The Trump Plan outlines a path for far-reaching change in Gaza and in the region’s political architecture—one that could normalize Israel’s relations with its neighbors and ensure that Gaza never again serves as a base for attacks against Israel. Its opening clause sets the condition for these ambitious goals: Gaza will be a de-radicalized terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbors.

For this vision to have any chance of success, the Palestinian narrative must change from one that denies the Jewish people’s right to a state in the Land of Israel and glorifies the struggle to destroy it, to one prepared to build peaceful relations with the Jewish state. This is the core reform demanded of the Palestinians in the Peace to Prosperity Plan presented during President Trump’s first term, and it will be a prerequisite for any future Palestinian Authority role in governing Gaza.

That change must begin with an internal reckoning—an acknowledgment that the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack was a grievous mistake, and that Israel cannot be defeated, certainly not by force.

The Narrative Obstacle: Why Hamas Refuses to Disarm

The debate over how October 7 will be remembered in Palestinian collective memory is already underway. It reached its peak during the events marking the attack’s second anniversary and the unveiling of the Trump Plan. Hamas spokesmen found themselves on the defensive across Arab media, straining to justify the assault.

Criticism in these outlets did not challenge the “heroism” of Hamas’s attackers or the supposed legitimacy of using violence to drive Israel out. Rather, it focused on Hamas’s failure to anticipate Israel’s response—a response that exacted a devastating price in lives and property. Hamas officials had no convincing answer for what they expected to happen “the day after,” or how the attack was meant to improve Palestinian life.

Even media close to the Iranian Islamist camp and the Muslim Brotherhood expressed criticism, noting the heavy price the Iranian axis had paid for Hamas’s short-sightedness. True, the Palestinian cause returned to center stage; hundreds of prisoners were released; anti-Israel demonstrations swept Western capitals; and a handful of Western countries recognized an  imaginary “State of Palestine.” But on the ground, the damage was immense—both for Hamas and for the Palestinian public, especially for those who took part in the fighting against Israel.

The real test of how October 7 will go down in Palestinian history is whether Hamas in Gaza agrees to disarm and relinquish control of the Strip, as the Trump Plan requires—or whether it will stand firm in its refusal, or convince Israel and the United States to accept only partial disarmament (perhaps limited to offensive weapons).

So far, Hamas remains defiant. It is consolidating its power through brutal reprisals against clans associated with its Fatah rivals. Its intransigence reflects not only a refusal to surrender power but also an awareness of what disarmament would symbolize: an admission of error and guilt.

For Hamas, laying down its weapons is far more difficult than releasing hostages without a full Israeli withdrawal (especially from the Philadelphi Corridor), or without freeing prominent Palestinian terrorists. Linking the end of the war to disarmament and to Hamas’s acceptance of the rest of the American plan makes the demand all the more intolerable. Still, Hamas’s agreement to release the hostages under these conditions—abandoning most of its previous demands—was a significant concession.

What Really Broke Hamas?

Understanding what forced Hamas to yield on the hostages may offer clues to how it could one day be persuaded to disarm and allow full implementation of the Trump Plan.

The main factor was the Israeli operation to capture Gaza City, which convinced Hamas for the first time that Israel truly intended to remove it from power by force. Israel’s determination to press ahead, despite intense international pressure, the wave of Western recognition of a Palestinian state, domestic criticism, and the potential costs, together with the massive destruction inflicted on Gaza’s infrastructure—collapsing high-rise buildings used by Hamas and deploying large explosive charges detonated by remotely controlled vehicles—created severe distress within Hamas’s ranks.

A second factor was mounting public anger in Gaza and Hamas’s eroding control over the population. The humanitarian aid centers run by the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), plans to expand the number of these centers, growing readiness among major clans to confront Hamas, and the mass evacuation of Gaza City at Israel’s request, despite Hamas’s efforts to prevent this, all reflected its diminishing grip on power.

It is no surprise that Hamas now devotes most of its attention to this problem. In its eyes, the loss of popular support and internal challenges are no less threatening—and perhaps even more so—than the prospect of being overthrown by the IDF.

A third factor was economic pressure: the evacuation of Gaza City undermined Hamas’s ability to convert control over humanitarian aid into economic assets.

A fourth was international and regional pressure led by President Trump but perhaps more significantly from Hamas’s patrons, Turkey and Qatar. The international community rallied behind the Trump Plan, and the mediators assured the U.S. president that Hamas would release the hostages and meet its other obligations under the plan.

Although Hamas’s propaganda campaigns about “starvation” and “genocide” were highly effective, they failed to stop Israel’s offensive. Meanwhile, Israel succeeded in convincing much of the international community that removing Hamas from power was essential—and, with the support of the hostages’ families, persuaded Trump himself that Hamas must release all the hostages immediately.

Now, as Hamas works feverishly to rebuild its forces and assert its rule—dragging out the return of the bodies of the remaining dead hostages to buy time—the United States and Israel must assess whether these same tools can be leveraged to compel its disarmament, and whether additional measures can shape how October 7 is ultimately remembered in the Palestinian national consciousness.

First, Israel and the United States must reiterate a credible military threat: if Hamas refuses to disarm, Israel—with full American backing— will be ready to resume combat and finish the job. President Trump continues to signal this, but Israel itself has been less vocal and appears less prepared to act.

Second, Washington and Jerusalem should mobilize the Palestinian public to demand that Hamas disarm by conditioning the next stages of the plan—opening the Rafah crossing, expanding humanitarian aid, and launching reconstruction—on the group’s disarmament and, beforehand, on returning all the hostages’ bodies.

This should go hand-in-hand with continued support for clans operating in areas under Israeli control, and possibly—with reference to Section 17 of the plan—the start of reconstruction in areas under their influence, especially eastern Rafah, where the Abu Shabab clan holds sway.

Third, the mediators must be pressed to use their leverage. They should be made to understand that failure to achieve Hamas’s disarmament will not only lead to its forcible removal but will also affect their own relations with the United States.

Finally, the United States should in parallel advance normalization between Israel and additional Arab and Muslim states, while working with European governments to dissuade them from punitive measures against Israel and to roll back those already taken. This would demonstrate that the October 7 attack not only dealt a severe blow to the Iranian axis but also failed in its goal of stopping Israel’s integration into the Arab and Muslim worlds.

If these efforts fail—and that remains a real possibility—Israel may have to resume fighting, this time with American backing, broader legitimacy, and without living hostages constraining its freedom of action.

The Only Plan for the Day After

In conclusion, whether or not Hamas cooperates, the Trump Plan remains the framework for the day after—and there is no alternative. Translating the principles it sets into agreed upon steps and modalities on the ground may require extensive negotiation and will face many obstacles. The “Board of Peace” led by President Trump will have to navigate those hurdles with the parties’ consent, and the interim authority under Tony Blair will need to oversee implementation. Yet the core principles are fixed and align fully with Israel’s expectations: the release of all hostages; Hamas’s disarmament and surrender of power; continued Israeli control of the perimeter and the Philadelphi Corridor without direct rule over the Palestinian population; exclusion of the Palestinian Authority from Gaza until it undergoes far-reaching reform; preventing Gaza from being able to once again become a base for terrorism; de-radicalization; and the creation of a foundation for expansion of the Abraham Accords.

The plan does entail risks—the release of imprisoned terrorists, and the enhanced role of problematic mediators such as Turkey and Qatar—and there is no guarantee it will be implemented. But as a policy blueprint, it represents a coherent and desirable strategic vision for Israel, one that would not have been possible without the operation to capture Gaza City and President Trump’s decisive intervention after the failed attack in Qatar.

Israel acceptance of a plan that includes a reference to a possible future Palestinian state, as a means of realizing Palestinian self-determination, is not new. Yet at this moment, it provides pragmatic Arab states with a political pretext for moving toward normalization. Conversely, it renders Western recognition of a “Palestinian state” absurd since those same governments endorse a plan that makes clear no such state exists or is likely to emerge anytime soon.

Finally, regarding Israel’s political right-wing: the plan rejects calls for renewed Israeli settlement in Gaza or for encouraging Palestinian emigration—statements Arab states have portrayed as an achievement justifying their support for the plan. In practice, putting forward ideas that seem unacceptable can sometimes be useful in negotiations; it creates room for flexibility by dropping those demands.

This article originally appeared in Hebrew on the N12 website.

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JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

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