impact of U.S. strikes. Notably, they have concealed the number of senior military casualties, holding public funerals only for officers at the rank of colonel or below. Though several senior regime figures have been reported dead or injured, the causes were typically attributed to natural circumstances or accidents. For instance, while the death of Brigadier General Ali al-Haimi was publicly acknowledged, no cause was provided—only that it was sudden and allegedly due to natural causes. Similarly, Minister of Information Hashem Sharaf al-Din was said to have been injured in a traffic accident, despite reports that his residence was targeted during the opening night of the U.S. strikes. These incidents, among others, strain credulity and highlight the limits of the regime’s ability to hide the damage inflicted on it.

The Houthis are also seeking to undermine the perceived success of the U.S. operation by claiming that it is civilians who have borne most of the damages and casualties. Some research outlets have echoed Houthi media claims that U.S. strikes have killed at least 142 civilians. More discerning analysts, however, estimate that the fatalities include over 100 Houthi fighters. The few photos released by the Houthis to support their civilian casualty claims appear staged and may be part of a broader propaganda effort.

This familiar tactic of inflating harm suffered by civilians proved effective during the Houthis’ conflict with the Saudi-led coalition. It helped to galvanize international pressure against the coalition at pivotal moments—such as just before its campaign to liberate Hodeidah port in 2018. This tactic remained in use well beyond 2018, as is evident in the notable 2019 Saudi coalition-led airstrike against “journalist” Abdullah al-Sabri, who headed the Houthi-controlled Yemeni Journalist Syndicate in Sanaa. Despite the widespread outrage this attack elicited at the time, it is now clear that Sabri functioned as a key figure in the group’s information warfare apparatus and later served as its ambassador to Damascus from 2020 to 2023.

Yet, the group’s ongoing media campaign to generate international pressure on the U.S. to halt its operations has proven ineffective. Global sentiment has shifted largely against the Houthis due to their increasingly rogue behavior over the past 18 months, and the current U.S. administration has become less responsive to political pressure from European allies.

It is also significant that humanitarian aid—previously funded by the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other members of the anti-Houthi coalition—is drying up in Houthi-controlled northern Yemen. This is likely a direct result of the intensified scrutiny of aid delivery to areas under Houthi control following the group’s attacks against Israel and international shipping since 2023. In the past, the Houthis have diverted aid and extorted aid organizations to generate revenue and sustain their war effort. They are believed to have controlled a significant share of the roughly $1.5 billion in international aid allocated annually to their territories. These resources were used in various ways: to pay the salaries of senior officials, reward loyalists, feed hungry troops, and in some cases, aid was sold on the black market for the personal gain of regime insiders.

In response to growing pushback from donors and aid organizations since 2023–24, the Houthis have attempted to reorganize the bureaucracy responsible for controlling—and diverting—humanitarian aid. So far, these efforts have done little to restore donor confidence or convince aid groups to resume full-scale operations. Yet, despite cutbacks in aid to Houthi-controlled areas, famine has yet to materialize—despite years of dire warnings from the UN and international NGOs that Yemen was perpetually “on the brink.” More recently, the group appears to have turned to hostage-taking, targeting aid workers in what seems to be a desperate bid to restore previous levels of funding. However, such tactics are unlikely to succeed in reviving international aid operations in northern Yemen.

All told, the Houthis now find themselves in unfamiliar territory. They are unable to mount an effective military or media response to the U.S. airstrikes, nor can they extract compensation or concessions from the international community as they once did. Unlike the Saudi-led coalition—more vulnerable to global pressure and limited in military reach—the United States, particularly under President Trump, presents a far more formidable and less politically constrained adversary now that international opinion has largely shifted against the Houthis.

Exploiting Houthi Weakness: Is a Ground Invasion Required?

With the Houthis on the back foot, it is critical to target and weaken the foundations that sustain their regime. Allowing them to continue ruling over northern Yemen and its 20 million inhabitants for another decade or more risks empowering the regime with both more advanced weaponry and a deeply radicalized population.

The group is already investing heavily in shaping the next generation. During the summer, they operate so-called “summer centers” that indoctrinate children of all ages and provide them with military training. Throughout the school year, a radicalized curriculum aligned with Houthi ideology is enforced in classrooms across northern Yemen. If this pattern continues unchecked for the next decade or two, the future of northern Yemen could more closely resemble North Korea than that of its neighbors on the Arabian Gulf.

To that end, there has been growing discussion about the Government of Yemen launching a ground offensive against the Houthis. However, such an operation is more complex than it may initially appear, due to three main factors.

First, the Government of Yemen is led by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which consists of three major anti-Houthi factions that are also ideologically at odds with one another. The National Resistance Council (NRC), led by Tareq Saleh and based along the southwestern Red Sea coast, advocates for a unified Yemen and strongly opposes Islamists. The Southern Transitional Council (STC), led by Aidarous al-Zubeidi, seeks independence for South Yemen and also opposes Islamist groups. Meanwhile, the Islah Party is an Islamist group (Muslim Brotherhood offshoot) supporting Yemeni unity, led by influential figures such as Marib Governor Sultan al-Aradah. Coordinating a joint military campaign among these three factions—each with differing objectives—would be, at best, an intricate challenge. Even if they succeed in capturing key areas from the Houthis, internal rivalries are likely to intensify in the aftermath as they compete over the spoils.

Second, the major Gulf players in Yemen are backing different local partners: the UAE has strong ties with both the NRC and STC, while Saudi Arabia favors Islah. The external sponsors of these factions may take uncoordinated steps to push their local partners to advance their backer’s national interest. Should a coordinated ground campaign provoke retaliatory attacks by the Houthis on Saudi or Emirati territory, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi may pressure their Yemeni partners to de-escalate. This dynamic was evident when Saudi Arabia, responding to Houthi threats, compelled the Central Bank of Yemen–Aden to reverse a policy of severing Sanaa-based banks from the international financial system. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia may resist military maneuvers that increase the influence of UAE-backed forces in areas traditionally within its sphere of influence.

Third, Yemen’s unique and fluid web of alliances make external support for anti-Houthi forces an important but delicate maneuver. Some examples of anti-Houthi elements that are not aligned with Washington or Tel Aviv include Hamid al-Ahmar of the Islah Party who was recently sanctioned for financially supporting Hamas. Other fighters like Tareq Saleh of the NRC are currently aligned against the Houthis, but were previously allied with the Iran-backed terror group. This does not mean these factions should be deprived of international support in their fight against the uniquely destabilizing Houthi threat; rather, it underscores the need for robust oversight and safeguards to ensure that assistance is directed effectively and responsibly.

That said, an imminent ground invasion by the Government of Yemen to reclaim territory from the Houthis is not a prerequisite for a successful U.S. strategy. One of the key advantages of the current campaign is that time favors Washington and works against the Houthis. The ongoing strikes are steadily dismantling the infrastructure that holds the Houthi regime together and enables its internal coordination. Yet, the group seems incapable of mounting a response. As long as anti-Houthi forces within Yemen can maintain their positions and sustain pressure, the combination of U.S. military action and mounting internal crises may ultimately cause Abdul-Malik al-Houthi’s regime to unravel from within.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

Photo: IMAGO / Hamza Ali