The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

Amid the ongoing complex negotiations of Saudi-Israeli normalization, keeping the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on board is essential. Despite grudges and occasional tensions, Jordan shares strategic interests with Saudi Arabia and stands to gain significant benefits once the proposed trade and transportation “corridor” from India to Europe passes through its territory. It is, therefore, advisable to leave the status quo in Jerusalem intact, and include Jordan in formulating any “package.”

Jordan’s Role in a Possible Saudi “Deal”

As discussions intensify on both sides of the Atlantic, the prospect of Saudi normalization with Israel looms. But it is also increasingly evident that many moving parts would need to be brought together if it is to come about. There would be bilateral aspects, which will essentially bring into the open, formally, a strategic relationship already in existence (in both security and economic terms). In addition, there are triangular aspects. The Saudis seek American delivery of a nuclear fuel cycle, enabling Saudi parity with Iran’s capabilities. They also want a security guarantee or even a defense treaty – which would require a two-thirds ratification in the US Senate, hardly likely unless Israel lends a hand.

Israel will also need robust American commitments, although many within the Israeli defense establishment doubt the wisdom of a formal defense treaty. A possible deal breaker for Israel may be the nature of the required “give” on the Palestinian question. Even if it remains within “conflict management” rather than a fantasy about conflict resolution, some of the treaty’s points may prove too far-reaching for parts of the governing coalition and the current Israeli consensus.

To lend further importance and incentives to the project, President Joe Biden announced on September 9 – during the G-20 summit in New Delhi, and with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s full support – a vision, yet to be backed by resources, of an India-Middle East (and Mediterranean) trade and transportation “corridor” to Europe (IMEEC), with both Saudi Arabia and Israel as integral parts of it. That is an initiative with its own merit, in American eyes, not least because it rivals China’s BRI (Belt and Road Initiative).

At this point, Jordan – for the last 30 years Israel’s (often uneasy, but never as cold as Egypt) peace partner – becomes a vital link in the chain. Israel does not have a common border with Saudi Arabia; Jordan’s short Red Sea coast separates them. Overland traffic in the putative corridor is, therefore, bound to go through sovereign Jordanian territory. Insofar as the IMEEC is a significant part of the “package” – as Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu suggested with his map and red felt pen at the UN General Assembly – then King Abdullah II and his government should be actively consulted and involved as the project proceeds.

Jordan would undoubtedly gain significantly in trade, investment, and improved infrastructure. The closer economic interdependence would strengthen its bilateral relationship with Israel, which in recent years has experienced some low points. It may also lead to a closer association between Jordan and PA-controlled areas, serving Israeli interests in the long run.

Saudi-Jordanian Relations

In this context, much may come to depend upon the current state of Jordanian-Saudi relations. The two monarchies have much in common, including concern over a radical destabilization in the region (once upon a time, they were both anti-Soviet; today, they both face the danger of Islamist totalitarianism). And yet their attitudes toward each other have seen ups and downs. It was King ibn Saud, after all, who in 1925 put an end to the Hashemites’ rule in the Hejaz and their thousand-year-old custodianship of Islam’s holiest places. For years, the Saudis worried about Hashemite revanchism, and the Jordanians suspected Saudi subversive activities among tribal elements in the southern areas of Jordan.

Unconfirmed reports swirled in Amman in 2021 about Saudi complicity in Prince Hamza’s challenge to his brother’s rule. The vast disparity in resources and the growing Saudi investment in the northwestern areas adjacent to Jordan (including the futuristic city of NEOM, Muhammad bin Salman’s flagship modernization project) lead to questions about Saudi intentions.

On the other hand, the marriage on June 1 of Crown Prince Hussein to the daughter of a prominent Saudi family, Rajwa al-Sayf – while legitimately portrayed as a purely romantic choice – came to be seen also as a sign of the Hashemites’ wish to put the tensions behind them and work closely with MBS, as Saudi Arabia redefines its identity, reinvents its past, and paints an ambitious vision for the future.

The Jerusalem Aspect

A potential disruptive element, at least in theory, could be a Saudi attempt – based upon the additional title of the Saudi monarch, “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” [Khadem al-Haramayn], in Mecca and Medina – to replace or share the present Jordanian status on the Temple Mount under the terms of the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty.

From time to time, the possibility of such a challenge to the status quo has been aired in the media in the context of the normalization negotiations – although there is no official indication that the Saudis have put this issue on the table in a formal manner. Nevertheless, there were clear indications that the Jordanians were concerned. They obtained a written commitment from the Palestinians in 2013 to sustain Jordan’s privileges on the Temple Mount, even if East Jerusalem would revert to Palestinian rule. However, the king knows that this is not worth the paper on which it was signed. To him, as the sole remaining Hashemite monarch (the kingdom lost the Hejaz in 1925 and Iraq in 1958), such a challenge to Jordan’s status directly threatens his dynastic legitimacy.

Israeli Policy Should Reflect Awareness of Jordan’s Interests

Israel has already moved forward this year with Jordan and the UAE on water and energy. It now needs to forge a multi-party relationship with Jordan and Saudi Arabia, with the US and India involved, to translate the vision into tangible gains that would shore up the fragile economy of its eastern neighbor.

That will also be an opportunity to enhance cooperation in other fields, specifically to help Jordan contend with the narco-terrorist complex shaping up on the Syrian side of its vulnerable northern border.

Of vital importance, as indicated, is the issue of Jerusalem. Israel and Jordan have a shared interest in maintaining the status quo, which in practice means the exercise of Israeli sovereignty coupled with special privileges for the Hashemite Kingdom in the places holy to Islam. It would be highly unwise to tamper with this proposition, tempting as it may be, to bring Israel’s putative new normalization partner into the equation. Firm assurances can and should be given to King Abdullah II. Moreover, Washington should be convinced to side with Jordan and Israel.


JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.


Photo: IMAGO / Sipa USA / Anthony Behar

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